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  ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
RE-NEGOTIATING ALEVI IDENTITY: VALUES, EMOTIONS AND THE 
CONTENDING VISIONS ON FUTURE 
 
Talha Köse, Ph.D. 
 
George Mason University, 2009 
 
Dissertation Director: Kevin Avruch 
 
 
This study focuses on the role of the collective emotions and values in the 
formation and the transformation of identity based conflicts. The research is about the 
transformation and the politicization of Alevi identity within the social and political 
context of post 1980 Turkey. Alevi identity has ethno-sectarian origins, but it has taken a 
multiplicity of forms during the ongoing process of identity transformation. The 
academic and popular literature on Alevilik has often referred to the period starting from 
the late 1980‘s as the ―Alevi revival‖  
Alevis, one of the largest identity groups in Turkey, are geographically spread all 
over Turkey. Alevi identity has traditionally been a strong identity with clear cultural 
boundaries, moral values, rituals and shared collective emotions. This identity, 
historically and culturally, has ethno-sectarian origins, which have been maintained for 
centuries through endogamous social order in a rural context. Because of the processes of 
  
rapid urbanization and modernization, the traditional Alevi identity and social order have 
been transforming into new forms.  
The social, political, emotional and normative aspects of the identity construction 
and negotiation processes are explored via collective and ―personal‖ narratives. Personal 
life stories, widely shared public narratives, and symbolic and linguistic resources are the 
essential resources for this research. A multiplicity of data sources have been used for this 
research but the main data is the formal qualitative interview transcripts of more than 70 
Alevi‘s that were actively involved, and still getting involved in this process of revival. I 
also have resorted to the transcripts and records of some semi-academic discussions that 
help outline general discussions. The interviews have been conducted in three big cities, 
Istanbul, Ankara and Malatya, between February 2006 and April 2007. Other data sources 
such as new Alevi literature, Alevi journals, web sites, newspapers and some public 
events have also been analyzed in order to collect public narrative accounts. 
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Chapter 1: 
Re-Negotiating Alevi Identity: Values, Emotions and the Contending Visions on 
Future 
 
 
 
One cannot fully understand the world in which we live without trying to integrate 
and understand its emotions. (Moisi, 2009, p. x)  
This study focuses on the role of the collective emotions and values in the 
formation and the transformation of identity based conflicts. The research is about the 
transformation and the politicization of Alevi identity within the social and political 
context of post 1980 Turkey. Alevi identity has ethno-sectarian origins, but it has taken a 
multiplicity of forms during the ongoing process of identity transformation. The 
academic and popular literature on Alevilik has often referred to the period starting from 
the late 1980‘s as the ―Alevi revival‖ (Çamuroğlu, 1997; van Bruinessen, 1996; Vorhoff, 
1998a; 1998b; Kehl-Bodrogi, 1996). 
Alevis, one of the largest identity groups in Turkey, are geographically spread all 
over Turkey. Alevi identity has traditionally been a strong identity with clear cultural 
boundaries, moral values, rituals and shared collective emotions. This identity, 
historically and culturally, has ethno-sectarian origins, which have been maintained for 
centuries through endogamous social order in a rural context (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1996). 
2 
 
Specific rituals and cultural practices played important roles for the maintenance of a 
strong identity. Inter-marriages, common ritual practices, and shared spheres of inter-
cultural interactions among even secularized Alevis and Sunnis are still rare phenomena. 
Because of the processes of rapid urbanization and modernization, the traditional Alevi 
identity and social order have been transforming into new forms. Today the majorities of 
the Alevi population lives in cities and are organizing around new forms of institutions. 
The particular focus of this study is the re-negotiation of values and emotions in 
the construction of the boundaries of urban Alevi identity. Alevi identity was not obvious 
to outsiders, and no public or political claims were made with regard to Alevi identity 
until the recent ―revival‖. The revival, or, transformation, led to a significant change in 
terms of visibility and some aspects of social and political struggle. During the ongoing 
process of transformation, particular legal, social, political, cultural and interest based 
claims are being made over the Alevi identity by certain individuals and institutions. The 
covert conflicts, resentments and grievances, and the perpetual fears of Alevis that have 
existed for centuries have been publicly voiced during the expression of these claims. The 
social, historical, political, and psycho-cultural characteristics are being discursively 
renegotiated within the ongoing process of identity transformation. The negotiation 
process is also conceptualized as an ―identity struggle‖. 
There is no exact data on the percentage of the Alevi population in relation to the 
overall population of Turkey because of the lack of census data that measures the ethnic 
3 
 
and sectarian diversity of Turkish society. According to highly contested KONDA
1
 
estimates, which provide one of the most comprehensive research data sets on 
contemporary Turkish society, the number of people who define themselves as Alevis are 
around 4.5 million (6.2 % of the Turkish population). Many Alevis, including writers and 
intellectuals, have objected to this percentage. According to many Alevis, the ―real 
population of Alevis‖ in Turkey is at least 20 million. Even this disparity in population 
figures gives an idea about the contested nature of the facts, figures related to 
contemporary Alevi reality. What is more important in the debates about the Alevi 
population is related to what is intended to be achieved by these population figures, or 
―factual data;‖ just like the debates related to definitions of Alevilik and different versions 
of Alevi history. 
The phenomenon of Alevi identity transformation has been defined differently by 
various authors: ―process of rediscovery‖ (Çamuroğlu, 1998, p. 79), ―revival‖ (Vorhoff, 
1998b, p. 34), ―coming out‖ (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1997, p. xiv), ―re-politicization‖ (Erman & 
Göker 2000, p. 99) (quoted in Erdemir, 2004, p.129). Almost all these concepts refer to 
the same social phenomenon. In this study, the concept of ―identity transformation‖ is 
preferred for analytic purposes. 
Transformations and changes are themselves part of the broader social process of 
Alevi modernization and the secularization of Turkish society (Erdemir, 2004; Subaşı, 
                                                 
1 KONDA is a respected public opinion research company in Turkey. In 2006 KONDA conducted a wide scale public opinion survey with face to face interviews 
with 48,000 subjects in 81 cities of Turkey. The survey with 48,000 subjects was one of the largest of its kind in Turkey. In the survey indirect questions that might 
reveal the ethnic and sectarian backgrounds of the Turkish citizens were posed. KONDA's estimate related to Alevi population was 6.2 % of the Turkish population. 
There were strong objections against these findings by the Alevi intellectuals and activists, who argued that the real number is at least three times more than 
KONDA's figures. The company defended its research by arguing that their findings reflect the population of people who define themselves and their identity as  
Alevi, not the people with Alevi background.    http://www.konda.com.tr/html/dosyalar/ttya_tr.pdf retrieved June 16, 2007. 
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2005; Kehl-Bodrogi, 1996). At the social level, Alevis are rapidly transforming into an 
urban population from a predominantly rural social structure. From being a conglomerate 
of isolated communities that have strong intra-group ties, Alevis have started to integrate 
into the rest of Turkish society. As a consequence of this process, the intra-communal ties 
have been weakened, but the interaction of Alevis both with the rest of Turkish society 
and with the other previously isolated Alevi communities has been intensified. The 
horizontal interaction, communication and cooperation of Alevi communities have been 
increased, but the process of modernization has also led to diversification, as well as 
social and economic stratification, thus fragmenting Alevi identity. Although many Alevis 
are proud of the egalitarian, horizontally organized social hierarchy of Alevi 
communities, their social reality is rapidly moving away from this ideal, and they are 
becoming vertically stratified. Institutionally, the traditional ritual based religious 
institutions such as musahiplik, cem, dedelik are being replaced by modern institutions 
such as associations, foundations and civil society organizations. Leaders of these 
organizations are increasingly gaining public visibility. 
Oral narratives and stories that were told by dedes, and stories that had been told 
in a rural context in face-to-face interactions are being replaced by written sources. Those 
epic stories, victimhood narratives, and normative stories that were transmitted orally in 
traditional contexts are also being replaced by written sources such as books, journal 
articles, and feuilletons in major newspapers. Intermediary figures, or the storytellers in 
the new context, are not dedes, but researchers, writers, academics, and journalists. The 
nature of new narratives and shared stories that constitute the modern Alevi identity are 
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substantially different from the traditional narratives. There are new heroes, new villains, 
new moral values and priorities. At the same time, existing narratives have been tailored 
and modified to fit the priorities and the necessities of the new social context. Those 
changes and transformations are causing tensions, fragmentations and conflicts within 
Alevi community. The predominant emphasis of this study, however, is not the 
exploration of the intra-communal dynamics of the identity transformation and revival, 
but the moral and psychocultural dynamics of identity transformation. 
The ―revival/transformation‖ has manifested itself in the forms of an increased 
group consciousness; relatively more comfortable expression of identity in the public 
sphere; increased public visibility; and making claims over Alevi identity in social and 
political arenas. These expressions of revival have been achieved not as a consequence of 
the natural awakening of the Alevi and Sunni public in Turkey, but as the conscious 
struggles and hard work of the entrepreneurs and activists of Alevi identity politics. The 
revival was also related to the general trend of the emergence of identity politics in 
Turkey (Ayata, 1997; White, 2002; 2003; Göle, 1997a; 1997b; 2002; 2003, Gülalp, 1999; 
2002; 2006; Kadıoğlu, 1996; 1998; Kasaba, 1997; Arat, 1994; 1998; Yavuz, 2003; Yeğen, 
1996; 2003; Dağı, 2001; 2005). These struggles over the recognition of Alevi identity 
have been facilitating the uncovering of cultural clashes in the forms of inter-group as 
well as intra-group conflicts. Unlike other cases, the Alevi identity struggle so far has 
been managed non-violently. This research also tries to address the question of ―how has 
the identity revival managed to remain non-violent, as opposed to some other less 
successful or more conflicted cases?‖ 
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Newly founded associations, foundations, and media instruments try to aggregate 
support for social, economic and political claims that are being formulated with an 
emphasis on Alevi identity. The common claim by diverse groups within the Alevi 
community is their quest for the public recognition of Alevi identity and institutions, and 
acknowledgment of grievances by the Turkish state and the majority Sunni population in 
Turkey. Among the diverse voices and self definitions of Alevi identity there are 
significant disagreements about the ways in which they wish to be recognized, which will 
be elaborated in Chapter 8. 
The inner struggle further complicates the identity claims of Alevis especially for 
non-Alevis. Shared values, political and social views, ritual practices, and an 
understanding of a good way of life each play a significant role in theconstruction of 
Alevi identity. What unites diverse Alevi groups, however, is the fact that they are non-
Sunni from birth and have shared narratives of heroes, traumas and discourses of 
grievances. The negative portrayal of the ―Sunni other‖ is a significant pillar of the Alevi 
self definition within the normative and emotional domains. Alevi self definition has 
historically been shaped in contradiction to the perceived Sunni imagination. Opponents, 
villains or perceived external enemies, and threats help create a virtual unity based on the 
moral denigration of ―other‖ or ―them‖. 
Inter-group tensions have always been an important dynamic for the continuation 
of Alevi identity, mainly because of the minority status of the Alevi community in 
Turkey, in comparison to the Sunni population. Alevis were supporters of Atatürk's 
reforms in the early years of the Turkish Republic. Recently the Alevis have contributed 
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to secularist- ―conservative Sunni‖ or ―Islamist‖ tension by clearly endorsing secularist 
ideas. This is in opposition to the increased presence of Islamist ideals practices in the 
public and political spheres. They were also a party of the left-right struggle in the1970s, 
by being activists for the legal and illegal leftist organizations. They are now pursuing a 
struggle on their behalf without completely giving up their secularist and leftist values 
and commitments. 
The puzzling questions for the Alevi community for their self definition and 
expression are: 
-How should the centuries-old ―enigma‖ be formulated and released? Which 
elements and components should be emphasized as part of contemporary Alevi ethos? 
Which others should be avoided in order to keep their position updated? 
-What messages should be given to the non-Alevi public and through which 
channels? 
-What should Alevi collectivity achieve as the outcome of political and social 
activities seeking recognition? 
These three major questions have been answered in a multiplicity of ways and 
multiplicity of contending discourse positions have been adopted in relation to Alevi 
identity. Available political language, moral convictions and values of the Alevi 
community and the psychocultural narratives have played an important role in the 
shaping of the answers to these questions. 
The distinctive feature of this study is its emphasis on both the practical and 
motivational levels of the process of identity negotiation. The investigation of Alevi 
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identity negotiation focuses on three main discursive spheres. The sphere of axiological 
praxis focuses on the discussions of moral and cultural values in personal and collective 
narratives. The sphere of psycho-cultural praxis focuses on the negotiation of the personal 
and collective emotions. The sphere of identity politics investigates the discursive 
practices of social and political activism and interest aggregation. Alevi identity 
negotiation is a dynamic process and discursive praxis in these three domains shapes this 
dynamic process. 
Subjective definitions about the facts and figures related to Alevilik and the 
practical use of these discourse in the identity debate are more central in this study than 
the ―objective‖ facts, figures and cultural characteristics. Narratives have often been 
drawn from the historical, cultural and political repertoires of the Alevi community, 
which include highly contested and controversial elements. While referring to academic 
debates over the facts and figures, this study mainly focuses on the use of public and 
private discourses on Alevi identity. 
1.1. Why Alevis? 
Alevis are one of the largest communal groups in Turkey. Contemporary Alevilik 
has been called ―faith based collective activism‖ (Erdemir, 2004), a ―transnational social 
movement (Şahin, 2001; 2005; Sökefeld, 2008; Massicard, 2007)‖, and an ―ethnic 
identity‖ (Andrews & Benninghaus, 1989, Okan, 2004). The nature of Alevi identity is 
contested; defining Alevi identity as ethnic, sectarian, religious, political, ideological or 
simply ―cultural identity‖ also reflects a particular point of view. While acknowledging 
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the value of other definitions, such as ethnic or sectarian group, I prefer analytically to 
use the concept of ―communal group identity‖. Alevi communal identity has ethno-
sectarian origins; however, Gurr's conceptualization of communal group identity is 
preferred for describing the Alevi ―community‖ in Turkey. According to Gurr, communal 
groups define themselves based on common descent, shared historical experiences, 
valued cultural and normative traits, and belief systems (Gurr, 2007). For Gurr, 
―communal groups are motivated by more than greed power.‖ They seek certain gains 
based on their shared cultural identity; not simply for the purposes of increasing material 
gains or power (Gurr, 2007, p. 131).The strength of communal groups comes from their 
shared historical, cultural and emotional bonds, and none of these individual bonds 
(ethnic, sectarian, racial, national, religious) is more prone to generating conflict than any 
other (Gurr, 2007). Alevi communities share some of the historical experiences and 
cultural traits with the Sunnis, but their normative priorities and collective grievances 
differentiate them from the Sunnis of Turkey. 
Though I tend to define Alevi identity predominantly as an ethno-sectarian 
identity, it has a multiplicity of cultural, historical and political sources. In the recent past 
there have been some social problems and confrontations between the Alevi community 
and the Turkish State, pan-Turkists (1970‘s) and pro-Islamists (1990‘s). However, the 
Alevi issue cannot be conceptualized as a protracted violent social conflict. Despite the 
history of confrontation and occasional appearances of violence, the Alevi issue has never 
turned into an inter-communal level violence. In that sense Alevi identity revival in the 
post 1980 era can also be considered as a process of nonviolent social transformation. 
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Investigating the dynamics of this process of non-violent social change/transformation is 
also one of the objectives of this research. This study particularly focuses on the urban 
Alevi identity and the research has been conducted in three large cities: Istanbul, Ankara 
and Malatya. 
In the last two decades the Alevi identity formation process, which is expressed 
mainly in new Alevi public narratives, has had two important visible features. First, 
Alevis have tried to construct and express a separate identity with references to 
contemporary and historical episodes of violence and discriminatory practices against 
them. Feelings of humiliation and marginalization have been expressed vociferously 
through print media, radio and TV, and the Alevi association. Second, and 
simultaneously, Alevis have emphasized national unity and commitment, citing their 
contributions during the Turkish independence war, including references to a 
commitment to modern secular principles and values of the Turkish Republic. These 
selective blends have constituted different individual life stories, collective storylines and 
subject positions of Alevi identity. 
The complexity and fragmentation of social identity is often confusing to 
outsiders and even to some Alevi groups as well; yet this is a feature of Alevi identity 
negotiation. Understanding the dynamics of the non-violent, yet highly confrontational 
process of Alevi identity negotiation offers clues about the management of ethno-
sectarian controversies in civic and non-violent forms. In terms of avoiding violence, 
communal riots and confrontations, Alevi-Sunni relations can be considered a success 
story. I will also investigate the background of the non-violent revival despite intense 
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emotions. Stereotypes, discriminatory narratives, dialectic vision of self and other; ―us‖ 
and ―them‖ are still common practices. 
Socialist culture, political language, and forms of collective action and ―rituals of 
protest‖ have all become prevalent elements of Alevi identity in the post 1960 era, 
especially for educated urban dwellers. The Alevi belief system is often considered to be 
a syncretistic and eclectic tradition, which has been influenced by a multiplicity of 
cultures and beliefs including: Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Central Asian religions, 
Shamanism, Manicheism, and pre-Islamic religions and traditions (Mélikoff, 2006; 2007; 
Birdoğan, 1990; Kehl-Bodrogi, 1996; Ocak, 2000). Socialism, some of the principles of 
Kemalism, and secular humanism are also included in the repertoires of the sources of 
contemporary Alevi identity. These sources are more visible in the personal stories and 
activists' discourses. A generation of educated Alevi youth has been introduced to Alevi 
narratives via socialist and Marxist social and political language, which left a lasting 
legacy. Ideals of social justice and struggle for recognition have been framed around 
socialist literature. It may seem contradictory since Alevi identity is mainly a belief based 
identity, but it is impossible to understand the Alevi organizations, associations and logic 
of collective action without visiting socialist ideas and values. 
Alevi identity politics has not attracted as much academic and policy-relevant 
interest as the Kurdish Conflict and Islamic social and political activism in Turkey has, 
mainly because it did not evolve into a violent ethnic struggle. The awakening of Alevi 
identity and group consciousness happened relatively smoothly, explaining why there are 
relatively few references to the Alevi issue in the ethno-political/ ethno-sectarian conflict 
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literature. The academic fields that study ethnic, religious and national conflicts focus 
mainly on violent conflicts; therefore the complicated processes of nonviolent 
confrontations do not attract as much research interest. It is also important to understand 
why certain confrontations and identity formation processes do not turn into violence, 
such as in the case of the Alevi. 
One of the reasons why there is little research on the Alevi identity revival in 
comparison to Kurdish and Islamist identities in Turkey is that it was a conflictual and 
controversial but non-violent revival process. Gazi Riots and Sivas Events are important 
violent episodes in the recent past, however these events cannot be considered the 
consequences of the Alevi identity struggle. For example, Sivas Events created an outrage 
among the conservative Sunnis mainly because of Aziz Nesin, the famous atheist writer, 
who declared himself willing to translate Salman Rushdi‘s controversial book The 
Satanic Verses, into Turkish. The Gazi Riots were a planned provocation, taking place in 
a district which is mainly populated by Kurdish Alevi in Istanbul. These episodes have 
had deep repercussions for Alevi groups in Turkey, and consequently have helped 
accelerate the institutionalization of the Alevi community. 
1.2. Values, Emotions and Psychocultural Approaches to Identity Conflicts 
In the last decade, especially after the first Iraq War, there has been an increasing 
level of ethno-sectarian conflict and violence within the Middle East, South Asia and the 
entire Muslim World. Sectarian division within the Shia-Sunni conflict is increasingly 
turning into violent conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Ethno-sectarian 
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divisions are deeply rooted divisions that have historical, cultural, institutional, emotional 
and ethno-political backgrounds. These divisions often cross the limits of time and space 
and have risen to the motivational domain by a multiplicity of means. Because of the 
residue of the anti-democratic and oppressive regimes that tried to rule their 
heterogeneous countries (in terms of ethnic sectarian composition) with an iron fist, many 
ethnic and religious groups have been oppressed and victimized. As the political regimes 
collapsed, the ethnic-sectarian groups that were previously marginalized, oppressed and 
victimized started to become perpetrators themselves. The only constants in those 
conflicts are the psychology and discourses of victimhood and marginalization. The 
psychology of victimhood increases the legitimization of ethnic, tribal, religious and 
sectarian violence (Mamdani, 2001). 
In many cases ethnic groups have been divided along contradictory victimization 
discourses, and hostilities have been activated by the use of sectarian parades, rituals and 
assaults (Ross, 1992; 1995; 2001; 2007). These contradictory narratives, in combination 
with some historical narratives and confrontations turn into essential boundary 
mechanisms in identity based conflicts. The politicization of psychocultural boundaries 
reproduces conflicting historical narratives and limits the possibilities of common 
storylines and narratives. 
Shia-Sunni, Alevi-Sunni, and Catholic-Protestant splits, as well as many other 
sectarian conflicts have existed for centuries with a shared narrative of victimhood and 
suffering. The ritual enactment of a shared Karbala victimhood has been reiterated by 
Ashura ceremonies at the month of Muharram. The Karbala event, along with feelings of 
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anger, fear, helplessness, and a sense of unity against unjust practices have been 
remembered and re-enacted every year with ceremonies. Every ―cem‖ ceremony has a 
component of mourning for the martyrs of Karbala. Leaders of the Anatolian folk 
rebellions are also the heroes of Alevi activists. 
Theoretical approaches in the CR field try to explain sources of identity conflicts 
with various assumptions. Some of the most popular explanatory schemas are: non-
negotiable basic human needs such as identity, security, recognition, autonomy, self-
esteem, and a sense of justice (Burton,1979; 1987; 1990a; 1990b; Azar & Burton, 1986; 
Azar, 1990; 1991); perceived incompatibility of goals and values (Pruitt & Kim, 2004; 
Bartos & Wehr, 2002); rational self interest (Rapoport 1974; Schelling, 1981); 
incompatible future goals and aspirations (Fisher, 1996; Kelman, 1997); in-group 
membership and comparison with out-groups (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner 
1986); ambiguity of boundaries, social change and shifting identities (Gurr, et al 2001; 
Gurr, 2007; Gurr & Harf, 1993); and shared beliefs, perceptions/misperceptions of fear 
(Bar-Tal, 2000; Bar-Tal, 2007; Bar-Tal & Teichman 2005). While taking into 
consideration conflicting interests, unsatisfied human needs, incompatible goals, and 
perceptions and misperceptions in identity struggle, this study more specifically analyzes 
the emotional and axiological dimensions of identity based conflicts. The management of 
collective emotions by the entrepreneurs of identity politics, some of which reproduce 
hostile feelings, is a significant pillar of any identity based conflict. It should also be a 
crucial part of any sustainable peacemaking and reconciliation effort as well. This study 
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tries to provide both conceptual guidelines to understand and practical instruments to 
respond to the conflicts of emotionally divided societies. 
Ethno-sectarian identities and conflicts have been maintained through a 
multiplicity of channels, including material interests and threat perceptions. Those 
perspectives do not fully explain the symbolic violence, desecration, deep rooted 
hostilities and mass murders that are happening in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, 
India, Northern Ireland and in former Yugoslavia. Collective narratives play significant 
roles in the transgenerational transmission and re-constitution of collective emotions and 
values that lead to both inter-group violence as well as strong intra group concord 
(Volkan, 1998b; 2001). Shared collective narratives and the emotionally intense 
storylines of battles, massacres, heroic struggles, heroic figures and victories such as the 
―Karbala Massacre,‖ the ―Yavuz Sultan Selim-Shah Ismail struggle,‖ or Anatolian 
Turcoman rebellions are pivotal in the maintenance of the moral boundaries of 
contending identity groups. 
Collective emotions and feelings such as victimhood, fear, traumas, hostilities, 
humiliations and shame are reproduced and transformed through various narrative genres. 
These narratives play considerable roles both in the formation and the resolution of 
identity based conflicts. Thus, the study of collective narratives of the formation and the 
transformation of identity based conflicts provide dynamic theoretical and practical 
instruments that incorporate interests, values, emotions and changing social imaginations. 
This study provides narrative oriented intervention methods for the mitigation and 
resolution of ethno-sectarian identities. 
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The conflict is not a phenomena other than the ways in which parties of the 
conflict talk about it. The particular ways in which the conflicts have been narrated or 
transmitted by the parties of an ongoing conflict through stories create a meaningful 
account of the conflict for that collectivity. Contradictory versions of stories by different 
parties of a conflict are often constructed with different symbolic and discursive 
resources for diverse goals. Negotiating the episodes, heroes, villains, moral grounds and 
intentions in those stories is at the same time negotiating the moral and emotional 
boundaries of identities. Normative descriptions/constructions of the conflict reproduce 
the conflict in a circular way, and the dialectic vision of ―us‖ and ―them‖ is also 
reproduced unless alternative and less conflictual storylines replace the extant conflict 
saturated storylines (Winslade & Monk, 2000). 
In terms of fashioning the self and collectivity, narratives have certain advantages. 
―They are open to fluidity, to improvisation, and to the design of alternatives‖ (Bamberg 
& Andrews, 2004, p.354). These narratives reconfigure the nature of collective 
discontents and conflicts within particular social and historical contexts. The value 
attributions and emotional attachments of the parties of conflicts to similar events, figures 
and subjects of conflict may be diametrically opposed to each other. These value 
attributions and emotional attachments may diverge, depending on the changing social, 
historical and cultural context. Without understanding these controversial value 
attributions and emotional valuations it is almost impossible to figure out the holistic and 
accurate account of the conflict which is the subject of analysis. 
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A conflict analysis and resolution frame based solely on ―objective interests,‖ 
―unchanging collective imaginations‖ or a ―fixed set of needs‖ is not helpful for 
comprehending the dynamics of Alevi identity formation and transformation. Collective 
Alevi narratives inform us about the feelings of marginalization, humiliation and 
discrimination Alevi citizens in Turkey have experienced, especially during the last three 
centuries of the Ottoman rule. The situation improved to some extent after the 
establishment of the Modern and secular Republic of Turkey by Atatürk in 1923. 
Nonetheless, the ideal definition of the Turkish national identity was based on the 
secularized Turks having a background of Sunni Muslim of the Hanefi sect. Master-
narratives of the Turkish national identity also emphasized an ethnically, religiously 
homogeneous vision of secular civic identity. At the popular level as well, the Alevi 
understanding of Islam has also been marginalized. ―The stories, or counter stories, 
which members of outgroups tell to themselves and others, help to document, and 
perhaps even validate, a 'counter-reality'‖ (Bamberg & Andrews, 2004, p. 2). Alevi 
narratives are alternatives to the master narratives that marginalize Alevi identity. Alevi 
narratives both express the collective emotions and try to morally validate the Alevi 
worldview. Challenging the homogeneous understanding of Turkish national identity and 
the monolithic understanding of Islam in Turkey has been a crucial aspect of the Alevi 
identity struggle. The cultural and narrative instruments of this struggle are not examined 
systematically in the burgeoning literature on Alevi identity struggle. 
One of the primary objectives of the CR field is to achieve non-violent social 
change which would ensure sustainable peace and social justice. The transformation of 
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hegemonic narratives which marginalize and delegitimize certain identity groups, and the 
emphasizing of conciliatory narratives are essential elements of this desired social 
change. Yet, it is necessary to take a step ahead and to generate conciliatory narratives 
that would allow for a gradual process of social and political reconciliation. Michel 
Foucault (1979) and Stuart Hall (Hall & du Gay, 1996) argued for the challenging of the 
hegemonic narratives in order to deconstruct the power relations that marginalized certain 
groups with discursive practices. However, they do not offer clear theoretical and 
practical guidelines for the creation of encompassing discourses that would incorporate 
the values, emotions, and social and political aspirations of marginalized identities. 
1.3. The Phenomenon of Alevi Revival 
This study characterizes the Alevi revival as a comprehensive expression of Alevi 
feelings with regard to social, political, economic, and emotional marginalization and 
victimization, and organized yet not well harmonized efforts to end this marginalization 
and victimization. Within the process of the revival many Alevis started to express their 
―Alevi identity‖ comfortably in the public sphere and became organized and 
institutionalized around the Alevi cause. The ―Alevi revival‖ cannot be seen as a 
movement of return to the original sources of the Alevi culture and belief system, as it 
has often been described, in the framework of revivalism studies or ―return to 
fundamentals‖ processes. It cannot also be considered to be the victory of a group that 
constantly experienced the fear of extinction against suppressors. Among all the themes 
that were discussed during the field research complaints regarding marginalization and 
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discrimination, fear of assimilation and desire for recognition were probably the only 
common themes that almost all of my Alevi informants stressed consistently. 
The making of social, political and legal claims with regard to Alevi identity via 
social institutions is also a crucial aspect of this new process. The period of relative 
openness and freedom starting from the late 1980s and Turkey's political reform efforts 
related to the EU integration process enabled many Alevis to get organized and 
institutionalized and express resentments to their ―feelings of centuries long 
marginalization‖. Some of these resentments have been expressed to other groups, such 
as conservative Sunni‘s and ultra-nationalists, in critical and sometimes even offensive 
ways. On the other hand, as people started to know and become familiar with Alevis, 
some of the prejudices against them have either weakened or completely vanished. For 
years, many Alevis hid their identity in their work places, schools, neighborhoods and 
many other social environments because of fear of discrimination. Suddenly, it became 
preferable to express their pride in being Alevi. The processes of EU integration and the 
widening of the social gap between secularist and more conservative segments of the 
Turkish society have also been influential in the process of shaping Alevi social and 
political discourses. 
The complicated process of re-negotiating the boundaries of Alevi identity has 
been taking place with the assistance of narrative instruments including mass media and 
publications, as well as through social, political and legal institutions, and practical 
activities. The study particularly highlights the narrational and discursive processes of 
identity re-negotiation and boundary-making. The significance of the personal and public 
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narratives is that moral, cultural, emotional, historical, and political concerns, as well as 
collective feelings and expectations, take shape within them. Marginalization, denial of 
Alevis and some of the social restraints on Alevis have been carried out through certain 
narratives, stereotypes, stigmas and discriminatory practices, in addition to political and 
legal restrictions. These meta-narratives of marginalization and exclusion have been 
countered by the Alevi elite by means of available discursive resources and different 
narrational genres. 
The quest for recognition includes both the recognition of an Alevi identity (its 
institutions, culture, rituals) and grievances caused by the Turkish state as well as the 
majority Sunni population and right wing politicians. Alevi activism seeks at least the 
acknowledgment of the painful experiences their ―ancestors‖ and the present generation 
have experienced. 
Conservative circles have long opposed the recognition of Alevism. The issue of 
recognition concerns the equal treatment and respect of beliefs and religious 
traditions. As one can see in the cases of mandatory (Sunni) religious instruction 
and the status of Alevi worship halls, Alevi Bektaşi faith has been systematically 
ignored. It is unacceptable for one religion to dominate other religions (Erdemir & 
Yaman, 2006). 
Recognition is an ambiguous process. However, it is clearly not just an abstract form of 
acknowledgment. Legal, political, social, economic and religious regulations are 
components of the process of desired recognition. The legal recognition of cemevi as a 
place of worship, the abolishment of mandatory religious courses, and the presentation 
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and coverage of Alevi culture by the public broadcasting company TRT are some of the 
concrete forms of recognition that Alevi citizens and activists are demanding. There were 
some unsuccessful attempts to facilitate the process of recognition, such as the 
establishment of a short lived Alevi political party, the Peace Party (1996-1999). Some 
others such as Alevi periodicals and print media have had a limited impact for a certain 
period of time, whereas TV stations, Alevi radio, websites and some social, political and 
belief institutions have had a much longer lasting impact. 
Among the variety of opinions on the Alevilik, it is the shared narratives of 
marginalization, discrimination and victimization which have had the most important 
unifying impact. The second most important uniting factor is the attribution of moral and 
ideological superiority to their beliefs and worldview. Political, cultural, religious and 
even policy level issues have been discussed along higher moral ground. The fact that 
these claims are made along moral and emotional lines, rather than based on interests 
makes the process of fulfilling these claims more difficult for non Alevis. Another 
important dimension of the fulfillment of the Alevi demand for recognition is the 
acknowledgment of the moral value and the superiority of ―Alevi way of life‖ and 
worldview. For many Alevis, the moral superiority of their teachings, beliefs and 
worldview are crucial for the continuation of their identity. As it will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 6, the normative and cultural contents of Alevi identity have been 
reformulated without completely dropping the traditional elements. They expect outsiders 
to sincerely accept, or at least acknowledge, some components of their worldview. 
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1. 4. Alternative Approaches to Understanding the Dynamics of Alevi Identity 
Transformation 
Transformation of Alevi identity has been discussed with references to various 
theoretical frames. Modernization, urbanization, secularization, politicization, social 
movement and identity politics, transformation of center-periphery relations, influence of 
external actors and social processes have been used as alternative conceptual models to 
understand the transformation of Alevi identity. Many of these approaches try to explain 
the aspects of the same social phenomenon by different means. These approaches will be 
discussed below. While acknowledging the value and contributions of each of these 
analyses for understanding the dynamic of Alevi identity, this study specifically explores 
the psycho-cultural dynamics of Alevi-Sunni, and Alevi-state contestations in the cultural 
and discursive repertoires of contemporary Alevi people. Elements of the Alevi collective 
axiology will also be discussed, with reference to personal and collective narratives. The 
perspectives discussed below contribute to a better understanding of certain aspects of the 
changing social context of Alevi identity transformation. 
Massicard focused on the dimensions of the transformation and politicization of 
the Alevist movement in both Turkey and Germany (Massicard, 2007). She preferred to 
differentiate the social and political movement from the social facts and processes of 
Alevilik. The name of the social and political movement, based on the contemporary 
phenomena of Alevilik, is ―Alevism‖ (Massicard, 2003). The people, groups and 
institutions that play important roles in the political struggle of the Alevis are ―Alevists,‖ 
according to Massicard‘s definition. She elaborated on the social and political spaces and 
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the political discourses of the Alevist Movement in Turkey and Germany. The concept 
―Alevist‖ or ―Alevici‖ is a pejorative term within the community because it often refers 
to a kind of people who try to benefit politically and economically from Alevi social and 
political activism. 
Massicard is not the only scholar who conducted research on Alevis in Turkey and 
in Europe. Şehriban Şahin and Martin Sökefeld also analyzed contemporary Alevi social 
and political phenomena as a transnational social movement (Şahin, 2001; 2005; 
Sökefeld, 2008). For Şahin, the transformation of Alevilik from a secret oral culture to a 
public written culture is a major change for Alevi communities. With the migration, the 
emergence of new communication channels, instruments and new political opportunity 
structures for social and political activism in local, national and transnational spaces, the 
Alevist movement has transformed into a transnational social movement (Şahin, 2001). 
According to this understanding, identity negotiation has been embedded within a 
transnational network of connectedness. Many scholars emphasize the historical 
continuity in the struggle between Alevis and the state, or in a broader sense, central 
political authorities (Şahin, 2001; Kehl-Bodrogi, 1996). Social movement theory and 
contentious political perspectives are important for highlighting the post-material values 
in Alevi identity; however, they do not help us to understand the diversification within the 
movement and the psychological traumas and emotional aspects that motivate Alevi in 
their struggle. 
For many analysts, struggle with the central authorities is considered to be a 
source of Alevi identity (Bozkurt, 1998; Şahin, 2001). Central political authorities, 
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including the Ottoman Empire, have historically been the consistent counterpart of the 
social and political struggles of Alevis, according to Şahin (2001). Social and economic 
unrest, as well as messianic influences (Dressler, 2005) have been important dynamics of 
struggle during the Ottoman period. This research shows that the feelings of 
marginalization, victimization and humiliation have been maintained through collective 
narratives rather than through struggle and confrontation. These negative emotional 
resources have been mobilized depending on the more concrete and immediate concerns 
of the Alevi groups. 
The extent and transformation of the spatial boundaries of the Alevi is also an 
important concern that is emphasized in relation to spheres of contemporary social 
movement activism. Massicard prefers the concept of transétatique in defining the 
relationship between Alevi political activism in Europe and Turkey. She takes state 
boundaries rather than national boundaries as the center of the spatial continuity of the 
Alevi social and political movement. Massicard also thinks it is necessary to overcome 
the local and national boundaries and to emphasize the multiplicity of localities in order 
to grasp the dynamics of Alevi social and political movement (Massicard, 2007). Şahin 
(2001) and Sökefeld (2008) prefer to define the contemporary Alevi movement as a 
transnational movement. She discusses and problematizes the impact of the ethnic 
differences of Kurdish and Turkish Alevis on social movement activism but prefer to 
define it as transnational network. 
Another important dimension of the transformation of the spatial boundaries of 
Alevi identity is the rapid process of urbanization (Bozkurt, 1998; Çamuroğlu, 1998; 
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Erman, 1998; 2001; Yılmaz, 2005). Some scholars do not completely differentiate 
urbanization from modernization in the Alevi case and define urbanization as embedded 
in the process of modernization. Some others conceptualize urbanization as the source 
and accelerator of modernization for the Alevi case. It is like a chicken and egg problem. 
In the Alevi case, urbanization brings a mandatory modernization. Alevi rituals, cultural 
practices and social organizations had been shaped within the rural context, therefore 
migration to cities represents more than change of space. It necessitates the 
transformation of social and political organization. Almost all the contemporary studies 
on Alevi identity and Alevilik as a social phenomena examine the consequences of 
urbanization, but most of those studies refer to urbanization as ―one of the‖ most 
important dynamics, not ―the only‖ dynamic. 
The perspective that emphasizes the urbanization as the major transformation of 
Alevis argues that the spatial transformation from rural to urban has caused fundamental 
transformations in the Alevi community (Bozkurt, 1998; Çamuroğlu, 1998; 2004; 
Yılmaz, 2005). Within the urban context, Alevi tradition has abandoned religious and 
cultural rituals and practices and transformed into an ethnic-political identity (Bozkurt, 
1998, p. 249). From the same perspective, urbanization represents a movement from 
periphery to center, yet within the new ―center‖ Alevi identity and belonging has been 
characterized completely differently. It is obvious that transformations of Alevi identity, 
culture and organizational forms are visible in the urban context, but it is not easy to 
analyze or explain this transformation geographically. The real impact of urbanization on 
the transformation of Alevi identity is the compulsory encounter with the ―other‖ or with 
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―them‖. Religious, ideological, political, economic, educational and institutional 
conditions in the urban context have also caused fragmentation of Alevi communities. 
Shankland (2003) argues that the emergence of the Alevis as a secular community 
is a reflection of the wider transition of becoming part of the modern nation (p. 173). 
Becoming part of a modern nation and surviving as Turkish citizens without their 
distinctive characteristics is a more challenging process for Alevis than for the Sunnis. 
Based on his field research in Alevi villages, Shankland argues that the traditional social 
organization and religion of a Sunni village are more easily adaptable to survival when 
they want to modernize, whereas Alevi villages experience substantially greater conflict 
and difficulty (Shankland, 2003, p. 4). Social transition is painful for Alevis. While they 
praise secularization and modernization normatively they are afraid of the practical 
consequences of this transition because of their concern about ―assimilation‖. The 
problem for the Alevi community is that they try to maintain their close inner ties in order 
not to be ―assimilated‖ but they want the Turkish state to transform Turkish Sunnis into a 
more secular society. As the Turkish state and society become more secularized or ―de-
Sunniized‖ Alevis start to accept the authority of the state and get closer to a Turkish state 
and society. Conversely the grave fear of Alevis is the increasing level of consciousness 
among the Sunni population with regard to their religious attachments. Politicization of 
the Islamic identity and an increased role for religion in the public sphere is seen as a 
serious threat by many Alevis. 
Shankland argues that it is easier for Sunni communities to become modernized 
than Alevi communities. Secularization and modernization are important paradoxes of the 
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Alevi community. The abstract forms of secularization and modernization are being 
embraced and glorified in the Alevi popular discourses, but the Alevis are confused about 
the concrete consequences and impact of these processes. Transformation of the secret 
oral culture due to modernization has led to dissolution of the traditional culture (Subaşı, 
2005, p. 199). The emergence of the multiplicity of Alevilik in the modern context is a 
consequence of this process of dissolution of traditional culture (Subaşı, 2005). Alevilik 
had not been carried to a different context with its ―authentic features‖; it has rather been 
reconstructed in the modern urban contexts (Bozkurt, 2000; Yalçınkaya, 1996; 
Çamuroğlu, 2005). Many authors assume that Sunni-religion oriented groups and 
communities had successfully managed to adapt themselves to the new conditions in the 
modern urban context. They created their own institutions: education, civil society 
organizations and media instruments. 
The ambiguous consequences of the dissolution of the traditional organizational 
forms led Alevis to perceive themselves to be disadvantaged by the conservative Sunni 
communal organizations, communities that had already transformed and reconstructed 
themselves successfully in the modern urban context. Alevis feel themselves to be 
relatively underprivileged in comparison to their ―other,‖ ―Sunnis‖ in this regard. As they 
feel that the gap between Alevis and conservative Sunnis has been widening, and to their 
disadvantage, the level of their anxiety is also deepening. This anxiety might not be as 
serious unless the deprivation, discrimination and feelings of oppression were not backed 
by collective grievances and depressing historical memories. Thus, historical grievances 
and narratives of victimhood and marginalization are the catalysts for the production of 
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fears and anxieties. 
Erdemir also places the relationship of Alevis to modernity at the center of his  
interpretation of the Alevi transformation (Erdemir, 2004; 2005). Erdemir classifies 
existing approaches or theories on Alevi transformation and their relationship to the 
process of modernization. 
I believe that a crucial factor which distinguishes various interpretations from one 
another is the way in which the relation of Alevi subjects to modernity and 
tradition is conceptualized. It is therefore, possible to classify the existing 
approaches into five different, but not necessarily mutually exclusive categories 
whether they see Alevi transformation as (1) modernization, (2) Move away from 
modernization; (3) return to tradition; (4) destruction of tradition; (5) End of 
modernity and the transition to post-modernity (Erdemir, 2004, pp. 129-30). 
Not many of the authors specify the nature and impact of modernization such as political, 
economic or other forms of politicization. As many of the authors have argued, social, 
political or economic modernization processes represent significant transformations for 
contemporary Alevis, but this transformation does not help us understand some of the 
fears, anxieties and grievances of Alevis in relation to identity. Social construction and 
transformation of collective images, beliefs, values and emotions is a more interactive yet 
a less straightforward process. Secularization, modernization, urbanization, globalization 
or transnationalization have transformed the notions of space and time for Alevi 
communities and enriched and complicated cultural resources, references that help for the 
construction of new ―Alevi identities‖. Therefore, these processes explain the 
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transformation of the macro scale phenomena more than the dynamics of psychocultural 
resources and repertoires. 
There are other approaches that define the historically contentious issues related 
to Alevi identity with the center-periphery paradox. Transformation of Alevi identity and 
the problems related to the transformation are interpreted as the difficulties of the 
movement from the historically peripheral position of Alevis to a political center (Ateş, 
2006). There is an ongoing debate within the Alevi community: would becoming more 
integrated into the political center have positive consequences for the Alevi social 
movement, or is keeping the distanced position and even the active resistance against the 
political center essential for the maintenance of Alevi identity? The Alevi tradition and 
belief system is historically considered to be heterodox and has always been scrutinized 
by the cultural and religious orthodoxy (Ocak, 1996; 1999; Çamuroğlu, 1997; 1998; 
2005; Mélikoff, 1975; 2006). With the transformation of social and political context and 
modernization this inner debate evolved into a more immediate concern, which is still an 
unsettled debate. Overall, the preferable position in terms of the center-periphery paradox 
for the Alevi communities is that there is a general desire to benefit from the social, 
economic and political resources of the political center, meaning the Turkish state, but 
keep a generally distanced attitude against it. There is a consensus over the consequences 
of the peripheral position: ―it led to the marginalization and persecution of Alevi 
communities all over Anatolia‖. 
Benefiting from the resources and the facilities of the center as the democratic 
right, yet keeping a neutral and sometimes even positive relationship with the political 
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center is therefore idealized by mainstream Alevi organizations such as the CEM 
Foundation or the organizations that are closer to Sunnis, such as the Ehl-i Beyt 
Foundation. One of the historically distinctive features of social reality for Alevi activists 
and writers is its dialectic opposition to social, political and more importantly religious 
orthodoxies. This ―ideal situation‖ is very unrealistic, which means the debate in terms of 
the center-periphery paradox will continue within the Alevi community. With the process 
of transformation/revival the Alevi community's interaction with the other segments of 
the Turkish society, including the social and political centers, is becoming augmented. 
A relatively passive interpretation had been provided by Aktay. He relates the 
Alevi revival or ―reconstruction‖ with the Turkish state‘s attempts to create ―folk Islam‖ 
or ―Turkish Islam‖ (Aktay, 1999). He calls this official project to re-organize religion, 
politics and society in Turkey as ―Protestantism‖. The secularization project of the 
Turkish Republic (we can also include the Union and Progress Party era of the late 
Ottoman Period) was about creating a ―national‖ and ―non-political‖ form of folk Islam 
or cultural Islam which is detached from political Islamist elements. Since the early days 
of the Turkish Republic, the state had the project of creating a homogeneous 
understanding of Islam (Kara, 2008). Some of the concepts such as ―irtica‖ 
(retrogression) had been created to deter Sunni religious groups from getting involved in 
politics. 
The Alevilik model fits this definition according to Aktay, which is the reason 
why the project of Turkish Islam had been, based accordingly (Aktay, 1999). An Alevi 
understanding of Islam had been presented as more humane, democratic, egalitarian, 
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humanist, secular and non-fundamentalist, as opposed to ―Wahhabi or Fundamentalist 
influenced Sunnism‖ or ―Islamism‖. Both the worldviews and the social and political 
orientations of Alevis and the ―guards of the Kemalist official ideology‖ coincided in the 
early republican era. The problem with the pragmatic references to Alevilik was that in 
terms of life style, worldview and understanding of Islam, Alevilik fits into the official 
project of secularization better than some of the politicized versions of Sunnism. As a 
project, Alevilik did not work as an alternative model for even the secularized Sunnis 
because of the exclusionary nature of Alevi identity. In terms of its institutions, historical 
problems with the state, and Sunni and traditional rituals as well, Alevilik could not serve 
as an alternative model for Sunnis. 
The political purposes of the ―Turkish Islam‖ or ―Local Islam‖ model do not 
correspond to ―Political Alevilik,‖ which is also an important reason why this project is 
destined to fail. For Aktay, this project had been designed to transform Sunni Islam, 
which eventually would have an impact on Alevilik as well (Aktay, 1999). This 
perspective ignores the internal dynamics of identity transformation. In the social and 
political domains, some of the narratives that had been popularized by the discourse of 
―Local Islam‖ or ―Turkish Islam‖ helped the legitimation and popularization of 
arguments ―Alleviates‖ use in their struggle for recognition. But the overall purpose of 
the first project was homogenizing and secularizing Islam or more specifically 
conservative Sunnis in Turkey whereas, the purpose of Alevists is recognition. Parallel 
discourses of the different projects sometimes confuse the Alevis and Alevi activists as 
well, but this confusion I think is an important dimension of Alevi identity negotiation. 
32 
 
The ongoing process of Alevi identity transformation has been discussed with a 
multiplicity of conceptual frames. The role of the new media has been mentioned as an 
important dimension of Alevi revival in almost all studies related to the subject, but 
Yavuz (1999a; 199b; 2003) and Çaha (2004) specifically emphasize the role of media in 
the Alevi identity revival. All these perspectives contribute to an understanding of 
contemporary Alevi identity and identity transformation but almost all these perspectives 
avoid the perspectives of the individuals who are part of this process. In this study the 
missing elements in the mentioned literature, perspectives, experiences, emotions and 
normative stories of Alevi individuals, are to be incorporated into the collective story. 
Collective emotions and normative resources that are used to reproduce the Alevi identity 
are specifically investigated in the coming chapters. 
1.5. Psychocultural and Axiological Dynamic of the Alevi Identity Negotiation 
Process  
In terms of an identity based conflict, the themes of continuity and collective 
emotions are portrayed in the psychocultural narratives. The concept pscyhocultural is 
defined as the ―interaction of psychological and cultural factors in the individual's 
personality or in the characteristics of a group‖ in Merriam Webster's Dictionary2. This 
study explores the psychocultural and axiological aspects of Alevi identity negotiation. 
The individual and public narratives that express/construct these emotions and 
resentments have been playing a significant role in defining Alevilik as a part and party 
                                                 
2 Psychocultural. (2009). In Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Retrieved May 22, 2009, from http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/psychocultural 
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of an identity struggle. These themes have often been under-emphasized within the 
burgeoning literature on Alevi revival. Institutional or ethnographic studies may provide 
limited insights for grasping the emotional psychocultural dynamics of identity struggle. 
Widely shared collective narratives of Alevis that are being transmitted through 
generations are important archetypes that are gateways to the emotional world of the 
Alevi community. There are a multiplicity of versions of these stories and narratives and 
the new information and social developments have been given meaning with these 
―available keys‖. 
Discourses of victimization and the claims related to the political and social 
aspirations of the Alevi community have been expressed in different literary and oral 
forms in the contemporary context through TV and radio stations, books, journals, web 
sites and songs. Individual life stories and popular discourses are important resources for 
understanding the processes of formation and transformation of the boundaries of Alevi 
identity as well as understanding the symbolic psychocultural sources of contemporary 
urban Alevi identity. Social and political processes are analyzed by the analytic and 
theoretical instruments of narrative discourse analysis with a special emphasis on the life 
stories of the people that are actively involved in the recent revival of the Alevi identity. 
In the Alevi case, some of the important fears, traumas and concerns for the future 
have either been concealed because of the sensitive political environment or indirectly 
expressed in the social context with some proxy arguments. These concerns have been 
expressed and revealed in more explicit ways through personal stories. In the social 
environment these concerns have been communicated with a language which is more 
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understandable to ―others‖ such as political, social, economic and cultural claims. I 
believe that these political claims are important for the Alevi community‘s social and 
political needs but they are also important means to challenge the feeling of ―centuries 
old marginalization‖. Some of these social and political arguments are crucial steps for 
the comprehensive process of recognition as well. The process of recognition will not be 
fully completed until the psycho-cultural dramas and narratives of victimization and 
marginalization are also mourned and sympathized with by the majority Sunni population 
and the Turkish state. 
Modernization, urbanization, secularization and institutional transformation have 
been emphasized as macro scale social processes that transform the boundaries of the 
Alevi community, as mentioned above. Alevi identity was a default identity in the 
endogamous rural contexts. The moral and emotional storylines and narratives that were 
mainly spread orally served to constitute a moral dignity and sense of self value without 
being challenged by out-groups. The existence of different views on the fundamental 
assumptions of Alevi beliefs was not considered to be a significant challenge until very 
recently where these differences have been institutionalized along different associations 
and organizations. Urbanization, modernization, institutionalization, cultural 
characteristics and rituals, and emphases on the particular periods of Alevi history are 
useful for the analysis of the social and political landscape of the Alevi revival. These 
dimensions are not sufficient to grasp the dynamics of the comprehensive process of 
boundary re-negotiation within this changing social and political landscape. It is a more 
challenging task for many Alevis to constitute and maintain the boundaries of their 
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identity in a context in which Alevi identity is not the default identity; it has been 
approached skeptically because of misinformation and prejudices. 
An integrative storyline about Alevi identity transformation must integrate 
traditional narratives and contemporary concerns with the personal life stories of 
individuals for the purposes of group identification. Early literature, starting from late 
1980s, which was mainly produced by Alevi researchers, has presented politicized 
accounts of Alevi culture and tradition with a reactionary tone. The early literature has 
now been functionally replaced by web sites, TV and radio stations. The battle of 
alternative discourses and narratives has been continuing along these new channels. 20 
years after the emergence of new Alevi literature, the Alevi community became much 
more educated and critical about the political nature of the entire project of writing Alevi 
history and tradition. 
There has been extensive research on the beliefs, traditions, history, organizational 
structure, institutionalization, and cultural origins of the Alevi community. This relevant 
research makes Alevi culture and history a more visible aspect of contemporary Turkish 
culture and increases the self esteem of the Alevi people. Yet the problems are not related 
to the lack of information and knowledge. The main problem is how that knowledge has 
been presented and understood. Available schemes and moral positions have distorted the 
Alevi imagination of ordinary Turkish people. The main transformation is to change the 
positions and storylines rather than the content of the knowledge. The relevant literature 
is instrumental to Alevi identity politics. There have been many accounts represented in 
newspapers because these editorials boost the sales of papers. 
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There is no research on the psychocultural and emotional backgrounds of the 
Alevi identity and struggle for identity politics. Personal accounts and public narratives 
have been avoided within the general intra and inter party debates. The other extreme 
form is taking those public narratives and presenting them as factual data, as in the case 
of some of the journalistic accounts. Some of these journalistic accounts are helpful for 
transferring the oral tradition into written form, but making these accounts the basis of 
public knowledge on Alevilik can be more confusing for both diverse groups among 
Alevis and the non-Alevi audience. It is possible to observe the implications and 
consequences of these discourses not only in the personal accounts and narratives but 
also in the written accounts as well. How these transformations have been interpreted is 
related to social discourses and general language. 
In order to deal with complicated discourses and emotions and transform conflict 
producing sentiments it is crucial to understand the psychocultural background and 
collective narratives that reproduce Alevi feelings of victimhood, marginalization and 
grievances. This study is a systematic attempt to understand these collective emotions in 
the forms of public narratives, social and political discourses. All these discussions and 
debates are meaningful within a particular social and political milieu. Rather than trying 
to explore the elements of an ―essence‖, consistency and persuasiveness of the academic 
and non-academic narratives will be explored here. The perspective of this study on the 
identity issue is a social constructionist one. 
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Alevi identity is being negotiated in interaction with ―others‖ as well as various 
different definitions of self. Taking into consideration the theoretical and methodological 
perspectives that are explicated above this study investigates the following questions: 
 How are the moral, cultural and political boundaries of Alevi identity being re-
negotiated vis-à-vis other social groups within the changing social and political 
context? 
 What are the constituent narratives of the ethno-sectarian identities?  
 How do the narratives on the collective emotions such as victimhood fear, 
humiliation, marginalization and discrimination practically influence the identity 
negotiation process? 
 How can we mitigate identity based conflicts? What can narrative approaches 
contribute in order to address identity based conflicts? 
 How can we address the deep rooted negative collective emotions which are 
important barriers to intercommunal reconciliation processes? 
1.6. Framing the Research on Alevi Identities 
Personal life stories, widely shared public narratives, and symbolic and linguistic 
resources are the essential resources for this research. A multiplicity of data sources have 
been used for this research but the main data is the formal qualitative interview 
transcripts of more than 70 Alevi‘s that were actively involved, and still getting involved 
in this process of revival, including the dedes, academics, association leaders, politicians, 
writers, and ordinary citizens as well as young Alevis. I also have resorted to the 
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transcripts and records of some semi-academic discussions that help outline general 
discussions. The interviews have been conducted in three big cities, Istanbul, Ankara and 
Malatya, between February 2006 and April 2007. Other data sources such as new Alevi 
literature, Alevi journals, web sites, newspapers and some public events have also been 
analyzed in order to collect public narrative accounts. 
1.7. Chapter Outlines  
 Chapter 2 provides a detailed background on the social and political 
history of the Alevi community starting from Islamization of the Central Asian Turcoman 
tribes in 10
th
 century AD until 1960s. There are multiplicity of storylines about the Alevi 
history in Alevi popular narratives but there is an increasing consensus in academic 
literature about the storylines that are adopted in the historical background chapters of 
this study. The historical references in the contemporary Alevi public narratives and the 
discussions related to the Alevi identity revival can only be understood with the historical 
background. Chapter 3 focuses on the politization of Alevi identity starting from early 
1960s.1950s and 60s marks a significant social and political change for both Turkey and 
Alevi community. The first period of multi-party democracy (1946-1960), come to an end 
with 1960 military coup. 1961 constitution was a relatively liberal constitution which 
allowed to emergence of Alevi civil society institutions. Massive migrations to the cities 
and Europe, involvement in left-wing politics and social and political diversification were 
other hallmarks of the post-1960 context for Alevis. Dynamics of rapid social, economic 
and political transformation until the recent Alevi engagement policy are examined in 
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chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 presents a brief survey of the major theoretical approaches and 
conceptual literatures that have been widely used in studying identity based issues in the 
CAR field. Theoretical approaches have changed depending on the priorities of the field, 
but identity issues have always been one of the central concerns of CAR. More 
specifically the focus of Chapter 4 is the theories that help to understand the psycho-
cultural dynamics and narratives of marginalization, humiliation and discrimination and 
the theories that explicate the conflictual processes of boundary negotiation. The 
epistemological and methodological assumptions of this study are elaborated in chapter 5. 
Opportunities and limitations of social constructionist epistemology and the theoretical 
and practical aspects of positioning theory are discussed in chapter 5. Chapter 5 also 
provides information about the field logistics and research processes. 
Normative aspects of boundary negotiation and the interplay of collective 
narratives and values are examined in chapter 6. The psychocultural process of facing and 
re-interpreting the history of victimhood, humiliation and marginalization and both the 
personal and collective emotions are elaborated in chapter 7. The process of inner 
discussions and debates between different formulations and discourse positions on Alevi 
identity, history and culture are elaborated in chapter 8. In the final chapter of this study 
possible paths to dealing with the paradoxes of Alevi identity politics within Turkish 
political culture is also explored. Possible conflict resolution mechanisms to address 
conflicts related to Alevi identity transformation are discussed with a set of policy 
recommendations.
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Chapter 2 
Revival without Essence: Social and Historical Background Until 1960s 
 
 
 
 This chapter provides a detailed background on the social and political history of 
the Alevi community in order to shed light on the contemporary issues and discussions 
related to the Alevi identity revival. Social and political history examines the changes and 
transformations of the relationship between the Alevi community and the state and other 
social and political groups and actors. The impacts of these transformations have also 
been generating inner debates and contribute to the shaping of Alevi identity and Alevi 
social and political organizations. Many of the sources of fears, biases, stereotypes and 
the narratives that help generate and maintain inter-group conflicts and divisions in the 
Alevi case are related to historical repertoires. 
 Alevi social imagination has been transformed and shaped by discourses on Alevi 
history, rituals and value systems. The contradictory or disparate mental images, 
narratives and the stereotypes of the ―non-Alevis‖ and the Turkish state establishment 
related to similar historical references and axiological resources also turn the Alevi-non 
Alevi divide into a self-fulfilling prophecy. One of the most significant components of 
identity negotiation and construction is the discussion of history and collective axiology 
(Rothbart & Korostelina, 2006). This is also relevant for the case of Alevi identity. 
 There are many ways to read and understand the Alevi history and Alevi cultural 
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resources. There are alternative approaches to Alevi history which begin with the ancient 
Anatolian civilizations. Some others start with early Islamic history, whereas some others 
explain the origins of Alevi-Sunni divide with the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict of 16
th
 
century. The list can be increased by adding several other alternative historiographies. 
What is obvious nonetheless is that those which are emphasized by the social and 
political entrepreneurs of Alevi identity politics are not the most essential sources which 
played important roles in the formation of the Alevi cultural and ritual system. The debate 
over the essence and the sources of Alevilik is a highly politicized and polarized debate. 
The debate over the essence, historical development and outlines of the history of 
Alevilik will not be settled until the social and political projects based on these debates 
have been unified. Unification of the political and social projects seems unlikely for the 
current generation of Alevis. 
 Keeping in mind that it is almost impossible to present a neutral account of the 
Alevi history and culture, this chapter tries to provide a storyline which is academically 
rigorous and convincing. The major social, cultural and political transformations and the 
impacts of these transformations on Alevi/Bektaşi communities is discussed here. The 
dynamics of the moral and psychocultural arguments are elaborated in a more detailed 
way in the research chapters. A chronological outline of the major social and political 
transformations that the Alevi community had experienced follows: 
 Turkic immigration to Anatolia from Central Asia 
 Turcoman revolts in Anatolia during Seljukid Empire 
 Anatolian dervishes and the impact of the Bektaşi Order  
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 Early Ottoman periods 
 Emergence of Safavid Movement and the construction of Sunni Orthodoxy  
 Late Ottoman Era: Nationalization, secularization policies of CUP 
 Alevi Bektaşi contributions during the ―National War of Independence‖ (Kurtuluş 
Savaşı) 
 Atatürk and early Republican Era 
 Alevis in the early days of the multi-party regime 
2.1. Ethnic Composition of Alevis 
Alevis can be classified under three main ethnic origins: Turks, Kurds and Zazas. 
The vast majority of the Alevis in Turkey are of Turcoman origin. Nusayrîs and Caferi 
communities are culturally different than the Turkish, Kurdish and Zaza Alevis and their 
population, as well as social and political impact are not as significant as the first three 
groups. 
Nusayrî are the Arabic speaking Alevis that live in the southern regions of Turkey, 
around the cities of Hatay, Adana and Mersin (Andrews and Benninghaus, 1989, p. 152). 
Historically and culturally they are part of Syria‘s Alevi community; their social, political 
and cultural ties with the Turkish, Kurdish and Zaza Alevis are very limited van 
Bruinessen, 1996, p. 7). They are Arabic speaking communities with an ethnic Arab 
background. As Ortaylı mentions with reference to Ottoman records, the Ottoman 
Administration‘s perception and treatment of the Nusayrî, or Alevi, as they are also 
called, was different than the Alevis and Kızılbaş of the Anatolia and Balkans (Ortaylı, 
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1999, p. 40). They were not treated like non-Muslim communities and they did not pay a 
special tax, but they were considered to be a heterodox ―râfızî‖ community. Some 
Nusayrî‘s in contemporary Turkey may be assimilated or integrated into the Alevi 
community, but sociologically and historically they are a different entity and outside the 
domain of this study. 
Kurdish and Zaza Alevis (Dimilî) are also ethnic variants of Alevi groups in 
Turkey (Andrews & Benninghaus, 1989). They speak two different languages and are 
located in different parts of the Anaolia (1989; Bumke, 1979). Andrews presents these 
two groups as two of the 47 ethnicities in the Republic of Turkey
3
. In terms of language 
and geographical locations, these two groups are differentiated. Zaza Alevis or Dimilîs 
are spread around Tuceli, Erzincan, Bingöl, Malatya and Sivas whereas Kurdish Alevis 
live mostly in the Tunceli (Dersim) region, Elazığ, Erzincan, Bingöl, Adıyaman, Sivas, 
Malatya, Kars, Kahramanmaraş, Adana, Kayseri, Gaziantep, Erzurum, Muş (Andrews & 
Benninghaus, pp. 117-123; van Bruinessen, 1996; 2000; Massicard, 2007, p. 20). Tribal 
divisions and esoteric cults are important for Zaza Alevis. Inaccessibility of the Tunceli 
(Dersim), protected the Dimilî tribes from outside influences and strengthened their 
identity as a group (Andrews & Benninghaus, 1989, p. 125). In that sense, the Zaza 
Alevilik is a strong loyalty. For the Kurdish Alevis as well the religious or sectarian 
loyalties are more important than language and tribal ties (Andrews & Benninghaus, 
1989). Tunceli or Dersim origined Kurdish Alevis have more heterodox beliefs and life 
styles than the Turkish speaking Alevis (van Bruinessen, 2000; 1996b). 
                                                 
3 This categorization had been contested in many ways. 
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According to Bumke mass deportations in the 1930‘s and the processes of labor 
migration to the cities in Turkey and abroad have removed Kurdish Alevis from Eastern 
Anatolia (Bumke, 1989, p. 512). Alevis with Kurdish or Zaza origins, some of which 
might be located in different parts of Turkey, play important roles within the Alevi 
identity movement. The issue of ethnic differentiation for Zazas and Kurds became more 
important during the early 1990‘s. The Kurdish ethno-nationalism, especially with the 
help of PKK, was dominant during this time and did not want a Zaza rival (van 
Bruinessen, 1996). This rivalry and the hegemonic position of PKK which was skeptical 
of the predominantly Zaza or Alevi (even-though Kurdish) actors, encouraged the active 
involvement of many Zaza Alevis and migrant Kurdish Alevis all over Turkey, in the 
emerging Alevi institutions. In the urban contexts, Zaza and Kurdish Alevis that forgot 
Kırmanci (Kurdish) or Zazaki language had more easily maintained their Alevi identity 
because of the endogamous character of their social order. Overall, especially in the 
urban contexts, there are more commonalities between ethnically Turkish, Kurdish and 
Zazaki Alevis.  
There are also Caferi communities in the eastern cities of Iğdır and Kars. 
Caferism is the Twelver Shiite understanding that is closest to Sunnism. They constitute 
less than one percent of Turkey‘s population. Their social and political views and 
organizational forms are different than Turkish, Kurdish and Zaza Alevis. The Caferilik 
markedly increased in strength following the revolution in Iran. Some of the less radical 
Sunni Islamists have encouraged the Caferization of the Alevi. It would appear that 
Çorum was chosen as a designated area for this policy, but in spite of all efforts the 
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strategy proved a failure. 
2.2. The Debate on the Population of Alevi 
The overall population or the percentage of Alevis within the population of 
Turkey had always been a controversial issue. Rather than a quantitative debate, the issue 
is related to the magnitude or the significance of social and political claims.  It is 
impossible to figure out an exact number because of the lack of census data based on 
ethnic and sectarian factors. It is easier to figure out the percentage that define themselves 
as Alevis and pursue particular social and political claims over this identity. KONDA's 
estimation was highlighted in Chapter 1. KONDA research was not an ethnic survey, but 
the findings give estimation about the percentage of Turkish society that define their 
identity primarily as Alevi. 
 The debate related to the population of Alevi-Bektaşis goes back even to the 
1930‘s. The Bektaşis themselves estimated their population around seven million at that 
time which is an overstated figure according to conditions of time. 
In October 1933 Niyazi dede, the head of the officially recognized Bektaşi 
community of Albania, gave me personally his estimate that in the old Turkish 
Empire there were 7.500.000 seven million Bektaşis not counting the more or less 
loosely affiliated Kızılbaş (Birge, 1965, p. 15). Besim Atalay in 1924 estimates 
the numbers at 1.500.000 (Birge, 1965, p. 16). 
 I surmise perhaps 15 per cent, of Turkey‘s population (Shankland, 2003). 
 Koçan and Öncü (2004, p. 474) give a very rough estimate between 10%-30% of 
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Turkey‘s population. Yaman and Erdemir (2006, p. 30) also give an estimation of 30 
million. Güneş-Ayata (1982) argues that it might be a realistic argument to estimate that 
Alevis constitute 20 percent of the Turkish population. Among all these estimations 
Üzüm's (1997, pp. 19-28) study involves research based on the cross examination of 
census data and the performance of the Alevi party Türkiye Birlik Partisi in the 1970s. 
Üzüm (1997) estimates the percentage of the Alevi population with regard to the overall 
population as 10 percent (Üzüm, 1997, pp. 19-28). No conclusive statement can be made 
over these figures but according to Alevis the Alevi population is at least 20 million and 
according to the survey based estimations the percentage of people who define 
themselves predominantly as Alevi is not more than 10 percent of the overall population 
of Turkey. 
2.3. Historical Sources and Political Positions: Elaborating the Ethnic and Historical 
Origins of Alevi Identity 
There has been a growing academic interest and increase in social research on 
Alevilik starting from the early 1990‘s. The earlier studies focused on the 
institutionalization process and new (modern) Alevi social and political organizations 
(Güler, 2008; Ata, 2007; Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2001; Kaleli, 2000; Yaman, 2007; 2000, Üzüm 
1997; Gümüş, 2004; Massicard, 2007; Şahin, 2001; 2005). There were ethnographic 
studies in some Alevi villages exploring Alevi rituals, lifestyle, and traditional social and 
cultural institutions (Yörükan [1928] 1998; Benekay, 1967; Shankland, 2003; Stirling, 
1965; 1993; Erdemir, 2004; 2005; Taşğın, 2003; 2004; Dönmez, 2003; Aksoy 2004; Bal, 
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1997; Bumke, 1989; Yalman, 1969; Shankland, 1998; 1999; 2003; Türkdoğan, 1995). 
Studies on the impacts of the recent processes of urbanization, social and cultural 
transformations (Yılmaz, 2005, Çamuroğlu, [1992] 2005) are also an emerging area of 
research. Historical analyses of key events and personalities have also been done in the 
studies of Mélikoff(1975; 1998; 1999; 2004; 2006; 2007), Ocak ([1980] 1996; 1992; 
1996; 1999; 2000; 2001), Faroqhi (1976; 1981; 2003), van Bruinessen (1994; 1996), 
Köprülü (1926;1976), Köprülü & Leiser (1992), Çamuroğlu ([1992] 2005; 1997; 1998; 
1999) , İnalcık (1980; 1994), Birge (1965), Kehl-Bodrogi (1996; 1999; 2001; 2003), 
Gölpınarlı (1963; 1990), Gölpınarlı & Boratav (1943), Bozkurt (1990; 1998), Dressler 
(2003; 2007; 2008), Massicard (2003; 2006; 2007); Kieser (1994; 2001; 2003; 2006). 
There is abundant literature produced by Sunni theologians on the characteristics of 
Alevilik and Bektaşilik as a belief system (Fığlalı, 1990, Öztürk, 1990, Üzüm, 1997; 
1999; 2004; Eröz, 1990). 
Besides this basic sketch we can easily expand the list of books related to Alevilik 
to a few hundred, however not many of these studies focus on the psychocultural 
narratives and traumas of the Alevi community. The focus of this study is on the life 
stories and public narratives and discourses. In terms of being a social identity, ―Alevilik‖ 
in the 2000‘s is very different than ―Alevilik‖ in the 1980‘s, or the 1950‘s. Since the 
purpose of this study is to understand the dynamics of the identity transformation process 
and conflicts related to transformation my focus is on the themes of change. 
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2.3.1. Origins of Alevilik 
Some overlapping concepts such as Alevilik, Bektaşilik and Kızılbaşlık have been 
used to represent the similar social and historical phenomena of Alevi-Bektaşi societies 
(Fığlalı, 1990, p. 7). The Alevi name means ―belonging to Ali and sympathizing and 
elevating the status of Ali among all other figures in Islamic history‖ (Üzüm, 1997, p. 3). 
In some countries such, as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt and Iran
4
, Alevi is used for those 
who come from the lineage of Ali (Yaman & Erdemir, 2006, p. 15; Fığlalı, 1990). The 
term Alevi, the group that is the subject of this study, has been used to refer to the social 
and historical phenomena since the late 19
th
 century (Mélikoff, 1998). Kızılbaş, Râfızî, 
Mûlhid, Işık, Torlak have been used instead of the name Alevi in Ottoman records 
(Mélikoff, 1998). The most common and popular name during the Ottoman era was 
Kızılbaş but the concept had been politicized and had been loaded with negative 
stereotypes, which is why Kızılbaş name had been abandoned and replaced by Alevi 
during the Young Turk Era. 
The nomadic Turcoman groups had adopted Islam by means of dervishes in 
Central Asia starting from early in the 10
th
 century. The name ―Turcoman‖ has been given 
to Muslim Turks of Central Asia that are mostly from Oğuz Tribes (Sümer, 1992a; Üzüm, 
1997, p. 51). In the early periods of their Islamization, Turcoman tribes could not give up 
their previous eclectic beliefs, culture or tradition, and elements from their previous 
beliefs have coexisted with the ―new religion‖, Islam. The main cultural sources and 
                                                 
4 Sects of Ismaili in Pakistan, Caferi in Iran, Zaydi in Egypt and Yemen, Nusayri in Syria, Druze in Lebanon refers to the Alevi, they have different historical and 
cultural sources. 
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beliefs of the pre-Islamic Turkic traditions were Buddhism, Manicheism, Iranian religions 
such as Zoroastrianism, Mazdaism, Christianity, Gök Tanrı (Celestial God)5, the cult of 
ancestors, and the cult of nature. Some elements from Judaism and Shamanism were also 
evident within pre-Islamic Turkish beliefs (Ocak, [1983] 2000). These pre-Islamic 
elements had co-mingled with their understanding of Islam, which was more of an oral 
version
6
, rather than scriptural and based on the book (Ocak, 2004, p. 217). Their culture 
and rituals were also different than the Sunni rituals and practices. 
The earlier migration of Turcoman, Oğuz Tribes to Anatolia transformed the 
demographic and social structure of Anatolia. Turkic migration to Anatolia increased after 
the Malazgirt (Manzikert) (1071) Battle between the Seljukid Empire and Byzantine 
Empire. Marginal heterodox Sufi elements had been popularized among the Turcoman 
tribes
7
. Mongol invasions of Central Asia, and especially the conquest of Khwarezmia 
(1219-1221) caused massive migration of Turcoman tribes to Anatolia (Birge, 1965). The 
majority of the dervishes that moved to Anatolia were of the Kalenderiye sect (Köprülü 
quoted in Birge, 1965, p. 32). The Seljukid central administration was unable to contain 
the social and economic turmoil and instabilities. 
The messianic uprises during the late Seljukid era, the Babaî Revolts (1239-
1241), have been emphasized as the beginning of the Alevilik (Ocak, 2000). These 
                                                 
5 Mélikoff shows a continuity from the idea of a Gök Tanrı, a "Celestial God", that is supposed to be a common religious representation among the central Asian 
Turkic groups in pre-Islamic times - to the representation of Ali in Alevi cosmology. 
6 Menâkıbs are the stories related to the lives of Sufi or mystic fathers that lived in the periods when the Turcomans became Muslim. Ocak had made a 
comprehensive study on the Menâkıbnâmes and Vilâyet names of early Turcoman Sufi dervishes. (Menâkıbu‘l Kudsiye, Menâkıb-ı Hacı Bektaş-ı Velî, Vilâyetnâme-i 
Hacım Sultan, Vilâyetnâme-i Abdal Musa, Menâkıb-ı Kaygusuz Baba, Vilâyetnâme-i Seyyid Ali Sultan, Vilâyetnâme-i Şucâuddin, Vilâyetnâme-ı Otman Baba. He 
classified the religious elements and narratives into four: 10% Cults of Nature, 25% Shamanizm, 33% Asiatic and Iranian Religions, 32% Old Testament and New 
Testament (Ocak, [1983] 2000, pp.- 278-280). 
7  Ocak calls there Sufi Brotherhoods Kalenderî. 
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movements, because of the famine, ―Black Death‖ and the social and political 
instabilities during the time, brought together dispersed elements and groups that were 
unsatisfied with the political center. Babaî Revolts took place in Anatolia and spread to a 
wide area including today‘s Adıyaman, Amasya, Malatya, Sivas, Çorum, Yozgat and 
Kırşehir, whereas the Sheyh Bedreddin Uprising was a Balkanic movement. Babaî 
Revolts were a rebellion of the nomadic Turcoman tribes against the political authority of 
the Seljukid administration and they were social, and political and psychological in 
nature. Ocak argues that those revolts did not have a religious character and cannot be 
considered to be revolt against heterodox or Shi‘ate circles at the political center (Ocak, 
2000, Ocak, [1980] 1996). 
The rebellion of nomadic or semi-nomadic Turcoman tribes was the rebellion of 
the peripheral communities against the political center. Messianic beliefs have been used 
as the ideological instruments and motivation for these rebellions. Heterodox elements of 
Anatolia had been gathered around the charismatic leadership of Baba İlyas. What is 
important to the contemporary Alevist movement in terms of the interpretation and 
understanding of these rebellions is that they are emphasized in many of the popular 
writings about the contemporary Alevi phenomena (Ocak, 2000). 
Political order in the Anatolian Seljukid State were threatened by the Messianic-
Mahdist ideologies. Followers of the Vefâi, Yesevî, Kalenderî, and Haydarî orders were 
united and mobilized against the Anatolian Seljukid administration. After the Seljukid 
administration‘s suppression of the Babaî Revolts, with the help of legionary Frank 
Soldiers in the Battle of Malya (1240), the dervishes within the Babaî movement had 
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eventually joined the Bektaşi order (Ocak, 2000). They are referred to as Rum Abdals 
(Faroqhi, 2003, p. 185). Geyikli Baba, Abdal Musa, Abdal Murad, Kızıl Deli, and Seyyid 
Ali Sultan are some of the important names among the Abdalan-ı Rum (Ocak, 2000, p. 
265). The Babaî Revolts cannot be considered to be a sectarian controversy of heterodox 
Turcoman tribes and the Orthodox Sunni Seljukid central administration because there 
were also Sunni Turcoman tribes in the revolts. 
According to Ocak many of the dede lineages of the Anatolia within the Alevi 
community are the descendants of those Rum Abdals (Ocak, 2000). Hacı Bektaş Veli who 
was the legendary founder of the Bektaşi order8 was not actively involved in the Babaî 
Revolts but he was a disciple of Baba İlyas9 (Mélikoff, 2004, p. 75). His brother Menteş 
was within the Babaî Revolts and died in the Battle of Malya (Ocak, 1980; 1996 Faroqhi, 
2003; Mélikoff, 2004; 2006; Birge, 1965). Another important disciple of the Baba İlyas, 
who did not actively participate in the Babaî Revolts was Sheyh Ede Bâlî. Ede Bâlî was 
the father- in-law of Osman I, who was the founder and the first ruler of the Ottoman 
State. 
2.3.2. Alevis During Early Ottoman Era 
Unlike its Seljukid predecessor in Anatolia, the Ottoman State had a more positive 
                                                 
8  There are many studies related to the history of the Bektaşi order. Concerning the studies on these issues there is no need to repeat what Faroqhi (1995) has 
reviewed recently. She concludes that thanks to the works of Mehmet Fuat Köprülü (1925, 1929, 1966/1919), Abdulbakî Gölpınarlı, Ahmet Yaşar Ocak (1983, 1989, 
1996), Iréne Mélikoff- and we should not forget her own study (Faroqhi 2003) - "we possess a reasonable understanding of the overall history of the [Bektaşi] order" 
(Faroqhi, 1995, p. 27). 
9  In the 1970‘s especially, the extreme Marxist activist with an Alevi background claimed that Hacı Bektaş Veli had joined the Babaî Revolts against the Seljukid 
central administration. They tried to create a revolutionary leadership from Hacı Bektaş Veli in order to legitimize their revolutionary Marxist position and to attract 
Alevi youth. He was a disciple of Baba İlyas but factual evidence clearly contradicts the claim that argues Hacı Bektaş Veli was part of the Babaî Revolts. His brother 
Menteş had fought with the Baba Ilyas‘s army in the Babaî Revolts. 
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relationship with the Rum Abdals and the Bektaşi dervishes. Rum Abdals or Kalenderî 
dervishes had been supported and sponsored by the Ottoman State in the early years of 
the State in order to conquer the Balkans (Barkan, 1942; Mélikoff, 2004, p. 211). Barkan 
called these dervishes the ―colonizer dervishes‖. Köprülü refers to the entire group of 
dervishes that fought against the Byzantine Empire as Abdals including Haydarî, Yesevî 
and Kalenderî (quoted in Faroqhi, 2003, p. 185). The Bektaşi order also became the 
spiritual and moral guide and inspired the Janissary corps (Birge, 1965; Faroqhi, 2003). 
The ideal-ideology of Gaza (Holy War) was central to the foundation and 
development of the Ottoman Empire (İnalcık, 1989; Wittek, 1971; Köprülü & Leiser 
1992). Bektaşi dervishes played significant role in the conquest and the Islamization of 
West Anatolia and the Balkans. Heretical and heterodox beliefs, and cultures of all sorts, 
including Islamic and Christian, were received with welcome in the frontiers (Birge, 
1965, pp. 30-31). According to Birge it was inevitable that there would develop a foreign 
culture in the political centers in the cases of the Seljuks Konya and Ottomans Bursa, 
Edirne and Istanbul. In the literary and artistic tradition, Persian culture had been adopted 
whereas in legal and religious affairs Sunni teachings had been adopted. Among the 
masses, Muslims, Christian and other beliefs had mingled and non-Orthodox beliefs had 
flourished. 
As Moslems and Christians on the frontiers mingled, a very mixed affair, and it is 
out of that mixture of all sorts of elements, Christian, Muhammedan and pagan, 
that the Bektaşi and affiliated Kizilbash sectaries developed (Birge, 1965, p. 31). 
With a slightly different perspective from Ocak and Mélikoff, who emphasize the 
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syncretistic and heterodox nature of Kızılbaş-Bektaşi teachings and worldview 
throughout a larger historical and cultural landscape, Birge underlined the cultural and 
religious interactions in the frontier culture with reference to Wittek (1971). It is seems 
that the Ottoman State in its early centuries did not have any problem with the non-Sunni, 
non-orthodox elements. There is not abundant information related to the early years of 
the Bektaşi Order, yet it is known that the Order had experience major transformations in 
the 15
th
 and 17
th
 centuries (Faroqhi, 2003, p. 185). The Bektaşi order had been reshaped 
and transformed by the Balım Sultan almost two hundred year after the death of Hacı 
Bektaş Veli (Birge, 1965, pp. 56-58; Mélikoff, 2004, pp. 205-213). For some scholars, the 
Balım Sultan had distanced Bektaşilik from Kalenderî ; for others he had introduced some 
non-Islamic practices to the order (quoted in Üzüm, 1997, p. 8). 
According to Mélikoff, Alevilik and Bektaşilik cannot be separated from each 
other since both entities refer to the phenomena of Turkish folk Islam (Mélikoff, 2006, p. 
29). The emergence of Safevism as a social and political movement lead to the 
differentiation of Bektaşilik and Alevilik. 
The difference between Alevis and Bektaşi is social and organizational rather than 
in terms of beliefs and their sources (Mélikoff, 2006, p. 29; Mélikoff, 2004, p. 
214)  
There are many common points between Alevilik and Bektaşilik. However, the 
available documents suggest that Alevilik and Bektaşilik share neither the same 
geographical framework nor posses the same internal mechanisms and rules. 
While Bektaşilik, which attracted the Turkish inteligencia during the Unionist 
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period (1908-1918) is a religious brotherhood, Alevilik in contrast designs a 
community whose borders are delineated by a sectarian belief system. Kızılbaş is 
a heterodox, syncretic belief and ritual system. Bektaşilik is dominantly Balkanic, 
while Alevilik finds its origins in Anatolia. Bektaşism has been mainly urban. 
(Bozarslan, 2003, p. 5) 
Kurdish Kızılbaş and the Turcoman Bektaşi orders were identical, since their 
beliefs, rituals and traditions were the same, with the only difference being a 
political one of leadership, which is a significant difference in our case. (White, 
2003) 
All three statements may be relevant depending on which cross-section of the Alevi-
Bektaşi history is taken as a reference point. Some scholars like Bozarslan emphasize the 
differentiation between Alevilik and Bektaşilik in terms of their social and political goals 
and backgrounds. His points are relevant for the period after the Kızılbaş revolts and 
Safevi-Ottoman Conflict, where the center of gravity for the Bektaşilik had been 
transferred to the Balkans (Birge, 1965). However, the origin of the concept of Alevi is 
Kızılbaş and it is difficult to differentiate the origins of Kızılbaş and Bektaşi. Kızılbaş 
were socially the nomadic or semi-nomadic Turcoman tribes that had heterodox and 
syncretistic beliefs. The Bektaşi order had mainly been organized around cities and more 
urban contexts and followers of the Bektaşi order were more educated. Fuat Köprülü 
called Kızılbaş or Alevi the village Bektaşi (Köprülü, 1926). 
Both groups refer to Hacı Bektaş. But the Bektaşis formed an organized group, 
whereas the Kızılbaş-Alevis believe in myths in which legends are mingled with 
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local folklore (Köprülü, 1926, p. 6). 
The sources that shaped beliefs and rituals of Alevism are mainly of Central 
Asiatic and Anatolia origin. Hacı Bektaş migrated to Anatolia from Khorassan (Central 
Asia) around the year 1230, after the Mongol invasion of Kharezm (Mélikoff, 1998, p. 2). 
Hacı Bektaş10 was the follower of Turcoman saint of Central Asia, Ahmed Yesevi and he 
did not give up his ancient Central Asiatic customs and practices (Mélikoff, 1998). Hacı 
Bektaş Veli did not initiate an order with the name of Bektaşi; he founded his tekke in the 
village of Sulucakarahöyük. He was a syncretistic Vefâî or Haydarî Turcoman sheyh, who 
was introducing Islamic teachings and trying to influence the Christians around the area 
(Üzüm, 1997, p. 7). His teachings were compiled and popularized by his disciples 
Kadıncık Ana and Abdal Musa. 
In addition to all these sources, Hûrufî
11 
influences had also been introduced to the 
Bektaşilik from as early as the 15th century. Hûrufî teachings were adopted by Alevi 
poems, such as Nesimi, but because of the anthropomorphic pantheistic notions of 
Hûrufîizm, are considered to be heresy. Hûrufîizm had never been part of mainstream 
Bektaşilik. What was destructive to the Ottoman State‘s relations with the heterodox 
communities and created the contemporary Alevi communities‘ negative attitudes and 
                                                 
10 There is not much information and historical records related to the life of Hacı Bektaş Veli and available sources are not dependable. 
11 Hûrufîsm (Arabic ةيفورح Hûrufîyya, adjective form Hûrufî) Populist Sufi order founded by Fadlallah Astarabadi in fourteenth-century Iran. Astarabadi claimed 
direct revelation from God and Hidden Imam status. The order preached that only manual work could produce legitimate income and claimed that salvation was 
attainable through secret knowledge of the numerical values of the alphabet. It spread into Anatolia and Bulgaria among Muslims and Christians. Some of its ideas 
were perpetuated by the Bektashi order. "Hurufis"  Oxford Dictionary of Islam. John L. Esposito, ed. Oxford University Press Inc. 2003. Oxford Reference Online. 
Oxford University Press.  George Mason Law.  24 May 2009  <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t125.e900> 
The numbers and their relations to letters was considered to be the ultimate elements and meanings of the word (Birge 1965: 59). This pantheistic notion which was 
adopted by Alevi poems like Nesimi had never been the mainstream part of Bektaşilik (Ibid). Among the seven important poets: Virânî, Nesîmî, Yemînî, Kul 
Himmet, Pîr Sultan Abdal, Hatâyî, Fuzuli of Alevis Virânî, Nesîmî, Yemînî had been influence by Hurûfiism. For more information about the influence of Hurûfî 
influences on Bektasi-Kızılbaş teachings Mélikoff (2006: pp. 169-182). 
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feelings was the emergence of the Ottoman-Safevi Conflict in the late 15th and early 16th 
centuries. Twelver Shi‘a themes, rituals and narratives that are today important 
components of Alevi culture and history, had only been introduced after the emergence of 
Safavism. The introduction of Twelver Shi‘a themes and the cult of Ali to the Alevilik 
dates back to the end of the 15
th
 and early 16
th
 centuries (Ocak, 1996 [2004], p. 259; 
Mélikoff, 1975). 
2.3.3. Emergence of Safevism and the Kızılbaş Revolts in Anatolia 
 The Safevid order had been established by Sheyh Safiyuddin (who died in 1334) 
in the early 14
th
 century in Erdebil-Iran as a Sunni Sufi order (tariqa) (Üzüm, 1997). 
Because of the charismatic leadership and social and political activities, it had spread to 
Iraq, Syria and Anatolia (Üzüm, 1997). During the periods of the Safavid Shahs, Cuneyd 
(1447-1460) and Haydar (1460-1488) (Mélikoff, 2004, p.174) who were ancestors of 
Shah Ismail, emissaries had been sent to Anatolia to recruit followers for the Safavid 
Order. After Cuneyd was driven out of Ardabil (Iran) he moved to Anatolia and claimed 
he was from the family of prophet (Mélikoff, 2004, p. 177; Birge, 1965, pp. 63-64). It 
was during Sheyh Haydar that the principles and characteristics of the movement had 
been clarified. Haydar transformed the Safavid order from a Sufi order into a militant 
movement with Ghaza ideology and recruited Kızılbaş Turcomans to his army (Birge, 
1965). Especially during the reign of Shah Ismail, Safavism became a more influential 
movement among the Turcomans. His Turkish language poems and Messianic message 
increased sympathy for Shah Ismail and his movement. With the leadership of the 
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legendary Shah Ismail (1487-1524), Safavis took control of Persia and established the 
Safavid State. 
Religiosity in the Safavid order was based on loyalty to the divinely inspired 
charismatic leader rather than the canonical law and central political authority (Dressler, 
2005). What was more important for the ideological background and message for the 
social mobilization of the Safavid order and movement was like that of the Babaî Revolts 
of 13
th 
; the Safavid movement and the rebellions also had Messianic elements. The 
relationship between the social political concerns and the mystic Messianic themes are 
complicated but for some scholars the religious dimension of the Mahdist Anatolian 
uprisings serve to explain the broad public support these revolts obtained as compared to 
other revolts (Ocak, 1980 [1996]; Dressler, 2005, p. 171). Almost the entire Safavid army 
was composed of Turcoman warriors from Anatolia (Sümer, 1992). 
The Safavid order experienced a process of transformation during the early 16
th
 
century; the religious ideology of the Shafi school of Sunni Islam had been replaced by 
Twelver Shiite ideology. Twelver Shiism became the official religion in Iran which 
further polarized the relationships of the Ottoman Empire and Safevids. Shah Ismail was 
extreme in his commitment to Shiism and he was cruel toward Sunnis during his reign. 
Persecution and the oppression of Sunnis became a systematic practice during his era.  
As soon as he was crowned he not only commanded that throughout his realm the 
phrase, ―I bear witness that Ali is the friend of God,‖ should be introduced into 
the profession of faith and that the first three Caliphs, Ebubekir, Ömer, and 
Osman, should be publicly cursed in the streets and markets, but he also 
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threatened to decapitate any who consciously objected (quoted in Birge, 1965, p. 
65). 
For some scholars the transformation of Ottoman and Safavid religious ideologies 
to the Orthodox versions of Sunnism and Shiism respectively is related to the social and 
political rivalry between Ottomans and Safavids. Therefore the differences in religious 
ideology and religious legitimation is a consequence rather than the source of Ottoman- 
Safavid social and political rivalry (Dressler, 2005). 
While religion played a considerable role in conflict (Ottoman-Safavid-Kızılbaş), 
the competitors had much more in common than is generally assumed...Ottoman 
and Safavids appear as competing actors in Anatolia by political and economic 
interests. It is argued that the religious dichotomy between Ottomans and Safavids 
was a product of Ottoman-Safavid rivalry rather than its cause (Dressler, 2005, p. 
152). 
Missionary activities of Safavid agents were successful in recruiting Turcoman 
tribes. Mainly because of the charismatic leaders of the Safavid order and because of 
the turbulent economic and political situation in Ottoman court and Anatolia, Safavid 
missionaries had attracted the support of Turcoman tribes (Sümer, 1992b; Allouche, 
1983; Mélikoff, 2004; Mazzaoi, 1972; Ocak, 1996, pp. 274-282). During the time 
there was a succession struggle among the sons of the Sultan Bayezid II. It was a 
period of turmoil; the succession fight among the sons of the Bayezid II allowed for 
fertile soil for Safavid propaganda. It is also argued that Turcoman tribes joined the 
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Safeviye because of their political and economic frustrations
12
 (quoted in Faroqhi, 
2003). Both Akdağ (1975), Sümer (1992), Mélikoff (2004) argue that these rebellions, 
such as the Şah Kulu Rebellion in the Antalya Teke region and Nur Ali Halife in 
Koyulhisar were not mainly religious rebellions. Poor government, especially of the 
Governor Şehzade Korkut was also a cause for these rebellions. 
Kızılbaş villages in the province of Tekke around Antalya revolted during the last 
years of the reign of Beyazıt II. The leader of the revolt, ―Şahkulu‖ (Slave of Shah), 
known as Şeytan Kulu, (Slave of Devil) in Ottoman documents, was a disciple of Şeyh 
Haydar, who was the father of Shah Ismail (Birge, 1965, p. 66). The Şah Kulu uprising 
started in Tekke Village (Antalya) and spread quickly until it had been stopped in Sivas in 
1511. Kızılbaş tribes, Torlak dervishes, and Turcoman villagers that were suffering from 
the harsh economic conditions joined these uprisings (Üzüm, 1997, p. 10; Şahin, 2001, 
pp. 34-35; Birge, 1965, p. 66). With his followers he defeated the Karagöz, the Beylerbey 
of Anatolia and proceeded to advance as far as Bursa (Birge, 1965, p. 10). Grand Vizir 
Ali Paşa took control of the army and after a bitter struggle defeated Şah Kulu. Both the 
Grand Vizir and Şah Kulu died in the battle. According to Mélikoff these activities that 
were instigated by Safavid Sheyhs introduced the notion of uprising and violence to Sufi 
ideals and then lead to bloody conflicts (Mélikoff, 2004, p. 222). 
When Selim I (Grim) seized the power in the Ottoman throne in 1512 he was 
determined to end all the uprisings that weakened the central authority of the Empire and 
                                                 
12  In the Ottoman narratives the Kızılbaş uprisings had been presented as religious heresy and there are not much references to social and economic conditions. 
Dressler 
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led to a period of turmoil. Before his campaign against the Shah Ismail, Selim I wanted to 
pacify the Kızılbaş groups that were supporting Shah Ismail and the Safavids. All the 
Kızılbaş in the Ottoman lands had been registered. With the fatwa of Mufti Hamza and 
Kemal Paşazade he legally declared Kızılbaş as heretics and unbelievers, by which he 
justified his campaign against the Kızılbaş (Şahin, 2001, p. 35; Tekindağ, 1968). 
According to official records 40.000 people died in those campaigns but according to 
Alevi-Bektaşi the number of Kızılbaş victims are much higher. 
Public memory and narratives of the Kızılbaş Massacres and the oppressive 
practices during the period of Selim I play a significant role in the making of the 
contemporary Alevi identity. The discourses of victimhood in particular constantly visit 
the brutality of Selim I and religious justification of these campaigns. Conflictual and 
distanced attitudes of the Alevis towards the Ottoman State are related to this period. 
Leaders of the uprisings then turned into folk heroes for some Alevis who sympathize 
with the ideology of resistance. 
2.3.4. Kızılbaş Revolts of Anatolia 
Şahkulu (1511) and Nur Halife (1512) Revolts were not the only Turcoman 
revolts against the Ottoman political center during the early 16
th
 century. Selim I‘s victory 
over Shah Ismail was unable to pacify the revolts. Şah Ismail and his son Tahmasp had 
continued to instigate and inspire those Kızılbaş revolts13. Şeyh Veli Celal (Tokat 
Amasya), Baba Zünnûn, Kalender Çelebi (Kırşehir Ankara) are some of the important 
                                                 
13  Shah Tahmasp had a special office to train missionary agents to instigate rebellions among Turcomans in Anatolia (Şahin 2001; Allauche 1983). 
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revolts. Kalenderoğlu is considered to be the biggest peasant revolt in Ottoman history 
and was not successfully suppressed in 1527. Şeyh Veli Celal‘s revolt had such an impact 
that the social movements and peasant revolts afterward have been called Celali Revolts 
(Akdağ, 1975). Many of the revolts took place around the Amasya and Tokat regions, 
where the Kızılbaş influences were strong. Sheyh Celal declared himself Mahdi and 
collected the support of the Turcomans. Selim I had difficulty controlling the situation, 
though Celal had some success. Beylerbey of Rumeli Ferhat Paşa managed to defeat and 
kill Celal. Kızılbaş groups that supported Celal were severely punished and many of them 
had been sent into exile, including women and children (Mélikoff, 2004, p. 226). 
The Kalender Çelebi Revolt of 1526-1527 was another major revolt against the 
Ottoman Center and the Bektaşis had actively been involved. (Ocak, 2004; Mélikoff, 
2004). Kalender Çelebi was the younger brother
14
 of Balım Sultan, who was the second 
founder of the Bektaşi order. Kalender also claimed that he was a descendent of Hacı 
Bektaş Veli. He gathered around him twenty to thirty thousand ―dervishes, abdals, 
kalenders, and others‖ (Birge, 1965, p. 69). Chief Vezir Makbul İbrahim Paşa did not 
want to send the Janissary troops over the Kalender Çelebi‘s group because of their 
possible sympathy for Kalender Çelebi. Tactical negotiations among the İbrahim Paşa 
fiefs managed to reduce the number of supporters of the Kalender Çelebi
15 
( Mélikoff, 
2004, p. 228). Kalender Çelebi and his remaining supporters were defeated by İbrahim 
Paşa. 
                                                 
14  It is also argued that he was spiritual borther of Balım Sultan (Mélikoff 2004 228). 
15 Two measures were essential in İbrahim Paşa‘s success: First he forbade under penalty of death the entry into his camp of any man from the armies defeated by 
rebels. He also distributed fiefs to the Türkmen tribes attached to Kalender Çelebi to assure his favor (Birge 1965: 69). 
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2.3.5. Pir Sultan Abdal a Metahistoric Figure (1480-1550): 
Pir Sultan Abdal is a legendary Sufi poet who was born in the Banaz village of 
Sivas. He was the head of a Bektaşi group. Although there are not much in the way of 
records and documents related to the life and struggle of Pir Sultan Abdal, he was almost 
a legendary metahistoric figure within the leftist political lexicon. His poems had always 
been recited among Alevis but there are many different versions of those poems 
(Gölpınarlı & Boratav, 1943). According to literary historians, there is more than one Pir 
Sultan Abdal. His struggle with the Governor Hızır Paşa is well known and is presented 
as the model episode that represents a resistance for justice. There are not many details 
about his struggle against the Ottoman Administration but it is known that he was 
executed by Hızır Paşa. He has always been remembered as a popular revolutionary 
figure among the Alevi community. Illustrations of Pir Sultan portray him, raising his lute 
(saz) in defiance, as a representation of revolutionary resistance. Iconic images of Pir 
Sultan Abdal‘s resistance have become a popular Marxist image in Turkey, somewhat like 
Che photos. The narratives both change with regard to the physical appearance and the 
poems of Pir Sultan Abdal. He has been transformed into an idealist hero that protects the 
people (Mélikoff, 2004, p. 232). 
2.3.6. Establishment of the Orthodoxy and Marginalization 
The Ottoman-Kızılbaş conflict was related to the association of Turcoman tribes 
with Safavids and the Shah Ismail (Imber, 1979; Dressler, 2005). It was not mainly 
related to the heterodox religious understandings of Turcoman tribes. Those heterodox 
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groups were peripheral elements but they were not oppressed and marginalized by force 
until the establishment of a territorial alternative in the immediate neighborhood of the 
Ottoman Empire (Dressler, 2005). Turcoman revolts and the support of the Turcoman 
groups of the Safavid order had led Kızılbaş Turcomans to get distanced from the state 
and the Sunni communities. Bektaşi order had also been closed by Selim I until 1551, it 
had been resumed and its property had been returned after 1551 (Faroqhi, 1976, p. 2003; 
Mélikoff, 2004). In terms of Ottoman central administration‘s attitudes towards the 
heterodox Turcoman tribes there was a transformation after the Safavid movement. The 
establishment of the Safavid Empire with the Turcoman Kızılbaş tribes created a serious 
territorial alternative
16 
(Dressler, 2005). The Kızılbaş tribes of Anatolia had suddenly 
became the object of Ottoman-Safavid rivalry. Not all the participants of these revolts had 
been instigated by Safavids but many of the Turcomans sympathized with Safavids 
(Ocak, 1996-2004, p. 284). 
Ottomans and Safavids and even the Anatolian Kızılbaş, were acting in 
commensurable social spaces, sharing a similar worldview and rhetoric. But in 
order to legitimize their support for gaza against their Muslim rival each accused 
the other with heresy, which supported Shiite and Sunni orthodoxies respectively. 
Ottoman center further distanced itself from the periphery. (Dressler, 2005, p. 
172) 
Safavid ideology had two main components that were inspired by Twelver 
                                                 
16 The Ottoman perspective on the Kızılbaş was structured around three accusations. The Kızılbaş:  
Rejected Ottoman rule and rebelled against them, followed the Safavid Shah, who was a rival of Sultan ; were heretics, deviating from the acknowledged path of 
Islam.(Dressler, 2005, p. 156) 
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Shiism: 
There was a strong Mehdi ideology (Messianic). Shah İsmail was claiming that he 
was the expected Mehdi and he came to salvage Turcomans from the oppressions 
of Ottoman regime. He was also claiming that Ali had divine personality (God) 
and he was the reincarnation of Ali. (Ocak, 1996 [2004], p. 279) 
Both Shah Ismail and his father Sheyh Haydar successfully used these ideological claims 
successfully to attract Turcoman groups. According to Ocak, the propaganda of Shah 
Ismail was similar to Baba İlyas‘s propaganda at the Babaî Revolts (Ocak, 1996 [2004], 
p. 280). Ocak defines Kızılbaş revolts as the revolts of periphery (social, economic, 
political and religious) to the center. The Messianic-Mahdist message and ideologies, and 
charismatic revolutionary leaders had always attracted the peripheral groups, especially 
during the periods of social economic unrest. 
With the adoption by Safavis of the twelver Shiism as the official ideology, the 
Ottoman center had to transform its religious ideology and legitimation into more 
orthodox Sunnism. In order to weaken the hegemonic discourses and the ideology of 
Safavism, the Ottoman center tried to marginalize heterodox and Shiite elements. The 
influence of the Sheyhulislam hierarchy in the Ottoman court increased during the reign 
of Suleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566). The intellectual life of the empire had also 
been dominated by Sunni ulama (Imber, 1979). The tolerant attitude towards heterodox 
beliefs had been replaced with a more skeptical view. It is often argued that the transition 
of the Ottoman Empire to Sunni Islam has also been in reaction to Safevism and Kızılbaş 
revolts in Anatolia. 
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In order to declare Safavids as ―infidels‖ the Ottoman Sultan was supposed to 
present a pious image and legitimacy of the state had to be based on canonical Orthodox 
Sunni Islam (Imber, 1979, p. 148; Dressler, 2005, p. 164)
17
. As opposed to Safavism and 
Shiism, the Ottoman court decided to place itself as the protector of Sunnism. Another 
important development that strengthened the Ottoman Empire‘s protectorate of Sunni 
Islam was the Selim I‘s takeover of the Caliphate from Mamluk Empire. The Caliphate 
had been taken over by the Ottoman Dynasty after Selim I‘s Campaign against the 
Mamluk Sultanate in 1517. After the collapse of the Mamluk Empire almost the entire 
Middle East had been controlled by the Ottoman Administration. The Ottoman Dynasty 
became the protector of Sunni Islam. 
It was more of a political controversy and rivalry utilizing sectarian and messianic 
symbols rather than a religious, sectarian controversy. It is also argued that the motive 
behind the Ottoman Empire‘s anti-Kızılbaş policies were related to Kızılbaş‘ 
unwillingness to accept Ottoman political authority (Dressler, 2003, p. 13). It is 
impossible to understand the problems by isolating it from the political rivalry between 
Ottoman and Safvid Empires. The Kızılbaş were the victims of this political rivalry of 
two states. On the Iranian side as well, Sunni‘s suffered a severe massacre during the 
reign of Shah Ismail and his son Tahmasp. 
Parallel to the persecution of Sunnis in Iran after the period of Shah Ismail there 
were oppressions against Kızılbaş in the Ottoman Empire. The defeat of Shah Ismail in 
                                                 
17 ―Ebussuud issued a sultanic decree obliging Muslim villagers to build mosques and regularly attend communal  prayers. Since prayer was conceived as a duty 
prescribed by sharia, failure to observe it would be a defiance not only of God, but also of Sultan‘s command. Such decrees provided the Ottomans with the legal 
grounds for persecuting the Kızılbaş‖ (Dressler, 2005, p.162). 
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the battle of Çaldıran (1514) did not completely eliminate the Kızılbaş' threat to Ottoman 
rulers; the Kızılbaş revolts had continued in various parts of Antolia. The ties of the 
Kızılbaş tribes with the Ardabil Dergah-Iran had been weakened and Turcoman tribes had 
been dispersed. Some of the Kızılbaş groups had gone underground (Şahin, 2001). 
For their safety, they had to resort to secrecy Takiyye. As their beliefs were 
condemned, they took gnostical forms: secret teachings revealed by esoteric 
interpretation of sacred texts, initiation of the profane, ceremonies held by night in 
hidden places, hermetical language by which adepts could express themselves. 
(Mélikoff, 1998, p. 7) 
The twelver Shi‘a principles had not been completely adopted by the Kızılbaş 
Turcomans. Elements such as love of Ehl-i Beyt (family of Prophet) and Ali, mourning 
for the martyrs of Karbala, twelve imams understanding had been adopted and integrated 
to Kızılbaş culture, beliefs and life styles, but their understanding and practice of these 
principles were much different than twelver Shiism (Üzüm, 1997, p. 41). Kızılbaş groups 
had neither adopted the orthodox versions of twelver Shiism nor the Sunni doctrines and 
practices. 
According to Mélikoff, Kızılbaş communities in the Ottoman Empire have been 
tamed and integrated with the help of the Bektaşi order (Mélikoff, 2006). It is also argued 
that Ottoman central administration had sent and supported the Bektaşi dervishes and 
missionaries to convert the Kızılbaş into the Bektaşi order (Mélikoff, 1975; 2006; 
Faroqhi, 2003, p. 187). Either because of the pressures from the Ottoman center, or 
sympathy or both, many of the Kızılbaş groups joined the Bektaşi order (Faroqhi, 2003). 
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The joining of the Kızılbaş elements to the Bektaşi order was a better and more efficient 
solution for the Ottoman central administration because fighting and trying to suppress 
the Kızılbaş tribes might have been riskier. Many of the Kızılbaş groups had been 
integrated into mainstream Sunni understanding or they choose dissimulation in order to 
protect themselves (Şahin, 2001, p. 39; Üzüm, 1997, p. 11). They continued to resist 
central administration passively; they continued their rituals secretly, and tried to handle 
their disputes with their dedes without resorting to Kadıs. 
Bektaşi teachings are more simplistic and easy to practice, which is one of the 
reasons why it attracted nomadic Turcoman tribes that are more in touch with oral 
culture, having a limited relationship with the written sources of the religion. The joining 
of Kızılbaş elements to the Bektaşi order led to the transformation of the Bektaşi order as 
well (Mélikoff, 1975; 2006, Faroqhi, 2003). Râfızî (heretic) elements including the 
twelver Shiite elements within the Bektaşi order had been increased along with the 
Kızılbaş elements (Mélikoff, 2006, p. 40, Faroqhi, 2003, pp. 186-187). 
2.3.7. Political Reforms in the Late Ottoman Era and Emergence of Alevis as 
Political Actors  
There are not a great deal of official records related to the Kızılbaş Turcomans 
after the late 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries. Generally it is believed that after the Safevi 
influences and Kızılbaş Rebellions, Bektaşilik had also transformed itself. Two main 
characteristics of this stage had been defined as secrecy and integration into Bektaşi 
order. Many of the Kızılbaş groups had been assimilated and changed under the Bektaşi 
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order (Faroqhi, 2003, pp. 188-189). Kızılbaş had either concealed themselves and 
continued their practices secretly in solitary places in different parts of Anatolia or some 
Kızılbaş groups had gradually been integrated into the Bektaşi order. Some of the 
rebellious Kızılbaş groups had been exiled to the newly conquered places in the Balkans 
as a part of the Ottoman Settlement policy. For example, the rebel Turcoman groups that 
joined the Şah Kulu revolts escaped to Safavid Iran, whereas the majority had been exiled 
to Modon and Koron in newly conquered Peloponnessos (Mora) (Mélikoff, 2004, p. 224). 
Because of the inclusion of many of the Râfızî elements into the Bektaşi order, the order 
tried to increase its central control over other dergahs. The Ottoman administration also 
supported and encouraged the central control of the Hacı Bektaş dergah on other zaviyes 
(Faroqhi, 2003). 
With reference to some of the available documents, İlber Ortaylı argued that there 
was not a consistent policy of discrimination and marginalization of Alevi and Bektaşis 
during the Ottoman periods (Ortaylı, 1999, p. 37) except during the reigns of the sultans 
Selim I and Mahmut II
18
. There was rather a consistent policy of avoidance, including 
during the period of the 19
th
 century. Within the ―millet system‖ Kızılbaş were not given 
a status of ―Dhimmi‖ but the Muslim groups with different rituals such as Nusayrî, and 
Durzî were considered Râfizî (heretic). According to Ortaylı this policy of avoidance was 
also related to the official policy that tried to avoid the Alevi-Sunni conflict (Ortaylı, 
1999, p. 37). Alevis were treated like other Muslim subjects but there had been some 
discriminatory practices by ulama and Sunni communities (Ortaylı, 1999). This policy of 
                                                 
18 The name Alevi began being used after 19th century  
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conflict avoidance can also be interpreted as tacit recognition which had never been 
accredited to Shiites that are under Iranian influence. The Ottoman Administration‘s 
treatment of the Nusayrî, or Alevi, as they are also called, was different than the Alevis 
and Kızılbaş of the Anatolia and Balkans (Ortaylı, 1999, p. 40). Faith, rituals and the 
lifestyles of Kızılbaş had not posed serious risks for the Ottoman central administration 
when they stayed away from political contestations. 
There are some records related to the Janissary Corps‘ relations with the Bektaşi 
Order
19
. For the Ottoman central administration the period of apathy and conflict 
avoidance had been replaced by skepticism and disturbance. The politization of the 
Janissary troops increased the pressures of central administration and ulema on the 
Bektaşi order. After the 17th century, Janissary troops started to become politicized. For 
example, Janissary troops played an important role in the imprisonment and the 
assassination of Selim III (1789-1807); they also caused serious troubles for the sultans 
Osman II, Murat IV, Selim III, Mahmut II. The fate of the Bektaşi order was also 
paralleled with the fate of Janissary troops. The general discontent related to politization 
and corruption of the Janissary troops led to the bloody abolishment of Janissary troops in 
1826. Mahmut II closed all the Bektaşi tekke‘s because of the connection of the Bektaşi 
order with the Janissary troops and the property of the order had been confiscated 
(Faroqhi, 2003, p. 190). The ulema played an important role in the political program of 
the Mahmut II and it is also claimed that the ulema‘s opposition to Rafızî movements was 
                                                 
19  Bektaşi Baba‘s accompanied the Janissary troops, in the capacity of chaplains. The Janisseries were sometimes called Sons of Haji Bektaş (Hacı Bektaş 
Oğulları) (Birge, 1965, p. 74). 
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influential in the abolition of the Bektaşi order (Faroqhi, 2003, p. 191). 
Although many ulema were not against the Bektaşi order, especially at the elite 
level, the representations of the sufi teachings at the folk level created problems. When 
explaining the feelings of Bektaşis in relation to Mahmut II‘s attempt to destroy the 
Bektaşi order, Birge quotes the narratives of the Bektaşis in the 1930‘s. Whether it is true 
or not the narrative reflects the bitter feeling of the Bektaşis towards Mahmut II.  
Bektaşis today report that he vowed to execute seventy thousand Bektaşis, and 
that when he could not find that many to behead he ordered headpieces to be cut 
off Bektaşi tombstones until the count should be complete… memory of Mahmut 
II was naturally something at which Bektaşis shuddered. It is said that it became 
their custom to spit and utter a curse whenever they passed the tomb of Mahmut 
on Divan Yolu in Istanbul‖. (Birge, 1965, p. 79) 
The abolution of the Bektaşi order did not completely lead to the disappearance of 
the Bektaşis. Secrecy became the rule and many of the Bektaşi tekkes continued their 
activities (Faroqhi, 2003; Mélikoff, 2006). According to Mélikoff, the closing of the 
Bektaşi lodges in 1826 was not the end of the Bektaşi order; rather, it represented a new 
and a very different stage for Bektaşilik. After 1826, the gap between the Bektaşi and 
Kızılbaş/Alevi started to widen. Afterwards, rural and urban Bektaşis had different fates 
and directions in both the social and political domains until the current revival in the post 
1980 context. Some of the Bektaşi lodges had been given over to the control of other 
tariqa orders such as the Nakşibendi order (Faroqhi, 2003). Especially after the 1839 
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Tanzimat period, the Bektaşi in the cities started to get closer to freemasonry20.  Many 
Bektaşis joined the Freemason Lodge, whereas the endogamous and rural character of the 
Alevi communities in rural contexts started to become clearer after this period. 
Freemasonry was more of a semi-secret and exclusive elite network. Freemason lodges 
were very influential centers among the Ottoman political, religious elites and the 
intellectuals during the 19
th
 century. A period of more strict secrecy for Bektaşis started 
during the republican period, with the 1925 legislation that banned dervish lodges
21 
(Faroqhi, 2003, p. 212). 
The Bektaşi order that resorted to secrecy after 1826 had found refuge among 
Freemasonry that were sharing similar ideals of liberalism, anti-clericalism and 
non-conformism. (Mélikoff, 2006, p. 216) 
2.3.8. CUP (Community of Union and Progress) & Alevis 
Both ―Young Ottomans‖, ―Young Turks‖ and some of the members of the 
Ottoman dynasty
22
 continued to support and sponsor Bektaşis after 1826. Bektaşis also 
supported Young Ottoman and Young Turk movements and the reform movements 
(Ramsaur, 1942). Bektaşis started to play roles in the political life of the late Ottoman 
period under different titles and names. The Tanzimat period (1839-76), and especially 
the declaration of Islahat Fermanı23 (1854) eliminated the legal distinctions between 
Muslims and other religions. The reform movements and the Kanûn-î Esâsî (1876) 
                                                 
20  For a detailed presentation of Bektaşi-Freemasonry relations see Mélikoff‘s article about the Bektaşi order after 1826  in her compilation book (Mélikoff, 
2006).  
21  Tekke ve zaviye 
22  It is believed that Abdülaziz (1861-1876) liked and sponsored Bektaşis. 
23  For the text of the reform http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/reform.htm, retrieved March 23, 2008. 
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(constitutional period) made significant changes in the social and political situations of 
the non-Muslim communities within the domain of the Ottoman State. Kızılbaş on the 
other hand had neither posed threats to the Ottoman Central Administration (except for 
the regions like Dersim where the combination of the Kurdish-Zaza and Alevi identities 
had been intermingled), nor had they benefited from the reforms. It was a period of 
frustration for many Kızılbaş groups. It would be anachronistic to argue that there had 
been a collective consciousness and a movement that claimed some political rights and 
representation with an overarching Alevi identity at that era. Alevi/ Kızılbaş groups had 
been dispersed in Anatolia and lived in isolated places except for the Dersim region 
where there was a concentration of the Kızılbaş-Zaza population. 
With the Pan-Islamism ideology, Abdulhamid II tried to unify the Muslims of the 
Empire and tried to create an identity and consciousness based on Islam. Preachers had 
been sent to Kızılbaş areas and textbooks had been produced to instruct Hanefi schools 
about Sunni Islam (Deringil, 1998, p. 40; quoted in Şahin, 2001, p. 42). This was a major 
change of policy, one of avoidance or denial of Râfızî elements within the domain of the 
Ottoman State. Many Alevis have very negative feelings related to Abdülhamit II‘s Pan-
Islamicist policies since they consider policies related to Alevis to be part of an 
assimilation and homogenization program. There is also a belief among the Alevi 
community that since the period of Abdülhamit II the policy of assimilation of Alevis into 
a majority Hanefi School of Sunni had never been given up. In the Alevi social 
imagination, DIB‘s (Administration of Religious Affairs) policies are considered to be the 
residue of Abdülhamit‘s policy of homogenization of Muslims. The main objective of the 
73 
 
Pan-Islamist policies of the Hamidian period in relation to the Kızılbaş community, 
however, was not to lose them to European powers that were planning to divide the 
Ottoman State. There was a general fear that Kızılbaş especially of the Dersim region, 
could rebel together with the Armenians (Kieser, 2003). 
Non-Muslim millets had gradually been broken up from the Ottoman State with 
the support of European Powers. The Pan-Islamist policy of the incorporation of Alevis 
was defensive in nature but it had been perceived as assimilationist by Alevis since it was 
unable to create a pluralist political environment. Because of their marginalized positions, 
centuries old grievances and unorthodox Islamic beliefs and practices, Alevis have been 
the target of Protestant and Catholic missionaries. For example, in a population statistic 
compiled by Protestant missionaries and subsequently confiscated by the Committee for 
Unity and Progress (CUP) members of Anatolia College in Merzifon, Alevis were listed 
as a former Christian grouping (Kieser, 2003, p. 180). The possibility of a rebellion 
together with other groups such as Armenians or Kızılbaş in cooperation with the 
European powers was the major concern of the Ottoman Central Administration (Kieser 
2005). 
The Young Turk era and CUP administration (1908-1918) led to a considerable 
easing of Alevi-state relations because of the secular nationalist orientations of their 
ideology. The Alevis sympathized with the CUP, the party of the Young Turks, since their 
political vision at that time was seen to be more progressive and inclusive. The CUP had 
the aim of accelerating the process of the secularization of the state, thus limiting the 
influence of the orthodox Islamic establishment. In contrast to Abdulhamit‘s Pan-
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Islamism that tried to integrate Alevis into the ―umma‖ (or in Alevi terms, to assimilate), 
the Young Turks idealized the Alevis as ―true Turks‖. Preserving national Turkish culture 
and religion against foreign (Arabic) influences was one of the objectives of the CUP 
(Massicard, 2007, p. 57). According to Kieser ―for the first time since the Kızılbaş revolts 
in the sixteenth century the watershed of 1908 led the Alevis to an open and collective 
reaffirmation of their identity‖ (Kieser, 2003, p. 178). Kieser defines this period as the 
―Alevi renaissance‖ (Kieser, 2003), Alevis had suddenly turned into actors in the politics 
of the late Ottoman period. 
The Alevi belief system and Kızılbaş groups of Anatolia that were marginalized or 
avoided during the Ottoman times attempted to integrate into the mainstream Islamic 
sphere as a part of nation building project during the CUP period. Baha Sait Bey was 
instructed to research Alevism and Bektaşism (Sait [1926], 1994). The CUP 
administration, which was struggling at that time to contain centrifugal separatist 
tendencies, could not afford to have another group, which had been composed of Muslim 
mostly ethnic Turkish subjects, in the separatist camp. During the Young Turks time, the 
general tone and model of re-interpretation and integration was secular and nationalistic. 
Young Turks preferred to use the term ―Alevi‖ rather than historically loaded term 
Kızılbaş. It was also policy to incorporate Alevis under the aegis of nationalism. By the 
same logic, in Syria during the early Baath Regime, the term ―Nusayrî‖ had been 
transformed into ―Alawi‖ to integrate them under the common umbrella of Islam. 
Sectarian re-naming by secular nationalist elites succeeded in achieving national unity 
(Firro, 2005). 
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The trauma of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and withdrawal of the Ottoman 
State from the Balkans had a deep impact on the CUP administration‘s concerns. 
Skepticism towards separatist elements and an emphasis on national unity had increased 
remarkably after this period. Reform policies and the parliamentarian system could not 
prevent the rapid shrinking of the Empire and loss of the territories in the Middle East 
and the Balkans. The traumatic legacy of the ―foreign conspiracies‖ (Yeğen, 2003) and 
―foreign interventions that support ethnic religious separatism within the Turkish state‖ 
was the residue of the late Ottoman period. The traumas of the Turkish state continue to 
be revisited.  
2.3.9. Alevis and the Turkish Republic 
During the Turkish War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal visited the Hacı Bektaş 
Dergah (convent). On December 23, 1919, Kemal met with two leaders of the order 
(postnişin) Cemalettin Efendi and (post) Salih Niyazi Baba (Şener, 2004, p. 119). The 
Bektaşi leaders promised to support Mustafa Kemal and the National Independence War, 
and made significant contributions during the Independence War
24
. After the 
Independence War, Alevi and Bektaşi leaders joined the Turkish Grand National 
Parliament (TGNP). When the TGNP was opened on April 23, 1920, Cemalettin Çelebi 
served as the Kırşehir representative and deputy president, giving the second most 
important position to a Bektaşi leader. Cemalettin Çelebi and his family had supported 
                                                 
24  Hülya Küçük, ―The Role of the Bektashis in Turkey's National Struggle (Leiden: Brill, 2002)‖. 
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Atatürk and his reforms
25
.In the first TGNP after the Independence War there were 15 
Alevi-Bektaşi representatives from different cities and regions including, the Dersim 
(Tunceli) representative Diyab Ağa and Hasan Hayri Bey (Yılmaz, 2005, p. 71; Şener, 
2004, p. 120).  
Many Bektaşis had also taken elite bureaucratic posts in the early years of the 
Turkish Republic. For the first time in their history, Alevi- Bektaşis had taken active roles 
as governing elite during the Republican era. This is also another important reason why 
Alevi-Bektaşis had embraced the new regime. However Alevi-Bektaşis could not manage 
to transform their peripheral position and become a more central element of the Turkish 
governing elite and society (Ateş, 2006). Integration meant the abandoning of the blood 
and tribe oriented communal ties and religious based organizations which meant 
assimilation for many rural Alevis. On November 20, 1925, Law No. 677 was passed by 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly closing all tekkes (lodge) and zaviyes. It was 
forbidden to use titles such as seyit, şeyh, baba, mürşit, dede, çelebi and halife (Birge, 
1965, p. 84). The fundamental institution of the Bektaşi order had been banned, a 
decision which resulted in significant frustration for the Bektaşis who had expected to be 
a central element in the social and religious life of the new Republic. 
According to the popular belief of Alevis, Mustafa Kemal‘s plans to build a 
secular nation had been supported by Bektaşis26. Bektaşis hoped that they would be 
exempt from the prohibition of dervish orders. Some Bektaşis also expected that, far from 
                                                 
25 Şener provides the text of Veliyettin Çelebi‘s letter supporting Turkish Grand National Assembly and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Cemal Şener, Alevilik Olayi: 
Toplumsal Bir Başkaldırının Kısa Tarihçesi, 35th ed. (İstanbul: Etik Yayınları, 2004: 112-114). 
26  This assumption had been challenged in the study of Hülya Küçük (Küçük, 2002); there were Alevi-Bektaşis that supported the Turkish Independence war but 
some other groups had neither supported the war nor the reforms. This generalization is not a right one. 
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abolishing the order, Bektaşilik should be the religion of the whole Turkish people (Birge, 
1965). This form of Turkish Islam was considered to be a better alternative for the 
Kemalist regime but it was not a convincing alternative that might have been embraced 
by the majority Sunni population. 
The nation building experience after the establishment of the Turkish Republic 
was a nonlinear process which faced several challenges. The overall purpose of the 
Kemalist nation building project was to create an ethnically homogeneous and religiously 
secular modern national identity (Kasaba 1997; Kirişçi 2000; Kadıoğlu, 1996; 1998; 
Taşpınar, 2005; Yıldız, 2001). The Kemalist mission aiming to create a centralized, 
secular and homogeneous Turkish nation-state met the active opposition of religious 
conservatives and ethnic Kurds (Taşpınar, 2005). Also, the rural parts of Anatolia had not 
been affected by the republican reforms as much as the central locations had. In an 
attempt to distance themselves from the Ottoman identity, Kemalist discourse focused on 
―Turkishness‖ rather than Islam as the core of Republican identity. In practice, ―Turk‖ 
meant persons of Sunni Muslim origin (of the Hanefi school), preferably Turkish 
speaking, and preferably from the Balkans (Neyzi, 2003, p. 112). 
The Kemalist nation building experience throughout the 1919-1938 period had 
three different stages (Yıldız, 2001). During the period of National Struggle (Millî 
Mücadele) 1919-1924, Turkish national identity had a religious character. The bond was 
based on Islamic character (Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997; Kirişçi, 2000; Çağaptay 2006b; 
2006a). Religion and ethnic origin at that time were important for creating a common 
ground. The nominal category of being Muslim was more important for creating the 
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Turkish nation than the religious component of the first stage. In that sense, changing the 
general name from Kızılbaş to Alevi was an integrative move. The leaders with the titles 
baba, sheyh, seyit, dede, and tribal leaders were also represented in the first TGNA. 
The second period was between 1924-1929 where the civic republican values and 
bonds had been underlined and religious ties in particular were constrained for the 
purpose of strengthening civic and legal unity (Yıldız, 2001). Religious and sectarian 
allegiances had been seen as a threat to civic ideals and Bektaşi and Alevi lodges had also 
been negatively affected from such a move. During this stage the religious elements had 
been excluded from the social and political context. ―During the third period, 1929-38, 
ethnic references were dominant (Yıldız, 2001, p. 17)‖. It was difficult to homogenize 
Kurdish/ Zaza Alevis of the Dersim region as a part of the Kemalist identity building 
project. Ethnic, sectarian and tribal ties had always been strong in that region. 
Transition from a community oriented organizational form (Gemeinshaft) as in 
the case of rural Alevis, to a modern homogeneous society (Gessellshaft) necessitated a 
transformation of the relationship between individuals with political authorities and with 
each other (Koçan & Öncü, 2004, p. 468). While maintaining their traditional social and 
cultural organization in their isolated rural contexts, Alevis had also been challenged by 
the process of homogenization under the modern secular regime. The regime of isolated 
existence and minimal contact with the ―others‖ during the classical Ottoman Era, which 
was relatively safe for Kızılbaş groups, was no more a sustainable option. Within the 
republican context the civic virtues had also been defined by the regimes and a particular 
understanding of Islam had been reproduced by the Directorate of Religious Affairs and 
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the other state institutions. 
A paradoxical situation for the creation of modern secular identity was that the 
state wanted to exclude religion and other communal identities from politics, while it also 
tried to promote a particular religious identity as means of promoting cultural and social 
solidarity (Koçan & Öncü, 2004, p. 472). Cultural sources and ritual practices of Sunni 
Islam are important components of the Turkish national culture (Ateş, 2006, p. 266), 
which is why those practices and cultural sources had also been incorporated into secular 
Turkish culture. Many Alevis had felt that their cultural practices and way of interpreting 
Islam had been denied by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, which they considered the 
representation of Sunni Islam. 
The ethnic origins of Alevi identity (Turkish) and the relationship of this identity 
to the pre-Islamic Turkish culture had been appreciated by the official identity because 
those sources contributed to the official Turkish historical narrative. On the other hand, 
the ethno-religious dimension of Alevi identity had been recognized (Ateş, 2006). This 
paradoxical situation puts both the Turkish state and Alevi identity into an ambiguous 
relationship. Neither the Turkish state trusted Alevis as the constructive element of 
Turkish national identity nor had Alevis abandoned their ethnic and communal 
allegiances for the sake of the secular civic national identity. Historically the Sunni 
represented the communities that were loyal to the Ottoman state in the rural context and 
Kızılbaş represented the rebellious groups. 
An interpretation of Islam had not been granted to any groups by the Turkish state 
and the official hegemonic definition attempted to transform the other Sunni groups‘ 
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understanding of Islam. Though Alevis had always supported the secularization policies 
of the Turkish Republic they also wanted to be recognized as a different yet equally 
legitimate Islamic group in Turkey. The hegemonic and homogenizing definition of 
official Islam did not give such a privilege to any groups. 
Islamic identity thus became a state institution supplying a specific form of 
cultural existence fused into political citizenship in a uniform way. In this sense, 
the pragmatic political choice of the founding elite during the nation building 
process resulted in the production of a unique model of secular citizenship that 
was culturally exclusionary (Koçan & Öncü, 2004, p. 472). 
Because of their historically marginalized position, recognition of Alevis' differences by 
the state and other communal groups and maintenance of their communal ties were the 
prerequisites for the incorporation of Alevis into the new citizenship model. There were 
emotional as well as cultural barriers for the incorporation of Alevis into the hegemonic 
model of citizenship. 
The loss of the Balkans and other Muslim provinces of the Ottoman Empire after 
the WWI and the emergence of nationalist movements such as Arab nationalism 
necessitated the emphasis on national symbols and ties. References to Central Asian 
culture and religions were important for the construction of the Turkish National identity 
and those references were more visible in the cultural practices of the Alevi Community. 
Baha Sait, who started his research on Kızılbaş and Alevis during the CUP period, had 
positive perspective on Alevis. Baha Sait‘s perspective was from a nationalist point of 
view and he described the Alevi-Bektaşi culture as the authentic Turkish culture, which 
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remained unspoiled by cosmopolitan ideals and Arab culture (Sait [1926], 1994). Baha 
Sait's and the nationalist point of view became more relevant after the establishment of 
the Turkish Republic and the abolishing of the caliphate. The search for authenticity in 
the Central Asian Turkic culture did not work and has been replaced by a new search 
based on the Anatolian cultures and civilizations. 
2.3.10. Alevi-Bektaşis and Kemalism: An Ambiguous Relationship  
Mustafa Kemal‘s coalition with the Alevi-Bektaşi in the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic is an overstated assumption. His encounter and relationships with the 
Bektaşi fathers during this period can be considered as success story. This successful 
encounter and coalition had not deterred him from putting into action his reforms for 
secularization and nationalization after the victory in the National War of Independence. 
Atatürk had not refrained from closing the Bektaşi Lodges within the general agenda of 
the secularization and centralization of the Young Turkish Republic. The Alevi-Bektaşis 
did not perceive this policy as a specific attack on their community and institutions. In 
fact, they argue that this policy was helpful in closing a dysfunctional institution that was 
already spoiled and had been administered by the Nakshbendi order after the closing of 
the Janissary Corps and banning of the Bektaşi order. 
Mustafa Kemal‘s cooperation with the leading figures of the Bektaşi order during 
the Turkish War of Independence and the early years of the republic was a ―glorious 
event‖ for many Alevis who are sympathetic to Atatürk and the Kemalist reforms. For 
some Alevis this cooperation is considered to be similar to the Osman Gazi and Edebali 
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synergy during the establishment of the Ottoman State. The former represented the 
―sword‖ the latter the ―soul and the identity‖ of the Ottoman State. Many Alevis today 
claim in a possessive way Atatürk‘s reforms and main principles of the Turkish Republic 
stating that these principles already represent Alevi-Bektaşi principles and worldview. 
Many Alevis today also argue that Atatürk had been influenced by Alevi-Bektaşi 
teachings because he was in touch with Bektaşi leaders when he was determining the 
founding principles of the Turkish Republic. However, Mustafa Kemal‘s alliance with the 
Bektaşi fathers and Alevi- Bektaşi community seems more likely to be a pragmatic rather 
than an ideological alliance. 
From the 1960's, the alliance between Kemalis and Alevis had been established 
against political Sunnism (or center right parties) and this alliance has been re-established 
and strengthened against a rising political Islam since the 1990‘s (Massicard, 2007). 
Bozarslan for example criticizes the views which argue that Alevilik gave up its 
opposition against the state and become a ―natural ally‖ of the Kemalist Republic in the 
single party period (1923-1945) (Bozarslan, 2003, p. 7). This imaginary alliance does not 
reflect the Kemalist power praxis of the 1920‘s and 1930‘s; Alevis were also marginalized 
as peripheral elements that resisted the homogenization efforts like many other groups 
during this period. The Kemalist-Alevi relationship and proximity had rather been re-
interpreted and even invented by the Turkish intelligentsia in the 1960‘s and 1970‘s 
(Bozarslan, 2003). As the Sunni communities supported right-wing politics, Alevis and 
left-Kemalists started to get closer. Alevis interpreted Atatürk as a revolutionary leader 
that had resisted Western imperialism and had won the struggle, whereas left-Kemalists 
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discovered Alevi-Kızılbaş culture to be a local resource for resistance and revolution. 
The Turkish intelligentsia‘s overture to universality was only possible through its 
legitimization by a local tradition. Alevism was this local resource that, in a 
mythicized and folkloric form that allowed access to universality. The more the 
Sunni community persisted in its support of the right-wing parties that employed 
religious references, the more neo-Kemalism turned towards Alevism to find an 
authentic source of resistanceç (Bozarslan, 2003, p. 7) 
2.3.11. Koçkiri Dersim Revolts and the Return of the Etno-sectarian Confrontation 
During the early years of the Turkish Republic, some Kurdish and Zaza Alevi 
tribes had joined the Koçkiri (1920) and Dersim (1937-1938) rebellions. Although these 
uprising were mainly related to Kurdish ethno-nationalism, tribal ties and the Alevi 
connection were effective in the mobilization of the people (Massicard, 2007). There was 
a definite sense of discontentment in the entire Dersim region toward the nationalistic 
policies of the Young Turks, who were skeptical of a possible Kızılbaş- Armenian 
alliance and rebellion (Kieser, 2003)
27
. Mutual mistrust of the state and Kurdish-Zaza 
Alevis continued even after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. 
The Alevi dimension alone cannot explain the nature of the discontentment and 
the mobilization against the republic (Massicard, 2007, pp. 50-52). It cannot also explain 
the allegiance and support for republican values. Alevis had sympathized with some 
values, principles and laws, whereas they had been highly critical of others, as had the 
                                                 
27  In order to get the support of the Dersim Alevis for the WW I, Young Turks requested the help of Bektaşi Baba of Hacı Bektaş Dergah Cemalettin Çelebi. 
According to Nuri Dersimi, Cemalettin Çelebi had a very limited influence over the Dersim Alevis (Dersimi, 1952, p. 94-103; van Bruinessen, 1996, p. 102) 
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other ethnic and sectarian groups in Turkey. Sometimes the values, principles and laws 
they had shared with the state contradicted with the other groups. For example, the 
principle of secularism was not a common ground between Kurdish Alevis and Islamist 
Kurds. Further, the principle of nationalism was not a common ground between Kurdish 
or Turkish Alevis. These overlapping, crosscutting and sometimes contradicting 
ideological and value oriented preferences and priorities had turned into constant tensions 
among the communities as well. 
What is distinctive in the case of Kurdish Alevis in the Dersim region and the 
Islamist Kurds is that they were much more distanced and they felt much more 
marginalized and disenfranchised than any other groups among the Muslim populations 
of the Turkish Republic. These groups had either been forced to be integrated or had been 
subdued by forced. Some of the tribes had also been forced to migrate to other parts of 
Turkey especially, to western regions. Neither of the ―solutions‖ were helpful for creating 
a sense of belonging or any further commonality. Overall, the essentialist claims that 
argue a perpetual state of conflict and confrontation between the Alevis and the state and 
other social groups does not reflect reality. There had been a flexible area for politics yet 
the Turkish military/bureaucratic establishment was always able to set and define the 
rules of the social and political game. 
Zaza-Kurdish Alevis were torn between their religious and ethnic loyalties
28
. The 
question was whether to support the secular Turkish Republic or to initiate a struggle that 
                                                 
28  van Bruinessen also discusses the paradoxes of the Alevi Kurds in the early years of the Turkish Republic in his essay with a provoking title van Bruinessen 
1997. 
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would claim broader political autonomy. In that case they would not have been supported 
by the Sunni Kurdish groups who were also requesting an enlarged autonomy yet did not 
share the religious beliefs of Kurdish-Zaza Alevis. They might not be supported by the 
Turkish Alevis as well because of the Bektaşi leaders‘ and Turcoman Alevis‘ support for 
―Milli Mücadele‖, and later on, Atatürk‘s project of the modern Turkish Republic. The 
second option was to support the Kurdish ethno-national/ethno-separatist movement. In 
that case as well there was a possibility that they might have been a minority within a 
broader Sunni-Kurdish entity due to their beliefs. A Kurdish nationalist entity might be 
more conservative in terms of its religious beliefs and values than a secular republic. 
Sectarian ties together with the tribal ties were very especially effective in the 
mobilization of Dersim people. The Sheyh Said uprisal (1925), which was a Kurdish 
Islamic movement, had not been supported by the Alevi groups, which manifested the 
religion and sect component of these mass mobilizations
29
. 
During early 1920‘s the Alevi tribes of Zaza and those of Kurdish ethnicity were 
undecided as to either support Turkish or Kurdish nationalism (van Bruinessen, 2000, p. 
77). Some of the groups decided to support Kurdish ethno-nationalism, whereas some 
other Alevi tribes decided to support the Turkish state that promised to create a modern 
secular nation. According to van Bruinessen this was because of the hostile feelings held 
by Alevi Kurds against Sunni Kurds whose views are considered to be fundamentalist, 
                                                 
29
 For the military background and the analysis of the Sheikh Said, Mt Ararat and Dersim rebellions, 
Robert Olsson, The Kurdish Rebellions of Sheikh Said (1925), Mt. Ararat (1930), and Dersim (1937-8): 
Their Impact on the Development of the Turkish Air Force and on Kurdish and Turkish Nationalism.‖ Die 
Welt des Islams 40 (1) 67-94. 
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and are denied Alevi identity (van Bruinessen, 2000). During the Sivas Congress of 
September 4-11, 1919 the leaders of the Kurdish Alevi Koçkiri tribe wanted an 
autonomous government under the Ottoman Federation. The Alevi Kurdish tribes of 
Koçkiri had not recognized the authority of the leadership of Atatürk (Massicard, 2007). 
Koçkiri revolts had not found enough support from the other Kurdish tribes because they 
were Alevis and they had not been supported by the Alevi tribes because they were 
rebelling for the Kurdish cause. The Koçkiri revolt had been suppressed without 
difficulty and the leader of the rebellion Alişer had been executed. It was a Kurdish Alevi 
revolt in which some Turkish Alevi villages and a few Armenians took part. Neither 
Kurdish nor Turkish Sunnis were involved in Koçkiri revolts (Kieser, 2003, p. 184). 
The Koçkiri movement displayed anything but cohesive Alevi support for the 
national war of independence as emphasized by some Alevi authors particularly 
since the 1960‘s (Kieser, 2003). 
The ethno-sectarian revolts of the early republican era were serious threats to the 
young Turkish Republic, in particular the Kurdish/Zaza Alevis‘ resistance to the 
republican regime‘s central control attempts which had led to the Dersim Revolt. In the 
popular narratives of the ethnic Turk Alevis, the Dersim Rebellion is considered to be the 
struggle of the feudal lords of the Dersim against the Turkish State; therefore the 
rebellion is not even partially supported. The traumatic memory of the bloody repression 
of the Dersim Revolt still generaties bitter feelings among Kurdish-Zaza Alevis, as the 
Dersimli‘s events of 1937-1938 had been aimed to repress Dersimli identity, which is 
defined as a rebellious Kızılbaş identity in the report of ―Gendarme General Chiefdom‖ 
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(Dersim, [1935] 1998. 
According to van Bruinessen, Turkey‘s repression of the rebellious Kurdish 
district of the Dersim and the rebellions of 1937-38 represents one of the darkest pages of 
the Republican history (van Bruinessen, 1994). There are Alevis in many parts of Turkey, 
but the beliefs and practices of the Dersim Alevis are different (van Bruinessen, 2000; 
van Bruinessen, 1994). The imposing of a central authority on the Dersim region was also 
one of the important aims of the Republican regime because, historically, there had never 
been a central control over the tribes of Dersim. Although the memory of the Dersim 
events of 1937-38 has an important place in the memory of the Alevis, it is often 
remembered as an ethnic, tribal-Kurdish revolt with a minor sectarian dimension. Van 
Bruinessen also defines the Dersim events as an ethnic campaign to forcibly assimilate 
Kurds (van Bruinessen, 1994; 2000), his controversial definition for the event is 
―ethnicide‖.  
 According to Gendarme General Chiefdom‘s report, the transformation of the 
Turkish speaking Alevis into Zaza, culture was considered a serious threat (Jandarma 
Genel Komutanlığı, [1935] 1998, pp. 38-39). In the same report the Kızılbaş is described 
accordingly: 
Kızılbaş, do not like Sunni, have deep animosity towards the Sunnis, they 
consider Sunnis as eternal enemies. Kızılbaş believe that their leaders (imams) 
had been tortured and killed by Sunnis that‘s why they are hostile to Sunni‘s. For 
Kızılbaş, Turk equals too Sunni, whereas Kurd equals to Kızılbaş (quoted in van 
Bruinessen, 2000, p. 105). 
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The leader of the Dersim Revolt, Seyid Rıza, was a religious leader as well as the chief of 
the Abbasuşağı Tribe. Five other tribes (among hundreds) of the region had joined the 
rebellion (van Bruinessen, 1994). Leader of the rebellion Seyit Rıza and his fifty men had 
been caught and Seyit Rıza had been executed with eleven of his men (van Bruinessen, 
1994). 
Many of the accounts related to Dersim events have been based on Nuri Dersimi‘s 
book. He had also been involved in the early stages of the rebellion and escaped to Syria 
(Dersimi, 2004). In these accounts the rebellion had been presented as nationalistic in 
nature. According to official records ten percent of the entire population of Tunceli had 
died
30
. Many of the rebellious tribes had later been exiled to other parts of Turkey. Van 
Bruinessen also tries to present the case as an ―ethnicide‖, confessing somewhere that the 
Dersim Rebellion shows more of the signs of traditional tribal resistance to government 
interference than a modern struggle for a separate state (van Bruinessen, 1994, p. 4). 
Seyyid Rıza‘s last sentences before his execution have often been presented as the 
proof of the sectarian characteristic of the rebellions. ―Evladı Kerbalayıh. Bihatayıh. 
Ayıptır. Zulümdür‖. Before he was hanged, Seyit Rıza: said, ―we are descendants of 
Kerbala (symbolic reference to Shia and Alevi martyrdom). We have nothing to be 
ashamed of. It is shameful. It is oppression It is murder‖ (White, 2003, p. 19). 
It is not clear whether these sentences were intended to make a sectarian 
statement based on Alevi identity, or to present the plight of himself and his people 
                                                 
30  In the 18th footnote of his study van Bruinessen gives some official sources he wished to keep anonymous. Many of the graphic accounts of violence related to 
the event were from Dersimi‘s book which can be considered ato be an exaggerated and ideologically Kurdish ethno-nationalistic account. 
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regarding the continuation of the Kerbela Massacre of 680 AD. In any case, he parallels 
the attacks of the Turkish military to Yezit‘s31 armies, which were shared equally by both 
Alevi and Sunni communities in Turkey. 
In the contemporary Alevi revival there are many references to the Dersim 
Rebellions of 1937-1938. While the political activists and ex-socialists and Marxists 
underline those rebellions as an example of the Turkish state‘s oppressive attitude and 
assimilationist policies towards Alevis, more nationalistic Alevis consider these rebellions 
to be tribal and ethnic rebellions that had nothing to do with the progressive and 
democratic ideals of the Alevi worldview. For some Alevis, Seyit Rıza had been glorified 
as a heroic figure like Shah Ismail and Pîr Sultan Abdal, who were considered to be 
defenders of the social justice and the rights of Alevi people. Some groups however 
consider him merely to be a tribal leader, yet appreciate his courage and nobility. While 
controversial, Seyit Rıza is an important figure in Alevi iconography. 
Another important point related to the Koçkiri and Dersim Rebellions is that these 
rebellions had taken place during Atatürk‘s32 era, and supporting them meant supporting 
the rebellion against Atatürk. Especially in the post 1960 context, it is not an acceptable 
position for many Alevis to resist Atatürk‘s reforms, the most important being secularism. 
Historically it may be a correct assumption to argue that some Alevis might sympathized 
with the Dersim and Koçkiri revolts, yet many Alevis do not want to be associated with 
                                                 
31  Yezit, Arabic pronunciation ―Yazid‖ is the Umayyad caliph who sent forces against Husayn and his followers in Karbala, Iraq, in 680, resulting in their 
martyrdom. Personification of evil and oppression for Shiis. In the twentieth century the Husayn/Yazid paradigm was used to describe the relationship between the 
oppressed Iranian people and the Pahlavi regime, and between the oppressed Shiis of Lebanon and the landlords, state, and police, "Yazid"  Oxford Dictionary of 
Islam. John L. Esposito, ed. Oxford University Press Inc. 2003. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.  George Mason Law.  25 October 
2009  <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t125.e2536> 
32  Atatürk passed away in November 10 1938 
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such a position for the sake of contemporary Alevi identity politics. Atatürk is a more 
important constructive figure and hero for the contemporary Alevi identity than any other 
rebellious figures in the normative reading of Alevi history. 
2.4. Turkish National Identity and the Alevi Question 
The Kemalist identity building project attempted to create an ethnically 
homogeneous, religiously secularized, and culturally westernized citizenship out of the 
Muslim subjects that were living under the territories of Anatolia and Thrace. The 
objective of the republican modernization project was broader than secularizing the 
political system and institutions; the project intended to create a new state with its 
modern secular institutions as well as a new society (Berkes, 1964). Ethnic, sectarian and 
religious oriented differences and affiliations would eventually become irrelevant if this 
top-down social and political engineering master plan was successful. The Kemalist 
identity building project promised a better and brighter future for all the citizens of the 
Republic of Turkey, but the traditional loyalties and values were impediments to the 
modern enlightenment notion of the future. Alevis, who suffered social, economic and 
sectarian persecutions and oppressions during the Ottoman era, were excited about this 
new modern, secular project. However, the traditional loyalties of Alevis were also a 
threat to the ideal vision of a modern Turkish national identity. 
In civic terms, the definition of ―Turk‖ was remade and the political meaning of 
was stripped of its ethnic connotations. All citizens of the Turkish State were considered 
to be constitutionally Turk. By formulating the definition of Turk in civic terms the 
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ethnic and linguistic differences of Kurds, Pomaks, Laz and other Muslim ethnic groups 
were also denied. The religious common ground was used instrumentally to neutralize 
ethnic differences and variations. Just like the civic notion of ―Turk,‖ the definition of 
―Muslim‖ has been re-conceptualized according to the needs of the Kemalist identity 
building project. 
The Turkish nationalist movement starting from the late Ottoman period 
identified itself with Turkish speaking Muslims (Kirişçi, 2000), predominantly the 
―secularist oriented Muslims of the Balkan peninsula.‖ The concept of ―Turkishness‖ 
according to Kemalist nationalism was based on the complex juxtaposition of territory, 
religion and ethnicity (Çağaptay, 2006a). The territorial limits of the Turkish nation 
included Anatolia and Thrace (Çağaptay, 2006a; 2006b). Loyalty to the Anatolia 
homeland and the ―Turkish nation‖ that inhabit the homeland is one of the fundamental 
tenets of the Turkish national identity (Kushner, 1997, p. 222). The narrative of a 
common homeland was a valuable asset for the Turkish bureaucracy for maintaining the 
loyalties of the Alevi citizens, since many Alevis have strong emotional and cultural 
attachments to the Anatolian homeland. 
With the Lausanne Treaty (1923), the non-Muslim groups were granted minority 
status and the Muslim subjects, regardless of the variations in their understandings, are 
now nominally considered part of the civic definition of the Turkish nation. Forcefully 
and/or voluntarily, many Turks and Muslims migrated to Turkey from the Balkans in 
1920s (Çağaptay 2006b; Kirişçi 2000). Religion and language played important roles in 
the incorporation of the immigrants to the ―Turkish nation.‖ Neyzi (2002, p.138) argues 
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that the Turkish national identity was ―based on modernist values predicated on a 
rejection of tradition, yet the Turkishness continued to be defined vis-à-vis Sunni Muslim 
heritage identified with an imagined Turkish ethnicity.‖ The Sunni groups of Anatolia 
had historically represented the loyalty to the Ottoman State and Sunni theology, and fıqh 
of Hanafi (madhab) was the official ideology in the Ottoman era. Religion did not play 
the similar consolidative role in incorporating Alevis into the national identity of the 
Republic of Turkey. The republican ideal and the promise of a secularized society, rather 
than religious common ground, played a role in incorporating Alevis into the republican 
social and political order. 
While attempting to ethnically and religiously homogenize Turkish society, the 
meaning of ―Muslim‖ has been stripped of its political and cultural connotations 
(Davison, 2003). Thus, Islam turned into a nominal category of belonging within the 
context of the Kemalist identity building project. The content of the religion was re-
mastered according to the needs of the regime. DİB was established to keep the religion 
under the tutelage of the state. By this means, the Turkish state facilitated, monitored and 
constrained certain religious activities. Despite the secularist political environment, the 
peripheral position of the Alevi understanding of Islam continued during the republican 
era as well. 
The ideal practical definition of Turkish citizenship was based on the criteria of 
being ―Turkish speaking, preferably from the Balkans,‖ ―nominally Sunni-Muslim of 
Hanefi sect,‖ and in terms of political culture and life style, ―secular, and pro-western.‖ 
Kurds, Islamists, and conservative Sunnis and Alevis remained at the margins of this 
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ideal definition. Since the wide majority of Alevis were ethnically Turk and ―pro-secular‖ 
or ―anti-Islamist/anti-sharia‖ they were less reluctant to participate in the Kemalist civic 
identity project until 1960s. On the other hand, the nominal definition of Islam was based 
on the Hanefi-Sunni understanding of Islam, which was also represented in the DIB. The 
abolition of the Caliphate and Sharia and the creation of a unified education system in the 
early years of the Turkish Republic did not completely wipe Islam out of the public 
sphere. Instead, the regime ―created a new structure of control and oversight between the 
state and Islam in which the republic's founders sought to use the powers of the state to 
interpret, oversee, and administer (including financially) religious doctrine and practice‖ 
(Davison, 2003, p. 15). Most Alevis criticized the state sponsored and monitored 
administration of religious services; they consider this contradictory to the principle of 
―laiklik.‖ Alevis started to feel more secure under this new regime because of its secular 
commitments and strict control over religious activities. 
The modernization and homogenization projects could not succeed in making 
Turkey part of the ―civilized nations of the West.‖ ―The Turkish experience rather 
culminated in economic backwardness and social flux, with Muslim and secularist, Turk 
and Kurd, reason and faith, rural and urban divides‖ Kasaba (1997, p. 3). Rather than 
creating a homogeneous and well-integrated definition of ―us,‖ or a ―Turkish nation,‖ this 
policy ended up generating a divided society where the old and new identities see each 
other in antagonistic and dialectic ways. In Huntington‘s (1992) terms, Turkey became a 
torn country; torn between modernist and pro-Western ideals and strong traditional 
loyalties. Kurds, Alevis, Islamists and conservative Islamic groups all felt marginalized in 
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different ways, yet none of these groups made an effort to empathize with each others‘ 
marginalization and sufferings. 
Within this polarized system, Alevis embraced secularist principles. They were 
predominantly rural and lived in the economically underdeveloped parts of Turkey. The 
main disappointment of the Alevi communities was the setbacks in the radical ―top-
down‖ secularization processes. Kurds were denied and marginalized because of their 
language and ethnic backgrounds; Islamists and conservative Sunni communities were 
marginalized on a religious basis as being seen as obstacles to secularization. Alevis were 
marginalized because of their sectarian orientations and their historically peripheral 
position. None of these marginalized groups sympathized with each other, instead the 
alternative Alevi identity was essentially the conservative Sunni and Islamist. The main 
reason for the skepticism against Alevis however was massive scale Alevi involvement in 
radical left movements. 
The gradual concessions to Islamic activities in the public sphere, especially the 
emergence of the Islamic oriented political parties; the growing influence of the DİB in 
the religious affairs; the spread of Imam Hatip Schools, which have intense religious 
training; and the strengthening of Islamic communities and civil society organizations all 
led to deep disappointments for Alevis. These developments contradicted the ―tacit‖ 
social and political contracts between Alevis with the Kemalist regime. Their contract 
was based on the ideal of a modern, secular and Westernized Turkish nation. With the 
military coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980 and the recent coup of February 28 1997, the 
Turkish military bureaucratic establishment tried to force Turkish society and politics 
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back into its Kemalist orientations. Ethnic variation, Islamic identity claims, alternative 
political visions and sectarian differences were suppressed for maintaining the notion of 
homogeneous civic nationalism. Despite the legacy of Kızılbaş (rebel) stigma, Alevi 
citizens who embraced the Kemalist principles have been promoted to the ranks of 
bureaucracy. Whereas like many other groups, which do not fit to the ideal definition of 
Turkish national identity, Alevis who tried to maintain their traditional life style and 
rituals experienced marginalization in many aspects of their daily lives. 
2.5. Alevis in the Multi Party Period: From Left-Kemalism to Marxism 
The Single party period (1923-1950) has often been referred as the golden age of 
the Turkish Republic in the narratives of Alevis that feel loyalty to Kemalism. The Alevi 
groups that feel close to revolutionary Marxism, Kurdish ethno-nationalism, liberal 
democracy and EU integration had a different and less sympathetic view related to the 
same period than did the majority of the Alevis. The top down process of cultural 
modernization and secularization has been appreciated and seen as a pathway to 
Anatolian enlightenment that would modernize the Sunni communities as well and make 
the Alevi-Sunni difference meaningless. Islamic culture and identity was seen as a 
divisive factor between Alevis and Sunnis and other ethnic and religious groups in 
Turkey, rather than as a common ground. The way to untangle and deal with these 
divisions was seen as the process of comprehensive enlightenment, secularization and 
modernization. Alevis in general were less resistant to secularization compared to Sunnis. 
These policies had not transformed the cultural, political and economic landscape for the 
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rural Alevis. The outcome of the selective appreciation of Alevi culture and Turkish 
folklore in order to create national identity and culture was the reintegration of Alevi-
Bektaşi into Islamic culture (Massicard, 2007, p. 45). In order to contain and control the 
religious groups, the Turkish state itself decided to direct the religious institutions 
through the DİB (Administration of Religious Affairs). 
Köy Enstitüleri (village institutes) were important institutions in accomplishing 
rurally based Anatolian enlightenment and the project of creating citizens for the new 
republic. The Kemalist official ideology provided grounds for the incorporation of many 
Alevis, but despite this fact their process of modernization and integration was slower 
than was the Sunnis (Shankland, 2003). Etatism of the Alevi community has been 
described as ―tekke socialism‖ even by RPP politicians of the time (quoted in Massicard, 
2007, p. 47). There had also been a fear during the later years of the single party period 
that Alevis might turn into communists. 
 The Alevi appreciation of the single party regime is not a well established 
argument. They only had instrumental values in a struggle to pacify or to contain 
Islamicist and ultra conservative groups in Turkey. The Kemalist repression of Sunnism 
did not necessarily have any direct beneficial influence on the Alevis. Alevi author and 
politician Reha Çamuroğlu defines the period as a romantic appreciation without much 
real substance. 
The Alevi Paradise Anatolia of the single party regime is a country of tales which 
gives enjoyment to those who lived there (Çamuroğlu, 1998, p. 14). 
Bozarslan mentions that Kemalist anti-Sunnism was in no way synonymous with Alevi 
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emancipation (Bozarslan, 2003, p. 9). 
In the aftermath of the WWII İsmet İnönü understood that the world changed 
radically as a result of the victory of the Allies over fascism (Ahmad, 2003). The Turkish 
political system lacked an opposition party and other civilian democratic institutions. A 
Multi party system and legal institutions of opposition were a requirement within the new 
world order. Support of the newly emerging bourgeoisie, landlords and military 
bureaucracy, as well as the capital flow from the new superpower America, could only be 
possible with a multi party regime (Bozarslan, 2003). The Multi Party period was an 
period for Alevis; for the first time they had a chance to organize around modern 
institutions such as political parties or other interest groups. The developments in the 
international arena as well had pushed Turkey for a search for Western alliance. 
During the single party period there was a symbiotic relationship between RPP 
and the state (Benli-Altunışık & Tür, 2005, p. 25). This symbiotic relationship did not 
need a popular support base. In January 1946, the new Democrat Party (DP) was 
established by four prominent members of the RPP
33
. The RPP was supporting the statist, 
centralized administration with a strictly secularist polity, whereas the DP supported a 
decentralized administration with more emphasis on private entrepreneurship. Freedom 
of speech and a less strict version of secularism was also supported by the DP (Ahmad, 
2003; Benli-Altunışık & Tür, 2005). 
Because of the more liberal discourses of the DP and policies related to rural 
development and democratization, and an expectation for positive social change, many 
                                                 
33  Adnan Menderes was a landowner, Fuad Köprülü a prominent professor, Refik Koraltan a bureoucrat and Celal Bayar, businessman and banker. 
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Alevis had supported the DP in the early 1950‘s (Schüler, 1999, p. 16). Some of the 
leading figures of the Alevi community had taken roles within DP
34
. This was not an 
ideological alliance or commitment based on the values of the DP. There was not much of 
a controversy between the principles of the DP and the Kemalist doctrines in the early 
years of the multi party period. Many Alevis found the promises and pro-liberal attitude 
of the DP convincing. In order to get support they got in touch with the leaders of the 
tariqats religious communities and organized some coalitions. During this time the Nur 
movement, which was a predominantly Sunni religious-social movement, had supported 
the DP and some of the DP ministers openly supported the Nur Movement (Cemaat). The 
engagement policy of the DP with the conservative Sunni religious groups alienated the 
Alevi community; it was impossible to get support of both Alevi and Sunni social 
movements at the same time. The 1957 elections were a turning point in terms of Alevi 
groups‘ support for the DP (Schüler, 1999, pp. 162-3; Massicard, 2007). 
Many Alevis perceived the right wing political party‘s tendency to weaken the 
principles of secularism as a return to Ottoman legacy which was interpreted as a period 
of marginalization and discrimination for Alevis. Alevi groups also became more 
skeptical about the political and economic liberalization in Turkey after the early years of 
the DP administration. Liberalization attempts in the economic sphere could not improve 
the social and economic conditions for emerging working class Alevis. They also had 
been perceived as a secret agenda of returning to the ancient regime and bringing the 
sharia, or religious oriented order back. The laws that allowed the ezan (call to prayer) in 
                                                 
34 CEM Foundation‘s president İzzettin Doğan‘s father Hüseyin Doğan Dede, was an MP of right wing Democrat Party (DP). 
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Arabic, opening of theology faculties, opening of imam hatip schools – all policies that 
were supported by DP – had changed the Alevi‘s perceptions of right wing politics 
negatively. The popularization of religious discourses has been considered to be a 
betrayal of the republican values and principles. Overall the political struggle based on 
religious or sectarian arguments have not served the interests of the Alevi community. 
The nature of Alevi incorporation into the Republican regime in the early periods 
was much different than the nature of the incorporation of other Sunni Muslim 
populations of the Ottoman Empire that remained under the territories of Turkish 
Republic. Although the republican regime was secular and nationalist by nature, religion 
was important as the social glue that played a role in the identification of people with the 
Turkish State. Muslim populations from the Balkans, Caucasus and other parts of the 
Middle East incorporated under religious common grounds, whereas the Alevis, the wide 
majority of whom are ethnic Turks, had been incorporated with the promise of 
secularization and with an emphasis on civic values. Especially in the early period of the 
Milli Mücadele (national struggle for independence) (1919-1924), religion was an 
important element of the construction of Turkish national identity. In the ensuing periods, 
however, ethnic (Turkish) and secular elements had been emphasized in the Turkish 
national identity construction. 
As the Kemalist principles enforced secularization and excluded the religious 
symbols and dimensions of Turkish national identity, Alevis started to feel more loyal and 
more attached to the Kemalist regime. As the political regime transformed into a multi-
party democracy, religion started to play a more important role in the political sphere. It 
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had taken a decade for Alevis to adopt the realities of multi party politics and they finally 
aligned themselves with the leftist political agenda. Adaptation to a new, modern, urban 
social, cultural and economic context however was a much more difficult and 
complicated process. 
2.6. Ambiguity of the Essence and Past 
The historical account that is presented in this chapter is based on the research 
which I find academically most convincing and rigorous. The traumatic episodes and 
historical turning points that I highlighted in this chapter are those that I believe play an 
important role in the shaping of the Alevi collective narratives. Alevi/Kızılbaş tradition is 
a heterodox and syncretistic tradition that has been influenced by a multiplicity of sources 
including the pre-Islamic Turkic traditions, Asiatic religions, Christianity, Twelver Shiism 
and some of the Enlightenment values. Secularism, Socialism, Kemalism and ideas of 
human rights and anti-imperialism have recently been added to the overall Alevi value 
system. These eclectic and dynamic values became the sources of Alevi identity. Trying 
to find the essence of Alevi identity and Alevi culture without these eclectic elements is a 
futile effort. 
We do not have evidences to confirm the arguments that assume the existence of 
historically deep-rooted communal confrontations between Alevi and Sunni groups in 
Anatolia. Many Sunni groups had also participated in the social and economic rebellions 
during the Ottoman Era. Alevi and Sunni communities however lived like separate 
entities with minimal contact. 
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One of the common assumptions related to ―Alevi/ Kızılbaş‖ is that communities 
have always experienced problems with the ―state‖ or ―central administrations or 
bureaucracy‖. It is true that Alevis had been at the margins and the periphery of the 
Ottoman and Seljukid societies but there was not a targeted discrimination policy due to 
their beliefs and culture. Major violent contentions had been experienced such as Babaî 
Revolts, Celali Revolts, Şahkulu Revolts, Kalenderoğlu Revolts and the Kızılbaş 
Massacres during Selim 1, Shah Ismail Confrontation. Social and economic discontent, as 
well as Messianic tendencies were the drives behind these rebellions. The religious 
beliefs and worldviews of Kızılbaş were emphasized to legitimize harsh repressions 
during the Ottoman era. One additional important matter is that there had been no 
overarching notion of ―Alevi identity and solidarity‖ during the Ottoman Era. The 
overarching consciousness based on the notion of Alevi identity is a very recent idea.  
Loyalties of the Kızılbaş groups to Ottoman Sultans have been questioned mainly 
because of their sympathy and support to the ―Safavid enemy‖. There was not a 
permanent ongoing confrontation between Alevi communities and the Ottoman State, 
though the loyalty of the Kızılbaş has always been questioned by the central 
administrations including the late Ottoman Era. There has also been deep mistrust with 
regard to the central administrations within Kızılbaş groups. Many of these stereotypes 
and misconceptions continued during the Republican Era as well. The situation for 
Bektaşi's were different; they were the urban elite and the spiritual guide of the Janissary 
Corps. The Bektaşi order also suffered with the decline of the Janissary Corps. The 
establishment of the Turkish Republic by Atatürk was a major turning point and source of 
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relief for Alevis. Despite the traumatic memories of the Dersim and Koçkiri rebellions of 
Kurdish/ Zaza, Alevis embraced certain aspects of the modern, secular Turkish Republic. 
The Kemalist-Alevi/Bektaşi alliance during the early republican era however is an 
overstatement. 
Adapting the modern urban social and political environment and reproducing the 
Alevi identity and culture in new environments has been the major challenge to Alevis 
since the 1950s. In the next chapter, the dynamics of the social, economic and cultural 
change that started in the early 1960‘s, and its influences on Alevi identity will be 
elaborated. 
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Chapter 3 
State, Violence and Social Mobility: Transformation of the Dynamics of Alevi 
Politics in post 1960 Turkey 
 
 
 This chapter tackles the social and political changes that the Alevi communities 
have been going through in the context of post-1960 Turkey. Accompanying the rapid 
urbanization and the swift transformation of the social and economic structure of the 
Alevi communities in this period, politicization and institutional development made 
formative influences on the nature of Alevi identity. More importantly, the episodes of 
ideological/sectarian violence in the 1970s and the traumatic experiences of Sivas Events 
(1993), Gazi Riots (1995), and Güner Ümit Affair (1995) reminded many Alevis of their 
collective fears and traumatic memories. Even though the literature on the Alevi revival 
often take the late 1980s as the starting point, the background of the revival cannot be 
grasped thoroughly unless the social and political processes, such as urbanization, 
migration, politization, experiences of violent confrontations and impact of Turkey's EU 
candidacy processes are examined. Many Alevi individuals and organizations are 
increasingly sympathizing with the trend of secular-nationalism (ulusalcılık), which 
primarily emerged as an umbrella ideology against the AKP administration. This is an 
ongoing trend despite the AKP government‘s new engagement policy regarding Alevi 
communities and organizations. 
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 Politicization in the 1960‘s early institutions of Identity Politics 
 Venture to the left, Marxism and Alevilik in the 1970 and 80‘s 
 Post 1980 change and transforming of Alevilik, Kemalism, Secularism and the 
politics of the Alevi identity 
 Sivas Events and Gazi Riots 
 EU integration process and legal struggle for group rights 
 Alevis during the AKP era, and the emergence of secular-nationalist (Ulusalcı) 
discourse 
 Alevi politics during AKP administration 
3.1. 1960’s and the Early Periods of the Identity Movement 
The May 27, 1960 military coup was an important turning point for the early 
organization and politization of the newly urbanizing Alevi community. The coup was an 
intervention in the short lived multi-party experience where the rightist DP administration 
had been overthrown by the middle rank officers (Ahmad, 2003; Zürcher, 2004). Adnan 
Menderes, the leader of the DP and the prime minister started to lose popularity because 
of the economic deterioration and his authoritarian tendencies. His execution, together 
with minister of foreign affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and minister of finance Hasan Polatkan, 
was one of the darkest pages of the Turkish political history. The Military Coup dissolved 
the democracy and abolished the DP. Many members of the DP were tried on the bases of 
corruption and unconstitutional rule. According to the military junta that called itself the 
―National Unity Committee‖ (NUC) the DP lost its legality because they failed to respect 
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the constitution and other institutions such as the press, the armed forces and the 
universities (Ahmad, 2003, p. 121). The NUC proposed a new constitution, a new 
electoral law, and new laws and institutions including a bicameral parliament and the 
constitutional court that would monitor authoritarian tendencies. The main concern of 
many Alevis during the DP administration was the increase in anti-secular tendencies and 
the regime‘s possible digression from Atatürk‘s principles. Alevis had not been affected 
negatively by the 1960 coup as much as the other segments of Turkish society. 
The 1961 constitution, which was considered to be one of the most liberal 
constitutions of the Turkish Republic, was a major change that allowed for the flourishing 
of political parties and civil society organizations including the Alevi associations. Both 
legal and illegal social and political organizations had mushroomed and spread all over 
Turkey. Labor Unions, especially left wing (DİSK), hometown (hemşehri) organizations, 
illegal extreme left organizations (TIKKO, DHKP-C, DEVSOL, TKP), the Alevi party 
Türkiye Birlik Partisi (TBP) and some Alevi associations were the venues where the 
Alevis were organized. Especially for the Alevi groups that were migrating to the cities, 
the new organizational structures were important channels for maintaining their rural 
based solidarities. 
Subsequent generations of social and economic groups among Alevis organized 
into different institutions during this period. Young Alevis were clustered around left and 
extreme left organizations and first generation workers around labor unions, whereas first 
generation urban immigrants in the small business and service sector organized around 
hometown associations. There was also a wide majority of unaffiliated, unorganized 
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Alevi citizens, who preferred to conceal their identities because of fear of discrimination 
and marginalization. Institutional diversification and competition during this period also 
created tensions among various segments. The traditional Alevi institutions and 
traditional forms of relationships started to decline during this period. 
3.2. Changing Social and Economic Landscapes: Migration to Cities and Europe 
Migration had at least as significant social and political consequences for the 
Alevi community as did the transformation into a multi-party regime. Migration and 
integration to the urban context started to change the social structure of the Alevi 
community. The economic reforms during the DP administration increased the social 
mobility and the speed of migration. Migration became a compulsory process for many 
Alevis after the 1960s because of the difficulty to survive socially and economically in 
rural contexts. The formation of Köy Enstitü‘s35 (village institutes) was mainly the policy 
of CHP (Republican People‘s Party) and were appreciated and supported by the Alevi 
groups. Rural revival and development was seen as a pathway to modernization, 
secularization and economic development. The consequence of the failure of these 
projects was the acceleration of migration to the cities and Europe. In fact, the 
abandoning of the policy of rural based enlightenment and development had opened new 
avenues to the Alevi community. Communication channels, education, industrialization 
and massive scale migrations to the big cities transformed the Alevi society like many 
other groups in Turkey (Karpat, 1976). 
                                                 
35 For the further background infor mation about village institutes Kirby, 1960 [2000]; Canboğa, 1980. 
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Immigration to Europe
36
, mainly to Gemany, France and The Netherlands was an 
important trend. In order to maintain its rapid growth, the German economy needed a 
large population of foreign workers in the aftermath of WWII. The Turkish and German 
governments reached a special agreement in 1961 that allowed labor immigration from 
Turkey to Germany. There was an uneven distribution of the Alevi within the group of 
immigrant workers (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 40). Labor migrations had been stopped in 1973, 
but because of the family unions, exiles and asylum requests by left wing militants in the 
aftermath of the 1980 coup and political asylums of Kurdish political activists beginning 
in the late 1980‘s, the total population of Turkish workers in Germany continued to 
increase. Alevis engaged extensively in the leftist political struggle and many of the 
activists had sought political asylum in Germany, which is why they had been 
overrepresented in the group of late immigrants (Sökefeld, 2008). 
One of the reasons why Alevis had been affected more from internal and external 
migration and trends of social transformation is that Alevis used to be a more 
homogeneous society with a clear social organization in the rural contexts. Dede‟s were 
both communal leaders and they lead religious rituals within the rural Anatolia. There 
was a strict social control mechanism with the institutions of ―halk mahkemeleri37 (folk 
trials)‖ and ―musahiplik38‖. These institutions guided and helped the maintenance of the 
social integrity of Alevi groups. Migration from the rural context to the urban context 
represented a transformation from a communal (gemeinshaft) order to a social order 
                                                 
36 Nermin Abadan-Unat (1995); Ruth Mandel, (1990; 1993; 2008); Philip L. Martin, (1991). 
37 Halk mahkemeleri (folk trials) is a system of informal ritual dispute resolution mechanism among Alevi communities which is an alternative to formal legal 
procedures. 
38 Musahiplik is a form of ritual kinship which was one of the fundamental institutions of rural Alevi culture. 
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(gesselshaft). 
Education is a very important instrument for the social mobility of the Alevi 
community. Many of the unskilled and uneducated Alevis had been employed as workers 
and other low prestige jobs in the early years of urban experiment. But the second 
generation Alevis emphasized education to improve their social position and prestige. 
They became doctors, teachers, lawyers and engineers, and reached positions as 
successful entrepreneurs. The majority of the newly immigrated Alevis, however, had 
been employed as workers in industry and factories. In order not to be discriminated 
against, some of the Alevis hid their identity at their work places and in their 
neighborhoods
39
. Labor union activism was grounds for the organization of Alevi 
citizens. Party organizations, especially the left wing parties were also getting more 
important for the aggregation of political and economic interests. A social support base 
and solidarity had been maintained in terms of village and hometown networks in 
gecekondu neighborhoods (Erman, 1998; 2001). These hometown networks helped for 
finding jobs, accommodations and the providing of basic needs for the new immigrants. 
These networks maintained social solidarity and cooperation among the Alevi 
citizens. This also brought a fragmentation and postponement of the formation of a 
collective Alevi consciousness, mainly because the hometown networks had been 
developed based on exclusionary membership mentality (Toumarkine, 2005). For the 
Marxist discourse, which was popular among newly urbanized Alevis that were organized 
around labor unions and students, Alevi rituals and ties had been considered unnecessary 
                                                 
39 Personal accounts related to the discrimination practices will be provided in chapter 7. 
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and archaic. In the early years of urbanization, survival and economic issues were a 
priority for many Alevis, which is why the faith based encompassing organizations had 
not been established during this period. 
3.3. Alevis and Politics in the Aftermath of 1960 Coup 
 The early political organization of the Alevi community can be traced back to the 
time just after the transition of the political regime to civilian rule in 1961. The DP had 
been closed down after the 1960 military coup, yet the popular support behind the party 
was still remarkable. The Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP) and the New Turkey Party 
(Yeni Türkiye Partisi YTP) were heirs of the DP. In the 1961 general election, these 
parties won 48.5 per cent of the vote (AP 34.8 and YTP 13.7) (Ahmad, 2003, p. 127). The 
military elite did not allow for a neo-DP government and AP and CHP formed a coalition. 
The Alevi issue used to be taboo or untouchable until that time but it started to appear 
more frequently in the public arena after this period. In 1963 the president Cemal Gürsel 
wanted to reform the DİB and wanted to establish a bureau that would represent all the 
mezheps (sects). The right wing media was particularly reactionary to the idea of a 
―bureau of sects‖ under the DİB and started to criticize the government and Alevis. Some 
people argued that there are no Alevis and Shiites in Turkey and Alevilik cannot be 
considered a part of Islam (Şahin, 2001, p. 50; Massicard, 2007, p. 55; Kaleli, 2000, p. 
17). One of the newspapers Express which is published in İzmir had provoking and 
offensive comments that disturbed the members of the Alevi community. 
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Who can guarantee that Kızılbaş would not attempt to perform ―mum söndü40‖ in 
our mosques (quoted in Şahin, 2001, p. 50; 55; Kaleli, 2000, p. 17). 
Other provoking statements in the media had followed up. A group of Alevi 
students came together to prepare a manifesto against the pejorative and discriminatory 
statement in the right wing media. Four leading names that signed the declaration were: 
Mustafa Timisi, Seyfi Oktay, Ali İhsan and Engin Dikmen (Şahin, 2001, p. 50). The 
manifesto was the first document that used the ―Alevi‖ term publicly (Massicard, 2007). 
The declaration criticized the nonnense accusations against the Alevis, and at the end 
emphasized the Alevis loyalty to the Kemalism
41
. The declaration created a public 
awareness about Alevis. Conferences were held in universities to discuss Turkish 
secularism and Alevi reality in Turkey. In the 1960s Alevis hid their identity because of 
the ignorance and biases against the Alevi community, and Alevis preferred to present 
themselves as the watch guards of Kemalist principles. The notion of ―watch guard of 
Kemalist principles‖ was mentioned frequently during the time and contributed some 
legitimacy to Alevi claims and institutionalization during the 1960‘s. The leaders of the 
early Alevi institutionalization were aware of the fact that religious or ethnic oriented 
claim making would not grant them a legitimate space for social and political activism. 
One of the earliest attempts for the institutionalization of the Alevi community 
was the establishment of Hacıbektaş Turizm Tanıtma Derneği (Hacı Bektaş Tourism and 
Presentation Association) in 1963. It was established under the guise of the tourism and 
                                                 
40  Mumsöndü means literally ―extinguish candles‖ but refers to orgy and sexual perversion which is one of the common stereotypes and slanders against Alevis.  
41  Even in the most savage tribes, it is not observed that these accusations are relevant human feelings and values. It is clear that making separatism among 
citizens that are ethnically Turk and Muslim with sectarian differences, instead of making efforts for the unity in this land, has no benefit and does nothing but serve 
to damage national interests.  
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public presentation office since it was still forbidden to organize under the Alevi name. 
The Hacıbektaş Turizm Tanıtma Derneği had the aim of presenting and publicizing 
Hacıbektaş Veli and Semah‘s which are the folkloric rites of the Alevi community. 
HBTTD organized a Cem ceremony with the participation of famous folk poems (ozan) 
Aşık Veysel, Aşık Davut Sulari, Aşık Daimi, Aşık Feyzullah Çınar, Aşık Mahzuni Şerif 
(Kaleli, 2000, p. 18). The Cem ceremony attracted the attention of many Alevis. In 1964, 
the Hacı Bektaş Shrine, which was closed after the enactment of a law that banned ―tekke 
zaviyes‖ in 1925, had been opened as a museum and Hacı Bektaş Festival had been 
initiated (Massicard, 2005; Salman, 2005
42
). Another important development related to 
the institutionalization of the Alevi community was the establishment of the Alevi 
periodical Cem in 1966 by Abidin Özgünay
43
. Cem continued to be published until 1969. 
Cem was silent until its second launch in 1991; however it had been halted in 1999. The 
weekly journal, Ehl-i Beyt Yolu, was published during the same period and was closed in 
1971. 
3.3.1. The Experience with Alevi Political Party TBP 
Massicard mentions a process of rapprochement between Bektaşis and Alevis in 
the early 1960‘s (Massicard, 2007, p. 56). Since Bektaşi lodges had been closed, the 
Bektaşi order had been organized underground and little documentation exists other than 
the accounts of people that experienced the period. Bektaşilik is less of a popular or 
                                                 
42  Meral Salman has written anMA thesis where she elaborates on the political, religious, cultural and social aspects of Hacı Bektaş Veli Memorial Ceremonies. 
Salman claims that those ceremonies served to represnt creation with symbols and signs about Alevi-Bektaşi identity. The transformation of the image of Hacı Bektaş 
Veli had been transformed due to updated identity needs of the Alevi-Bektaşi comunity. 
43  Murat Okan presents a comprehensive evaluation related to the history, transformation and the thematic contents of Cem (Okan, 2004, pp. 127-143) 
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political movement but it attracted some of the new urban educated Alevis and some 
Sunnis as well. The first Alevi political party Türkiye Birlik Partisi (Turkish Union Party) 
had been established in 1966 (Schüler, 1999; Ata, 2007; Güler, 2008). It was clearly a 
sect based party, represented by the emblem twelve stars and a lion which symbolize the 
twelve imams and Ali. Equality for the beliefs and sects, freedom for religious and ritual 
practices and commitment to Atatürk‘s principles were emphasized in the program of the 
party
44
. 
In the first election in which it participated, in 1969, the party received 2.8% of 
the votes and eight seats
45
 in the parliament. The first secretary general of the party was 
Tahsin Berkmen, who was a retired general (Kaleli, 2000; Güler, 2008; Ata, 2007). The 
emergence of the party and its performance in the general elections had contradictory 
results for the Alevi community. There were rumors that it was supported by the right 
wing AP in order to contain and divide the votes of CHP, and other left parties such as 
TİP (Turkish Labor Party). After the election, five of the MP‘s of TBP, including the 
secretary general Hüseyin Çınar, had joined the governing AP. These MP‘s were excluded 
from the party by the decision of the party council. These developments were shocking 
for the supporters of the party and for those who specifically wanted to make certain 
political claims regarding Alevi identity. In most districts Alevi citizens had supported 
left wing parties such as the TİP and the CHP. The main controversy concerned the 
position of the party in between its socialist and religious claims (Massicard, 2007, p. 58). 
                                                 
44  For the program of the TBP, ―Birlik Partisi Programı‖ (Schüler, 1999, p. 313). According to Kehl-Bodrogi and Özbudun, the program of the TBP did not have 
an Alevi character (quotes in Schüler, 1999, p. 313).  
45  Hüseyin Balan (Ankara), Haydar Özdemir (İstanbul), Kazım Ulusoy (Çorum), Ali Naki Ulusoy (Amasya), Yusuf Ulusoy (Tokat), Sami İlhan (Malatya), 
Mustafa Timisi, Hüseyin Çınar (Sivas). 
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In the ensuing elections in 1973 the party received 1.1%
46 
of the votes and the Secretary 
General Mustafa Timisi was elected to the parliament. In the 1977 elections the party 
received 0.4% of the votes and none of the candidates of the TBP were elected to 
parliament. The party was closed after the September 12, 1980 military coup. 
The limits of a predominantly Alevi party with a lightly faith based agenda had 
been tested through the TBP experience. It was not a successful attempt because the idea 
of an Alevi party had not been supported by Alevis and some of the demands of the Alevi 
community had been voiced by Bülent Ecevit‘s CHP in the 1970‘s (Schüler, 1999, p. 
163). During the 1970‘s, the CHP moved from Kemalism to the left-of-center ideology in 
Turkey‘s political spectrum. In the late 1970‘s, the TBP wanted to redefine itself as a 
working class party with leftist ideals, and an anti-fascist and anti-imperialist point of 
view (Schüler, 1999, p. 163). The same ideals had been represented by the TİP (Turkish 
Labor Party). In the 1965 elections, the TİP received 15 seats in the parliament; it is 
argued that majority of this vote came from Alevis (Şahin, 2001; Şener, 2004; Schüler, 
1999)
47
. 
An interesting point concerning the TBP experience was that while mentioning 
the social and political experiences related to the 1970‘s and 1980‘s, very few of my 
informants mentioned the TPB experience. One of the reasons for this avoidance is the 
contradiction between the socialist and sectarian claims of the party. The other 
disappointing event for Alevis was the joining of five of the TBP MP‘s to the right wing 
                                                 
46 A very detailed analysis of the electoral success, candidates and vote percentages can be found at the monographs written on theTBP (Ata, 2007; Güler, 2008).  
47  Schüler provides a comprehensive analysis of the performance of the TBP, SHP and other center-left parties in the predominantly Alevi districts (Schüler, 
1999, pp. 157-190). 
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JP. Alevis had been indecisive about their support for Kemalist principles and modern 
secular values; working class social and economic priorities that are principally socialist; 
and faith and community based concerns. Together, with their fears and concerns from 
ultra-nationalism and Islamism, socialist activism was the dominant trend among newly 
urbanizing working class Alevis and Alevi students. Within the extremely ideologically 
polarized environment of the 1970s Alevis took their place in the left and extreme left 
edges of the political spectrum, whereas their competitors in the right wing were 
predominantly conservative Sunnis. Moderate Alevis who were concerned about their 
traditional values and rituals had pursued a political discourse that emphasized the 
secularism principle of Kemalism, which was also represented in Cem. 
The TBP experience, Alevi Journals, Hacı Bektaş Commemoration Ceremonies, 
emerging associations, ritual performances and labor union activism when taken together 
created consciousness among Alevi groups and more importantly contributed to their 
experiences in institutionalization. The 1961 constitution and tolerant approach of the 
regime also made Alevi activism possible. As the Alevis moved to the left they started to 
reinterpret the Alevi belief of collectivism and social struggle according to Historical 
Materialism (Massicard, 2007; 2003; Bilici, 1998). Social movements of the 16
th
 century 
had been reinterpreted as socialist movements (Dressler, 2003). The red ―kızıl‖ color of 
Kızılbaş turned into the ―kızıl‖ of the socialist revolution (Massicard, 2007, p. 60). 
During this time, the Alevis had been associated with the radical left and the meaning of 
the ―Kızılbaş‖, which used to be understood as rebellious, gained the meaning 
―Communist‖. 
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Kızılbaş during the 16th century had been considered to be the agents or the allies 
of the foreign enemy Safevids. In the late Ottoman period, especially the late 19
th
 and 
early 20
th
 centuries, Kızılbaş‘s were also under the scrutiny of CUP officials for their 
potential alliance with the enemies of the late Ottoman State. These suspicions were 
proven to be unfounded, since Alevi-Bektaşi groups played important roles in WWI and 
in the aftermath for the ―National Struggle for Independence‖ (Milli Mücadele). In the 
cold war context, starting with the late 1960s, Alevis had been stigmatized as pro-Soviet 
communists. The image of Alevis from the nationalist right view had been transformed 
from authentic Turkish groups that were representing local Turkish cultures and beliefs to 
Communist sympathizer Soviet protégé‘s. The loyalty of Alevis to the Turkish State has 
been questioned in critical moments because they have been stigmatized as potential 
insurgents or potential traitors. In the Alevi identity movement of the post-1990 context, 
many Alevi leaders paid special attention to prove their loyalty to the Turkish State and to 
love of their ―Turkish Homeland‖ (vatan). 
Among conservative Alevis in Anatolia there were more popular opinions related 
to the Kemalist establishment. Among the newly urbanized working class, Kurdish-Zaza 
Alevis and young educated groups, leftist views had been considered as progressive 
ideals. As the ideological confrontation between left (communism and socialism) and 
right (ultra-nationalism and conservative  religious right) started to get intensified many 
Alevis had switched from their designated center Kemalist position to center-left and 
extreme-left social and political organizations. The groups that moved to the extreme-left 
conversely had been seen as a threat to the regime. 
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Until the September 12, 1980 military coup, many urban Alevis were active in the 
most extreme-left pole of the ideological confrontation. The period between the 
September 12, 1980 coup and the Alevi Declaration of 1989 can be considered to be an 
interregnum era for Alevi social and political activism. This general picture had changed 
after the late 1980‘s with the introduction of new progressive ideals such as identity 
politics, human right activism, liberal democratic views, EU integration and cultural-
religious revival. The Kemalist and leftist discourses are no more considered to be the 
most progressive ideals among the Alevi community. Diasporic Alevis were important 
catalysts in the introduction of new ideas and the formation of organizational bodies. The 
position of Alevilik with regard to Kemalism, socialism and traditional values is still an 
unresolved issue. The details of this debate will be elaborated in a more detailed way in 
chapter 6. 
3.4. Political Turmoil in Turkey and Ideological Violence in the 1970’s 
Ideological polarization, economic stagnation, oil crises, the Cyprus Problem, and 
weak government made the 1970‘s one of the least stable periods of Republican Turkey. 
In the 1973 and 1977 parliamentary elections, no parties got the majority of seats in the 
parliament. There were weak and unsustainable coalition governments that were 
impossible to maintain because of the ideological differences. Center-right (AP) and 
center-left (CHP) parties tried to form coalitions with the more radical parties in their 
ideological camp. The Nationalist front government brought the center-right AP together 
with the ultra-nationalist MHP (Nationalist Action Party) and the pro-Islamic MNP 
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(National Order Party) together against the CHP and the left. 
The social and political turmoil of the 1970‘s dragged Turkey to the brink of civil 
war. Because of the armed ideological confrontations, more than 5,000 people had died in 
between 1970 and 1980. There was widespread political violence throughout Turkey, 
mostly within the context of the left-right struggle. The distinctive characteristic of the 
political violence was the massive involvement of the Turkish society in this polarization. 
Political confrontation had turned into social confrontation and violence. Particularly the 
districts in Anatolia where the Alevi-Sunni‘s lived in mixed contexts, sectarian divisions 
had turned into social and political confrontation and violence. Many of the militants in 
the urban contexts were immigrants from the regions where there were divisions based on 
Alevi-Sunni, and Turkish-Kurdish divides (Massicard, 2007, p. 59). As these divisions 
multiplied, the level and the intensity of the confrontations were also intensified. In the 
1970‘s, however, the ideological-sectarian divides were more intense and prone to 
violence than ethnic divides. Alevi-Sunni mixed cities such as Kahramanmaraş (Maraş), 
Sivas, Çorum, Malatya, Tokat and Erzincan were at the center of ideological-sectarian 
violence and confrontations. Within cities such as İstanbul and Ankara there were 
districts that were ideologically ―cleansed‖ or homogenized as well. 
Ideological confrontations of the late 1980s have had a very negative record in the 
memories of Alevi groups all over Anatolia. Despite the fact that the parties of the 
ideological confrontations were mainly Alevi/Leftist groups and Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP) along with its Ülkücü (idealist) youth associations, many Alevis continue to 
believe that paramilitary and counter-terror groups had taken a role in the ideological 
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struggle and supported the right wing militants against leftist groups. Their victimhood 
doubled because of their dual stigma as both Communists and Kızılbaş‘s48 (rebels).  
The main outbursts of violence occurred in Malatya (April 17 1978), Sivas 
(September 3 1978), Kahramanmaraş (December 23-24 1978) and Çorum (July 2-7 
1980). Areas with both ethnically (Turk and Kurds) and sectarian (Sunni and Alevi) 
mixed populations were the centers of heated confrontation. The right wing mayor of 
Malatya Hamit Fendoğlu (Hamido), who was supported both by nationalist and Islamist 
groups had been assassinated by means of a mail bomb. The assassination of ―Hamido‖ 
immediately made the leftist groups that were mainly composed of ―Alevi‖ citizens the 
primary suspects as perpetrators. In the protest demonstrations, leftist associations had 
been attacked and some Alevi neighborhoods and workplaces had been assaulted and 
looted (Massicard, 2007, p. 62). The events in Malatya were just the indicators of other 
more severe ideological and sectarian fights. All the Alevi-Sunni mixed cities were 
possible grounds for bloody riots and fights, and because of the ideologically polarized 
and intense social and political environment it was easy to instigate fights. 
Sivas is a city with a mixed Alevi-Sunni population and some towns had a 
majority Alevi population. There were rumors in the summer of 1978 in Sivas that were 
spread by the Ülkücü (idealist) youth organization of the MHP activists, which claimed 
―communist-Alevis‖ were planning to attack mosques. On September 3, 1978 a group in 
Sivas spread the rumor that Alevis had bombed a mosque, killing 300 people. Despite the 
fact that the rumors were not true, it was the rumors together with the previous 
                                                 
48 Cultural and historical background of the Kızılbaş concept is elaborated in chapter 7. 
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incitements that mobilized a mob of people, who attacked the two neighborhoods where 
most of the inhabitants were Alevis. 11 people, mostly Alevi, died. More than 100 people 
were injured and hundreds of businesses and shops had been damaged (Jorgenden, 2003; 
Massicard, 2007).  
One of the most bloody and dramatic events of violence took place in the city of 
Kahramanmaraş at the end of 1978. On December 19, 1978, the Ülkücü (idealist) youth 
organization of the MHP held a meeting in Kahramanmaraş in a movie theater. During 
the meeting a bomb exploded without causing much damage. The Ülkücü pointed to the 
left and first attacked the party building of the CHP and TÖB-DER
49
. On December 21, 
1978, two leftist teachers, Hacı Çolak and Mustafa Yüzbaşıoğlu were killed. During the 
funeral ceremony some tensions had been experienced. Rumors continued. Some people 
claimed that Alevis burned the mosques. On the 23rd and 24
th
 of December 1978, an 
armed mob caused the death of 111 people; most of the victims were Alevis. Hundreds of 
houses and workplaces were destroyed (Sinclair-Webb, 2003; Jorgenden, 2003). The 
military had arrived to the city two days after the events. Many Alevis migrated to the 
other places in Anatolia after the ―Maraş Pogroms‖. The Maraş event created a massive 
public outcry and police forces had been accused of supporting the ülkücü militants. 
These events led to further distancing of the Alevi groups from the state. According to the 
unofficial estimates, the number of deaths were much higher than 111. 
On May 27, 1980, Gün Sazak of MHP, who was the Minister of Customs in the 
national front government was assassinated by a leftist terrorist organization. The next 
                                                 
49 Tüm Öğretmenler Birleşme ve Dayanışma Derneği (all teachers union and solidarity association). 
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day, ülkücü organized a meeting in Çorum for the commemoration of Sazak. On the 2nd, 
3rd and 4th of June, some ülkücü‘s attacked the workplaces of leftist supporters. The 
attacks and armed confrontations lasted until the 7
th
 of July, causing the death of more 
than 50 people; more than 200 people had been wounded in these attacks. In the 1970‘s, 
Turkish nationalists and conservatives considered Alevis to be the natural allies of the 
left. 
The distinctive characteristic of the events of the 1970‘s was that social groups of 
Anatolia had never gotten into violent confrontations before. The polarized social and 
economic environment together with a weak economy and government had turned 
Turkey into a chaotic and ungovernable country. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 
Iranian Islamic revolution once more increased Turkey‘s strategic importance as a key 
NATO country (Ahmad, 2003). At that time, stability in Turkey was seen as a more 
immediate concern than democracy; there was already a suitable ground for a military 
coup to stop the ideological-sectarian violence. The result was the September 12, 1980 
military coup. Milli Güvenlik Konseyi (NSC), headed by General Kenan Evren, who was 
chief of staff, took over the civilian government, banned all the political parties, dissolved 
the parliament and suspended trade unions and associations. Thousands of people from 
all political factions, predominantly ultra-nationalists and communists, were taken to jail. 
The new cabinet was led by retired Admiral Bülent Ulusu and ministers were mostly 
bureaucrats, academicians and retired officers. 
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3.5. September 12, 1980 Coup and the Period of Organizational Vacuum 
The September 12, 1980 Military Coup was another significant turning point for 
the Alevi community. Being very active in the left wing organizations, Alevis had 
disproportionately been affected by the impacts of the coup d'etat. The coup advanced 
right wing ideology. More than 250,000 people were arrested after the military coup. The 
military junta was very skeptical about the Alevis and their involvement in anti-state, and 
most importantly, pro-Soviet activities. The HBVKTD had been closed and some of the 
members of the Alevi grassroots organizations were accused of supporting communist 
organizations. The main organizational body and networks of the Alevi community had 
been shattered with the regulations of the Junta. Many left wing activists that took an 
active role in the communist organizations and resistance movements had been sentenced 
to jail terms. Most importantly the extreme-left wing political activism had lost its 
institutional frames and the socialist struggle started to become marginalized within the 
Turkish political domain. 
The majority of the civil and organizational rights that were given with the 1961 
constitution were then curbed with the 1982 constitution. Religion courses began to be 
compulsory under the new constitution, which was severely criticized by many Alevis. 
Because of the restrictions on associations and organizations, informally organized 
religious networks and cemaats (community) had gained a more important position 
within the social, economic and political domains of the Turkish society. One of the 
major objections of the Alevi community was the compulsory religion courses, which had 
became a constitutional requirement. 
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The consequences of the September 12, 1980 military coup had led to 
controversial assessments among Alevi opinion makers. For some, it was an opportunity 
to make a clean and fresh start with new social and political goals and an agenda in the 
public sphere. This new beginning represents the dissociation with the socialist past that 
contradicted with the basic principles of Alevi belief system. For some others, however, 
the September 12, 1980 coup had serious consequences for the Alevi community. 
Unsatisfied with and unconvinced by the traditional Alevi institutions and values, new 
generations have been organized along socialist organizations and they had gained 
political experience within the leftist struggle. The Socialist organizational frame for 
these was more progressive and consistent with the Alevi aims in the modern context. 
Alevi youth at that time believed that there was an overlap in Alevi social values and the 
leftist values and claims. However, the harmonization of leftist values and Alevi values 
were attemtped at the expense of traditional Alevi values and institutions rather than vice 
versa. 
The revival of Alevi identity as an ethno-sectarian entity might not have been 
possible, or might have been much different if many of the contemporary Alevi political 
entrepreneurs had maintained their political activism within ranks of the socialist 
organizations. Involuntary though, the social and political context turned into a more 
suitable one for the resurgence of traditional Alevi values and beliefs in the urban 
environments. Some of the extreme left activists sought political asylum in Europe, 
especially in Germany after the 1980 coup (Sökefeld, 2002a; 2003; 2004; 2006; Wilpert, 
1988, Mandel, 2008; Massicard, 2003; Rigoni, 2003; Zırh, 2008). While the authoritarian 
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influences of the 1980 coup were continuing in Turkey, these activists initiated the Alevi 
identity movement immediately after the collapse of Berlin Wall in 1989. 
The massive involvement of Alevi citizens in the left wing social and political 
activism during the ideological struggle of the 1960s and 1970s was the major turning 
point which renewed mistrust of both bureaucratic establishment and the conservative 
Sunni citizens against Alevi. The Kızılbaş (rebel) stigma has been recalled, and in 
addition, Alevis were popularly stigmatized as ―communist‖ and ―atheists‖ in many parts 
of Anatolia. In the aftermath of the September 12 1980 military coup, religious references 
and the Kemalist ideals were re-established as the glue in rebuilding social harmony, 
which was disrupted as a result of quasi-civil war. Religious courses became 
constitutionally compulsory in the secondary schools. Alevis considered this move to be a 
part of a broader assimilation and ―Sunnification‖ process. According to many Alevis, 
international actors such as Saudi Arabia and the USA also sponsored this policy. The 
official position with regard to Islam had changed for a while, promoting the Turkish-
Islamic synthesis (Toprak, 1990; van Bruinessen 1996). According to van Bruinessen 
(1996, p.8), the change in the official position with regard to Islam, specifically Sunni 
Islam, led to the increased interest in Alevilik as a religion as well. 
Islamic (Yavuz, 2003; Taşpınar, 2005; Göle, 1997; Toprak 1995) and Kurdish 
ethnic movements (White, 2000; Kirişçi, and Winrow, 1997; Yeğen 1996; 2007; Somer 
2002; Cizre, 2001) started in the early 1980s. Being both pro-secular and predominantly 
Turkish speaking, Alevis were considered to be the regime's insurance against Islamist 
and Kurdish ethnic movements, with an exception of the period of ideological 
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polarization. In comparison to Islamists and Kurds, the popular Alevis discourse 
continued to be the Kızılbaş and Communist ―other,‖ unlike the relatively sympathetic 
attitude of the Kemalist bureaucracy towards Alevis. Alevis‘ unsubstantiated position as 
the ―allies of the Kemalist bureaucratic establishment‖ disturbed the people who were 
mistreated by the republican bureaucratic elite. 
The post 1980 era in Turkish political history marked the failure of the 
modernization and homogenization policies of the republican regime. The ambiguous 
process of EU integration also became a new driving force for the bureaucracy to 
gradually reform itself. Kasaba (1997) describes the change that occurred in the post 
1980 Turkey as a comprehensive transformation: 
Instead of making further sacrifices for a future that kept eluding them, they were 
starting to inquire their histories, institutions, beliefs, identities, and cultures from 
which they had been forcefully separated. This reorientation of the social compass 
spread to all segments of the society, not only affecting people's political outlook 
but also influencing the way they dressed, which music they created and listened 
to, how they built their houses and office buildings, and how they thought about 
the history of modern Turkey. (p. 2) 
In the pre-1980 context, any identity group that did not fit to the republican ideals were 
considered to be ―other,‖ and were marginalized and suppressed by the bureaucratic 
establishments. The marginalized or ―residual‖ identities focused on their own identity 
based claims in this new era. Until the early 1990s, Alevis hid their identities and had to 
forcefully deny their traditional culture, social order and rituals. The public appearance of 
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the alternative identity positions also led to the emergence of multiplicity of ―others.‖ 
Alevi identity negotiation in this new and dynamic context started to get more 
intricate. Traditional narratives, symbols and rituals are starting to be ―reconstructed‖ as a 
part of redrawing the normative contents and the boundaries of Alevi identity. Alevi 
activists struggle for the recognition of their cultural, religious and normative differences 
and to be acknowledged by the bureaucratic establishment, which previously tried to 
create a homogeneous identity. It is much more challenging to transform the malignant 
and misinformed public image and discourse on Alevi identity at the grassroots level. It is 
within this new market place of identity politics the dynamic Alevi ―self‖ is being re-
negotiated vis a vis the categories of ―others.‖ The Alevi identity struggle in this 
complicated context is trying to establish itself in order to confront two completely 
different forms of marginalizations: top-down marginalization and discrimination by the 
Kemalist bureaucratic establishment, and the grassroots level marginalization and 
discrimination of conservative Sunni communities, Islamists and the ultranationalists. 
While the bureaucratic establishment was trying to create a homogeneous Turkish 
national identity, the conservative Sunni groups wanted to see a homogeneous and 
standardized understanding and practice of Islam. The Alevi identity struggle was 
stretched between these two (top-down and bottom up) unity and homogeneity claims, 
which are very different from each other. 
3.6. Revival as Identity Politics: Alevi identity in 1990s 
The early 1980s was a silent period for Alevis. The leadership cadres of radical- 
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left groups had either been jailed or sought refuge in Europe. Because of the 1982 
constitution, social organizations and political activism was restricted in many segments 
of the Turkish society. Illegal organizations such as the PKK, Hizbullah
50 
and others and 
the informal social networks such as religious networks and cemaats (communities) had 
increased their social influence. During this period it was believed by scholars of Alevilik 
that the Alevi community would get secularized and assimilated into the rest of Turkish 
society (Kehl Bodrogi, 1988; Vorhoff, 1998b). Socially and politically the period was an 
interregnum and a time of confusion for Alevis. Many Alevis were in a search for 
understanding the meaning of their default identity, which they decided to keep secret for 
decades. 
Two events played significant roles in the public declaration of the maintenance 
of the Alevi identity: the publication of Cemal Şener‘s (an Alevi writer) book on Alevilik, 
“Alevilik Olayı: Toplumsal bir Baş Kaldırının Kısa Tarihçesi” (Alevilik Incident: A Short 
History of a Social Uprising) in 1989 and the “Alevilik Bildirgesi”51 (Alevi Declaration) 
by the “Hamburg Alevi Kültür Merkezi” (Hamburg Alevi Culture Centre) in March 1989 
(Şahin, 2005, p. 465; Erman & Göker, 2000; Zelyut, 2005). The Alevi Declaration was 
written in March, 1989, but it was published for the first time in February, 1990. The 
Declaration was signed by numerous intellectuals, artists, academics, authors and 
                                                 
50  The ―Kurdish Hizbullah‖ is a different organization than the Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hizbullah had been involved in illegal violent activities and terrorism 
during the 1980‘s and 90‘s.  
51 There are many revised versions of the ―Alevilik Bildirgesi‖, which is an important text for understanding the claims of the ealy Alevist movement. The 
Manifesto has been revised 10 times for the most recent text Rıza Zelyut, ―Öz Kaynaklarına Göre Alevilik, (11th ed.)‖ Karacaahmet Sultan Derneği Yayınları, 
İstanbul, 2005, pp. 414-420).    
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journalists
52 
. The Declaration begins with the following opening statement: 
This declaration aims to make the problems of Alevilik, a branch of Muslimhood 
living in Turkey, known and to inform the public with the demands of Alevis. 
Alevis see other beliefs as ―true, beautiful, and sacred‖. However, they expect a 
similar positive sense and approach towards their own faith and culture . The 
recognition of the Alevi thought will be a source of peace and prosperity for 
Turkey (op cit. Erman & Göker, 2000) 
 The declaration summarizes many of the public demands of the Alevi community 
and emphasizes that Alevis have always supported and still do support the principles and 
reforms of Atatürk (op cit. Erman & Göker, 2000). Alevis declared themselves openly as 
a political force claiming the right of self-determination and official recognition as a 
cultural/religious community (Vorhoff, 1998). The Alevi Declaration, new publications 
and Sivas Event of 1993 were important for the public acknowledgment of the 
contemporary Alevi phenomena especially for the Alevis that were reluctant to publicly 
declare their identities. The publications, new associations and the remembering of the 
rituals that were abandoned during the early years of the urbanization marked the 
transformation and revival of Alevilik. The transformation was from a secret, oral and 
ritual based community to a public, written and politically organized community (van 
Bruinessen, 1996; Şahin, 2005; Massicard, 2007; Vorhoff, 1998; Çamuroğlu, 2005; 
                                                 
52  The Alevi Manifesto had been signed by Sunni and Alevi intellectuals, artists, academics, authors and journalists. The list includes the following names: Yaşar 
Kemal, Aziz Nesin, İlhan Selçuk, Tarık Akan, Zülfü Livaneli, Berker Yaman, Kıvanç Ertop, Çetin Yetkin, Ataol Behramoğlu, Atilla Özkırımlı, Emil Galip Sandalcı, 
Süleyman Yağız, Bekir Yıldız, Muharrem Naci Orhan, Erdal Atabek, Nejat Birdoğan, Vedat Günyol, Cemal Özbey, Mesut Mertcan, Battal Peklivan, Cengiz Bektaş, 
Müjdat Gezen, Recep Bilginer, Lütfü Kaleli, Jülide Gülizar, Nevzat Helvacı, Nart Bozkurt, Tanıl Bora, Adnan Sözen, İhsan Atar, Ahnet Bulut, Akın Gürdal, Musa 
Ateş, Rıza Zelyut (Zelyut, 2005, p. 421). 
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Sökefeld, 2008). 
These developments marked an important change in the nature of Alevism a 
transition from its century‘s old tradition as a secret, initiatory, locally anchored 
and orally transmitted religion to a public religion with a formalized or at least 
written doctrine and ritual (van Bruinessen, 1996, p. 8). 
For centuries, Alevism was repressed and kept hidden in Turkey, until it suddenly 
and powerfully emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s; and now Alevis constitute 
20 percent of the Turkish population by a realistic estimate and are also prevalent 
in a number of other, mainly European, countries (Şahin, 2005, p. 465). 
More examples, which emphasize the transformation of Alevilik and Alevi identity can 
definitely be added. Unlike the previous transformations that were mainly related to state- 
Alevi relations or social transformations this last transformation represents a more 
comprehensive social, cultural, political, institutional and economic transformation. 
Vorhoff emphasizes the significance of the press, new publishing houses, and 
―researcher writers‖ in the early 1990s (Vorhoff, 1998; Çaha, 2004; Yavuz, 2003; Şahin, 
2005). Unlike the left wing revolutionary activism, the new form of activism began to use 
media and public representation channels effectively to raise awareness about Alevilik 
and Alevi claims. The use of ―Public Relations‖ rather than rebellious or negative 
activism created more sympathy towards Alevis. A series on Alevilik appeared in almost 
all the major Turkish papers and journals, countless new books on the topic were 
published, and new publishing houses were founded (Vorhoff, 1998b, p. 32; Yaman, 
2000; 2007; Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2001; Kaleli, 2000). There were also a number of CD‘s 
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about Alevi music and folklore. ―Bağlama/ saz53‖ courses were other venues that were 
crucial in maintaining Alevi culture and music at the popular level (Yaman, 2000; 2007). 
The nature of political and social activism has been diversified; Alevis are no longer seen 
as political figures who are solely associated with socialist activism. ―The Alevi 
community in Turkey‖ also presented itself as the defender of a secular state, democracy, 
human rights and other progressive ideals (Vorhoff, 1998b, p. 32). It partially 
acknowledged the secular state, but it represented a change in discourse. 
There are many explanations for the revival of the Alevi identity in the 1990s. 
Most of these explanations have similarities. According to Neyzi, in the 1990s two 
important events helped the resurgence and popularization of the Alevi identity: the 
emergence of the Alevi Diaspora and the new media, and an explosion in the number of 
publications related to Alevilik (Neyzi, 2003). Erman and Göker argue that in the post-
communist era, with rapid urbanization, Alevi communities have come to define their 
identities more by cultural and religious definitions, many of them criticizing the strong 
class emphasis of the pre-1980s (Erman, & Göker, 2000). According to Yavuz, three 
reasons contributed to the revival of identities in Turkey in the post 1980s period: 
political and cultural liberalization, a rise in the level of education, and the relatively free 
publication on identity-oriented issues in the media (Yavuz, 199a; 1999b; Çaha, 2004; 
Şahin, 2005). New media and communication channels such as TV stations, radios, web 
sites, and journals have also been underlined for the publicity of the Alevi identity (Şahin, 
2005; Sökefeld, 2008). 
                                                 
53  Stringed traditional Turkisf folk music instruments that look like lute. Many of the masters of the bağlama and Turkish folk music are from Alevi community.  
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Unlike separatist versions of the Kurdish identity movement and ethno-
nationalism that was associated with the illegal activities of PKK
54
, in most cases the 
Turkish media was sympathetic to Alevis. Çamuroğlu explains the revival of Alevi 
cultural and religious identity in relation to: the collapse of the communist block; the 
experience of Alevi activists in leftist organizations; the rise of political Islam in Turkey 
in the post 1980 era; and the Kurdish problem which expressed alternative contradictory 
discourses to the official identity discourse (Çamuroğlu, 1997). Some of the Kurdish/ 
Zaza Alevis played a role in the Kurdish separatist movement and joined PKK. The Sivas 
Events and Gazi Riots raised Alevi self-awareness and accelerated the institutionalization 
of Alevi social and political organizations. All the reasons mentioned above contributed 
to this wide scale transformation. Understanding the dynamics and the consequences of 
this transformation is even more complicated than its causes. 
3.7. Alevis Identity Under Threat: Verbal and Physical Attacks Against Alevi in 
1990s 
In the 1990s, three significant events, all of which can be considered different 
forms of attacks against Alevis, changed the political and social landscape of the Alevi 
identity movement. The Sivas Events or ―Sivas Massacre‖ of 1993, Gazi Riots in Istanbul 
(March 1995), and the Popular TV show Turnike‘s host Güner Ümit‘s slip of tongue 
(January 1995) raised the consciousness of Alevi identity. We can also add the 
demolishing of Karacaahmet cemevi in September 1994 to the list of events, though this 
                                                 
54  Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkêren Kurdistan) 
131 
 
event did not have as much media coverage as the other three. The importance of the 
demolishing of the Karacaahmet cemevi is that the Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
was the mayor of İstanbul in 1994 and Alevis attributed responsibility to Erdoğan. The 
Alevi perception of Erdoğan is quite bleak since that event despite his efforts in the recent 
Alevi initiative. These events have resonance within the personal narratives of almost all 
my informants. These episodes are pivotal in the contemporary Alevi social imagination. 
These events intensified the threat perceptions of many Alevis and increased the 
salience of Alevi identity. Increased anxieties and social dissatisfactions, together with 
threat perceptions, led to a resurgence of historical fears and grievances. These events 
also halted the gradual process of engagement of Alevis with the Turkish state. What is 
more important for the purpose of this study is to understand the meanings and social 
function of these events in the Alevi identity claims. The psychocultural implications and 
concrete consequences of these events are elaborated in detailed in chapter 7. Alevi 
consciousness and solidarity has been drastically influenced by these events and many 
non-Alevis have also sympathized with Alevis because of their victimization. However, 
these events also led to the reactionary and unplanned institutionalization of the Alevi 
organizations which later caused organizational discrepancies. The non-Alevis and the 
state were not accommodated by the political language and discourses that had taken 
form within those institutions. In particular, the memory of the ―Sivas Events‖ of 1993 
and public and personal narratives of this event have a significant place in the narratives 
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on contemporary Alevi identity
55
. 
3.7.1. Sivas Events of 1993: Return of the “Islamist Threat” 
PSAKD (Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği) had organized a commemoration 
ceremony and cultural festival for the 16th century folk poem and Sufi Pir Sultan Abdal 
in the first days of July 1993. PSA has a special value for the Alevis with a socialist 
orientation; PSA is often considered as a revolutionary figure. The image of PSA, with 
his saz (lute) in his hand raised against injustices was an important symbol of Anatolian 
folk resistance. His original name was Haydar but he was given the honorific titles of Pir 
and Abdal (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 67). The first two days of the festival were planned in the 
Sivas Kültür Merkezi (Culture Center of Sivas) in the city center, and the second half of 
the festival was planned to be held in the village of Banaz, where PSA was from. The 
writers, artists, intellectuals, singers and semah group (ritual dance performers) stayed in 
a Madımak Hotel in the city center. Conferences, concerts and dance (―semah‖) 
presentations were organized in Sivas. 
Aziz Nesin, who was a famous public figure and author known for his 
controversial views on religion, was also one of the guests at the festival. Aziz Nesin was 
not Alevi himself, in fact he was outspoken about his atheist worldview, but respected by 
the Alevi people. Nesin was one of the signers of the Alevi Declaration in 1989. Nesin 
started to translate Salman Rushdi‘s controversial book The Satanic Verses which 
contains sections insulting the prophet of Islam. Both Rushdi‘s book and Nesin‘s plans to 
                                                 
55  Soner Doğan, Sivas: 2 Temmuz 1993, Ekim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007; Zeki Büyüktanır, Madımak Çığlığı, Can YayınlarTamaşa F. Dural, İstanbul, 2006 ; 
Aleviler ve Sivas Olayları; Haydar Gölbaşı Ant Yayınları, İstanbul, 1997;  , Aleviler... Ve Gazi Olayları..., Ant Yayınları, İstanbul, 1995 
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publish the Turkish translation of The Satanic Verses led to public outrage in conservative 
circles in Turkey. There were signs of tensions even before the arrival of the participants 
of the festival to the city. On the second day of the festival (July 2, 1993), after the Friday 
prayer, a mob of radical groups started to gather in front of the Sivas Culture Center 
where the festival was taking place. The mob shouted Islamic slogans and pulled down 
the statue of PSA. The mob brought the statue of the PSA in front of the Madımak Hotel 
where the guests for the festival were staying. The crowd in front of the hotel was close 
to 10,000 in number. The demonstrators threw stones at the hotel and then set it on fire. 
Fire fighters arrived at the hotel late and the security forces were absent for more than 6 
hours. 37 people including singers, writers, poets, intellectuals and semah dancers were 
killed. The news video of the brutal event was aired numerous times on TV stations. The 
desperation and helplessness of the victims presented in TV images traumatized almost 
everyone in Turkey. 
The late arrival of the security forces and the 7 hours of continuous mob violence 
was a complete disappointment for Alevi citizens
56
. The violence was a shock not only to 
Alevi citizens but to secular people in Turkey because many of the slogans were anti-
secular as well. Politicians, the city mayor in particular, Temel Karamollaoğlu who was 
from the Islamist Refah Partisi, were accused of encouraging the Islamist militants. There 
was a disagreement between the mayor and the governor of Sivas about the intervention 
decision. The mayor was prosecuted for not allowing the fire department a rapid response 
and for encouraging the mob, but he was not charged with any offense. The detainees that 
                                                 
56 Details of the Sivas Event, video and other photos can be found in the daily newspapers in the ensuing days after July 2 1993. 
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were prosecuted for the events were defended by Şevket Kazan of the Refah Partisi, who 
later became the minister of Justice under the Refah-Yol (RP and DYP) coalition 
government. The ―Sivas Massacre‖ has been considered more than merely Alevi-Sunni 
polarization. Unlike the pogroms of the 1970s there were no attacks against Alevi 
neighborhoods shops or ordinary Alevi citizens; the participants of the festival were on 
the spot (van Bruinessen, 1996, p. 9). 
From the secularists‘ perspective the event was considered to be part of the 
Secularist-Islamist polarization. The Sivas Events offended the secularist groups in 
Turkey as well. There was an emerging polarization between Islamist activism and the 
secular groups and the state establishment in the early 1990s, and Alevis were pushed to 
be part of this new polarization. 3 days after the Sivas Events, another tragic event was 
experienced within the Sunni village of Başbağlar, which is within the territories of 
Kemaliye town, in the city of Erzincan. Başbağlar village was raided by the Kurdish 
separatist terrorist organization PKK and all 28 males in the village had been killed. The 
village was burned and one child and four women also died in the fire. The PKK declared 
that it was for the revenge of the ―Sivas Massacre.‖ Despite the PKK‘s propaganda and 
attempts to use the Sivas Events to attract Alevis, many Alevis refrained even from 
supporting the PKK. 
The immediate response to the ―Sivas Massacre‖ was the acceleration of the 
institutionalization of Alevi civil society organizations. Although many Alevis 
sympathized with secularist groups and a small portion with Kurdish separatism, they did 
not want to be a party of cultural and ideological polarization with the exception of 
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marginal groups. The depressing memory of the left-right polarization of the 1970s made 
Alevis extra cautious about being part of or party to political polarization. 
3.7.2. Gazi Riots and the Encounter with the “Deep State” 
The second important shock for the Alevis was the events in the Gazi 
neighborhood of Istanbul on March 13-15, 1995. Gazi is a working class 
neighborhood in İstanbul, the residents of which are predominantly Alevi, and mostly 
Kurdish-Alevi citizens. On March 12, 1995, three unknown assailants executed a 
drive-by shooting at the Doğu Coffeehouse, three other coffeehouses, and a pastry 
shop. One person died and numerous others were injured because of the attacks. 
Although the coffeehouses were a few hundred meters away, police did not take 
immediate action to arrest the assailants (Dural, 1995; Sökefeld, 2008, p. 69). There 
was already tension between the Gazi residents and the police. Two months prior, a 35 
year old man was killed while in police custody and the leftist illegal groups were 
active in the area (Marcus, 1996, p. 25). After this incident protesters gathered in front 
of a nearby police station. The demonstrators called the police ―fascists‖ and anti-
Alevi. Many people, including the Alevi youth, protested the police in the streets and 
the crowd threw stones and even petrol bombs at the police. The Police responded by 
shooting at the crowd. Riots spread to all over the neighborhood and the rioters 
destroyed the shops and the workshops owned by right wing people (van Bruinessen, 
1996, p. 9). 
The number of the protestors increased in the first hours of March 13, and the 
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police put a barricade in front of the local cemevi, where the protesters had gathered. 
Protesters shouted ―We will force police out of Gazi,‖ ―Police out of Gazi, Gazi will 
be graveyard for Fascism‖ (Marcus, 1996, p. 25). Many police and demonstrators 
were injured. The protests spread to other Alevi neighborhoods of İstanbul Ümraniye 
Mustafa Kemal Neighborhood, Sarıgazi and Ankara. The riots in Ümraniye were also 
intense where 5 protesters also died. The army took control and curfew was declared 
in three neighborhoods. Police, rather than calming the situation, shot at the people 
and insulted the protesters. Police bullets killed 15 people, and hundreds were injured; 
according to rumors, the numbers are higher. 
The Gazi Riots were especially important for the manifestation of discontent 
and grievances in the Alevi neighborhoods or ―ghettos‖ of Istanbul. It was easy for 
militant leftist organizations such as he the TIKKO (Maoist), the DEV-SOL, the 
DHKP-C, TDKP and the Kurdish PKK to become organized in these neighborhoods 
mainly because of this discontent. The ―Secret state‖ or ―deep state‖ had been accused 
by many Alevi as the responsible agents. Many people in Turkey, including the 
conservative or non-Marxist Alevis, interpreted the attacks as ―foreign powers‘ 
intervention‖ (dış mihrakların müdahalesi) or ―outside provocation.‖ Feelings of 
victimhood, helplessness and anti-state sentiments with regard to the Gazi Events are 
remembered  
3.7.3. Innuendos: Public Expression of Cultural Insults 
The third event, which played a significant role in the raising of the Alevi 
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consciousness in 1990s, was talk-show host Güner Ümit‘s slip of tongue. Güner Ümit 
was the host of the popular quiz-show ―Turnike‖ on TV channel Interstar. On January 10, 
1995 he made a joke implying incestuous relationships among Kızılbaş on a live show. 
Immediately after the unfortunate joke many Alevis all over Istanbul gathered around the 
building of the TV station to protest Ümit. Thousands of people protested in front of the 
building and the TV station received thousands of protest calls. Ümit resigned from the 
program, and his show career almost came to end. Although he was a secular person and 
his program did not have any religious content, the exposition of a common stereotype 
that was not publicly outspoken allowed many Alevis to express their anger openly. Many 
Alevi authors refer critically to this event by relating it to the broader cultural mis-
perceptions about Alevis (Kaygusuz, 2004; Korkmaz, 1997; Yaman, 2006; Kaleli, 2000). 
An unorganized yet well attended protest manifested the annoyance of many Alevi in 
relation to ignorance and discriminatory stereotypes of ordinary Sunnis about Alevis. 
A similar slip of tongue was also stated by the Minister of Justice, Şevket Kazan 
in November 1996. Kazan was member of Islamist Refah Partisi. There was a popular 
protest campaign in relation to Susurluk Scandal
57
. In order to protest the scandal and the 
dirty state-Mafia relations, participants of the protest flickered the lights at 9p.m. every 
night (Erdemir, 2004, p. 89). Prime Minister Erbakan was critical of the protest 
campaign, but his minister of Justice, Şevket Kazan was quoted as saying ―the opposition 
is playing candle extinguishing‖ (muhalefet mumsöndü oynuyor). Kazan‘s remarks had 
been interpreted to be a suggestion of the sexual depravity claims that were related to 
                                                 
57  The Susurluk scandal was a political scandal in Turkey in 1996 that indicated a relationship between the government, the armed forces, and organized crime. 
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Alevis. Kazan‘s remarks also led to criticisms in media and political circles. Alevi 
association, Semah Kültür Vakfı, filed a case against Kazan58 (Kaleli, 2000, pp. 300-317). 
The number of exemplary insults that deeply irritated Alevis includes numerous 
others, such as Virtue Party chairperson Recai Kutan‘s referral to Syria‘s Nusayrî in 
saying ―Nusayrîya is a kind of perverted Alevi understanding‖ (Nusayrîlik bir nevi sapık 
Alevi anlayışı). Kutan then understood his mistake and corrected his speech by saying ―I 
do not refer to Alevis in Turkey. What I call perverted Alevi understanding is the Nusayrî 
in Syria
59‖. Kutan‘s late comment and explanations did not sooth the situation because of 
the extra sensitive nature of the issue. Collectively, these insults belie the ignorance and 
cultural biases about the Alevi community and history. Even the ignorance and biased 
attitudes of the public figures mentioned above can give an idea about the ignorance level 
of ordinary citizens. 
The implications of these and similar attacks for the Alevis has been that in order 
to protect their social and legal rights, there is a necessity for more organized and 
harmonized response mechanisms. 
[A. Yl.]: Alevis are under the threat of different forms of violence by the extremist 
Sunni‘s. We need to work on the legal and institutional mechanisms to protect 
ourselves 
―We cannot depend on Turkish state, police and military for protection of our rights 
and our security, because state has a very biased and discriminatory attitude 
                                                 
58  A detailed account of the case and the follow up can be found in Lütfi Kaleli‘s, ―Alevi Kimliği ve Alevi Örgütlenmeleri,‖ İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2000. 
59  Nusayri are a minority sect (10%) in Syria that has an authoritarian control over politics and society. President Hafez al Assad and his son current president 
Bashar al Assad are also Nusayri in terms of sectarian origin. There is a minority Nusayri population living mainly in the cities of Hatay, Adana, and Mersin. They are 
called ―Fellah‖ by local people. 
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towards us as seen in the examples of Sivas Massacre and Gazi Riots. We need 
the support of EU and other secular elements in Turkey as our allies. We can seek 
our right at the international contexts such as European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR).‖ 
[M.İ. ]: ―There are wide scale ignorance and biases against Alevis with historical 
references even within the secular sections of the Turkish society. We need to 
inform and educate people with media channel and we should seek the help of 
neutral outsiders. The government is also responsible for informing Turkish 
people.‖ 
3.8. Institutionalization of the Alevi cause in modern urban contexts 
Traditional religiously oriented communities tried to reproduce and reorganize 
themselves in new organizational and institutional forms. In some cases the traditional 
organizational forms got on well with the emerging modern institutions. In some other 
cases the language and interaction modes of modern civil society organizations could not 
integrate well with the traditional institutions. Alevi civic institutions in this context have 
been very well organized in terms of number and types of organizations but as of yet are 
not well harmonized or coordinated over particular objectives. In the last several years, 
different organizational forms have been added to the Alevi organizational repertoire, 
such as civic associations, TV and radio stations, and web blogs. These multiplicities of 
voices created a cacophony and confusion in the beginning and great deal of effort was 
spent in the intra-Alevi debates. 
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There are monograph studies that lay out the entire contemporary Alevi 
institutions, including both the traditional and more recent ones, in a detailed way. There 
are also web sources that are updating the lists of Alevi institutions in both Europe and 
Turkey as well
60
. Almost all books on contemporary Alevilik have a separate section or a 
chapter related to the institutional configuration of the contemporary Alevi identity 
movement (Massicard, 2007; Gümüş, 2004; Üzüm, 1997; 2002; Yaman, 2007; Sökefeld, 
2008; Engin & Franz, 2001; Şahin, 2001; Erdemir, 2004; Vorhoff, 1998b; Erdemir & 
Yaman; Yılmaz, 2005; Erman, & Göker, 2000; Bilici, 1998). In this study, rather than 
listing and discussing the organizational forms, relationships of different actors will be 
elaborated in a separate chapter
61
. What is more crucial for the purpose of this study is to 
address the questions: ―what kinds of different discourses do these institutions produce?‖ 
and ―How do these discourses shape Alevi subjectivity and relations with the other social 
and political actors?‖ The discursive positions and activities of each of these institutions 
and actors remain a subject of different research. 
Alevi institutions are a dynamic field reflecting the changes and transformations 
in global trends as well. For example, in the last couple of years there has been an 
increased interest in Alevi TV and radio stations, web sites, mail lists, cemevis and among 
the youth saz (lute) and semah (Alevi ritual dance). On the other hand Alevi journals, 
written sources that are produced by the researcher-writers and associations, are losing 
their popularity and social impact. People are increasingly more interested in the 
                                                 
60  Federation of Alevi Unions of Germany has such a list, http://www.alevi.com/alevi_kurumlarae.html. List of Alevi instituions in Turkey: an updated list 
http://www.aktifhaber.com/news_detail.php?id=149544 
61 For the annotated list of Alevi institutions see Appendix2. 
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institutions of belief and social networking than in the institutions of social and political 
struggle. Besides its claims related to recognition, such as ―Abolition of the DİB and 
compulsory religious courses, and legal status for cemevis,‖ Alevi political language is 
very non-constructive. Traditional institutions, especially the institutions of belief such as 
Dergahs (Karacaahmet, Şah Kulu, Hacı Bektaş Veli, Abdal Musa) are attracting an 
increasing number of Alevis. Associations and civil society organizations draw more 
attention during times of crisis, where Alevis feel increasingly threatened. 
Alevis and party politics: An uneasy relationship 
One of the riskiest and least successful areas of organization for Alevis is the field 
of party politics. In her section on the Alevi political party, Massicard (2007) used the 
title ―Alevi Political Party: A Dream Never Actualized‖ (Hiç Gerçekleşmeyen Alevi 
Partisi Düşü‖). I would rather use the title ―Alevi Political Party: A Dream Which Never 
Succeeded.‖ There had been two major efforts for the predominantly sect based social 
democratic parties: The TBP (Union Party of Turkey 1966-1981) and The Barış Partisi 
(Peace Party 1996-99), the former of which was more sustainable, but both experiences 
can be considered a disappointment. The TBP experience in the 1960s and 1970s was not 
a promising one and did not make expected contributions to the Alevi cause (Ata, 2006; 
Güler, 2008; Schüler, 1999).  Many Alevis rather preferred to align themselves with 
center and extreme-left parties. In particular, the 10% national vote threshold for the 
parties to send MP‘s to the TBMM (Turkish Grand National Assembly) in the 1982 
constitution was a barrier to small and particular interest based parties, which also 
affected the prospect of a successful Alevi party. 
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The Demokratik Barış Hareketi (Democratic Peace Movement) was initiated by 
an Alevi businessman, Ali Haydar Veziroğlu. Ali Haydar Veziroğlu, originally from 
Tunceli, was elected MP from CHP in the 1977 elections (Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2001, p. 80). 
He resigned from his party and joined TBP after the Maraş Pogrom of 1978 (Massicard, 
2007, p. 196). He became a successful businessman and made a remarkable fortune as a 
government contractor in the 1980s and early 90s. Veziroğlu was a party delegate for the 
SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party) in the early 1990s. After the Sivas Events and 
Gazi Riots, he decided to be more active in Turkish politics. Ali Haydar Veziroğlu 
established the ―Democratic Peace Movement‖ (Demokratik Barış Hareketi) on 
September 1, 1995. The AABF, HBVD and PSAKD had been involved in the 
establishment of the DBH and the BH rapidly organized in 40 cities. Because of the 
constitutional act against the founding of political parties and associations on the basis of 
ethnic, section religious groups, the DBH refrained from using the Alevi name. The 
movement was not also using the Alevi symbols and discourses like the TBP, but the 
Alevi color of the party was predominantly used. 
For the December 1995 elections the ABTM (Alevi Bektaşi Council of 
Representatives) decided to join elections with independent candidates. The DBH 
supported the independent candidates of the ABTM. The opinion polls did not return 
promising results for the DBH candidates, and the DBH could not generate excitement in 
Alevi citizens either. There was also a risk then that the CHP was unable to exceed the 
10% national threshold. Veziroğlu decided to withdraw the DBH candidates from the 
elections. In his press conference Veziroğlu said ―The nation could not get into election 
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excitement. The political support may stay in the streets and may not be represented in 
the parliament. There is a risk that some social democratic parties may not exceed the 
threshold, we do not want to take this responsibility
62‖ (Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2001, p. 89). 
The RPP received 10.7% of the votes and crossed the threshold with a small margin. 
The slogan of the party was ―Our names may be different, but our last name is 
Turkey
63.‖ The party program had an article supporting the abolishment of the DIB, 
which is a constitutional institution. The party executive board resigned due to the 
impending closing case. A new political organization with the title of the ―Barış Partisi‖ 
(Peace Party) was established and the property of the DBH was transferred to the BP. 
Rather than abolishing the DIB, the new party included an article supporting the 
embracing of all religious groups (Massicard, 2007, p. 197). In the April 18, 1999 
elections, the party received .018% of the votes, which was a disaster for the party. The 
BP was unable to reflect the variety of views within the Alevi community. The party 
could not function as an umbrella organization that would represent Alevis at parliament 
level politics. It was also far from offering a new and innovative perspective and political 
space for non-Alevi people in Turkey, therefore the project was abandoned immediately 
after its failure in the elections. The excuse for the failure was 10% national threshold.  
The failure of the DBH/ BP as an Alevi political project was not a surprise for 
many. There is a traditional alliance between the Alevi community and social democratic 
parties in Turkey. In fact, Alevis are the easy vote base for the CHP (Republican Peoples 
                                                 
62  ―Ülke seçim atmosferine girememiştir. Bu seçimde siyaset sokaklarda kalacak, parlamentoya taşınamayacak. Bazı sosyal demokrat partilerin barajı aşamaması 
riski var, bu sorumluluğu taşımak istemiyoruz‖. 
63  ―Adlarımız farklı olabilir, soyadımız Türkiye‘dir.‖ 
144 
 
Party) (Schüler, 1999). The indifference of the CHP to Alevi demands did not discourage 
the Alevi community from supporting the CHP, mainly because of the secularist 
sensitivities of the Alevi community. Almost all other parties, including the right wing, 
appointed Alevi candidates in Alevi populated areas to attract Alevi votes, but those 
moves did not jeopardize Alevi support for the CHP. The existence of a separate party 
that had recently been supported by the Alevi constituency was risky because it might 
have distanced other parties from the Alevi supporting social and political demands of the 
Alevis. It may lead to the further marginalization of Alevis within the center-left parties 
and the rest of the Turkish political spectrum. Rather than concentrating the attention 
solely on party politics, the Alevi movement is using the different methods as explicated 
above. The available associations, foundations and cemevis were already very well 
organized institutions that were mainly operating at the grassroots level. 
There is, however, an increasing level of discontent and frustration with the CHP 
on the part of many Alevis because of the CHP‘s inaction with regard to unaddressed 
Alevi demands. According to some Alevi and Sunni Kemalists that feel dissatisfaction 
with the CHP, ―Today CHP is a party, which was established by Atatürk but then distorted 
and abandoned its revolutionary progressive ideals because of poor leadership‖ Overall, 
Alevi citizens will continue to support the CHP unless there is a realistic alternative in 
left wing politics in Turkey. They will instead try to pursue their goals through other 
institutions and channels. 
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3.9. Transformation of Alevi State Relations in the Post-1980 Era 
Many analysts of the Alevi issue argue that the direction and strategies of Alevi 
identity politics and mobilization have been highly dependent upon the changing nature 
of the Turkish State establishment (Erdemir, 2004; Massicard, 2007). Resistance to the 
state and the central political authorities has historically been identified as one of the 
fundamental pillars of Alevi identity by Alevi authors (Aydın, 2007; Öz, 1992). The 
Turkish State establishment had never been a neutral actor solely monitoring and 
regulating the developments in the ethnic and civic fields. The civic, political or ethnic 
groups determine or change their position according to the responses of civilian and 
military bureaucratic establishment. Because of the threat of communism and widespread 
Alevi involvement in left wing politics, Alevis were considered a threat by the Turkish 
State establishment before the September 12, 1980 coup. In the academic literature that 
portrays the social and political order of post 1980 Turkey, the overall ideology that 
seems to have emerged has been defined as the ―Turkish-Islamic synthesis‖, which is a 
blend of local Islamic conservatism with the mix of nationalism (Toprak, 1981; Poulton, 
1997; van Bruinessen, 1996; Çetinsaya, 1999). For some analysts the ―official attitude 
towards Islam after 1980, Turkish Islam Synthesis, represented a departure from Kemalist 
tradition‖ (van Bruinessen, 1996, p. 8). The right wing version of Kemalism had been 
idealized by the state establishment; however, the outcome of the post 1980 political 
context facilitated the development of conservative and Islamist circles in the social and 
political spheres. 
Turkish bureaucratic establishment‘s perception of Alevis has also changed 
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gradually after the 1980 coup with the termination of the communist threat. More 
importantly, during this period the Alevi-Bektaşi tradition had been portrayed as the 
authentic version of Islam. The Alevi-Bektaşi version was also incorporated into the 
―Turkish-Islamic Synthesis‖ discourse by some Sunni authors, mainly theologians, which 
also disturbed the Alevi elite. 
Sympathizing mostly with the ideological tenets of the so-called Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis (Türk-İslam Sentezi) according to which Turkishness and Islam for 
centuries formed an inseparable unit, Sunni authors often introduce Alevism as 
thoroughly marked by the culture of the Turkish nomads, who once came from 
Central Asia to Islamize and Turkify Anatolia. When these presentations try to 
flatter the Alevi as good, Turkish Muslims, they attempt to win them as defenders 
of a unified Muslim-Turkish nation and keep them away from the Kurdish cause 
at a time when the Kurdish movement had grown to a threatening extent, and 
when Kurdish Alevi feel disappointed by the Kurdish and Socialist movements. 
These had in the seventies also denied the Alevi a separate religious identity 
(Vorhoff, 1998b, p. 40). 
With the September 12, 1980 military coup, the threat of communism has been 
contained in Turkey, but the ―Turkish Islamic Synthesis‖ argument or common religious 
background was obviously insufficient to re-incorporate Alevis into the rest of Turkish 
society. The new threat perception of the state establishment during this period was the 
development of political Islam, and Kurdish ethno-nationalism. Alevis were ideal allies 
for the state establishment to contain these two threats since they are both secular and 
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mostly ethnic-Turks (van Bruinessen, 1996). Once again Alevis were presented as the 
watch guards of the ―Kemalist‖ Secular Republic against ethnic separatism and religious 
extremism. 
The state establishment tried to create its own version of ―Turkish Islam‖ which 
had the elements of Alevi-Bektaşi teachings. The HBV commemoration ceremonies had 
turned into ceremonies that were attended by high level politicians in the 1990s (Salman, 
2005, p. 98). In the 1970s, HBV Commemoration Festivals resembled a parade of leftist 
writers, singers, intellectuals and activists (Salman, 2005). Whereas, in 1990 the Ministry 
of Culture took over the festival and turned it into an international festival (Massicard, 
2003b, p. 127; Salman, 2005). It was a drastic shift for the government as a departure 
from the policy of denial. Massicard calls this the ―etatization‖ of the festival (Massicard, 
2003; Salman, 2005). In 1994, for the first time, the Turkish president (Süleyman 
Demirel) attended the festival and the Hacı Bektaş turned became an arena in which 
social and political promises were negotiated (Salman, 2005, p. 127). According to Şahin, 
the general discourse of the Turkish State with regard to Alevis in Turkey was to define 
them as ardent supporters of the principle of secularism, and present Alevi culture and 
tradition as one of the most important elements of ―Turkishness‖ and Turkish culture 
(Şahin, 2002, p. 28). 
The transformation of Alevi-state establishment relations, however, had not been 
taken enthusiastically by the Alevi-Bektaşi groups in Turkey. Instead, Alevis decided to 
pursue their identity claims and official recognition by challenging the hegemonic 
position and political discourse of the Turkish State. Alevis also felt threatened with the 
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strengthening of political Islam and conservative religious communities, though this had 
not lead to a natural alliance with the state establishment. 
The Turkish bureaucratic establishment manifested flexibilities in terms of 
adopting itself to political liberalization starting from the mid 1980s, during Turgut 
Özal‘s political leadership. These adaptations were not always voluntary and they were 
slow. In the regional context, international actors such as the EU and transnational actors 
and trends also influenced the shaping of identity struggles in Turkey. The process of EU 
integration helped challenge the Turkish State‘s hegemonic position of defining and 
regulating, and sometimes imposing the official Turkish national identity (Taşpınar, 
2005). Starting from the early 1990s, Turkish bureaucracy had made drastic legal and 
political changes including 9 constitutional revision packages and a complete revision of 
the penal code (Müftüler-Baç, 2005). 
European Alevis‘ contributions and influence on the emergence and 
institutionalization of the Alevi identity movement in Turkey were crucial in the early 
1990‘s. Many analysts strongly argue that it is not possible to understand the 
development of the Alevi movement without emphasizing its transnational dimension, 
meaning the European dimension (Şahin, 2005; Massicard, 2003; Sökefeld, 2003; 2008; 
Rigoni, 2003). The Hamburg Alevi Kültür Grubu (Alevi Cultural Group of Hamburg) 
was one of the first associations to use the Alevi title in 1989 (Rigoni, 2003, p. 163). 
During the periods of the 1980s and early 1990s, there was a constrained space for civil 
society activism in Turkey and many Alevis were under scrutiny because of their activism 
in extreme left organizations before the September 12, 1980 coup. Especially in terms of 
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transferring the experiences in civic institutions in social and political areas and providing 
financial resources, European Alevis had made important contributions. They also put 
pressures on Turkish politicians and governments for the rights of Alevis, via their 
connections with European politicians and social and political institutions. Beginning 
from the 1990s, the state publicly supported the Alevis (van Bruinessen, 1996, p. 8), and 
high level officials publicly celebrated Alevi Bektaşi traditions. The official endorsement 
of Alevis in Turkey had gradually marginalized the influence of diasporic Alevis. 
Diasporic Alevis gained political and organizational experience due to the more 
established and stable political environment for social movement activism in Europe. 
These experiences and resources have been carried to Turkey with the activities of 
European Alevists. Because of the increased disagreements between the European and 
Turkish Alevists and the relative decline of EU‘s influence after 2000, Alevi politics 
returned to its local Turkish dynamics. 
3.10. Alevi requests and Turkey’s struggle for EU membership 
Like many other scholars that are researching the contemporary Alevi society and 
Alevi politics, I also define the broader request of the Alevi movement as the request of 
recognition (Sökefeld, 2008; Massicard, 2007; 2003; Erman, & Göker 2000; van 
Bruinessen, 1996). Recognition by the Turkish state and society is their broader 
objective. They have made a specific request through which they maintain their struggle 
for recognition. The recognition of cemevis as legal places of worship and financial 
support for building and maintaining cemevis including the salaries of dedes (religious 
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leaders) is one of the most important requests. Abolishing the compulsory religious 
courses, which have been considered by Alevis to be the indoctrination of Sunni beliefs, 
is the second important request. Thirdly, they request the dissolution and confiscation of 
property of the treasury of the DİB (Administration of Religious Affairs), which is 
considered to be the official institution of Sunni Islam in Turkey. There are some views 
that support the democratization of the DİB, but overall almost all Alevis want a drastic 
change in the structure of the DİB. 
There are other requests such as the abandonment of the policy of mosques in 
Alevi villages, as well as representation of Alevi culture and traditions in state TV and 
radio TRT (Üzüm, 1997, p. 140). Alevis also want prejudices, mis-perceptions and 
ignorance of Sunni citizens regarding Alevis to come to an end. Under the general title of 
recognition we can include some other requests as well. These claims are voiced loudly in 
the public arena, but they are not more important than the Alevi grievances that are 
caused by economic, social and political marginalization and discrimination. 
In order to support these claims, Alevis mobilized all the available communication 
and action channels mentioned above. One of the variables that played a significant role 
in the shaping of the Alevi collective claims is the Turkey‘s EU membership candidacy 
process
64. At the Helsinki Summit, 1999, Turkey‘s candidacy was recognized by the EU 
Council, and Turkey was given a date for starting admission negotiations. Although 
Turkey became an associate member of the EEC with the Ankara Agreement of 1963, the 
                                                 
64  Erdemir (2004) discusses the impact of EU integration on the Alevi community in the 6th chapter of his study. In here I will highlight the impact of EU as an 
actor, but I will not get into the details of the debate because of the scope of my study. 
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EU has never been an actor affecting political decision making process significantly. This 
situation had been changed after Turkey applied for full membership in 1987, and 
increased drastically with the EU‘s acceptance of Turkey to the status of candidacy for 
full membership in 1999. Turkey was subject to ―Copenhagen Criteria‖. ―Copenhagen 
Criteria‖ are the rules or membership criteria designated in the Copenhagen Summit of 
the European Council in June, 1993
65
, for EU candidate countries that delineate whether 
the candidate country is eligible for membership. In order to proceed on the path towards 
membership, Turkey was also subject to certain sets of criteria, including the Copenhagen 
Criteria. Some scholars even explain the political liberalization and internal political 
change in Turkey starting in the late 1990s through the EU membership process 
(Müftüler-Baç, 2005). 
Increased assimilation of rules and norms of liberal democracy in Turkey since 
1999 is a direct result of Turkey‘s institutional ties with the EU and its hopes for 
membership‖ (Müftüler-Baç, 2005, p. 17). 
After the Cardiff Summit of 1998, the European Commission started to publish 
progress reports on Turkey. These yearly reports have been updated regularly and 
presented to the European Council
66. In these reports Alevis have been referred as ―non-
Sunni Muslim communities‖. Alevi requests such as legalization of the cemevis, 
discontent with compulsory religious courses, and complaints related to Diyanet have 
                                                 
65  ―Membership requires that each candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and, protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union‖. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf, (Accessed March 23, 2009) 
66  For the compilation of Turkish version of the reports that are related to Alevis 
http://www.hubyar.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=120&Itemid=87 (Accessed April 2, 2009) 
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been mentioned in these reports. For example in the EU Commission‘s ―Turkey 2008 
Progress Report
67‖ with regard to Alevis issues of the government‘s overall Alevi policy; 
―As regards the Alevis, the government announced an initiative aimed at 
improving dialogue with this community and addressing its concerns. In what was 
noted as a first decision of its kind in the country, a municipal council recognized 
a Cem house as a place of worship and applied mosque tariffs to its water charges. 
However, the government's initiative has not been followed through. Overall, 
Alevis continue to face the same problems as before, in particular as regards 
education and places of worship. This has led an AKP Alevi MP to resign from 
the position of Advisor to the Prime Minister on Alevi issues‖. 
cemevi issue;  
―As regards places of worship, two cases regarding Alevi places of worship (Cem 
houses or cemevi) are pending before the courts, one of them before the Council 
of State. In both cases, Alevis were refused plots to construct Cem houses. These 
are not recognized as places of worship and, as a result, receive no funding from 
the authorities‖. 
compulsory religion education  
―As regards education, under Article 24 of the Turkish Constitution religious 
culture and ethics classes are compulsory in the curricula of primary and 
secondary education. This was not the case previously, i.e. before the entry into 
force of the current Constitution in 1982. In October 2007, further to an 
                                                 
67  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2008:2699:FIN:EN:PDF (Accessed March 23, 2009) 
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application lodged by a family who are followers of Alevism, the ECHR found 
that these classes did not just give a general overview of religions but provided 
specific instruction in the major principles of the Muslim faith, including its 
cultural rites. The Court requested Turkey to bring its educational system and 
domestic legislation into conformity with Article 2 of Protocol No1 to the ECHR. 
This ECHR judgment needs to be implemented. In August 2008 an Alevi 
Federation applied to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
complaining that this judgment is not being implemented and claiming that the 
new textbooks include superficial information on Alevis part of which could also 
be considered misleading. In March 2008, in two separate cases, the Council of 
State (CoS) decided that children of Alevi families were entitled to be exempted 
from these religious education classes‖. 
had been mentioned. The government‘s new Alevi initiative was acknowledged but 
government was criticized because of not following its promises. There had also been a 
ban on establishing associations with the Alevi-Bektaşi name, which had been amended 
by 2002. The issues had been harmonized with the religious freedoms agenda of the EU, 
however, the overall purposes of Alevi identity politics are much broader than the 
religious rights agenda. 
From the mid 1990s, to the 2004-2005 periods, the EU played the important role 
as facilitator and sometimes arbitrator in the Alevi identity struggle. An important case 
which was decided in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) was Hasan and 
Eylem Zengin vs Turkey. The case was related to the compulsory religious courses in the 
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Turkish educational curriculum. Hasan Zengin is an Alevi citizen who had appealed to 
the ECHR on his daughter Eylem Zengin‘s behalf. Eylem Zengin was a 7th grade student 
in a state school. Hasan Zengin alleged that the ―compulsory classes in religious culture 
and ethics were essentially based on the fundamental rules of Hanafite Islam and that no 
teaching was given on his own faith
68‖. 
The applicants alleged that the classes in religious culture and ethics were not 
conducted in an objective, critical or pluralist manner, and thus did not fulfill the 
criteria identified by the Court in the context of its interpretation of Article 2 of 
Protocol No. 1
69
. 
The ECHR‘s decision recognized the violation of the rights of the applicants and 
requested compensation. 
The Court also observes that it has found in this case a violation of the 
Convention on account of the inadequacy of the Turkish educational system, 
which, with regard to religious instruction, does not meet the requirements of 
objectivity and pluralism and provides no appropriate method for ensuring respect 
for parents' convictions. These conclusions in themselves imply that the violation 
of the applicants' rights, as guaranteed by the second sentence of Article 2 of 
Protocol No. 1, originates in a problem related to implementation of the syllabus 
for this class and the absence of appropriate methods for ensuring respect for 
parents' convictions. In consequence, the Court considers that bringing the 
                                                 
68 http://www.ius-software.si/EUII/EUCHR/dokumenti/2007/10/CASE_OF_HASAN_AND_EYLEM_ZENGIN_v._TURKEY_09_10_2007.html  (accessed April 
4, 2009). 
69 http://www.ius-software.si/EUII/EUCHR/dokumenti/2007/10/CASE_OF_HASAN_AND_EYLEM_ZENGIN_v._TURKEY_09_10_2007.html (accessed April 
4, 2009). 
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Turkish educational system and domestic legislation into conformity with the 
above-cited provision of the Convention would represent an appropriate form of 
compensation which would make it possible to end the violation found
70
. 
 The critical aspect of the case however was not the contents of the compulsory 
religious course but the court‘s statement related to the Alevi definition. Constitutional 
reforms with regard to the compulsory religious courses were an expected change within 
the agenda of Turkey‘s EU integration negotiations. The ECHR‘s decision intensified the 
legal and political debates related to the issue of compulsory religious education. The 
Alevi definition of applicants on the other hand characterized ―Alevilik‖ as a belief or a 
philosophy that is influenced by other cultures, beliefs and philosophies
71
. The Alevi 
definition that was emphasized by the applicants portrayed ―Alevilik‖ as a separate belief 
system or a philosophy, and recognition of ―Alevism‖ as such might have further legal 
and political consequences for the Turkish State. The court rather adapted the Alevi 
definition as a branch of Islam that is influenced from Sufi teachings and pre-Islamic 
beliefs
72. ECHR‘s Alevi definition disappointed some Alevi activists. 
                                                 
70 http://www.ius-software.si/EUII/EUCHR/dokumenti/2007/10/CASE_OF_HASAN_AND_EYLEM_ZENGIN_v._TURKEY_09_10_2007.html (accessed April 
4, 2009). Ibid 
71 ―According to the applicant, Alevism is a belief or philosophy influenced by other cultures, religions and philosophies. It represents one of the most widespread 
faiths in Turkey after the Hanafite branch of Islam. It advocates close contact with nature, tolerance, modesty and love for one's neighbour, within the Islamic faith. 
Alevis reject the sharia (code of laws in orthodox Islam) and the sunna (forms of behaviour and formal rules of orthodox Islam) and defend freedom of religion, 
human rights, women's rights, humanism, democracy, rationalism, modernism, universalism, tolerance and secularism. Alevis do not pray by the Sunni rite (in 
particular, they do not comply with the obligation to pray five times daily) but express their devotion through religious songs and dances (semah); they do not attend 
mosques, but meet regularly in cemevi (meeting and worship rooms) for ritual ceremonies. Equally, Alevis do not consider the pilgrimage to Mecca as a religious 
obligation. They believe that Allah is present in each person. According to Alevism, Allah created Adam in his image and all his manifestations in this world are in 
human form. Allah is neither in the sky nor in paradise, but in the centre of the human heart‖. http://www.ius-
software.si/EUII/EUCHR/dokumenti/2007/10/CASE_OF_HASAN_AND_EYLEM_ZENGIN_v._TURKEY_09_10_2007.html 
72  ―Alevism originated in central Asia but developed largely in Turkey. Two important Sufis had a considerable impact on the emergence of this religious 
movement: Hoca Ahmet Yesevi (12th century) and Haci Bektaşi Veli (14th century). This belief system, which has deep roots in Turkish society and history, is 
generally considered as one of the branches of Islam, influenced in particular by Sufism and by certain pre-Islamic beliefs. Its religious practices differ from those of 
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Because of the indecisive and discriminatory policies of the EU in terms of 
Turkey‘s accession process starting from 2004-2005, the EU had been losing its influence 
and legitimacy as a catalyst for political liberalization in both official and civic domains 
in Turkey. Neither the Alevis nor the Turkish officials perceive EU policies and position 
towards Turkey‘s Alevi issues as sincere and convincing. The outcome of the declining 
legitimacy of the EU as a ―neutral and positive agent of social and political change‖ in 
Turkey is the return to the confrontational domestic dynamics of Turkish politics. 
Because of frustrations and the increasing trend of nationalism (ulusalcılık), a growing 
number of Alevis disapprove of the EU as a third party to intervene in the domestic 
political affairs of Turkey. 
The logic of the identity struggle game in which there are limited transnational 
linkages is very different than a game in which the transnational actors and international 
organizations are actively involved. Confronting or challenging the Turkish 
state/bureaucratic establishment and its position on national identity may be more 
difficult and may have unintended consequences in a contained domestic struggle. In 
claims and activities competitively or in zero-sum logic. Rather than perceiving identity 
claims of each other as parallel or sometimes overlapping as part of democratic 
processes, they paradoxically try to delegitimize the other groups‘ position. This is 
mainly due to mistrust and poor communication between different identity groups. State-
Alevi relations are also an area that needs a comprehensive reconciliation, improvement 
____________ 
the Sunni schools of law in certain aspects such as prayer, fasting and pilgrimage‖. http://www.ius-
software.si/EUII/EUCHR/dokumenti/2007/10/CASE_OF_HASAN_AND_EYLEM_ZENGIN_v._TURKEY_09_10_2007.html 
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and mutual trust building. Such a context alternative social movements or identity groups 
perceive each other‘s. 
3.11. Alevi Politics in the First Term of the AKP Administration (November 
2002- July 2007) 
The early years of the AKP administration, particularly the first term (November 
2002- July 2007) was a period that led to disappointments for Alevis. During this period 
many Alevis felt they were socially, politically and economically discriminated and 
marginalized by the governing party and its constituents. There were some indications 
that would substantiate the concerns of Alevi citizens related to discrimination and 
marginalization. Among the 363 MPs of the AKP (over 550), there were no Alevi MPs. 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did not refer to Alevis in his public speeches. 
There have been no attempts by the AKP government to engage with the representatives 
of the Alevi associations and Alevi civil society institutions. Alevi social, political and 
identity based claims had either been denied or had been avoided during this period. 
There were no specific statements and policies with regard to Alevi identity based claims 
in the party program, as well (AK Parti Programı, 2001) as the election statement of June 
2007 (Güven ve İstikrar İçinde Durmak Yok Yola Devam, 2007). 
There is a statement on the services of the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (DİB), in the 
section related to the religious services in the election declaration of June 2007. In that 
section there was an emphasis on the perspective of the DİB with regard to the religious 
services for various sects. However the term ―Alevi‖ was not specifically mentioned in 
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that statement. 
The DİB does discriminate on the basis of sect when it is providing the religious 
services. The social and cultural diversity are seen as richness, and everybody is 
treated equally based on equal citizenship rights
73
. 
The Alevi Issue was a blind spot in the policy agenda of governing AKP until the second 
half of the year 2007. 
According the AKP‘s understanding, Alevi identity based claims fall under the 
general policy agenda of improvement of human rights and democratization. EU 
integration reforms and the constitutional amendments were seen as catalysts by the 
governing party to deal with those sensitive issues. The stalemate situation in the EU 
integration reforms has led to the  necessity of a more specific emphasis on the issue 
agenda, such as ―The Kurdish Question,‖ ―The Alevi Issue,‖ ―the Human Rights and 
Democratization Agenda‖ and ―The Improvement of Religious Freedoms.‖ 
As the AKP administration consolidated its power and rule, Alevis felt further 
marginalized and discriminated against
74
. Human rights and democratization policies of 
AKP administration were unable to address the identity based claims of Alevi 
community. There was a widespread fear and animosity against the Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan and his bureaucratic and political allies. There were already available 
stereotypes and prejudices among Alevi community about the AKP because of its Islamist 
background, and those convictions had been strengthened because of the AKP‘s 
                                                 
73 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, din hizmetlerini yürütürken mezhep, anlayışı ve uygulama ayrımı yapmadan toplumdaki farklılıkları ülkemizin zenginliği görerek 
herkese eşit mesafede durmuş ve vatandaşlık esasına göre hizmet sunmuştur. 
74 For research on the marginalization of different groups during the AKP administration (Toprak et al., 2009). Toprak et al (2009)‘s research started certain 
repercussions and it has been criticized in terms of its methodology, findings and overall arguments. 
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indifference to Alevi claims. 
During this period, because of these frustrations, some Alevis even sympathized 
with the anti-democratic coalitions within the civilian and military bureaucracy that 
directly targeted the AKP administration. The wide majority of the Alevi groups have also 
been supporters of the CHP and other left wing parties since the early 1960s and this 
situation did not change in the course of the last decade (Schüler, 1999; Shankland, 2003; 
Çarkğlu, 2006). The AKP elite had never been considered by Alevis to be a group that 
would potentially support its party. This is why the political drives had not motivated 
AKP to prioritize Alevi claims in its policy agenda. 
Alevi claims have not been an important part of the AKP agenda because the 
dissatisfaction of the Alevi community with the AKP government has been articulated in 
indirect forms. Alevi social and political activists had rather preferred to state its 
dissatisfaction with the AKP government with some proxy arguments. Alevi discontents 
were presented in the forms of ―fear of sharia (Islamic theocracy),‖ ―fear of weakening of 
the secular fundamentals of the Turkish Republic,‖ ―AKP‘s betrayal to Atatürk‘s legacy,‖ 
―anti-democratic policies against certain identity groups,‖ ―violation of basic human 
rights‖ and ―discriminatory social and political practices.‖ 
3.12. AKP and the Practice of Dealing with Domestic Issues 
During the AKP administration there has been an increasing level of polarization 
between the secularist/Kemalist segment of Turkish society and the conservative religious 
segments that are closer to the AKP. Both the AKP administration and the representatives 
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of the Alevi community were involved in this polarization without naming it as such. 
Alevis were actively involved in the ―Republic Protests‖ that were held in Ankara (April 
14 2007), İstanbul (April 29 2007), İzmir (May 12 2007), Manisa and Çanakkale (May 5 
2007) to state its support for the secularist, Kemalist principles of the Turkish Republic. 
This proxy tension had clearly been manifested with the Alevi meeting that was held in 
Ankara on November 9 2008. 
Alevi political discourse emphasized certain proxy arguments such as ―defense of 
the secularism,‖ ―defense of the fundamental principles of Atatürk‘s Republic‖, social 
justice and equal rights for all Turkish citizens. Nationalism, secularism, anti-Islamism, 
anti-imperialism, meaning anti EU and anti-US, are the common themes of the ―ulusalcı‖ 
(Uslu, 2009) and Alevi political discourses. Alevi identity based claims were presented 
along these lines. The AKP elite for a long time perceived the Alevi political discourses to 
be the voice of the emerging ―ulusalcı‖ coalition against its party and/or as the 
ideological discourse of the opposition party CHP, which represented the ―pro-status quo 
Kemalist Establishment.‖ There are many overlaps between these two political discourses 
and the Alevi political discourse, but the governing party started to recognize the nuances 
after the engagement process. 
This polarization, avoidance and dialectic continued until the AKP government 
acknowledged that they could not mitigate the Secularist/laicist and conservative 
religious/Islamist tension without addressing the problems and expectations of Alevi 
citizens. Some Alevi leaders also acknowledged that confronting the government does not 
help them to reach its political and economic objectives. This created wider divisions 
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within the Alevi community, while some groups and associations approached the AKP 
governments‘ engagement policy positively as a significant opportunity for official 
recognition; others maintained its skepticism and protested the groups and Alevi leaders 
who engaged with the government. This contention is gradually turning into a process of 
mutual recognition. Psychological and communicative barriers are still preventing deeper 
level engagement. 
3.13. From Avoidance to Engagement: Recognizing the Alevi Realities 
AKP-Alevi relations, which was for a long time in a stalemate situation, has 
become much more dynamic with the AKP‘s second term in government, starting from 
July 22 2007. The approach which avoided Alevi claims and denied Alevi social and 
political leaders has been abandoned in this new period. An ―Alevi engagement policy‖ 
(Alevi açılımı) has been put into action and many important symbolic gestures have been 
made by both the AKP government and some Alevi leaders. The Alevi issue has neither 
been avoided nor tried to be addressed with some proxy mechanisms such as EU 
integration reforms in AKP‘s second term. The AKP Government tried to develop a more 
accommodative language without alienating its constituents. For both the Alevi 
community, or Alevi groups, and the AKP, the ongoing period is a gradual process of 
mutual recognition. Delineating the problems and the parties to those problems correctly 
been the first and foremost step towards mutual recognition. 
Despite the government‘s efforts, Alevi activists of the ABF (Alevi Bektaşi 
Federasyonu) have maintained its skepticism and critical attitudes towards the AKP 
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administration. Alevi activists became more vocal about its identity based claims during 
this period. The ―Grand Alevi Rally‖ (November 9, 2008) was an important endeavor of 
the ABF (Alevi Bektaşi Federation) to voice its social and political concerns. The 
participants of the rally confronted the AKP government and its ―Alevi engagement 
policy.‖ ―Equal citizenship rights‖ and ―commitment to the secularist principles of the 
Turkish Republic‖ were the highlights of the rally. The usual lists of claims were also 
mentioned in the meeting. The tone of the rally was anti-AKP government; one of the 
popular slogans of the organization committee was even ―We came here to wipe AKP to 
Ankara River
75‖ (Birgün, October 27, 2008). The government and Prime Minister 
Erdoğan, and the Diyanet have been accused of being ―assimilationist,‖ ―retrograde‖ 
(gerici), ―pro-theocracy‖ (şeriatçı), ―Fascist‖ and ―the servant of imperialists‖ 
(emperyalist uşağı).  
There are certain groups and factions within the governing party, bureaucracy and 
Alevi community who are disturbed by the changing stalemate. There is, however, an 
increasing number of Alevis that are becoming more interested in dialogue and 
engagement rather than confrontation. The supporters of dialogue and reconciliation 
processes between the Alevi and Sunni citizens and the social and political actors are 
rapidly increasing, which is a positive sign. The pro-nationalist opposition party MHP 
also declared its new plan with regard to Alevi claims. There is an emerging social and 
political consensus on the necessity to address deep-rooted hostilities and problems with 
constructive engagement and creative mechanisms of conflict resolution and 
                                                 
75 ―AKP‘yi Ankara Çayı‘na süpürmeye geldik‖ 
163 
 
reconciliation. It is still very early to make evaluative judgments about the implications of 
the ―Alevi engagement policy‖ but there are some improvements, which may be a source 
of raised optimism. 
The major highlights of the governing AKP‘s Alevi engagement policy76 are the 
nomination and the election of Alevi MP‘s Reha Çamuroğlu and İbrahim Yiğit. 
Çamuroğlu also played an important role in the PM Erdoğan‘s participation to the Alevi 
iftar‘s (breaking fast) in 2008 and 2009. Most importantly, the speeches of Erdoğan in 
both iftars can be considered to be historical moments for the recognition of leaders of 
Alevi community and the acknowledgment of Alevi victimhood. 
―I came here to share all our mourning, not just your mourning. This is together 
our mourning. 
We have been drinking from the same spring, we have been turning to same qibla, 
we should not put the blames of the history on to each other 
Our path, our guides and our destinations are same.‖ (Erdoğan‘dan Alevilere: 
Acıyı bal eyleyelim, 2008)  
In the second Alevi iftar which was held in İstanbul on January 7 2009 Erdoğan 
emphasized that ―Sivas and Başbağlar are our shared pains.‖ State TV TRT 1 broadcasted 
the prime time news from Karacahmet Cemevi on the 10
th
 of Muharram. It was an 
important gesture because the PM Erdoğan was accused of demolishing Karacaahmet. 
TRT 2 also broadcasted programs on Karbala, Alevi culture, beliefs and rituals on the 
month of Moharram. One of the most important gesture was that Minister of Culture 
                                                 
76 For the detailed chronological survey of the Alevi engagement policy see Appendix 3 
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Ertuğrul Günay apologized to the Alevi citizens as the representative of state for the past 
victimhood that the ancestors of Alevis had experienced (Bakan Günay‘dan Aleviler için 
tarihi çıkış, 2008). Günay said that ―Alevis had many painful experiences in the past Such 
as Sivas and Maraş Events. On behalf of Turkish state I would like to apologize.‖For the 
first time, a representative of the Turkish State apologized to the Alevi community. 
Besides the symbolic gestures and embracing speeches, a series of Alevi 
workshops were also put into action. The Ministry of State initiated the 7 step Alevi 
workshop series which is moderated by Professor Necdet Subaşı. The workshop series 
intends to incorporate a multiplicity of related actors and stakeholders to the engagement 
process. There are also ongoing legislative and administrative arrangements related to the 
situation of compulsory religious courses and the needs of Alevis related to religious 
services. With the ongoing Alevi policy, official authorities directly engaged with the 
representatives of the Alevi community and Alevi civil society organizations. This is one 
of the rare moments in the history of the Turkish Republic where the Alevi identity is 
symbolically recognized as an entity with certain rights and duties. The contents of the 
rights and duties may be a subject of tough public negotiations but the high ranking 
officials and the members of the AKP elite, including the Prime Minister Erdoğan have 
already acknowledged some of the victimhood narratives of Alevis. Legal, political and 
psychocultural reconciliation processes necessitate a sustained and reciprocal engagement 
that expands to the grassroots levels as well. It is still too early to see the results and 
resonances of the engagement policies at the grassroots levels, but there are an increasing 
number of people from both communities who are willing to hear each others‘ stories. 
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*** 
Politization of Alevi identity since the early 1960s has in no sense been a linear 
path. There were many ups, downs, confusions, social contentions and even some violent 
confrontations within the last 50 years. Encounter with the ―other‖ in the urban context 
necessitated the ―reinvention‖ of the ―Alevi self‖. An entire generation of urban Alevi 
youth has built an identity based on Marxist political language starting from 1960s. 
Whereas their fathers/mother avoided their identity claims for the sake of social and 
economic survival. Many Alevis today believe that, they were the real victims of 
ideological violence of 1970s and the September 12, 1980 military coup. The 
interregnum period for Alevi social and political activism, in the aftermath of the 
September 12, 1980 military came to an end with the ―Alevi revival‖ starting from early 
1990s. In terms of organizational experience and raising consciousness about Alevi 
identity based claims, remarkable achievements have been accomplished during the last 
two decades. Recent Alevi engagement policy of the AKP government might not be 
possible, without the efforts of Alevi civic organizations and the ―Alevi identity 
entrepreneurs‖. Alevi identity based claims and the limits and possibilities of the recent 
Alevi revival will be discussed in a more detailed way in the conclusion chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
From Basic Human Needs to Narrative Identity: The Study of Identity Based 
Conflicts in CR 
 
 
The most common categories of social identity are: ethnic, racial, gender, 
religious, national, communal, sectarian and professional (Hardin, 2001). The academic 
disciplines that study social identity and group dynamics, such as social psychology, 
psychology, anthropology, sociology and political science have different conceptual 
nomenclature and different research agendas related to identity based conflicts. It is 
problematic to begin analyzing the contemporary Alevi identity processes with any of 
these categories, mainly because of the complicated and unsettled intra-group dynamics 
of the Alevi community. Members of the Alevi community also have a strong resistance 
to being defined or described by any one of these conceptual frameworks
77
. This study 
puts a particular emphasis on the psychocultural dynamics of Alevi identity. Personal 
stories and group narratives have been analyzed as the integral components of Alevi 
social identity processes. 
This study does not want to constrain itself with the research agenda of any 
particular discipline. Instead, I try to understand the social identity dynamics of the urban 
                                                 
77 According to Richard Jenkins, the categorization of a group of people by a more powerful other is not just a matter of classification. It is an intervention in that 
group‘s social world, which may also alter that world and the experience of living in it (Jenkins, 1997, p.72). It has direct impact in practical issues such as 
employment and recruitment. 
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Alevi community of post 1980 Turkey with specific references to collective narratives. 
Life story narratives are embedded in a particular social milieu and the personal life 
stories and narratives have been interactively shaped according to public discourses and 
narratives. The relationship between personal and collective narratives is also one of the 
emphases of this study. The interdisciplinary nature of the CAR field allows operating 
with multiple theories. In this chapter I will present a brief survey of the major theoretical 
approaches and conceptual literatures that have been widely used in studying identity 
based issues in the CAR field. Theoretical approaches have changed depending on the 
priorities of the field, but identity issues have always been one of the central concerns of 
CAR. 
Three main emphases of this study with specific reference to the Alevi case are: 
 Psycho-cultural dynamics and narratives of marginalization, humiliation and 
discrimination. 
 Conflictual processes of boundary negotiation and use of moral/political positions 
and storylines in this negotiation. 
 Narrative dimensions of Alevi quest for recognition. Interactive role of individual 
life stories and public narratives in the process of countering the meta narratives 
of the majority Sunni understanding and the official Turkish identity meta-
narrative. 
The contemporary Alevi identity can be considered to be a modern social 
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phenomenon, but for centuries the notion of Alevi groupness
78
 has been preserved and 
sustained as a distinctive social category, as opposed to all other competing social 
categories such as Sunni, Turkish, Kurdish, etc. There may be some overlapping cultural 
features such as language, customs and common religious rituals and practices with the 
other social categories, but narratives of victimization, discrimination and marginalization 
that are specific to Alevi communities all over Anatolia has helped the preservation and 
continuation of the separate Alevi subjectivity. Alevi communities historically had certain 
value systems and ritual practices that are separate from the mainstream Sunni 
worldview. 
The psychocultural narratives of the Alevi community which have mostly been 
transmitted through ritual performances and oral narratives have served to represent the 
dimension of continuity in Alevi identity. However, the content and the practical 
implications of those psyhocultural narratives have been transformed over time according 
to changing challenges the Alevi community have been experiencing. There are some 
foundational narratives about the Karbala Event, Council of Forties, Selim 1, Shah Ismail 
struggle, and Şahkulu Uprisals79 but the function and the use of these narratives have 
been re-negotiated according to the more immediate needs and expectations of the Alevi 
communities throughout history. Psychocultural narratives of Alevi community such as 
the narratives of victimhood, discrimination and marginalization are important 
                                                 
78  Groups are defined by and meaningful to their members, while categories are externally defined without any necessary however, the distinction between 
groups and categories is weak and only implicit; a group is an actually existing concrete point of reference for its members, while a category is a collectively defined 
classification of identity, part of local common knowledge. Recognition by their members (e.g. Turner and Bourhis, 1996, pp. 27-30)(Jenkins 2004).Group 
membership in itself, regardless of its context or meaning, is sufficient to encourage members to, for example, discriminate against outgroup members. Group 
members also exaggerate the similarities within the ingroup, and the differences between the ingroup and outgroup 
79  These narratives and their contemporary versions will be elaborated in chapter 6. 
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components of contemporary Alevi identity politics; therefore they are analyzed in this 
study. 
The second important dynamic that significantly influenced the re-negotiation of 
Alevi identity in the last decades are the processes of wide scale urbanization and 
modernization. These processes led to the transformation of the boundaries of Alevi 
identity. Heightened feelings of insecurity and the fear of assimilation are the byproducts 
of the ambiguities related to the boundaries of Alevi identity within these new social 
realms. Boundary transformation is the fundamental social process that has been causing 
significant problems and debates within the Alevi community. There is a wide range of 
ingroup definitions and different agendas associated with these definitions. When these 
social and political agendas contradict, the controversies have often been discussed in the 
public realm with reference to opposing perspectives on the essence and definition of 
Alevilik. 
What makes the boundary negotiation more complicated is the unsettled inner 
debate related to the contours of ―Aleviness‖. Regardless of the differences in self 
definitions, increased interactions with the out-groups activates fears of assimilation and 
discrimination. Alevi collective fears that have been nurtured through the historical 
narratives have been transformed into a productive social motive. Mostly reactionary in 
nature though, the rapid institutionalization of the Alevi community can be attributed to 
this fear. Normative, emotional and social dynamics of boundary negotiation and 
transformation is also examined in this study. 
The third important dimension of contemporary urban Alevi identity is the 
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transformation of the oral narratives into written form. Certain publications, media 
channels, public figures, social and political debates played a significant role in this 
process of re-narrativization
80
. I am mostly interested in the pragmatic dimension of new 
narratives and therefore address the question: ―what does the Alevi community want to 
achieve with these narratives?‖ The process of narrativization and transformation into 
written form is mostly done in order to challenge the Turkish national narrative and 
orthodox Sunni understanding of Islam. Alevi social activists tried to create a legitimate 
and socially acceptable position within the Turkish Islamic context which is both more 
authentic and pure and different than the majority. 
 Alevi revival is also a quest for recognition and acknowledgment and even a 
request for the appreciation of ―purity and authenticity‖, which is claimed by many Alevi 
activists. Turkish national identity meta-narrative that assumes a homogeneous Turkish 
Sunni Muslim identity denies the ethnic sectarian and religious diversity of Turkish 
society
81
. On the macro scale, the public meta-narrative and the historiography of the 
Turkish national identity have been challenged with the new narratives. Public narratives 
and discourses have been countered with a set of alternative storylines. The study also 
                                                 
80 Ethnopolitical entrepreneurialship 
81 In the ethnicity and identity related academic literature on Turkey, especially with their contributions, European scholars and the liberal left scholars in Turkey 
try to construct a notion of dominant ethnicity or majority group. The pillars of this ―majority group‖ are Turkish, Muslim, Sunni and Hanefi schools of thought 
within Sunni Islam (TMSH). It is true that the Turkish national identity has many exclusionist dimensions but I still believe that we have to be critical of the TMSH 
orthodoxy as well. It is mainly because the TMSH majority does not have a social relevance and explanatory power in social events in Turkey. There are cleavages 
based on, religion, ethnicity, sect, hometown, political orientation, tribal roots (especially in South East Anatolia) an all of these ties are relevant at different contexts. 
Trying to create a dominant identity based on TMSH is also an attempt to portray people or groups that are outside of this equation as minority. It is also a form of 
otherization which is one of the purposes of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs. I think this TMSH is constructed with the inspiration of the WASP (White Angle Saxon 
Protestant) notion of North America. Eric P Kaufman has comprehensive studies on the transformation of the WASP identity in North America. Kaufman, E.P. 
(2004). The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America: The Decline of Dominant Ethnicity in the United States, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Eric P. Kaufman, 
The Decline of WASP in the United States and Canada‖ in, Kaufman, E.P. (2004) (ed.) pp 61-84, Rethinking Ethnicity: Majority Groups and Dominant Minorities, 
London: Routledge.  
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classifies the competing narratives genres of contemporary Alevi identity, which is 
defined as the ―fragments of Alevi identity‖. 
Individual life stories, group narratives and the entire process of narrativization 
have been functioning as ways to counter the meta-narrative of ―Official Turkish national 
identity‖ and the majority's understanding of orthodox Sunni Islam. Public and 
institutional claims and the Alevi legal struggle in most cases prioritized the interest 
based issues. These legal and interest based claims are considered to be the components 
of the struggle for recognition in this study. 
Life stories are important connections between Alevi meta-narratives and the 
other meta-narratives, such as Sunni and Turkish national meta-narratives. Personal 
transformations have been taking place within the interactive context of the two. The 
telling of life stories shapes the formation of both an Alevi collective story and 
transformation. Life story narratives are important in order to understand the dynamics of 
individual, collective interactions and expressing social and political concerns. 
4.1. Identity, Group Relations and Conflict Analysis 
In the last two decades, in many fields of the social sciences that deal with the 
problems of collective conflicts and violence, it has been a widely accepted view that 
ethnic, religious, tribal and racial differences have been a driving force behind collective 
confrontation and violence. This perspective became more visible and widely accepted in 
the ethnic, religious and tribal conflicts of the post-Cold war era. There are many case 
studies related to these conflicts, such as Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Somalia, and many other 
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conflicts as well. The debate over identity includes the controversial categories of gender 
and sexual identities as well. 
Recently, many theoretical frames have been developed to analyze and resolve 
ethnic/religious and identity based conflicts in the CR field. These theories are sometimes 
tautological in the sense that they start their analysis with the premises that different 
ethnic, religious groups have confrontational dynamics. Rather than trying to bring 
critical analyses on the dimensions of confrontational dynamics, many of the studies, 
consciously or unconsciously, reify differences. When we talk about ethnicity, religion 
and ethnic religious conflicts, we almost automatically find ourselves talking about ethnic 
groups as separate and confronting entities. I will reflect on some of the characteristics of 
the identity debate that are relevant for the analysis of the Alevi issue. My analysis tries 
to understand the social processes that shape the inter, and intra group dynamics. The 
processes of formation, mobilization and politization of identities are also the main 
interest of this study. 
4.1.2. On Nomenclature: Critical Discussion of the Concept of Identity 
Identity is one of the complicated and controversial concepts, like culture, which 
has a multiplicity of meanings in different contexts. Identity was introduced into social 
analysis in the social sciences and public discourse in the United States in the 1960s 
(Brubaker, 2004). James Fearon presents a comprehensive survey of the definitions and 
practical uses of identity in different disciplines and according to different theoreticians 
(Fearon, 1999). The author of ―Social Identity‖ Richard Jenkins defines identity as a 
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dynamic process. According to Jenkins, identity is our understanding of who we are and 
who other people are, and, reciprocally other people‘s understanding of themselves and of 
others (Jenkins, 2008, p. 5). There may be disagreements on these understandings, or 
misunderstandings, therefore it is necessary to see identity as a reflexive process and a 
process of negotiation. 
Identity can only be understood as a process, as ―being‖ or ―becoming‖. One‘s 
identity- ones identities, indeed, for who we are- is always singular and plural- is 
never a final or settled matter (Jenkins, 2004, p. 5). 
In this study I will emphasize a practical identity definition rather than getting 
into the details of the theoretical debates. In the IR and CR disciplines, the use of 
―identity‖ is often opposed to ―interest‖. This use highlights and conceptualizes identity 
as a noninstrumental mode of social and political action (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). This 
―noninstrumental mode of action is driven by particularistic self-understandings rather 
than by putatively universal self-interest‖ (Somers, 1994). 
Dan McAdams‘ story oriented definition conceptualized identity as ―the story that 
the modern ‗I‘ constructs and tells about the ‗me‘‖. According to McAdams people 
integrate themselves into society by trying to construct a purposeful self-history 
(McAdams, 2001). Story is the key to locating identity within a spatio-temporal context. 
To the extent the modern I can indeed relate to the ―me‖ as a meaningful story, the 
I succeeds in meeting the modernist challenge to construe the self as a dynamic, 
multileveled project that is integrated in time and across social space (McAdams, 
2001, p. 63). 
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Jenkins on the other hand thinks that identities are by definition social because 
identifying ourselves or others is a matter of meaning, and meaning always involves 
interaction such as agreement, disagreement, communication and negotiation (Jenkins, 
2008). Social constructionist scholars Harré (1993), Shotter (1984, 1993a; 1993b) and 
Gergen (1999; 2001), Gergen and Gergen (1997) also emphasize the social nature of the 
identity and self. Rather than studying the inner dynamics of the psyche they call for 
studying the continuous communicative interaction between human beings (Shotter, 
1993a). 
Social constructionists are concerned with how, without a conscious grasp of the 
processes involved in doing so, in living out different, particular forms of self-
other relationships, we unknowingly construct different, particular forms of 
person world relations (Shotter, 1993a, p. 12). 
Many of the categories of social identity such as ―nation,‖ ―race,‖ and ―identity‖ 
are used analytically and practical use of these categories in specific contexts reifies them 
(Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). In order to avoid the dilemmas related to the reification of 
identity, social constructivist epistemology theorizes identities as multiple, fragmented, 
and fluid. Harré‘s Wittgensteinian pragmatic notion of identity tries to avoid the problem 
of reification. According to Harré, identity is a dynamic concept, the meaning of which is 
constructed in discourses. ―The meaning of identity (and other concepts) is derived from 
how it is used in the discourse, the functions that it serves, the acts it is used to 
accomplish, the illocutionary force it bears when it positions actors in various ways‖ 
(Harré, 2006, p. 228). 
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4.1.3. Groups, Categories and the Critique of Groupism  
Groups and categories are the basis of social analysis in many disciplines of social 
sciences. They are the main protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of 
social analysis in CR as well. Groups are defined by and meaningful to their members, 
while categories are externally defined. ―A group is an actually existing concrete point of 
reference for its members, while a category is a collectively defined classification of 
identity, part of local common knowledge‖ (Jenkins, 2004). Recognition by their 
members is sufficient for the group definition. 
According to Social Identity Theory group membership in itself, regardless of its 
context or meaning, is sufficient to encourage members to, for example, discriminate 
against outgroup members. Group members also exaggerate the similarities within the 
ingroup, and the differences between the ingroup and outgroup. “The tendency to take 
groups as discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous, and externally 
bounded entities that are basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social 
conflicts and fundamental units of social analysis‖ is called groupism according to 
Brubaker (2006; 2003). 
Much talk about ethnic, racial, or national groups is obscured by the failure to 
distinguish between groups and categories. If by ―group‖ we mean a mutually 
interacting, mutually recognizing, mutually oriented, effectively communicating, 
bounded collectivity with a sense of solidarity, corporate identity, and capacity or 
concerted action, or even if we adopt a less exigent understanding  ―group,‖ it 
should be clear that a category is not a group. It is at best a potential basis for 
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group-formation or ―groupness.‖  
According to Brubaker it is necessary to break seemingly obvious and uncontroversial 
points that ethnic conflicts –or ethnically framed conflicts- should be understood as 
conflict between ethnic groups (Brubaker, 2004). 
Charles Tilly‘s story oriented social constructivist definition of identity 
characterizes identities as social arrangements reinforced by socially constructed and 
continuously renegotiated stories (Tilly, 2002). Tilly argues that stories play a significant 
role in the processes of political mobilization, conflict and change. In the course of social 
―interaction, people produce, negotiate, register, and respond to stories having 
remarkably uniform logical and ontological structure‖ (Tilly, 2002). Tilly‘s definition 
allows for a dynamic and analytic understanding of the term. Tilly argues that ―social 
identities on all scales, from individual to international, combine three elements: 
relations, boundaries, and stories” (Tilly, 2002). The process of boundary construction 
depends closely on the adoption and modification of shared stories about the boundary 
stories according to this understanding. According to Tilly, boundary stories include 
names for the sites on either side of the line, accounts of where they came from, and 
imputations of shared attributes to the entities on each side of the line (Tilly, 2002; 1996). 
Charles Tilly‘s story based depiction of political identities is relevant for my treatment of 
Alevi identity politics. In his study Tilly summarizes the features of political identities as 
follows: 
Political identities are always, everywhere relational and collective 
They therefore alter as political networks, opportunities, and strategies shift 
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They always include the adoption of shared stories concerning we-they 
boundaries-stories about how the boundaries arose and what they separate 
The validation of political identities depends on contingent performances to which 
other parties‟ acceptance or rejection of the asserted relation is crucial. 
That validation both constrains and facilitates collective action by those who 
share the identity. (Tilly, 2002, p.61). 
 Tilly‘s depiction of the features of political identities portrays general 
characteristics and action components of collective identities. There are multiplicities of 
ways to approach identity based conflicts and available conceptual frameworks which 
emphasize different dimensions. Although the Alevi identity revival has certain political 
claims, elements of certain theories highlight some of the more intricate dynamics of 
identity negotiation. Now I will discuss the possible contributions of conceptual frames 
for understanding the dynamics of Alevi identity movements as well as other ethnic, 
sectarian and identity based conflicts. As mentioned above, cultural, normative and 
emotional dimensions of identity processes are emphasized in this study more so than the 
social and political activism side. 
4.2. Identity as a Need: Early Concepts in the Discipline 
Early theorists in the Conflict Analysis and Resolution discipline had formulated 
and operationalized the issues of identity and group conflicts in various generic forms. 
Human Needs Theory, which has sociopscyhological and sociobiological roots, assumed 
that diverse problems such as family breakdown, industrial strives, and ethnic conflicts, 
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have  human needs as a source and may be amenable to resolution through the process of 
problem solving (Jabri, 1996). Concepts such as protracted social conflict (Azar, 1986; 
1990), intractable conflict (Kriesberg, Northrup, & Thorson, 1989), and deep rooted 
conflict (Burton, 1987) strongly stressed the issues of identity. Stating identity and 
belonging as basic human needs and sources of intractable conflict was an important step 
that underlined the importance of the concept, but identity has been mentioned together 
with a list of other needs
82
. 
The introduction of these theories and concepts in the early 1980‘ was 
revolutionary, especially for IR scholars. Shifting the unit of analysis from the individual, 
state or system to ethnic, religious, sectarian or other groups was a significant turn. The 
emphasis on the issues of culture, identity, and belonging as opposed to interest based 
analysis was not new for disciplines like anthropology and sociology but these concepts 
were new for IR scholars. Major sources of conflict between groups according to the 
Realistic Group Conflict Theory are the conflict of interests, values, needs or power. 
Conflicts over material needs are encompassed in competing interests that relate to 
resource scarcity (Fisher, 1990a, p. 103) whereas; Human Needs Theory assumes that 
individuals have inherent drives to fulfill their basic need for identity and belonging. 
The unsatisfied need for identity and belonging is seen as a source of intractable 
conflict (Burton, 1990; Azar, 1990). The concept of need has replaced the dominant in 
                                                 
82  There are several lists related to basic human needs that more or less overlap. The most well-known for the CR field is Burton‘s list of nine universal human 
needs with reference to psychologist Abraham H. Maslow. Burton‘s list included: need for consistency in response, need for stimulation, need for security, need for 
recognition, need for distributive justice, need to appear rational and develop rationality, need for meaningful responses, need for sense of control and need to defend 
ones role (Deviance 72-3). Banks‘s list of BHN‘s included the need for basic resources, the need for self-determination; and the need for association (From Mitchell 
1990). De Reuck‘s list includes identity, recognition, rationality, respect, autonomy, and Control. James C. Coleman mentions physical, social-affectional, self-esteem 
and self-actualization needs.  
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understanding deeply rooted ―identity‖ conflicts. Individual needs such as harmonious 
social relationship or food and shelter do not depend on stages of individual or social 
development. The general conception of need constrains the precision and analytic depth 
of the concept when trying to understand complicated social events. Burton argued that 
without the satisfaction of these needs the individual will find the norms of the society in 
which he behaves- primitive, traditional or industrial- to be inappropriate because these 
norms can be used by him to secure his needs (Burton, 1979). 
Azar‘s notion of ―Protracted Social Conflict‖ suggests the type of on-going and 
seemingly unresolvable conflict. As opposed to interest based explanations, Azar argued 
that unmet psycho-political and socioeconomic needs lead to dysfunctional cognitive and 
behavioral patterns that are not easily remedied by ordinary methods of diplomacy or the 
use of force (Azar, 1990). Protracted social conflicts have certain unique properties:  
The focus of these conflicts is religious, cultural or ethnic communal identity, 
which in turn is dependent upon the satisfaction of basic needs such as those for 
security, communal recognition and distributive justice. While domestic, regional 
and international conflicts in the world today are framed as conflicts over material 
interests, such as commercial advantages acquisition, empirical evidence shows 
that they are not just that (Azar, 1990, p. 2). 
Protracted social conflicts are defined as the social conflicts which arise out of 
attempts to combat conditions of perceived victimization stemming from: a denial of 
separate identity of parties involved in the political process; an absence of security of 
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culture and valued relationships; and an absence of effective political participation 
through which victimization can be remedied (Azar & Burton, 1986, p. 147). The idea 
that the most useful unit of analysis in protracted social conflict situations is the identity 
group- racial, religious, ethnic, cultural and others have strongly been supported by Azar. 
Stephen Ryan also emphasized the point that protracted conflicts are usually prolonged 
conflicts between ethnic groups (Ryan, 1990). Denial of identity and prolonged 
perception of victimhood have been presented as the fundamental dynamic of protracted 
social conflicts. 
For the purpose of describing, explaining and predicting the dynamics of a 
protracted social conflict situation, the identity group is more informative than the 
nation state. There are times when national interests and group interest overlap but 
these are becoming less obvious in the world. What is of concern are the societal 
needs of the individual- security, identity, recognition and others (Azar, 1990, p. 
148). 
According to Chris Mitchell there is a particular confusion on the need for 
identity. It is not clear whether the identity represents the notion of belonging or being 
separate from others. 
In some work, it is treated as a concept relating to an individual‘s need to preserve 
and strengthen a sense of individuality- that is to be clearly and surely separate 
and apart from others. In other works, the concept is treated as an individual‘s 
sure and secure sense of belonging to a group, community or nation, such 
membership being unhampered and such groups being respected by others. In this 
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second version, the concept deals with belonging rather than being apart (footnote 
22 in Mitchell, 1990). 
Azar‘s notion of identity need is a social one and is fulfilled by the forming of identity 
groups. He defines the community as an identity group. People express their grievances 
resulting from unmet human needs collectively. Deprivation of physical needs and denial 
of access to some other needs of minority groups can also be an implicit manifestation of 
the refusal to recognize or accept their communal identity. Structural Victimization' (i.e., 
social, political, and economic inequalities as well as psychological oppression) usually 
takes the form of ethnic discrimination and affects some groups disproportionately, or to 
benefit others. As a form of belonging, collective identity may manifest itself in terms of 
cultural values, images, customs, language, religion, and racial heritage (Azar, 1990, p. 
9). 
In explaining the conflict potential of unsatisfied needs, Burton puts societal 
institutions that suppress basic human needs at the center of his analysis. For Burton, 
such needs as identity, recognition and security are not in themselves sources of conflict, 
but only become so as they are suppressed by societal institutions (Burton, 1979). In 
many situations, institutions suppress such needs in order to impose order and stability. 
BHN theory holds the assumption that regardless of the social conditions and constraints, 
human beings will try to satisfy these needs. If the institutions try to suppress these needs 
in order to impose order, this may cause just the opposite and create further trouble. 
Therefore dealing with the suppressive institutions is also a component of a viable 
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problem solving process. In his important work ―Deviance, Terrorism & War‖ Burton 
outlines his theory as follows: 
1. There are certain human needs and desires that are specific and universal 
2. These will be satisfied, even at the cost of social disruption and personal 
disorientation 
3. Some structures and institutions that have evolved over time as a result of 
differentiation of power and of socialization do not necessarily, either in the short 
or long term, reflect these needs and desires and frequently frustrate them 
4. Disruptive behavior is the consequence of interaction between the pursuit of 
human needs and the institutional framework created by power differentiation 
5. In the interests of social organization and to avoid destructive behavior there is a 
call for a deliberate or conscious input by authorities designed to create conditions 
conducive to fulfillment of human needs. (Burton, 1979, p. 209) 
 Institutions ideally help to promote basic human needs, and solidify the group 
integrity and, identity. Unsatisfied needs may be barriers that can destroy social norms 
and prevent the emergence of social solidarity. 
The view that understands identity as belonging assumes that the need for identity 
is only satisfied by being a member of a group. However, the dynamics of group 
membership may lead to conflicts with other groups. According to Fisher, the need for 
identity, which is seen as a positive aspect of the human condition and a requirement for 
development, may also operate as a negative driver in the causation and escalation of 
intergroup conflict (Fisher, 1990, p. 105). Ethnocentrism and ingroup favoritism have 
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been presented as a universal phenomena in social psychology (Levine & Campell, 
1972). Positive social identity and attachment for in group members may therefore lead to 
negative or hostile attitudes towards the members of outgroups. This is a paradoxical 
situation for a human needs understanding of identity. Fisher developed an eclectic model 
that takes into consideration the intensity of the conflict to address this paradoxical 
situation (Fisher, 1990a). This paradox does not have any particular remedy, but Chris 
Mitchell‘s proposition to separate needs and their satisfiers may help us to think more 
flexibly (Mitchell, 1990). 
Needs may have completely different satisfiers and priorities in different contexts 
and in different times. Mitchell also proposed the possibility of certain degrees and levels 
of satisfaction of the needs rather than thinking in zero sum terms. 
It may be that there is a continuum of need fulfillment underlying potential 
solutions to conflicts: one pole represents total satisfaction of all relevant BHNs 
and is labeled ―Resolution‖. A central area represents less fulfilling solutions 
labeled something different; and an opposite pole is labeled, ―Settlement,‖ at 
which no improvement in fulfillment has occurred but a temporary compromise 
of interests has been arranged the key question remains one of the degree to which 
a solution successfully fulfills the parties‘ need, not whether or not it does fulfill 
them (Michell, 1990, p. 172). 
Yet, complexifying the needs and their possible solutions is against the logic of BHN, 
because one of the primary aims of the theory is to reduce the subjectivity in explanation 
of human conflicts and to bring holistic and encompassing explanations (Burton, 1993). 
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The genetic determinism of BHN theory and its failure to take into consideration 
culture and institutions have been criticized by Avruch and Black (1987; 1990). For the 
analysis of individual and collective processes of identity related conflicts, as well BHN 
theory, have serious deficiencies. Identity is assumed to be the link between the 
individual and mass mobilization for conflict. According to Vivienne Jabri, a human 
needs approach that situates identity within the ontological make up of the individual is 
unable to explain the dynamic relationship between an individual and society (Jabri, 
1996). Social conflicts are a collective phenomena and without social mobilization and 
manipulation of the leaders it is neither possible to generate wide scale collective conflict 
and violence nor s it possible to resolve them. The subjective and emotional dynamics of 
ethnic or other conflicts and manipulation of this subjectivity is crucial for maintenance, 
escalation and de-escalation of these conflicts.  Institutional, discursive and collective 
emotional processes of collective phenomena are fundamental in social analysis. 
An individual‘s reflexive capacities to think, decide and act is also avoided in the 
notion that considers human beings agents who are already programmed by human needs 
drives. This is a dangerous perspective because it takes both social and moral 
responsibility and agency from individual. The outcome is a static model of already 
programmed individuals, mobilized once their identity is recognized as being violated 
(Jabri, 1996). 
The individual has a reflexive capacity, which enables her or him to judge 
behaviors and circumstances and express this in discursive, interactive and 
interpretive mode. To suggest that the individual is driven by needs, the violation 
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of which could lead to violent conflict, is also to remove the moral agency from 
the individual (Jabri, 1996). 
Instead, Jabri wants to focus the analysis of conflict processes on the mechanism of 
communication, interaction and manipulation. Conflicts can better be managed or 
resolved in this way because needs are non-negotiable yet there are numerous means and 
methods to deal with identity based conflicts. 
Connected to the human needs analysis practical approach, ―problem solving‖ 
provided some innovative tools to deal with interpersonal and intergroup conflicts 
compared to power or interest based bargaining. These concepts and theoretical 
approaches that are provided by CR scholars could not have changed the scholarly 
orthodoxy in the IR discipline in late 1980s. However the introduction of constructivist 
approaches in the IR discipline (Wendt, 1994; Guzzini, 2000; Ruggie, 1998) starting from 
early 1990s has shaken the realist/neo-realist orthodoxy in IR. Many of the criticisms of 
the CR scholars against the power and interest based analyses in IR have been 
acknowledged by constructivist IR scholars in the post Cold War era. Basic Human 
Needs stayed as an important metaphor for the analysis of identity based conflicts in CR 
until very recently. However, studying identity as a need could not bring enough analytic 
clarity and depth to the understanding of complex social processes. In a sense, the need 
metaphor presented identity as a mystery and a source of intractability. 
4.3. Identity as Ethnicity, Race, Religion and Nation 
After the end of the ideological struggle of the Cold War era, many multi-ethnic, 
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multi-religious states have been separated along ethnic, tribal, religious and sectarian 
lines. Some of them have managed peacefully as in the cases of Spain (Catalonia), 
Czechoslovakia and the Baltic Republics, but in many other cases, especially those in the 
Balkans, the Middle East and Africa, bloody ethnic conflicts and civil wars have broken 
out. Violent conflicts in Bosnia Herzegovina, Rwanda, Chechnia, Kosovo, Sudan, Sierra 
Leone, etc have made the management of the post violent conflict process much more 
complicated. The general trend of the corrosion of Westphalia states and the emergence 
of the ethno-national struggles is an ongoing one, which has been evident even in 
Western Europe. The prolonged ethnic/sectarian conflicts, such as in Northern Ireland, 
the Kurdish Issue, Iraq, Lebanon, the Quebec struggle in Canada, and even the Flemish-
Walloon divide in Belgium, and the identity struggles of many other groups including 
those in Europe, started to attract more scholarly and policy oriented attention. 
There is often a common association of ethnic identity and community with 
conflict and violence. In many cases the prolonged ethnic and identity struggles that did 
not turn into violence had not attracted as much attention as the violent ethnic and 
identity based confrontations. I do not believe the assumption that automatically 
associates ethnic differences with intergroup conflict, but I believe that some of the ethnic 
lenses and perspectives may contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of identity 
and group processes. Rather than reifying ethnic categories and processes, this research 
illustrates the benefit of ethnic identity based ways of analyzing the inter-group 
processes. 
There was ample academic research related to ethnic, sectarian, tribal and 
187 
 
religious conflicts before 1990s. There was also a lively academic debate related to the 
ways to approach ethnicity and ethnic conflicts since 1970s. Yet, the quantity of the 
research and publications on the analysis of ethnic conflicts has increased drastically 
starting the early 1990s
83
. Peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention to those bloody ethnic 
conflicts, post-conflict interventions, nation building and democratization were the main 
agenda of the Conflict Management practice until the 9/11 attacks. Since the 9/11 attacks, 
the focus of IR and CR theorists and practitioners have shifted to the ―Global War on 
Terror‖. 
The Protracted Social Conflict Theory of Edward Azar and Deep Rooted Conflicts 
of John Burton emphasized ethnic or other groups as the units of their analysis. However 
human nature oriented generic assumptions of the BHN theory does not pay the 
necessary attention to cultural, religious and emotional factors. Conflict analysts and 
practitioners that were using these theories have been perplexed when faced with 
complex ethnic, religious, sectarian, tribal conflicts. Many of these ethnic, tribal, 
religious conflicts had deep cultural, social and historical roots. Psychocultural and 
psychoanalytic approaches have been introduced to the field earlier than the 1990s 
(Volkan, 1987; 1990; 1991; 1998; Volkan & Montville, 1991; Ross, 1986; 1995; Kelman, 
1965; 1979; 1985; 1997; 1998; Fisher, 1990b; Montville & Davidson, 1981; Montville, 
1985; 1989; 1993; 2007), but the rich academic tradition of social and cultural 
anthropology had not been used to analyze identity based conflicts until recently. In 
addition to these factors, political processes such as state collapse, regional instabilities, 
                                                 
83  Wimmer, 2004, p. 11 
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conflict economies, international political support for the separatist movements and 
diaspora advocacies made these conflicts much more complicated. Understanding the 
historical, cultural, social complexity and depth of the many ethnic, tribal, religious and 
sectarian conflicts necessitated more sophisticated and less generic theoretical approaches 
than the BHN theory and protracted social conflicts. 
Studies on ethnic, racial and religious groups have much deeper backgrounds in 
the disciplines of Anthropology and Sociology
84
. As the study of ethnic identity has 
become more central in the CR field the theoretical and conceptual tools that are provided 
by Anthropology and Ethnic Sociology became more significant to the field. The 
processes of the formation and transformation of boundaries of ethnic, identity based 
groups have been studied within the anthropology literature (Barth, 1969; Cohen, 1978). 
Studying Alevi identity with ethnic lenses is important in the sense that almost all 
different positions within the Alevi political and social landscape based their arguments 
with cultural sources.  While discussing some of the essentialist, primordial arguments 
related to ethnicity I pursue a constructivist, agenda. Cultural arguments and repertoire is 
being used by the political entrepreneurs to re-negotiate the new boundaries of Alevi 
identity. Focusing on the instrumental ways this repertoire have been used and 
transformed by the political entrepreneurs is more important for understanding the 
dynamics of Alevi identity transformation, than focusing on the cultural content, basic 
texts and the ritual practices. The moral, political discourses, positions and dynamic 
                                                 
84  Although there are studies related to ethnic groups starting from the 1940s, the term became popular in the 1970s with Glazer and Moynihan‘s collection 
―Ethnicity: Theory and Experience‖ (Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Glazer, & Moynihan 1970). The concept of ethnicity was introduced to dictionaries in the late 
1960s (Avruch, 1992; Sollors, 1989; 1996). 
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social context have shaped the ways these repertoires have been organized. One of the 
problems related to an ethnic understanding of identity is that it is not sensitive to 
individual perspectives and personal life stories. Studying identity as ethnicity focuses on 
the group dynamics. 
4.3.1. Definition of Ethnicity & Ethnic Group 
The root of the concept of ethnicity, the Greek word ―ethos‖, involves a double 
meaning. It refers to people in general as well as people that are differentiated from the 
rest of the community by racial origins or cultural backgrounds (Sollors, 2001, p. 4813). 
For the definition of ―ethnic group‖, the criteria on which almost all the theorists agree on 
is the shared belief or perception of a common origin or ancestry. For example, Weber 
defines ethnic group as ―human groups, which cherish a belief in their common origins of 
such a kind that that it provides a basis for the creation of community‖ (Weber, 1978). 
Another important theorist of ethnicity, Anthony Smith, defines ethnic groups as 
populations that have: a common proper name; shared historical memories; elements of 
common culture; are linked with a homeland; a sense of solidarity; and believes in a myth 
of common ancestry (Smith, 1986). Theorist of nationalism Walker Connor also defines 
the essence of nation as the psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it 
from all nonmembers. Connor‘s definition of nation is a group of people who feel that 
they are ancestrally related (Connor, 1994). Felt kinship ties are crucial in Connor‘s 
definition of nation as the largest group of social belonging. 
Pioneer of the instrumentalist approach to ethnicity, Fredrik Barth, criticized the 
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culturalist view that defines ethnic ―groups as 1-biologically self-perpetuating; 2- share 
fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms; 3-make up a field of 
communication and interaction 4-have a membership which identifies itself, and is 
defined by others as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories if the 
same order‖ (Barth, 1969). Rather than focusing on cultural characteristics and substance, 
Barth emphasized the social processes that produces and reproduces the boundaries of the 
identification of these collectivities. According to Richard Jenkins, Barth‘s understanding 
of ethnic groups that prioritizes the social processes of boundary production has been 
influenced by Weber‘s definition of ethnic groups (Jenkins, 1997). Weber‘s definition is 
centered on a set of beliefs and not on any objective features of group membership such 
as shared language, religion, and especially biological traits associated with the everyday 
understanding of race (Stone, 2003). A sense of common ancestry is vital, but the 
identification with shared origins is largely, if not wholly, fictitious (Stone, 2003). 
The historical roots of the concept of ethnicity and its practical uses may be 
complicated and diverse, but ethnicity in its contemporary form is a consequence the 
emergence of nation states (Black, 2003; Hastings, 1998; Anderson, 1991). The practical 
meaning of ―ethnic‖ in the CR field and IR especially, when it is used to refer to ―ethnic 
conflicts‖, denotes a general state of difference or separateness from the national 
majority. ―Ethnic group‖ as a concept has often been prioritized in comparison to other 
concepts associated with ethnic studies. Rogers Brubaker criticizes the general tendency 
to understand social categories or processes as clearly defined groups. His criticism of 
groupism, which is reifying the groups tagged as such, applies to ethnic groups as well 
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(Brubaker, 2004). 
We need to break, with the seemingly obvious and uncontroversial point that 
ethnic conflict involves conflict between ethnic groups. I want to suggest that 
ethnic conflict— Or what might better be called ethnicized or ethnically framed 
conflict—need not, and should not, be understood as conflict between ethnic 
groups, just as racial or racially framed conflict need not be understood as conflict 
between races, or nationally framed conflict as conflict between nations 
(Brubaker, 2004, p. 9). 
On the other hand Peter Black argues that the use of the term ―ethnicity‖ in the 
field of CR is inadequate for the analysis and resolution of deep-rooted conflicts (Black, 
2003, p. 124). This inadequacy is mainly because ethnicity is considered to be a weak 
conception of culture that is not suitable for organizing social diversity within the 
pluralistic state (Clifford, 1988). According to Black, the concept is inadequate because it 
has been grounded in American social life (Black, 2003, p. 124). Brubaker‘s criticism of 
―groupism‖ also supports Black‘s argument. Concepts such as sect, tribe and race have 
similarities with ethnicity. Also the level of attachment and dynamics of interactions 
cannot be explained with the ethnic group tag. Thomas Hylland Eriksen tried to present a 
contextualized version of forms of ethnic relations. Eriksen‘s five categories are: ―urban 
ethnic minorities‖, ―indigenous peoples‖, ―proto nations‖, ―ethnic groups in plural 
society‖, and ―post slavery minorities‖ (Eriksen [1993] 2002). Eriksen‘s contextual 
definition of the forms of ethnic relations is far from presenting the complexity of ethnic 
relations but it helps to classify the existing research areas and scholarship. 
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Handelman‘s typology of ethnic concepts according to degrees of ethnic 
incorporation makes these concepts analytically more useful. ―Ethnic category denotes a 
perceived cultural difference between the group and outsiders, and a sense of boundary‖. 
―Ethnic network‖ is a regular interaction between ethnic members, a network which can 
distribute resources among its members. ―Ethnic associations‖ are the political 
organizations or associations that represent the common interests at a collective level. 
―Ethnic community‖ according to Handelman possesses a permanent, physically bounded 
territory, above its political organizations such as national state (Handelman, 1977)‖. The 
analytic distinctions that are elaborated by Handelman may be helpful to differentiate the 
collective activities and processes that are conducted along ethnic lines. Despite all these 
fair criticisms the ethnicity literature, especially the anthropological literature on 
ethnicity, discusses and tries to address those inadequacies. 
4.3.2. Approaches to Ethnicity: Primordialism, Instrumentalism and Cognitive  
4.3.2.1. Constructivism vs Essentialism 
The debate between constructivism and essentialism is an important debate in 
ethnicity and nationalism studies, which also has relevance for the analysis and resolution 
techniques of ethnic conflicts. In academic discussions of ethnicity, constructivist 
approaches are dominant and much of the current academic research is being conducted 
along constructivist assumptions. Yet everyday talk, policy analysis, and media reports 
still frame accounts of ethnic, and national conflicts in groupist and essentialist terms 
(Brubaker, 2004). The constructivist/essentialist debate is related to social ontology and 
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epistemology which has a strong influence on the methodological debates on ethnicity. 
The essentialist social ontology assumes that ethnicity is an aspect and an essential 
feature of being human. According to the essentialist approach to ethnicity, ethnic identity 
emanates from certain primary traits of a population. Ethnic or national communities 
grow organically, as it were, out of preexisting cultural communities. 
The essentialist position is asociological and reduces the social phenomena such 
as processes of group making, identity formation, transformation, and conflicts and 
violence to inherent roots and drives (Hutchinson & Smith, 1997). Social processes and 
transformations are minimal in value in an essentialist analysis, because ethnic groups are 
considered like extended kinship relationships (quoted in Jeong & Vavrynen, 1999). The 
primordialist approach to ethnicity is a form of essentialism
85
. A reason for essentialist 
form of explanation in the anthropological study of ethnicity according, the Allen & Eade 
(1997), is the fact that anthropologists have usually focused on small populations which 
are likely to come from single ethnic groups (Allen & Eade, 1997). The findings of small 
group researchers have been generalized to other groups. 
Constructivism, on the other hand, assumes that ethnicity or national features are 
not things that exist in nature. Ethnicity or nationhood are categories or processes that are 
socially constructed therefore needs explanation as social processes. They need social and 
relational forms of explanation rather than apriori biological ones. The constructivist 
position argues that ethnic or national communities and groups are created consciously, 
                                                 
85  There are diverse theories that can be mentioned under the essentialist approaches to ethnicity. Sociobiology (van den Berghe, 1978, 1981; 1986;; Reynolds, 
Falger & Vine, 1987) and ethnos theory (Tishkov, 1996; 1997) are two of these (cited in Allen and Eade 1997, pp. 22-27). Sociobiologists have been criticized for 
reducing cultural and social behavior to biological drives and genetic capacity. Pure essentialism is less relevant in academic discussions.   
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therefore they are contingent, and fluctuating entities. The emphasis of the studies in 
constructivist anthropology is on identities rather than cultures. Avruch briefly outlines 
the constructivist approach to culture, ethnicity and nationalism. 
Traditions (cultural forms, beliefs, ritual and ceremony) and nations are recent and 
modern because they are continually caught up in processes of social and cultural 
construction. They are invented and reinvented, produced and reproduced, 
according to complex, interactive and temporally shifting contingencies of 
material conditions and historical practice. They are products of struggle and 
conflict, of material interests and competing conceptions of authenticity and 
identity (Avruch, 1992, p. 614). 
Postmodernist versions of constructivism emphasize the fragmentary and 
fluctuating nature of the boundaries of social groups. These vague and flexible 
conceptualizations of identity and ethnicity, especially in the postmodern variants, have 
also their own drawbacks in social analysis. Theorists of nationalism and ethnicity have 
pointed out time and again that identification is relational, situational, and flexible, and 
that each person carries a number of potential identities, only a few of which become 
socially significant, making a difference in everyday life. This notion of constructivism 
weakens the value and the explanatory power of the concept. Rogers Brubaker refres to 
this kind of constructivism with the derogatory term “clichéd constructivism.”  
Weak or soft conceptions of identity are routinely packaged with standard 
qualifiers indicating that identity is multiple, unstable, in flux, contingent, 
fragmented, constructed, negotiated, and so on. These qualifiers have become so 
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familiar indeed obligatory—in recent years that one reads them virtually 
automatically. They risk becoming mere placeholders, gestures signaling a stance 
rather than words conveying a meaning (Brubaker, 2004, p. 38). 
The constructivist turn opened up the whole relationship of ethnicity, nationalism, 
race and culture to new inquiries. The focus shifted from the issue of how ethnic culture 
was preserved or succumbed to assimilation to the question of how ethnic groups 
emerged and how ethnicity was constantly reimagined and reinvented (Hobsbawm, 1983; 
Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1992; Anderson, [1983] 2006 ). The role of cultural and political 
entrepreneurs who codify and standardize a language, equipping it with a written form, 
create an ethos-centered historical narrative, popular with internal heroes and external 
villains, and build a literary tradition are crucial in the constructivist approach (Young, 
2003 ). 
Ernest Gellner (1983; 1997), argues that nations are entirely modern creations; 
they are byproduct of industrialism and the state. Nations more or less fraudulently invent 
their past to gain a semblance of antiquity and deep roots (quoted in Eriksen, 2001, p. 
45). His famous quote ―It is nationalism that engenders the nations not the other way 
around‖ (Gellner, 1983) expresses his modernist view on the subject. According to 
Gellner nationalism is primarily a political phenomena; it is a theory of political 
legitimacy that attempts to hold political and national units together (Gellner, 1983). 
The author of ―Imagined Communities‖ Benedict Anderson also has quite similar 
ideas about the issue where he also mentions that ‗Nationalism is not the awakening of 
nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist (Anderson 
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[1983], 2006, p. 6). In fact Anderson‘s idea of imagined communities and the vision of 
constructivism overarches the domain of nations. Anderson claimed that all communities 
larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are 
imagined (Anderson [1983], 2006). For Anderson also, what really matters is the style in 
which the communities are imagined. Ethnic narratives play a crucial role in the 
production of imagined communities. The debate over the authenticity and genuineness 
of ethnic groups is irrelevant, because these categories have been activated with the 
production of convincing national myths and narratives (Anderson [1983], 2006). 
For Anthony D. Smith preexisting ethnicities still play a significant role for the 
development of nationalism, but myths and symbols have played a significant role in 
sustaining the continuity of these ethnicities. The resurgence of ethnicity in the modern 
world happened with reference to a certain ―solid‖ ground that is not fluctuating (Smith, 
1986; 1998). By categorizing the nations into ethnic and civic ones he opens a space for 
some of the primordial ties in modern definitions of nation (Smith, 1998). For Gellner 
ethnic groups and their leaders‘ possession or willingness to control a state is crucial the 
emergence of nations. Whereas Anderson‘s notion of imagined community is more or less 
an abstract idea or feeling, there is not a specific link between nation and ethnic group in 
Anderson (emphasis in Eriksen, 2001). The link has historically been created and 
transformed over time. 
Nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind. To 
understand them properly we need to consider carefully how they have come into 
historical being, in what ways their meanings have changed over time, and why, 
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today, they command such profound emotional legitimacy (Anderson [1983], 
2006, p. 4). 
4.3.2.2. Primordialism vs Instrumentalism 
Another important debate related to the approaches to ethnicity is the debate 
between instrumentalism and primordialism. The primordialist approach to ethnicity 
argues that ethnic identity is profoundly rooted in and generative of collective 
experiences. Ethnicity is something that is given, ascribed at birth deriving from kin and 
clan structures of human society, something more or less permanent and fixed (Isajiw, 
1974). Clifford Geertz, who is often mistakenly associated with this view, argues that 
―cultural systems are more or less self-sustaining and are thus not subject to the willful 
manipulation of individuals‖ (Geertz, 1973). 
These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an 
ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves some 
unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself (Geertz, 1973, p. 
259, emphasis of Avruch). 
Harold Isaacs, prominent primordialist approach theorist, defines ethnicity as a 
basic group identity having identifications which everyone shares from the moment of 
birth by chance into a family (Isaacs, 1975). ―Diacritics‖ or distinguishing markers of 
groups, are according to Isaacs, physical appearance, name, language, religion, history, 
and it is difficult to escape these markers, as they are more or less fixed. According to 
Harold Isaacs ethnicity serves the basic human need for a safe place of ultimate 
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belonging (Young, 2003). In terms of being ethnic markers these primordial ties and 
markers that are mentioned by Geertz, Isaacs and Smith may seem much clearer, but they 
do not explain collective goals, social political orientations, common modes and 
processes of collective action. Primordialism has been criticized for presenting a static 
view of ethnicity and for lacking explanatory power (Eller & Coughlan, 1993). 
The instrumentalist position argues that ethnic identity arises as an ad hoc supplement 
to political strategies and manipulation. For instrumentalists, ethnicity is a social, political 
and cultural resource for different interest groups (Hutchinson & Smith, 1997). Frederik 
Barth‘s seminal work ―Ethnic Groups and Boundaries‖ has changed the general 
understanding of the relationship between culture and ethnicity. According to Barth, 
cultural differences cut across ethnic boundaries; and that ethnic identity is based on 
socially acceptable notions of cultural differences, not "real" ones (Barth, 1969). Barth 
defined ethnic ascriptions and boundaries as the categorical ascriptions and transactions 
across the boundaries as the means to strengthen these boundaries. Barth outlines his 
project as follows: 
 Ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the actors 
themselves, and thus have the characteristic of organizing interactions between 
people.  
 Rather than working through a typology of forms of ethnic groups and 
relations, we attempt to explore the different processes that seem to be involved in 
generating and maintaining ethnic groups. 
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 To observe these processes we shift the focus of investigation from 
internal constitution and history of separate groups to ethnic boundaries and 
boundary maintenance (Barth, 1969, p. 75). 
The essence of ethnicity is mental, cultural social and not necessarily territorial 
boundary-constructing processes. For Barth it was the ―ethnic boundary that defines the 
group, not the cultural stuff it encloses‖. Barth directed attention to processes of boundary 
maintenance and argued that members of all ethnic groups in all ethnic groups in a poly-
ethnic society could act to maintain dichotomies and differences (Sollors, 2001, p. 4816). 
Barth has been criticized for operating with fixed ascriptive categories such as symbols 
and codes. 
In his instrumentalist anthropological account of urban Africa, Abner Cohen 
emphasizes the conscious manipulation of kinship and cultural symbols by political 
entrepreneurs seeking political gain (Cohen, 1969b). According to Cohen, ethnicity is 
essentially a political phenomenon, as traditional customs are used only as mechanisms 
for political alignment (Cohen, 1969b). Cohen‘s instrumentalism is much more clear and 
pure: 
If men do actually quarrel seriously on the ground of cultural differences it is only 
because these cultural differences are associated with serious political cleavages. 
On the other hand men stick together under the contemporary situation only 
because of mutual interests (Cohen, 1969b, p. 201) 
In his studies Cohen tries to connect symbolic and political dimensions of life, but for 
Cohen in order for ethnicity to prevail it has to have a practical function. It is only in this 
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way we can explain why some ethnic groups succeed or become important while others 
disappear (Eriksen [1993], 2002, p. 44). One of the weaknesses of Cohen‘s analysis is 
that it is really difficult to explain how ―dysfunctional identities‖ or the identities that do 
not provide certain privileges that would balance the discrimination or possible 
marginalization that is attached to those identities, prevails. In fact, in many cases 
victimization or marginalization discourses are a much stronger glue to keep a particular 
ethnic group together for longer periods of time than do common interests. 
Banton (1983), Moynihan (1975), Hechter (1986)‘s instrumentalism also assumes 
that some actors joining ethnic and national groups help maximize material goods such as 
power, wealth and statue.  The rational orientations of individuals have been emphasized 
in these pure materialist forms of instrumentalism. In a sense complicated intergroup 
relations, comparisons and conflicts helps to organize the distinctive ingroup identities 
positively. Cultural contents are just minimal in value when organizing these different 
interests according to this purest form of instrumentalism. Therefore the real conflicts and 
struggles may be over the ―real‖ scarce resources according to this notion. Ethnicity or 
identity is not just for pursuing particular interests or maximizing utility. 
4.3.3. Current Academic Orthodoxy in Anthropological Approaches to Ethnicity 
Ethnicity was considered to be concerned with culture and shared meanings of a 
particular group. Therefore the characteristics of the group have been studied by focusing 
on the cultural features.  The view which sees ethnicity as a socially contained property 
of a group has been replaced by the view which sees ethnicity as a property of a 
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relationship between two or several groups (Eriksen, 2001; 2002). While the method of 
ethnic group analysis for the former model focuses within group dynamics, the relational 
model of analysis focuses on the interactions and relational communication of different 
groups. This pragmatic notion focuses on the multiplicity of means through which 
cultural differences of groups can be communicated. The dialectic relationship of 
similarities and differences of groups are crucial in ethnic analysis (Jenkins, 1997). 
The instrumentalist view which argues that there is no one-to-one relationship 
between ethnic differences and cultural ones is predominant in the contemporary 
understanding of ethnicity. The variable and complex relationship between ethnicity and 
culture is contingent on the social and political situation (Eriksen, 2001; 2002; Jenkins, 
1997). Ethnicity is no more fixed or unchanging than the culture of which it is a 
component or the situations in which it is produced and reproduced. Cultural differences 
are made relevant in social interaction, and it should thus be studied at the level of social 
life, not at the level of symbolic culture. Ethnicity as a social identity is collective and 
individual, externalized in social interaction and internalized in personal self-
identification (Jenkins, 1997, pp. 13-14). 
4.3.4. Cognitive Ethnicity & Brubaker’s Project 
The epistemological orientation of the constructivist version of cognitive 
anthropology has some parallel assumptions with the instrumentalist and constructivist 
approaches to ethnicity. Constructedness, deterritorialization and symbolic expressions of 
ethnic and other identities are just some of the commonalities. While the instrumentalist 
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and constructivist approaches focus on how ethnic or other groups are made and 
maintained, the cognitive approach focuses on the ways the notion of ―groupness‖ has 
been publicly discussed and negotiated (Brubaker et al 2004; Brubaker 2004; Brubaker 
2003). Cognitive anthropologists‘ studies of ethnicity have focused on the ways in which 
the social world has been shaped in ethnic terms, metaphors, schemas, etc. Even the 
selection of concepts, idioms and theoretical categories are seen as a part of processes of 
shaping and directing social and political processes. Understanding the ethnic dynamics, 
with reference to these practicalities and the instruments of these processes makes the 
primordial/instrumental debate or essentialist arguments irrelevant. 
Rogers Brubaker‘s contemporary notion of a cognitive approach to ethnicity 
conceptualizes ethnicity as relational, processual, dynamic, and eventful (Brubaker, 
2004). Rather than taking the ―group‖ as a thing or entity, Brubaker‘s approach to 
ethnicity, takes groupness as a contextually fluctuating conceptual category as well as an 
analytical process, (Brubaker, 2004). Brubaker's view is that the categories of analysis 
such as ethnicity, race and nation should not be conceptualized as substances or things, 
―they should rather be conceptualized in terms of practical categories, situated actions, 
cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, 
institutional forms, political projects, and contingent events‖ (Brubaker, 2004). 
Ethnicity, race, and nationhood are fundamentally ways of perceiving, 
interpreting, and representing the social world. They are not things in the world, 
but perspectives on the World.‘ These include ethnicized ways of seeing (and 
ignoring), of ways of seeing (and ignoring), of construing (and misconstruing), of 
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inferring (and misinferring), of remembering (and forgetting) (Brubaker, 2004, p. 
17). 
According to the constructivist version of a cognitive approach to ethnicity 
ethnicization, racialization, and nationalization are political, social, cultural, and 
psychological processes that are activated with discursive and practical activities of 
enthnopolitical entrepreneurs. Perceiving self and others, experiencing the world and 
interpreting the events in ethnic, sectarian, and racial terms actually crystallizes these 
categories.  Many of the commonsense ethnic categories are essentialized and naturalized 
with ethnopolitical as well as academic entrepreneurs‘ activities and writings (Hirschfeld, 
1996). What Roger Brubaker refers to in his criticism of the reification of groups is 
precisely what ethnopolitical entrepreneurs are in the business of doing. 
By invoking groups, those entrepreneurs seek to evoke them, summon them, and 
call them into being. Their categories are for doing—designed to stir, summon, 
justify, mobilize, kindle, and energize (Brubaker, 2004, p. 10). 
The accounts and public activities of people such as ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, 
politicians and even ordinary citizens are performative in character (Bourdieu, 1990; 
1991, Austin, 2000; Butler 1993; 1997). The social meaning of the particular group or 
categories have been contextualized and activated with the entire speech and other acts of 
those entrepreneurs. Brubaker extended the possible instruments of group making. Ethnic 
idioms, ideologies, narratives, categories, and systems of classification, and ethnic ways 
of seeing, thinking, talking, and framing claims, have all been the part of groupmaking 
(Brubaker, 2004). How social events have been framed and discussed; legal and political 
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claims have been formulated and expressed and are important components of  
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Labeling, interpreting conflicts, ethnic problems and struggles and the debates 
related to the nature of conflicts is the integral part of conflict itself. There may be both 
inter and intra-party debates related to this point. In particular, one of the most 
controversial and important issues on the agenda of the cognitive approach is the way to 
frame violence. Besides helping to construct and maintain moral boundaries, the debate 
over the framing of violence is about the nature of the conflict. ―Acts of framing and 
narrative encoding do not simply help to interpret the violence; they constitute it as 
ethnic‖ (Brass, 1996). Studying the processes of framing conflict and violence is 
therefore an important component of the conflict and political confrontation itself. 
To cause an event to be seen as a ―pogrom‖ or a ―riot‖ or a ―rebellion‖—is no 
mere matter of external interpretation, but a constitutive and often consequential 
act of social definition (quoted in Brubaker, 2004; Brass, 1996). 
Conceiving the violence and conflict as a cognitive and performative process makes the 
academics, researchers, politicians, officials, journalists, social and political entrepreneurs 
from all parties as the active agents in the formation as well as resolution of these 
problems. The ways ethnic or other issues have been publicly discussed may be a conflict 
intervention itself. 
Theoretical debates on ethnicity, race, religion, sect and nationalism are still going 
on. The current academic orthodoxy in the ethnicity field considers the formation and 
transformation of ethnic identities as a dynamic process. Framing the identity as ethnicity, 
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nationality or in any other way is also an intervention. I tend to understand academic or 
other public debates related to Alevilik as an intervention to the dynamic process of the 
negotiation of Alevi identity. 
4.4. Social Identity as In-group/ Out-group Process: Outline of the Social 
Psychological Approaches to Identity 
4.4.1. Social Psychological and Notions of Identity 
Another research tradition, which has been highly influential in the study of 
identity and group relations related to issues in CR field is Social Identity Theory (SIT). 
Henri Tajfel and his colleagues, within the discipline of Social Psychology, contributed to 
the early development of SIT between 1971 and 1981 (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel 1978a, 1978b; 
Tajfel 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). SIT is a theory that has been developed with the 
conceptual and methodological tools of social psychology but have influenced some 
other disciplines such as Anthropology, Psychology, and International Relations as well. 
Early works of Tajfel try to explain the relationship between categorization and 
intergroup discrimination (Deaux, 2000). The main unit of analysis according to SIT is 
groups, but the dynamics of group (both intra and inter group) interactions have been 
portrayed differently in SIT, in comparison to ethnicity studies or more materialistic and 
instrumentalist models. Conflicts within social psychology have been addressed with 
theories and approaches to intergroup relations (Ashmore, Jussim & Wilder, 2001). 
Self Categorization Theory, Optimal Distinctiveness Theory, Role Identity and the 
discursive variants of SIT are the products of the academic debate that has flourished 
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with the initiation of SIT. The origins of SIT can also be traced back to Sumner‘s famous 
theory of ethnocentrism (Sumner, 1906)
86. However, Sumner‘s arguments and many 
more hypotheses related to intergroup and intra group dynamics have been examined 
with Minimal Group Experiments which contributed to the ―scientific‖ legitimacy of 
these hypotheses. The positivistic legitimacy of the arguments of SIT have been 
challenged to a certain extend by the social constructivist arguments of the ―second 
cognitive revolution
87‖ (Harré, 1992; 1994) yet the assumptions of SIT inspire research, 
and help explain complex inter- and intra group dynamics. 
Social Categorization (SC) is concerned with the way people categorize 
themselves and others. It is related to how categories come to be coherent, and how they 
affect human perception and action (Krueger, 2002, p. 14219). Jenkins defines SIT as the 
intergroup processes that enable the transformation of categories into coherent groups 
(Jenkins, 2004). The main assumption of SIT is that, ―people exhibit the tendency to form 
groups and define their identity and sense of place in the world relative to groups‖ 
(Tajfel, 1978; 1982; 1986). Unlike the psychoanalytic models SIT does not focus on the 
dynamics of the self and intrapsychic mechanisms. The theory of social identity has 
started with a dualistic assumption and stresses that in addition to personal identity he 
also has a social identity and this identity influences the individual‘s perception of 
himself or herself and society (Korostelina, 2007, p. 23). Questions of individual and 
group relationship and origins of intergroup conflict are the primary agenda of SIT, and 
                                                 
86  Brewer concisely summarized the Sumner‘s definition of ethnocentrism as follows: 1-Human social groups are organized into discrete ingroup-out group 
categories.2-Individuals value their ingroups positively.3-Ingroup positivity is enhanced by social comparison with outgroups, in which ingroups are evaluated as 
better than outgroups.4-Relations between ingroup and outgroups are characterized by antagonism, conflict and mutual contempt (Brewer, 2001, p. 19). 
87  The issue will be discussed later 
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these questions have been addressed by a mostly positivist epistemology via experiments 
in lab conditions (Capozza, Brown, 2000)
88
. Ashmore et al summarizes the features of 
SIT as individual level analysis, lab experiments and scientific evidence that try to 
address mostly the issues of stereotypes and prejudices (Ashmore, Jussim & Wilder, 
2001, p. 7). 
SIT offeres a convincing perspective to deal with one of the important issues of 
social theory; the relationship between individual and group (Ashmore, Jussim & Wilder, 
2001, p. 7). Group membership, according to SIT, represents a different ontological state 
for individuals for both cognition and action. SIT provided an analysis of intergroup 
behavior which is both individualistic and social (Ashmore, Jussim, & Wilder, 2001). The 
theory explains collective phenomena such as prejudice or social protest movements by 
some of the methodological tools of individual psychological analysis (Ashmore, Jussim, 
& Wilder 2001). Individual identification and group formation are portrayed as an 
interactive process; therefore self and ingroup dynamics can only be understood with 
reference to this process of interaction (cited in Hancock, 2003, p. 20). One of the 
strengths of SIT , according to Capozza and Brown, which also helped the continuation 
and the development of the theory for such a long time, is the ability of the theory to 
                                                 
88  Besides the main texts of SIT by Tajfel and Turner (Tajfel), there are several more recent studies that outline the features, assumptions and the dynamics of 
SIT. Capozza and Brown‘s edited volume ―Social Identity Processes: Trends in Theory and Research‖, provides a state of the art compilation of articles that address 
the main theoretical themes and research topics of SI research. The research programme of the book is consistent with the orthodox quantitative research tradition. 
Measurement and operationalization of the basic concept is stresses in the volume. Jenkins‘ volume ―Social Identity‖ stresses the dynamics of Social Categorization 
and group formation. Interaction of the in-group and out-group dynamics and processes and more specifically consolidation of the groups are the emphasis of 
Jenkins. Karina V. Korostelina also provides a concise and practical summary of the SIT and its interaction with social conflict. Korostelina tries to complexify the 
system of social identity beyond the lab and Minimal Group (MG) oriented finding of SIT. She also tried to integrate the positivist (lab and survey) and constructivist 
researches (narrative). The legitimacy of her statement on SIT is strengthened by quantitative data and analysis. While Brewer emphasizes the dynamics of 
conflictual intergroup interactions in the SIT especially conditions of ethnocentrism. With reference to these critical texts as well I will emphasize how SIT helps our 
understanding and shaping of identities and identity related conflicts. SIT and SCT are especially useful for analyzing the complicated and fluctuating intra-group 
dynamics of Alevi identity.  
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integrate cognitive and motivational processes into a single model. Categorization 
represents the cognitive dimension of SIT and allocates some form of social coherence 
and enhancement (Capozza & Brown, 2000, p. ix). The ―cognitive dimension have been 
translated into the motivational area of the intergroup phenomena in terms of biases in 
social judgments, and reward allocations‖ (Capozza & Brown, 2000). 
4.4.2. Social Identity and Social Conflict 
The basis of identity based confrontations is not unsatisfied human needs, scarce 
material resources or cultural commonalities, but differences or boundaries, according to 
SIT.  It is related to the subjective feeling of belonging to a particular group and the 
positive self esteem derived from this belonging and competing group membership 
situations. Anthropologist Harold Isaacs has previously emphasized the importance of 
physical characteristics such as race and color in the formation of emotional group 
attachments and self esteem production (Isaacs, 1967; 1974; 1975). In SIT, the emotional 
group attachments extend beyond physically differentiated entities. 
Jussim, Ashmore and Wilder briefly outline the social psychological perspective 
on the interaction of identity and intergroup conflict as follows: 
Social identities create intergroup conflicts, intergroup conflict influences social 
identity and addressing the issues of social identity may help reduce intergroup 
conflicts (Jussim, Ashmore & Wilder, 2001). 
There is a circular interaction between social identity and intergroup conflicts, but 
conflict has been presented as mandatory dimension of interacting groups according to 
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this perspective, which is also one of the flaws of this theory. Peter Black on the other 
hand argues that it is the intergroup conflict that creates social identities (Black, 2003). 
The dynamics of group formation, ethnocentrism, emergence and transformation of 
stereotypes and prejudices as well as identity salience and the strengthening of group 
solidarity are some of the research themes of the social psychological approach to social 
identity. 
According to SIT, people form ethnic groups, or culturally defined communities 
that share distinctive elements such as language; religion, social institutions and origin 
myths (Jenkins, 2008). Common characteristics, social experiences, and behaviors are 
considered to be the basis of the communities and categories (Korostelina, 2007, p. 23). 
In a sense, these distinctive elements remind Isaacs‘ notion of the diacritics of ethnic 
groups (Isaacs, 1975). Individual self esteem rises and falls according to the fate and 
status of the collective group with which one identifies. Positive valuation of the ingroup 
and positive orientations toward fellow ingroup members increases the self-esteem 
(Tajfel, 1978) which may also lead to negative attitude towards outgroups. Without the 
processes of interaction with others, the self or in-group cannot be formed or known. 
The theory of SIT stresses that each identity is formed as a result of an 
individual‘s membership in an ingroup and of an opposition to or comparison 
with members of an outgroup and an ingroup‘s negative and conflict-ridden 
relations with it strengthen group identity (Korostelina, 2007). 
The approach understands collective identification as not just an internal group 
matter, but as coming into being in the context of group relations; thus, groups identify 
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themselves against, and in their relationships with, other groups. SIT suggests that the 
need to acquire high social status and a positive identity through membership in socially 
prestigious groups is the basis for the formation of intergroup prejudice (Korostelina, 
2007). Locating prejudices and stereotypes at the basis of social comparison limits the 
horizon of social interaction, this idea therefore have been challenged by discursive 
variants of psychology and social psychology. 
According to Tajfel‘s famous definition, social identity is that "part of an 
individual's self-concept that derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social 
group (quoted in White, 2001, p. 139)." For Tajfel, the need to view oneself positively 
may heighten differences between groups and lead to conflict (quoted in White, 2001). 
The basis of social categorization may not be anything but ingroup favoritism, further, 
positive judgment of the ingroup members is found to be universal, according MG
89
 
experiments. Even in the absence of conflicts and confrontations people tend to form 
categories of in-group and out-group; the different attitudes and behavior between 
ingroup and outgroups shape the negative perceptions towards others (Brewer, 2001, p. 
31). Competition over status or other resources helps to fuel the process of positive 
evaluation of one‘s own group and negative evaluation of the other group (Krueger, 
2002). With this perspective every group is defined with a natural tendency to build 
negative attitudes and perceptions towards outgroups, nonetheless certain factors and 
                                                 
89  Minimal Groups (MG) are categories created in research laboratories in order to examine the dynamics of intergroup behavior. MG experiments have generally 
been based on arbitrary group membership. According to the MG experiments, categorization of persons into differentiated social groupings is enough to cause 
preferential discrimination in favor of ingroup over outgroup members (Brewer, 2001, p. 19). People show a strong tendency to discriminate against the members of 
randomly formed outgroups.   
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situations have been determined as increasing the salience of identities therefore leading 
to conflicts. This is explained with people‘s quest to derive self-esteem, positive status, 
and a sense of positive self identity from identification with the in-group. 
Being able to discriminate against an out-group can strengthen a sense of social 
identity and heighten self-esteem while reducing feelings of uncertainty (Krueger, 
2002, p. 14222). 
Since it is argued that the salient identities lead to inter-group conflicts, a great 
deal of research has been conducted in order to explain the factors that increase identity 
salience
90
. The general argument related to salient identities is that as conflict between 
groups escalates each group that is in confrontation experiences an increased sense of 
unity and cohesion. Increased in-group cohesion is associated with a heightened sense of 
difference from the out-group. In her recent study Korostelina outlines the features of 
salient identities and the reasons that lead identity salience. According to Korostelina 
there are three factors that influence the salience of social identities: i) level of 
differences between groups, ii) prevalence of interpersonal contact, iii) competition 
among groups (Korostelina, 2007, pp. 72-73). As the intergroup contact increases it leads 
to an increased identity salience. Outgroups are often perceived to be more homogeneous 
than they really are and this perceived homogeneity increases as the ingroup differences 
become more visible
91
. 
The effect of an out-group‘s homogeneity contributes to the perception and 
                                                 
90  Arguments related to salient identities have often been debated in situations of conflict escalation and salient identities have been associated with conflict. 
91  With regard to the different in-groups, people conceive the groups they do not belong as simple and homogenous, whereas the groups they belong as more 
complex but at the same time well connected.  
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evaluation of the out-group as more homogenous in comparison with the in-group 
(Korostelina, 2007, p. 26). 
Pressures from powerful outgroups as a negative drive have significant impact on 
identity salience and this negative feeling towards outgroups may lead to primacy of the 
group goals and interests over personal ones. Salient identities also have a positive impact 
on satisfaction level from ingroup activities. 
The salience of social identity is connected with the primacy of ingroup 
components of this primacy are: pre-dominance of in-group aims over individual 
ones, readiness to forget all internal conflicts in a situation of threat to the ingroup 
and the readiness to unite against ingroups. The higher the level of ingroup 
primacy for ingroup members, the stronger their willingness to disregard their 
own goals and values and to follow the ways of behavior required by the ingroup 
(Korostelina, 2007, p. 73). 
Minorities, or groups that stand on the weaker side of the power and status 
asymmetry, manifest a tendency toward a stronger sense of identity salience as well as 
ingroup homogeneity than the majority groups or powerful parties (Brewer, 2001; 
Euemers & Simon, 1992; Korostelina, 2007). 
4.4.3. Social Identification and Optimal Distinctiveness 
Marillyn Brewer‘s Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (ODT), challenges the basic 
assumption of SIT (Brewer, 1991; 1993) opposes an alternative motivational explanation 
for the emergence and maintenance of social identities. According to Brewer, social 
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identification is the product of the search for inclusion and differentiation, rather than the 
consequence of the search for self-esteem and positive social comparison (Brewer, 2001). 
Human beings have two powerful social motives: a need for inclusion that 
motivates assimilation of the self into large, impersonal social collectivities, and 
an opposing need for differentiation that is satisfied by distinguishing self from 
others (Brewer, 2001, p. 21). 
One of the main reasons why ODT challenges SIT is the fact that group outcomes are not 
always positive or enhancing to the self esteem. Locating esteem at the center of group 
dynamics is not convincing for ODT to explain identification with self esteem (Brewer, 
2001). 
According to ODT, groups that are exclusive and with clear boundaries satisfy the 
need for inclusion and at the same time satisfy the differentiation need (Brewer, 2001). 
What really matters most, according to ODT, is to have clear group boundaries because 
clear ingroup boundaries help both inclusion and exclusion. The differentiation cannot be 
satisfied in homogeneous societies with negligible cultural diversity (Brewer, 1991; 2000; 
2001). In such cases people tend to develop ingroup loyalties to a community, city, or 
ethnic minority, stressing minor differences to outsiders within the wider society 
(Korostelina, 2007). In a similar vein as the functionalist notion of ethnicity, ODT also 
focuses on the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion but ODT emphasizes the cognitive 
and interactive dynamics of intra-group and inter-group relations. Stereotypes, mis-
perceptions, prejudices and discriminatory practices are important for sustaining the 
processes of inclusion and exclusion between groups. 
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As the definition of ―self‖ transforms, the meaning of self-interest and self-
serving motivation also changes accordingly (Brewer, 1991, p. 476). Motivational drives 
follow the cognitive notions of inclusion and exclusion. In terms of the cognitive 
dimensions of social identification and the maintenance of social groups, the inclusion 
and exclusion drive oriented assumptions of ODT propose a better explanation than SIT. 
However, the self-esteem oriented assumptions of SIT propose a more convincing 
explanation for the motivational dimension of conflicts as well as other collective 
behavior. 
4.4.4. Self Categorization Theory and the Dynamics of Intra-goup Processes 
Self Categorization Theory (SCT) is the cognitive analysis of social 
categorization (Turner, 1985; 1987). Moving from intergroup to intragroup matters, SCT 
examines the psychological processes that produce intra-group cohesion (Jenkins, 2008). 
While Tajfel‘s SIT focuses on intergroup relations, Turner and his colleagues (Turner et 
all1987) extended the social identity perspective and emphasized intragroup behavior 
(White, 2001, p. 139). According to Turner, cognitive simplification, comparison and 
evaluation, and the search for positive self-esteem are the processes that bring groups into 
being (Turner, 1982). 
The internalization of stereotypes generates a sense of similarity with other group 
members, and attractiveness or esteem. (Jenkins, 2004, pp. 89-90). Stereotyping and 
depersonalization of self perception are the processes that enable categorizations. The 
theory of categorization describes group processes in terms of the functions of self-
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conceptions and stresses the group processes influence on self-categorization, perception 
and learning. 
Personal and social identities are explained as different levels of self 
categorization, perception and learning. Social identity is connected with the social 
categorization of ―us‖ and ―others,‖ categories of self that define the individual in terms 
of a shared similarity with members of a specific social category in contrast with other 
social categories. Social categorization generates social identity, which produces social 
comparisons, which produces positive (or negative) self evaluation. Cognitive 
simplification, comparison and evaluation, and search for positive self esteem mediate 
between social categories and individual behavior (Jenkins, 2004, p. 89). 
Depersonalisation and naturalization of self-perception is the outcome of the SC process. 
This process is not independent of the context and background. Level and kind of identity 
used to represent self and other varies with motives, background, values, expectations etc. 
and with the social context (Jenkins, 2004). 
4.4.5. Identities as Roles 
Role identities also help explain the range of activities that are socially approved 
and expected from a particular subject position. Connected with the symbolic 
interactionist research tradition in sociology (Mead, 1934; Blumer, 1969; 1986; Stryker, 
1982), role theory also emphasizes the social, subjective and negotiated nature of ―social 
reality‖. Certain requirements have been attached to some social positions and those 
requirements have been absorbed by individuals as being ―group members‖. ―During 
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their socialization process individuals internalize role requirements attached to social 
positions including their own positions and roles‖ (Stryker [1982], 2002; White, 2001). 
The requirements that are attached to particular social position than become identified as 
part of the self (Stryker, 1980). According to Harré and van Langenhove adopting or 
being assigned a role fixes only a range of positions that are compatible with that role 
(Harré & van Langenhove, 1999, p. 196). White also argues that group or category based 
identities are collective level self conceptions that are identifications of the self with a 
collectivity, whereas role identities focus on who the individual is (White, 2001, p. 139). 
Both identities are social in a different sense. According to SIT, the self is a 
product of comparison and categorization whereas according to role identity ―self is 
product of others‘ expectations and appraisals‖ (White, 2001). There is a strong 
motivational dimension for social action that is connected to the roles, which may be 
helpful to explain certain acts. White explains the differing motivational dynamics of 
violence in Northern Ireland with reference to role identity and SIT. 
In terms of violent political activists in Northern Ireland, persons may kill on 
behalf of their group, and/or the may kill because they have internalized such 
behavior as part of the role of being a particular political activist. Indeed, activists 
may kill because they are motivated simultaneously by both a social identity and 
role identity (White, 2001, p. 140). 
In testing two hypotheses within the Northern Ireland case with reference to his research 
White argued that Protestant paramilitaries are best understood from an SI perspective 
whereas Irish Republicans are motivated by both social and role identities (White, 2001). 
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As White states, role identities can be important in explaining the violent intergroup 
conflicts in addition to SIT. Analyzing the symbolic sphere and the historical 
backgrounds of social interactions also helps us to understand culturally shaped motives 
in intergroup relations. 
4.4.6. Critique of SIT 
In most real life situations ingroup favoritism has many sources. Competition for 
scarce resources, a history of ideological or symbolic rewards, or unrepresentative 
interactions among group members are the sources of intergoup confrontation. 
Categorization and the understanding of similarities and differences may be contingent on 
situations of comparison but individuals and ―groups always stand in relation to specific 
histories, memories, ideologies, symbolic systems, languages and geographic locations‖ 
(Jabri, 1996). 
Human conduct and articulations identity are situated historically so that 
conditions which define the contextual frameworks of action, in the form of 
structures of signification and legitimation, are drawn upon reflexively and are 
reproduced intentionally or unintentionally through the process of interaction 
(Jabri, 1996, p. 130). 
The generic assumptions of SIT, which are based on MG experiments, do not help 
explain some of the most complicated dynamics of intractable conflicts such as history, 
culture, and the discursive construction of memory and morality. 
The dynamics of key elements such as the history of a conflict, culture and 
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collective narratives have not fully been conceptualized for analytic purposes in SIT. In a 
sense these elements have only been operationalized as the markers of ingroup, outgroup 
differentiation. It is because of this avoidance that SIT has many generic assumptions 
related to intragroup and intergroup relations, yet some of the cultural elements have been 
acknowledged in the research on stereotypes and prejudices. 
Social constructionism conceptualizes conflicts and the conditions that create 
conflict as constructed in discourse. Discourses of exclusion, inclusion and narratives on 
violence and conflict provide a more flexible and dynamic understanding of intergroup 
relations. The discursive construction of boundaries and features of the ingroup may also 
shape the nature of the ingroup, outgroup, history of intergroup relations and conflict as 
well. Emphasizing the performative character of language and narratives and formulating 
processes of social comparison and difference making as discursive processes locates the 
conflicts and intergroup relations within a social context. 
Biases and cognitive mechanisms are the ingredients of intergroup discrimination 
and conflicts. Manipulation of the biases, other cognitive instruments and inter-group 
perceptions are not acts without actors. Social and political entrepreneurship plays a 
significant role in manipulating and reframing the markers of groups. One of the 
important deficiencies of SIT or SCT is that they do not emphasize the process of 
manipulation, the social and political pragmatics of intergroup relations, and they 
underestimate social and political entrepreneurs. Social groups are often fluid, and the 
continuation and transformation of group boundaries and intergroup interactions have 
been manipulated. Once the identity group has been formed, SIT helps explain its 
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relations to other groups, but it fails to explain the sustenance and transformation of 
groups. The cognitive dimension of SIT has fallen under the criticisms of the second 
cognitive revolution
92
 (Harré, 1992). Self esteem or differentiation oriented explanations 
of ingroup solidarity and outgroup bias are not sufficient for understanding ancient 
hatreds and prolonged conflicts. SIT and SCT are also less efficient in portraying ingroup 
diversity. 
4.5. From Chosen Traumas to Narratives of Humiliation: Psychocultural Dynamics 
of Threatened Identities 
The psychology of victimhood, whether expressed in terms of traumas, dramas, 
humiliation narratives, or threats is the central component of identity based conflicts. The 
Psychological sources of victimhood are highly intersubjective and abstract; therefore it 
is difficult to reveal those sources without referring to their expressions and cultural 
meanings in the social interaction processes. These diverse sources have been shaped and 
represented in the public domain with reference to the cultural, emotional and axiological 
characteristics of the societies, or communal groups. Consistent with its normative and 
intersubjective characteristics, the psychology of victimhood has been revealed, 
interpreted and expressed in relation to the up to date social needs and expectations of 
victimized communities. 
Chosen traumas and glories are metaphors which have been used to the explain 
                                                 
92  There are certain limitations related to the positivistic orientation of SIT and lab based findings of the tradition, yet the research tools of SIT help to work with 
large n data. I believe that SIT works better with other theories and research methods such as narrative research in order to understand the cultural and historical 
backgrounds of the identity based conflicts. This issue has been addressed with the introduction of the Second Cognitive Revolution (Harré, 1992). 
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violent ethnic and religious conflicts of the 1990s, particularly in the Balkans and Africa 
(Volkan, 1990; 1998; 2001; Volkan & Itzkowitz, 1994). Other emotional concepts such as 
shame (Scheff, 1987; 1988; 1994; 2003; Scheff & Retzinger, 2001), humiliation (Silver et 
al 1986; Miller, 1995; Lindner, 2001a; 2001b; 2002; 2006), and rage (Scheff, 1987) have 
also been the subjects of studies. The concept of trauma has intra-psychic origins, but the 
broader collective implications of ―chosen traumas‖ explain the dynamics of collective 
grievances. 
The notion of chosen traumas and glories were very helpful in explaining the 
logic of the ―ethnic religious conflicts‖ of the 1990s. The notion of chosen trauma is 
especially useful for understanding the deep rooted sectarian divides in Iraq, Lebanon, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Alevi-Sunni divide in Turkey. Every year at the day of 
Ashura
93
 commemoration ceremonies are held to remember the martyrdom of Husayn 
ibn Ali, who was the Islamic prophet Muhammed‘s grandson, at the Battle of Karbala. 
Sectarian divides have been maintained with certain rituals and symbolic forms in 
Northern Ireland and in Shia-Sunni divided Muslim communities (Bryan, 2000a; 2000b; 
Bryan et al 2005; Buckley & Kenney, 1995; Norton, 2005; Schubel, 1991; Chelkowski, 
1985; 2005; Nakash, 1993). 
Shiites annually perform an extreme form of remembering a chosen trauma by 
commemorating their religious leader al Husayn ibn‘Ali through ritualized self-
flagellation on the anniversary of his martyrdom (Volkan, 1997, p.49). 
There is no scarcity of historical references for traumas in the Alevi case details which 
                                                 
93  10 Muharram 61AH (680 AD) 
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will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7. Alevis commemorate the Karbala Massacre 
differently than Shii‘s, but remembrance of the Karbala Massacre is also an important 
component of the Alevi ritual cem. The commemoration of Hacı Bektaş Veli, founder of 
the Bektaşi order; Pîr Sultan Abdal, and the recent Alevi trauma of the ―Sivas Massacre‖ 
of 1993, and remembrance of other painful experiences such as the Maraş Events of 
1978, are important components of the maintenance of Alevi identity. These occasions 
are important sites and spaces of activism for many Alevi associations. The language of 
Alevi activism is also full of references from the historical victimhood episodes. 
The perpetual feeling of victimhood has historically been maintained and the 
language and the discourses of victimhood have been adapted to the conditions of the 
changing social and political environment. Victimhood represents the element of 
continuity in the Alevi identity. As discussed in the introduction chapter the boundaries of 
identity are currently representing the dimension of change. The dynamics of the 
―remembrance‖ or ―reproduction‖ of the emotional elements of victimhood therefore are 
primary research topics of this study. SIT, SC theories and BHN oriented theories often 
neglect the symbolic and deeply emotional backgrounds of inter-group relations in their 
analytic frames. 
―Victimhood is about an unjust traumatic loss that is being denied by the 
―descendents‖ of perpetrators. To perceive oneself as a victim requires naming the pain 
one suffered, blaming the offender and claiming some type of restitution (Huyse, 2003, p. 
60)‖. Victimhood, fear and threat are the essential elements of almost all ethnopolitical 
conflicts. The debates on the moral responsibility of victimhood are often lively debated, 
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which also help the negotiation of the moral boundaries of identity groups. Dealing with 
historical grievances, especially the psychology of victimhood, is crucial in order to 
transform the relationships into positive form. Joseph Montville argues that any conflict 
resolution strategy that does not address the psychological needs of the victims and 
victimizers can only have a superficial effect on the resolution, especially of ethnic and 
sectarian conflict (Montville, 2006). 
Ways have to be found to help adversaries face the historic burdens on their 
relationship, to help them present their historic grievances but also, especially, 
acknowledge the wrongs they have inflicted on the other side, a process must be 
established in which the losses of victims are recognized and made part of the 
public record for all to see (Montville, 2006, p. 368). 
The state of denial or mis-recognition of historical controversies also feeds the 
fear of the potential repetition of violent past experiences and perpetuates the psychology 
of victimhood. Victimhood, therefore, reproduces itself in different forms according to 
changing circumstances, unless a process of societal reconciliation has been achieved. 
There are ways in which a person or a group of people who are the victims of political, 
ethnic or religious violence can receive additional hurt after the direct cause of 
victimization has disappeared () this is referred to  as re-victimization by Luc Huyse 
(Huyse, 2003). The sources of re-victimization are not just emotional; in many cases 
there are legal, political or social practices that reminds the group or the individual of past 
victimization by: 
Denial of the status of victim; 
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Unfulfilled expectations in dealing with official agencies; 
Unwanted effects of victim-centered initiatives; and 
Social stigmatization and exclusion (Huyse, 2003, p. 61). 
Although the psychocultural dynamics of victimhood operate at the attitudinal level it 
does not negate social and economic factors and transformations. Sources of attitudes and 
perceptions and the way those attitudes and perceptions have been formulated and 
reproduced is the focus of psychocultural dramas (Ross, 2001; 2007). Besides the implicit 
or explicit daily practices of discrimination and marginalization, the way past victimhood 
is being remembered is part of the victimhood process. Memories of past victimhood, 
sufferings and traumas has often been formulated and presented in different narrative 
forms. These feelings have both been presented in collective narratives and story forms 
and also through more conceptual and abstract models such as memorials, museums, rites 
and other commemorations (Ross, 2007). The enterprise of collective remembering is not 
only the process of revealing the past but also a process of negotiating moral values as 
well as social and political priorities and the desires of the communal or identity group 
(Bhabha, 2004). The psychology of victimhood does not automatically lead to conflicts 
between groups or provoke cycles of counter-violence, but the politization of victimhood 
plays a vital role in the motivation of in inter-group violence (Enns, 2007). It is equally 
interesting to investigate the question: Why the discourse of perpetual victimhood has not 
generated violence in the Alevi case, except the overrepresentation of Alevis in the left 
wing organizations such as TIKKO, DEV-SOL, and TKP-ML, which had been involved 
in violence especially before the 1980 coup? 
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According to Demetrius (1990), historical enmity, dehumanization, and 
victimization are instrumental in the perpetuation of aggression on both national and 
international levels (Demetrius, 1990). When activated, those historical enmities and 
victimhood psychology contribute to the drawing of definite boundaries between groups 
of people. Victimization, according to Demetrius, also represents a sense of shared 
collective guilt that brings a social cohesion (Demetrius, 1990, p. 101). 
Victimization is the embodiment of the drive to sacrifice. Sacrificial rituals have 
been performed since humans first gathered into tribes. It became a way of 
appeasing and perhaps even coming into contact with gods. Victimization 
represents that tribal ritual that brings about collective cohesion through a sense of 
collective guilt. Thus victimization also becomes a defensive process against the 
feeling of overwhelming guilt (Demetrius, 1990, p. 101). 
It is obvious that the feeling of victimization brings a form of social cohesion, however 
the arguments related to shared threat rather than the guilt provides a more coherent 
social explanation in the Alevi case. In the Alevi case as well the shared victimhood and 
shared threats have always been a unifying factor. Victimhood and common threat 
perception became a more important unifying factor in the urban context. Whereas in the 
rural context the connections and ties were based on face to face interactions, common 
religious rituals, marriages and shared social space. 
As in the case of SIT, variants of psycho-cultural conflict theories approach 
conflict in terms of psychological and cultural forces that frame the beliefs and attitudes 
about the self and other group with reference to historical controversies. Although 
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Demetrius defines these terms as first and foremost intrapscyhic processes, implications 
of these dynamics are at a social level (Demetrius, 1990, p. 99). As opposed to general 
ahistoric understandings of SIT, perceptual historical relationships and conflicts and 
glories of the past play significant roles in psychocultural conflict theories. Group 
psychology, collective emotions, ritual enactments and performances and perceived 
group history are a necessary yet not sufficient means to understand the complexity of 
ethnic conflicts. Psychocultural approaches do not completely negate social, political, 
economic and other more macro scale structural explanations. The studies that approach 
Alevi revival as a transnational social movement (fe: Massicard: 2007; Sökefeld 2008; 
Şahin 2001; 2005) emphasize the recognition of Alevi identity and public demands as the 
main drive of ―Alevi identity movement‖, they do not pay the necessary attention to the 
emotional and psychocultural dynamics. Public claims and the recognition of needs are 
important drivers of the ―Alevi identity movement‖, as are collective emotions such as 
fear, humiliation, traumas, and the psychology of victimhood. I will now discuss the 
dynamics of remembering and revitalization of these ―collective emotions‖. 
4.5.1. Remembrance and the Reconstruction of Victimhood 
There are two main approaches in the enterprise of memory and the process of 
remembering the historical controversies and violent social episodes; neo-Freudian and 
neo-Durkheimian approaches. A neo-Durkheimian approach understands the past as a 
symbolic resource that helps reduce the contemporary confrontations and collective 
problems. Collective memory, according to the neo-Durkheimian perspective, is 
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understood as a complex social process- including the instrumental and symbolic 
struggles of various members of the group over the definition of the past- to strengthen 
the ties that bind individual members together within the collectivity (Connerton, 1989; 
Hawlbachs; 1992; Prager, 1998). Moral aspects of the community or identity group are 
highlighted in the Durkheimian paradigm. 
At the core of the Durkheimian tradition, thus, is the insistence on the importance 
of a sense of collective identity, seen as being reinforced through links to the past. 
This tradition also stresses that the nature of group life shapes the way individuals 
think and remember and what they deem moral (Misztal, 2003, p. 124). 
A neo-Freudian perspective however insists that ―collective memory is a social 
process in response to social ruptures, or discontinuities, that have occurred in the past 
(Prager, 2001, p. 2225)‖. For neo-Freudians these ruptures and discontinuities interfere 
with the smooth functioning of collective life. ―Neo-Freudians are preoccupied with the 
persistence of the ruptures and traumas, whereas Neo-Durkheimians emphasize the 
continuity of the present to the past underscoring the important role that remembering 
plays (Prager, 2001, p. 2225)‖. 
The past is a source, rather than a resource, of challenges confronting a present 
day collectivity. Collective memory articulates the relation of a particular present 
for a group to its traumatic history that helped constitute it. For neo-Freudians‘ 
perspective the tensions and strains within a present day collectively are largely 
understood as deriving from unavoidable intrusion of traumatic past (Prager, 
2001). 
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According Halwbachs, who is considered to be the pioneer of the neo-Durkheimian 
approach to collective memory, present concerns contribute to the recovery of the past 
(Halwbachs, 1992). Collective memory plays a role in constituting the notion of 
―common consciousness‖. The relationship of the present and future is only coherent in 
relation, in part, to an understood past (Halwbachs, 1992). Collective memory concerns 
itself with dialogical, discursive processes occurring as a result of communication 
between various groups and institutions comprising the collectivity. Remembering, 
whether individually or collectively, always involves the representation after the fact of 
past events or experiences. The representation or representations of the content may be in 
ritual or performative forms. ―Individual memory relies upon available cultural narratives 
to provide context and meaning to what otherwise would be relatively meaningless and 
random events in an individual‘s life‖ (Prager, 1998). 
Psychocultural and psychoanalytic approaches to identity based conflict both 
revisit past conflicts and collective confrontations. The psychoanalytic approaches that 
are mentioned below portray a neo-Freudian approach to past struggles, whereas 
psychocultural approaches portray a more symbolic and social vision to past conflicts and 
victimhood. Overall both psychocultural and psychoanalytic theories are useful in 
understanding the historical continuity and the transformation of deep rooted conflicts 
and controversies that occur at the attitudinal and perceptual domain. Vamik Volkan, in 
one of his recent books Killing in the name of Identity: A study of Bloody Conflicts 
explains the motivation behind bloody intergroup conflicts with the shared psychological 
oriented mental images. 
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The shared mental image of a massive tragedy that leads to shame, humiliation, 
helplessness, and difficulty in mourning over losses within a large group decades 
or centuries later may become the fuel for new infernos that are deliberately 
started by people in the name of identity (Volkan, 2006, p. 17). 
However, the way in which these feelings, emotions and concerns are transformed into 
actual practices and episodes of violent conflicts is less clear according to psychoanalytic 
and psychocultural theories. Ted Robert Gurr, for example, emphasizes the dynamics of 
large scale social transformations such as modernization, political mobilization and 
changing opportunity structures and international contextual transformation as the 
sources of incentives for ethnopolitical mobilization (Gurr, 2007). Unlike the 
psychoanalytic approaches and psychocultural theories, grievance and relative 
deprivation theories emphasize responses to social change and transformation that are 
more easily transferable to social action. But this perspective marginalizes the 
significance of deep emotional traumas and historical grievances. 
Concepts such as shame, humiliation, trauma, mourning and victimization have 
been connected to the motivational dimension of identity based conflicts, yet the 
mechanisms of the action and behavioral component have often been weakly connected 
to the theory. Psychocultural approaches are better for diagnosing the origins, sources and 
dynamics of identity oriented conflicts than for providing practical tools to prevent the 
actualization of these problems. 
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4.5.2. Chosen Traumas and Glories 
Vamık Volkan defines his famous concept of chosen trauma as a ―large group‘s 
mental representation of a historic event that resulted in collective feelings of 
helplessness, victimization, shame, and humiliation at the hands of others‖ (Volkan, 
1998). The mental representation of the event carries a deep emotional texture because 
the event typically involves drastic losses of people, land, prestige, and dignity (Volkan, 
2006, p. 173). There are often ―victims‖ and ―perpetrators‖ and their successors that are 
connected to the historical event. In most cases chosen traumas and glories reflect the 
mental representations of ―victims‖ rather than the ―perpetrators,‖ in the sense that 
blaming of ―perpetrators‖ is also an important part of this representation. ―Chosen trauma 
is more than a simple recollection of events or facts; shared mental representation 
encapsulates the realistic information, fantasized expectations, intense feelings, and 
defenses against unacceptable thoughts‖ (Volkan, 1997, p. 48). 
Vamık Vokan metaphorically defines group identity as a ―large canvas tent‖ that 
protects its members from outside (Volkan, 1997, p. 27). The leader according to Volkan 
is the pole that holds the tent erect. In their relationship to the tent, members of the group 
are connected to one another not only because they love the same leader but because they 
share the same emotional bonds, and because they need the protection of the same shelter 
(Volkan, 1997). 
I like to use the analogy of a large canvas tent to explore large group psychology 
in a more comprehensive way. The first layer fits snugly. This is one‘s personal 
identity. The second layer is a loose covering that protects the individual in the 
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way that a parent, a close family member, or other caregiver protects one. It is the 
leaders‘ task to prevent them from collapsing, but the tent‘s canvas survives 
through many leaders (Volkan, 1997, p. 27). 
The notion of a leader follower relationship helps to explain the psychology of ethnic or 
national groups in normal situations. However this kind of leader follower relationship is 
not a sufficient way to explain the acts of mass violence and other horrifying acts 
according to Volkan. The reason behind rallying around the leader in periods of shared 
anxiety and regression is the members‘ preoccupation with repairing and mending the 
tears in the canvas. Efforts to stabilize and repair the tent once it has been shaken may 
cause violent mass behavior according to Volkan (Volkan, 1997). In identity-rooted 
conflicts, especially in times of high anxiety and fear, collective emotions link recent 
events to older troubles. Chosen traumas and glories are ruptures on a historically 
different canvas but they have been transformed into the most important component of 
the contemporary tent. 
Vamik Volkan argues that in most cases the memory of the chosen trauma is 
utilized to justify ethnic aggression against the groups whose ancestors might have 
perpetrated the acts against their own ancestors (Volkan, 1997, p. 78). 
―Adopting a chosen trauma can enhance ethnic pride, reinforce a sense of 
victimization, and even spur a group to avenge its ancestors‘ hurts. It is interesting 
how often disastrous defeats celebrated as heroic are also traumatic for many 
groups. Among the examples of this are Custer‘s defeat at Little Bighorn, the 
expulsion of Muslims and Jews from Spain in 1492, and Crusader massacres of 
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Muslims in Constantinople and Jerusalem (Volkan, 1997, p. 78). 
One of the problems with the notions of chosen trauma and glory is that the historical 
ruptures in the canvas are almost impossible to fix and the continuation of conflict is 
almost inevitable according to this understanding. There is no panacea for the feelings of 
victimization and traumas, but there may be some other means to control and manage 
these feelings. Emotional preoccupations and psychologically sensitive issues in the 
conflict may be identified by psychocultural approaches and these approaches may 
provide important insights for the CR process (Jeong, 1999, p. 26). 
These glories and traumas are linked to real or symbolic objects called suitable 
targets of externalization (STE‘s). STE‘s are determined by the cultural environment and 
they are related to shared reservoirs (emphasis by Korostelina, 2007). Externalization 
serves to support and maintain an integrated sense of self, while avoiding tension and 
anxiety between unintegrated units (Volkan, 1988). STE‘s are initially mostly inanimate 
and nonhuman objects, such as ethnic food, one‘s country‘s colors, or familiar landmarks 
in the environment (Volkan, 1988). Building monuments after drastic collective losses is 
a psychological necessity for sustaining emotional integrity as well as enabling societal 
mourning, according to Volkan. 
Structures made of stone or metal function as the group‘s linking objects. Their 
indestructibility makes them psychological containers that preserve and limit 
emotions (…40). The inability to mourn, the significance of gaining 
acknowledgment of injuries, and the need for suitable restitution for loss cannot 
always be accommodated at the negotiating table. 
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STE‘s may help the maintenance of bitter feelings and hatreds but they make these 
feelings more manageable. Genres of Alevi oral folk literature, including folk songs and 
deyişs, were instrumental in transmitting Alevi feelings for centuries. New forms of these 
songs have been produced by both the traditional Alevi singer-songwriters (ozan) and 
modern forms of ideological songs. 
Unmourned feelings, and unacknowledged pains and traumas may cause further 
anxieties for the threatened group identities. Volkan argues that feelings of weakness, 
threat and anxiety may motivate victimized and threatened individuals to some violent 
activities such as a terrorist attack. Feelings of weakness, helplessness and the disruptions 
in psychological and personal integrity are more important negative motivators than the 
threat of death. 
The person who perceives that his group is being victimized, and whose own 
sense of self is weak and threatened by that perception, may be drawn to terrorist 
activities (Volkan, 1990, p. 44). The threat of death is far less cogent than the need 
to foster a cohesive sense of self and of belonging to the group. 
Unmourned grievances of the past may be deeply entrenched in the consciousness of 
succeeding generations (Volkan, 1990). STE‘s or the materialization of these fears and 
historical grievances may be helpful to deal with the current anxieties. 
Ethnic markers which may also be considered as part of the lexicon of 
instrumentalist or constructivist anthropology have been used by Volkan. What is 
significant from Volkan‘s perspective is that in addition to some of the symbolic, 
ritualistic explanations of ethnic markers, Volkan emphasizes the psychoanalytic and 
233 
 
psychocultural aspects of these markers. An ethnic marker, according to Volkan, is used 
by members of a group to protect and maintain the ethnic canvas and to maintain the 
loyalty of individual members. Ethnic markers can be abstract concepts, such as chosen 
glories, or concrete objects (Volkan, 1998). In addition to ethnic markers, prejudices also 
differentiate one group from another. Prejudices such as telling ethnic jokes or rituals that 
foster prejudice psychologically help to secure group identity (Volkan, 1998, p. 113). The 
Bektaşi tradition of humor is an important genre within Turkish literature. They deal with 
some of the difficult questions with the humor. 
Medical analogies have been used frequently in Volkan‘s theory; ethnic problems 
are presented as a disease or pathology that needs a process of healing or treatment: 
Normally we expect a badly cut finger to bleed and ultimately heal, often leaving 
a scar, but there is also the chance that it may become infected and remain open 
and painful. Among national and/ethnic groups living side by side, hostility 
causes cuts and bruises too, which all the group members share (Volkan, 1990, p. 
31). 
Genetic and medical analogies negate the dynamic and constructed nature of collective 
narratives and stories. Volkan argues that transgenerational transmissions are not simply 
the result of handing down stories about humiliation and calamity from one generation to 
the next. Traumatized self images have also been transmitted through some nonverbal 
messages and behavioral traits. 
Psychological DNA were planted in the personality of the younger generation 
through its relationships with the previous one. The transmitted psychological 
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DNA affects both individual identity and latter adult behavior (Volkan, 1990). 
There is a notion of psychological DNA in Volkan‘s understanding that naturally 
transmits the seeds of conflicts and controversies as well as other group characteristics to 
coming generations. With the process of identity transformation, if unresolved, these 
grievances and traumas have also been reframed and transformed. The notion of a genetic 
transmission of traumas does not illustrate the dynamic characteristics of identity 
formation and transformation. Humiliation, threat and victimization therefore are more 
productive notions since they focus on the perpetuation, reproduction and widening of 
psychological ruptures with symbolic and discursive instruments rather than ―psycho-
genetics‖. 
4.5.3. Kakar and the Neo-Freudian Analysis of Riots 
Sudhir Kakar‘s study Colors of Violence focuses on the psychological 
backgrounds and violent social expressions of threatened identities. Kakar‘s study 
attempts to combine psychological and social, material and political factors in explaining 
the dimensions of threatened identities. Though the Freudian concepts and social 
psychological explanations are dominant in his analysis he acknowledges the economic 
and social aspects and the backgrounds of the threatened identities with these remarks: 
Feelings of loss and helplessness accompany dislocation and migration from rural 
areas to the shanty towns of urban megalopolises, the disappearance of craft skills 
which underlay traditional work identities, and the humiliation caused by the 
homogenizing and hegemonizing impact of the modern world which pronounces 
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ancestral cultural ideals and values as outmoded and irrelevant (Kakar, 1996, p. 
187). 
Although Kakar emphasizes social dislocation, change and rapid social and economic 
transformation as factors that lead some identities to feel threatened, he is very skeptical 
of the perspectives that prioritize political and economic structures in the shaping of 
consciousness. For Kakar, cultural traditions-including the ideology of the other- 
transmitted through the family have a line of development separate from the political 
economic system of a society (Kakar, 1996, p. 196). 
According to Kakar the heightened sense of ―identity threat‖ provides the basis 
for the social cohesiveness of the threatened groups and this cohesiveness is necessary to 
safeguard the individual economic, political and social interests. Another important 
source of the identity threat is the perceived discrimination by the state or disrespect for 
its cultural symbols (Kakar, 1996, p. 187). Changing political and social landscape such 
as the end of empires or collapse of political regimes may also affect the level of identity 
threat. Ted Gurr‘s relative deprivation oriented theory also mentions rapid social change 
and transformation as a significant reason for identity threat (Gurrr, 1993; 2007). 
The mental and emotional impact of social transformation and change is more 
important than the actual change itself. For Kakar, who adopts a Cartesian division, ―riots 
do start in the minds of men (Kakar, 1996, p. 192)‖. A particular self-image and 
experiences are transmitted from one generation to the next through the group‘s 
mythology, history, ideals, values, and shared cultural symbols. The individual‘s 
religious-cultural identity and consciousness comes to the surface and the group's identity 
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becomes more important in the aftermath of the riots (Kakar, 1996). The problem with 
Kakar‘s conception is that he defines two different but interacting conceptions of identity: 
individual and group. Group identity in Kakar‘s conceptualization has been defined as an 
extended self, in other terms, self as a member of an ethnic/ religious/ cultural collectivity 
(Kakar, 1996). This definition implies a possibility of a self that can be defined as 
contained or independent from others. Ritual performances of violence, representation 
and expression of trauma are central in Kakar‘s approach on inter-group conflict; 
however the possibility of ritual healing does not seem an option according this 
perspective. 
Apriori assumptions and the pre-linguistic and individualistic origins of the 
chosen traumas and glories do not allow for an explanation of complicated collective 
processes. Psychocultural dramas and humiliation narratives that represent aspects of 
continuity and change in psychological contradictions have provided trauma oriented 
notions. This transformation allows for the analysis of collective emotions as a more 
comprehensive and dynamic social process. Boundaries between these parallel or 
complementary conceptualizations are often blurred, but they try to explain similar social 
phenomena and processes. 
The practices of legal, political and economic discrimination; stereotypes and 
public insults may assist in the continuation of psychocultural dramas and humiliation 
narratives. There is no direct correspondence between these practices and psychocultural 
dramas and humiliation narratives because the practices are related to the social and 
behavioral domain, whereas interpretations of these practices are related to the cognitive 
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domain.  Methodologically, the social constructivist epistemology tries to integrate these 
two domains and the practical function of language (Austin, 2000; Searle [1979], 2008). 
Narrative approaches have become alternative that are more convincing than genetic and 
intra-psychic oriented Freudian trauma literature. 
4.5.4. Psychocultural Dramas 
Marc Howard Ross has taken a step further and tried to integrate anthropology, 
history and psychoanalysis in his notion of psychocultural dramas. The notion of 
psychocultural drama is derived from Victor Turner‘s (1975) notion of the social drama. 
As a conceptual tool psychocultural drama links cultural expressions and psychocultural 
narratives in order to analyze how the parties frame their own and others‘ goals and 
actions in conflict and the important role that ritual plays in setting them. Mass rituals, 
parades and collective narratives methodologically play the central role in the formation 
of and the change in identities and their transformation into violent forms of inter-group 
engagement. Marc Howard Ross defines psychocultural dramas as ―conflicts between 
groups of competing and apparently irresolvable claims that engage the central elements 
of each group‘s historical experience and contemporary identity‖ (Ross, 2001). 
The manifest focus of a psychocultural drama can be about the allocation of 
material resources, or differences about cultural components of identity such as language, 
religion, social practices, or music and popular culture (Ross, 2001). ―At a deeper or 
latent level however, psychocultural dramas are about polarizing events about non-
negotiable cultural claims, perceived threats, and/or rights connected to narratives and 
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metaphors central to a group‘s identity‖. Rather than the genetic, biological or Freudian 
metaphors that are used in the chosen traumas, psychocultural dramas examine cultural
94 
expressions as ritual performances and enactments that spell out the dynamics of cultural 
contestation (Ross, 2001; 2007). Psychocultural dramas refer to a process or collective 
emotional re-interpretation and re-enactment of a particular historical event. 
For Ross, cultural identities, which are crucial in the formation of ethnic conflicts, 
should also be central to successful constructive conflict management. Collective 
emotions, feelings and fears play a significant role in Ross‘ definition of cultural 
identities (Ross, 2007, pp. 3-4). 
―Collective memories, everyday performative cultural practices such as parades, 
flag displays, language, clothing, religious practices, and public monuments that 
symbolically connect the past and present help to the formation and expression of 
collective emotions (Ross, 2007, pp. 1-2)‖. 
Ross does not specifically underline the necessity of negative emotions towards 
outgroups in order to have positive ingroup feelings. Psycho-cultural dramas and ritual 
and narrative components of these dramas nonetheless are psychological models that 
implicitly shape attitudes and behavior towards other groups. 
Ross believes that both group narratives and certain cultural ritual performances 
that are connected to a region‘s symbolic landscape are crucial in shaping and reflecting 
group feelings. Culture in this sense is understood by Ross to be a form of cognitive map. 
                                                 
94  Culture according to Ross ―is a framework for interpreting the world that marks a distinctive way of life‖ characterized in the subjective we-feelings among 
group members, and expressed though specific behaviors including customs and rituals – both sacred and mundane – that mark the daily yearly, and lifecycle 
rhythms that connect people across time and space‖ (Ross, 2007, p. 18). 
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Culture from this perspective is a worldview that includes cognitive and affective 
beliefs about social reality and assumptions about when, where, why, and how 
people in one‘s culture and in other cultures are likely to act in particular 
circumstances (Avruch, 1998; Chabal & Daloz, 2006; Ross, 1997). 
Rather than trying to portray the group emotions with abstract Freudian models or 
ingroup/outgroup distinctions, Ross integrates psychology, culture and narrative in the 
form of dramas in his method of analyzing ethnic or other inter-group conflicts. Written 
and visual accounts, reenactments through social action and ritual performances such as 
political rituals, pilgrimages, and festivals are components of his more concrete portrayal 
of culture (Ross, 2007). For the cognitive dimension, the aggregation of interpretations 
into accounts of a group‘s origin, history and conflicts with outsiders, including its 
symbolic and ritual behaviors is at the core of shared system of meaning and identity 
(Ross, 2007, p. 24). Emotional boundaries of cultural communities and moral positions 
and roles of the members and outsiders have been re-negotiated through the narratives 
and parades. These cognitions have correspondence within the behavioral domain as well, 
by responding similarly to shared motives, concerns and expectations people create a 
collective consciousness and modes of action. 
People sharing a group identity possess, to a greater or lesser degree, a sense of 
common fate including expectations of common treatment, joint fears of 
survival/extinction, and beliefs about group worth, dignity, and recognition. 
Identity involves group judgments and judgments about groups and their motives 
(Ross, 2007). 
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The cognitive side of ethnic or other identity based conflicts is illustrated through 
psychocultural dramas. Psychocultural examinations also can inform us about the ways 
the parties interpret recent and historical events, the core issues that are at stake, and the 
way they express their fears and their hidden collective feelings. The ways the parties 
frame a conflict, and what is at stake in it have dynamically been shaped along these 
dramas. Dramas offer valuable clues to make sense of conflict dynamics and insights 
about matters that must be addressed for it to be managed constructively (Ross, 2007). 
As psychocultural dramas unfold, they produce reactions which (a) are 
emotionally powerful; (b) clearly differentiate the parties in conflict; and contain 
key elements of the larger conflict in which they are embedded. As psychocultural 
dramas unfold, their powerful emotional meanings link events across time and 
space, increasing in-group solidarity and out-group hostility (Ross, 2007, p. 80). 
According to Ross, widely shared narratives matter because ―they offer 
emotionally meaningful accounts of the world they also explain motives and actions‖ 
(Ross, 2007). For Ross, these narratives must be central to the analysis of ethnic conflict 
and steps taken to mitigate it because emotions help in the framing of the world and 
shape action.  One of the problems related to Ross‘s understanding of dramas and 
narratives is that he attributes some causality to motives. He does not however expect to 
make predictions of particular behavior. It may be true that certain motives and emotions 
may make some behavior and actions more possible but it is difficult to monitor the 
causal connection between the two. His notion of causality is a probabilistic one rather 
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than a determinative one
95
. 
The narratives surrounding a conflict are not just reflectors of the conflict but 
operate as well as exacerbaters and inhibiters of further conflict, and play a causal 
role in making certain courses of action more plausible and appealing than others 
(Ross, 2007, p. 28). 
Concerns about a common fate and fears are a uniting factor linking people across 
time and space. Ross integrates narratives and ritual practices and performances and tries 
to analyze the psychology of the group along those lines. What is most crucial, however, 
about interpretations and narratives regarding a conflict is the ―coherent account they 
offer to each group in linking specific events to that group‘s general understandings‖ 
(Ross, 2007). The ritual enactment of narratives, political and cultural performance, and 
parades, are models for the continuation and the reproduction of bitter feelings of 
intergroup emotions. A cultural and emotional analysis of dramas and parades is therefore 
a strong approach for the analysis of identity based conflicts that has cultural as well as 
emotional connotations. The same instruments that have been used for the formulation, 
expression, transformation, politization of collective emotions, and the transmission of 
those emotions to coming generations, may help for the management of the same 
emotion. 
4.5.5. Humiliation as the Nuclear Bomb of Emotions 
In a globalized and interdependent world, humiliation may work as the nuclear 
                                                 
95  I would like to thank Kevin Avruch for helping to clarify the mode of causality mentioned in Ross‘s study. 
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bomb of emotions that instigates extremism and hampers moderate reactions and 
solutions (Lindner, 2006). 
―Human dignity‖ and ―humiliation‖ have recently been emphasized as the 
unavoidable dynamics of violent anti-social behavior within the research on emotional 
sources of identity based conflicts. In particular, the motivational background of self 
destructive violence, which has become more of an issue after the spread of ―suicide 
terrorism‖ and ―protracted asymmetric struggles‖, has been understood in relation to 
honor and dignity (Lindner, 2001; Lindner et al 2006). Humiliation has been defined as 
―enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damage or strips 
away pride, honor, or dignity‖ (Lindner, 2006, p. 172). One of the conceptual advantages 
of humiliation and dignity in comparison to the trauma oriented research is that, 
humiliation is not defined as totally an intra-psychic notion. Feelings of dignity and 
humiliation have neither any rational calculable basis nor are they purely related to intra-
psychic dynamics, as is the case with trauma. Humiliation and dignity have been defined 
as collective and relational feelings. Cultural codes, collective axiology and social 
comparisons shape both the nature of humiliation and the responses to it. 
Stripping away one‘s dignity became as profound a violation as stripping away 
one‘s flesh, and humiliation was defined as a mortal wounding of one‘s very 
being (Lindner, 2006, p. xv). 
Humiliation is defined as a relational social process. According to Lindner, a 
perpetrator‘s act, the victims feelings, and social process (Lindner, 2006, p. xiv) are the 
elements of the humiliation experience. Within this interaction different sets of actors 
243 
 
have been socially and emotionally positioned in relation to each other (Cobb, 2004). 
Sara Cobb‘s narrative formulation of humiliation also presents the triangular relational 
nature of the issue (Cobb, 2004). According to Cobb, ―in a narrative of humiliation the 
victim position is constituted by the ultimate helplessness of the victim, (the lack of 
agency, overall, despite efforts), the intention of the Other to harm and denigrate the 
victim in front of Others, as well as the imperviousness of the Others who witness the 
victimization and do nothing‖ (Cobb, 2004). Since humiliation and victimhood have been 
defined as social and discursive processes rather than pure intra psychic processes, the 
witnesses according to Cobb play an active role in these definitions. As a social process, 
humiliation has been formulated with the narrational and discursive positioning of the 
victims and perpetrators, and the approval and denial of the witnesses. Without 
translating the sufferings and grievances into the narratives of illegitimate humiliation, 
the retaliation of the victims of humiliation is usually not an option on the table. 
Nevertheless this interactive relational process may transform the ―humiliated subjects‖ 
into ruthless perpetrators of violent acts. 
As soon as sufferings are translated into overarching narratives of illegitimate 
humiliation that must be responded to by humiliation for humiliation, the desire 
for retaliation is on the table. Humiliation seems to be the catalyst that turns 
grievances into nuclear bombs of emotions. Victims may yearn for and plan acts 
of humiliation against perceived humiliators, and they may become ruthless 
perpetrators and humiliation entrepreneurs (Lindner, 2006, p. 169). 
The relational and comparative dimensions of humiliation, as in Relative 
244 
 
Deprivation Theory (Gurr, 1970; 1993), dignity and humiliation are also affected by the 
rising levels of social and emotional expectations. Deprivation, poverty, low status, and 
marginalization do not automatically cause feelings of suffering and yearnings for 
retaliation (Lindner, 2003).Lindner also argues that ―being forced to a position that is 
inferior to what one feels one should expect against one‘s will is a deeply hurtful feeling‖ 
(Lindner, 2006, p. 172). However the humiliation research formulates the feelings of 
helplessness, marginalization and inferiority that are the consequences of deprivation as 
the sources of humiliation rather than the deprivation itself. Most importantly for the 
victims, either individuals or groups, to be forced into passivity and helplessness are a 
drive for aggressive or reactionary acts. 
As with the general claims of BHN theory, human beings‘ struggle for recognition 
and respect are crucial to the fulfillment of the need for dignity. The desire for 
recognition is a factor that unites human beings and therefore provides a platform for 
contact and cooperation. If the individuals or identity groups perceive that recognition 
and respect have been denied by other groups, this may destroy their relationship and 
create rifts that might not easily be overcome
96 
. Lindner is also convinced that the feeling 
of humiliation is more likely than other forms of deprivation to generate the urge toward 
violent retaliation (Lindner, 2006). She depicts humiliation as the source of many recent 
violent social conflicts. 
In recent years, genocide has occurred in Rwanda and Burundi, ethnic cleansing 
has occurred in ex-Yugoslavia, atrocities have been committed in East- Timor and 
                                                 
96  BHN Theory is discusses earlier in this chapter. 
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many other places until 9/11 awakened the world to ―global terrorism‖ which in 
turn led to the ―war on terror‖ (Lindner, 2006, p. 88). 
Humiliation is not enough to explain the actualization of these violent acts. Rather 
than emphasizing the intra-psychic mechanisms, Lindner also highlights intermediary 
processes such as leadership: 
―For humiliation to be transferred into organized violence, ―there is a necessity of 
a leadership who know how to channel the sufferings of their followers into a 
joint project of retaliation (169)‖. 
Institutional structures that enforce wide scale collective confrontation and violence are 
also crucial for the possibilities of retaliation. More importantly, if the ―victim‘s‖ value 
system could explain their social suffering, deprivation or marginalization without 
accusing other actors, this may have less serious consequences within the social domain. 
In other terms, in certain circumstances relative deprivation may not turn into humiliation 
because of the collective axiology of the marginalized communities. This highlights the 
significance of the value orientations in the dynamics of identity based conflicts. 
A religious person may join a monastery, proud of poverty. Low status may be 
explained as God‘s will or as just punishment for sins perpetrated in an earlier 
life. Not all minorities feel oppressed. Allegiance to American dream keeps many 
of the poor in the United States from rebelling (Lindner, 2006, p. 168). 
For Lindner, ―respect and recognition‖ may be equally effective forms of 
relational processes that can enable the possibilities of coexistence. One of the illustrative 
examples that highlights the positive outcomes of respect and the value of leadership in 
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the successful management of humiliation is two completely different approaches of 
responses to World War I and World War II. 
World War I and II may be taken to support the proposition that humiliation can 
lead to war, Holocaust, genocide, and ethnic cleansing, while respect can facilitate 
peace- the humiliation entailed in the Treaty of Versailles led to war, while respect 
entailed in the Marshall Plan led to peace. (Lindner, 2006) 
Though Lindner seems to avoid social, economic, political and many other factors in 
order to emphasize a psychologically based explanation, her understanding of humiliation 
by nature is not independent of these factors. Especially in the post-colonial, post-
imperial or post-authoritarian realms, aggressive struggles to regain shattered dignity may 
have serious consequences. These factors may be helpful for the appeasement of the 
humiliation feeling yet they cannot resolve the humiliation feeling without a process of 
reconciliation or trauma healing. 
Unlike the trauma oriented explanations that propose abstract therapeutic healing 
mechanisms and processes, humiliation research suggests that conflict resolution 
mechanisms fix broken social relationships. The alternatives to humiliation and 
marginalization according to this perspective are the social and relational processes that 
endorse recognition and respect. Ethnic, religious, tribal, sectarian, or other forms of 
social diversity can be sources of mutual enrichment, if the relationships are 
characterized by mutual respect and recognition. 
Trauma as a metaphor represents a form of disease or psychological defect that 
needs to be cured, fixed or managed in order to have a healthy psychological state. 
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Collective traumas, and feelings of threat and humiliation are the most important 
collective ―psychological disorders‖ that maintain the attitudinal dimension of identity 
based conflicts. Collective therapy based healing processes such as reconciliation, trauma 
healing and TRC‘s are designed to be conflict resolution mechanisms that address the 
roots causes of the psychological disorders of the identity group. 
For the practical side of the psychocultural approaches, successful conflict 
resolution and peace building have to incorporate reconciliation and healing processes in 
addition to problem solving activities (Montville, 1998; 2006). There may be many 
sources of victimization other than controversial collective emotions that may be 
consequences of unmourned feelings for decades or centuries, but managing and relaxing 
these emotions is an incredibly difficult and complicated task. 
4.6. Narration and the Constitution of Identities 
Stories, especially collective stories such as origin myths and histories are 
important narratives for community formation and maintenance (Hinchman & Hinchman, 
1997, p. xvii). In the literature about narrative identities, narratives are defined as the 
connective structures that organize communities along different lines. In contrast to the 
primordial and material interest based collectivity formation, narratives generate a 
cultural sense of belonging. 
What binds individuals together into a cultural community is the centripetal force 
of a connective structure that organizes a considerate body of thought and 
knowledge, beliefs and concepts of self: that is, a worldview rooted in a set of 
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social rules and values as well as in the shared memory of a commonly inhabited 
and similarly experienced past. The overarching function is to guarantee a cultural 
sense of belonging—in contrast, for instance, to a belonging based on kinship, 
race, material property or economic dependence. At issue, then, is a sense of 
belonging that binds the individual into a culture while binding the culture into 
the individual‘s mind (Brockmeier, 2002, p. 18). 
The way we construct and orient our present choices and actions is shaped in light of our 
imagined futures and the version of our pasts that fits with those choices. The most 
important feature of narratives is that they ―give a shape to the temporal dimension of 
human experience (Brockmeier, 2002, p. 27)‖. Collective narratives play an important 
role in the temporal organization of collective experiences. Historical narratives and the 
debating of historical information are very important dimensions of the renegotiation of 
Alevi identity. Transnational networks and social movement theories emphasize the 
spatial dimension and collective action dynamics but they are not as helpful for 
understanding the cultural repertoires of identity groups. Collective stories, national or 
group myths and collective ideals that are already available and widely shared by group 
members often play important roles in the orientation of personal stories. 
Conflict and conciliation narratives and the other narratives that influence the 
shaping of identities are expressed within a narrative structure. The construction of the 
storylines and narratives of conflict and conciliation is at the same time making meaning 
of them and re-negotiating according to actual needs. Any conflict or conciliation 
emerging outside of a meaningful storyline may be considered senseless. There is often a 
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severe hegemonic competition over the versions of collective stories and the individual 
stories appropriate to those collective stories in the struggles of identity politics. 
Institutions of social and political activism, scholars – especially the European scholars 
and ―orientalists‖ – and diasporic Alevis have produced very different narratives related 
to the Alevi issue and Alevi identity that also have resonance in Alevi public discourses. 
Narratives are not simple mediums in the processes of identity formation and 
transformation. Harré argues that narratives do not simply represent the objective 
description of things as they happened. With reference to his ―positioning theory‖, Harré 
says that stories are told from ―positions.‖ That is, they happen in local moral orders in 
which the rights and duties of persons as speakers influence the location of the prime 
authorial voice (Davies & Harré 1990, 1990b; Harré & van Langenhove, 1999; Harré & 
Brockmeier, 2001; 2003; Moghaddam, Harré & Lee 2008). Narratives are products of 
particular points of view and particular voices; they also have particular purposes and 
objectives. ―Telling a story or narrating an event is not only an account of an action but 
an action itself, not only a structure of meaning but also a performance of meaning‖ 
(Brockmeier, 2002, p. 27). Formulated in this pragmatic way, narratives can be 
considered as cultural constructs that instruct us about what is to be done and not to be 
done in life. Individuals are also integrated into generalized and culturally established 
canons via narrative structures. Besides helping us to understand the meanings of 
temporal/historical experiences, narratives can instruct us about collective action as well. 
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4.6.1. Narrative and Cultural Analysis 
How individuals tell their personal and group stories, the episodes and anecdotes 
they emphasize and forget, their stance as protagonists or victims, establishes different 
kinds of relationships between storytellers and other social actors. ―Stories are not merely 
a way of telling someone about one‘s life; they are the means by which identities may be 
fashioned‖ (Rosenwald & Ochberg, 1992). Individuals make sense of their experiences 
and make claims related to their own lives in narrative form (Bruner, 1990). Another 
important point related to the narrative that is pointed out by Harré and Brockmeier is 
that, ―among the wide variety of units of language such as words, expressions, sentences, 
speech acts and conversational forms, narrative is the one which has the most powerful 
persuasive power‖ (Harré & Brockmeier, 2001, p. 41). Narrators create persuasive 
storylines from disordered social experiences and give social realities of individuals a 
unity and consistency. People make sense of their past and make future reflections 
through narratives (Brockmeir & Carbaugh, 2001; Brockmeier, 2002; 2005). More 
importantly they become members of particular identity groups by adopting, defending 
and reproducing those storylines. Relations between identities, groups, self and other 
have been shaped with stories and everyday accounts of people. 
4.6.2. Narratives and Conflict 
Sometimes the story of a conﬂict is almost all there is. Only occasionally is blood 
let, are bombs thrown and houses stoned. Could it be that conﬂicts are sustained 
by the adoption by the hostile parties of conﬂicting story lines, in the light of 
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which incompatible and irresolvable contradictions in meanings have become 
entrenched? (Harré & Slocum, 2003, p. 102) 
The quotation/question above has a clear yes answer for the authors. The 
statement definitely has significant ontological and epistemological assumptions related 
to the nature of social conflicts. Many social episodes, including conflicts, are carried 
through by discursive mean; by things said (Harré & Slocum, 2003). This understanding 
also has strong assumptions related to the resolution means and mechanisms of conflict. 
There is often more than a single storyline by which conflicts are defined and classified 
(Winslade & Monk, 2000, p. 35). Dominant discourses often determine what gets storied 
or included and excluded when talking about the conflict. The way conflict has been told 
creates the story and the story which has been constructed by the conflict reproduces the 
conflict again and again. 
Stories of conflict and violence are important turning points in narratives of the 
self and they are crucial for understanding the transformations in the meanings. Turning 
points in narratives are steps toward narrational consciousness ―they signal the 
transformation in intentional stages‖ (Bruner, 2003). Conflicts, especially violence, do 
not constitute only important elements of identity formation and negotiation, yet the 
narratives of conflict and violence are usually disproportionately represented in life 
stories as important turning points. Narratives of conflict and conciliation episodes mark 
the turning points in this study. Episodes of direct conflict and confrontation are usually 
more visible and easily identifiable than are processes of coexistence and cooperation. 
Rhetorically, Alevi narratives can be seen as part of the struggle over the 
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recognition of Alevis as a distinct-not necessarily separate - social group in Turkey with 
their own group rights and privileges.  In other terms, narratives have been used as a 
means to challenge the meta-narratives, such as describing the Turkish population as 
being 99% Muslim, and ethnically and religiously homogeneous. Alevis have always felt 
discriminated against and they have felt resentments toward the state and other social 
groups. In their new social context and space, Alevis are also struggling to reconstitute 
their binding stories. Conversely, the narrative processes of identity construction has led 
to the fragmentation of Alevi identity, which will be discusses in the chapter titled 
―Fragments of Alevi Identity‖. 
In the Alevi public memory and social and political imagination, narratives related 
to past episodes of violence constitute a significant place and value. Within the process of 
fragmentation mentioned above, the symbolic forms and narrative practices of violence 
have a strong unifying power. Violence has had a special rationale and performative value 
in the securitization of fluid identities; this is why it is one of the most valuable assets for 
the activists of identity politics and ethnic struggles. In Formations of Violence, Allen 
Feldman argues that political agencies are constructed through symbolic forms, material 
practices and narrative strategies of violence (Feldman, 1991). Political agency is 
relational, having no fixed ground, it is the effect of situated practices. ―Political agency 
is predicated on self-reflexive, interpretive framings of power, which are embedded in 
language and relational sequences of action‖ (Feldman, 1991). Relations between 
violence and narrative have to be understood in relation to the background of power 
relations as well as with reference to an imagined future sketch. Narratives are enacted as 
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well as written according to fluid subject positions. In the case of Alevi identity, there is 
no unified future path except the ―abstract quest for recognition‖, which explains the 
complexity of contending Alevi discourses. 
To sum up, narratives and stories have a semantic as well as performative value in 
analyzing identity based conflicts. Much of the information, such as collective traumas, 
humiliation narratives, symbolic stories, group values, resentments and collective 
requests, have been stated in narrative form. Narrative form is especially useful when 
trying to understand the meaning and function of temporal information in identity 
struggles. 
The reason for a comprehensive sketch of theories on identity and conflict is the 
complicated nature of contemporary Alevi, which is far from being settled yet. Identities 
are relational and the nature of the group formation process has often been shaped by 
cultural resources and temporal and axiological narratives, rather than material interests. 
Material requests may be a reflection of broader psychocultural concerns. As the 
boundaries of identities change and transform, the contents of identities are also re-
negotiated. New narratives, new symbolic resources and new relational pragmatics are 
constituted. Identity groups are never stable categories, though there can be primordial 
ties which seem stable. Normative assumptions, common fears and common threats, and 
shared historical traumas can be the conditions of possibility for certain acts. Since 
identities are dynamic, they involve three related but distinct contrasts in ways of 
conceptualizing and explaining action. 
As we return to Tilly‘s emphasis on the three requirements of social identities: 
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relations, boundaries and stories, almost all the theoretical frameworks have certain 
assumptions about these three components. When the boundaries of identity groups are 
unstable there is a general level of anxiety and feeling of threat, as in the case of Alevi 
identity. If the boundaries are too impermeable, relationality becomes based on the strong 
opposition of ―self‖ and ―other‖ or ―us‖ and ―them‖ definitions. In the Alevi case, these 
boundaries have been maintained for centuries. Cultural stereotypes and negative 
imaging are the byproducts of this division. 
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The victor's tale of triumph is the loser's tale of defeat, though both were in the 
same battle. History, too, as historians have been insisting for generations, cannot 
escape the perspective that dominates its narrative telling. Unmasking one 
perspective only reveals another (Bruner, 2002, p. 25) 
5.1. Social Constructionism and CR 
Identity politics and ethnic/religious conflict literature emphasize and analyze 
mostly the conflictual issues and narratives of violence. I think this approach gives an 
incomplete and sometimes biased analysis of any identity based conflict. Especially with 
regard to the Alevi issue, an analysis of only violence and marginalization narratives 
gives an incomplete portrayal of the problem. Therefore, this study focuses on both 
conflict and cooperation narratives as well as the other normative and emotional 
narratives that constitute the moral and political boundaries of the contemporary Alevi 
community. Identities can also be re-negotiated to create a common understanding, while 
preserving the distinctive features of the communities. 
Social constructionist scholars in the CR field focus on understanding the 
conceptions of conflict, violence, conflicting identities, sufferings, traumas, 
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discrimination, and conceptions of ideal social and political order and peace. The 
meanings and practical implications of these conceptions are constructed and negotiated 
through interaction with the other social entities and actors. Meaning making, according 
to this understanding, is a dynamic social and interactional process, explored mainly with 
reference to symbolic and linguistic resources. 
The epistemological and methodological assumptions of this study are based on 
social constructionism. Social constructionism differs from positivism with regard to its 
general characteristics, features and differences. Social constructionism has made 
considerable advances in many of the social science disciplines since the publication of 
Berger and Luckmann‘s publication of their seminal work The Social Construction of 
Reality  (1966). Both Kenneth Gergen, and Vivienne Burr prefer to provide an 
operational and practical definition of social constructionism (Gergen, 1999; Gergen, 
2001; Burr, 1995). This is mainly because it is difficult to provide a dictionary definition 
of social constructionism, both as a philosophical movement and epistemological 
approach. Social constructionism has been developed as a comprehensive critique of 
positivistic and realistic epistemologies in the social sciences. According to social 
constructionism, historical and cultural contexts play an important role in shaping 
complex and interrelated social phenomena. Communal meanings and knowledge of 
social reality are negotiated dynamically as social processes. Meanings are embedded in 
social, cultural and linguistic contexts and are dynamically shaped and reshaped. ―Self 
and world are articulated in social relations by discourse‖ (Gergen, 1999). Different 
forms of discourses mainly stories, are the major elements of this study as well. 
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Within the social and political domain, social constructionism provides significant 
tools for social movements and activists for identity politics. Claims to authority, truth, 
rationality and moral superiority have been challenged with the tools of social 
constructionism (Gergen, 2001). The outcome of this love relationship between social 
constructionism and identity politics in many instances encouraged social and political 
activism in academia and in other public arenas. The side effects of the critical counter-
discourse and activism were the reproduction of rhetoric of blame and discourses of 
counter-discrimination. In identity politics, differences with out-groups are often 
constructed in negative forms. Instabilities in meanings may in fact prove to be creative 
and fertile ground for renegotiating the conflictual boundaries of identities. It is important 
to recognize that the availability of common linguistic and symbolic repertoires and 
resources may enable more accommodative collective narratives. 
Jerome Bruner, one of the leading figures of social constructionism and narrative 
research emphasized that ―the symbolic systems that individuals use in constructing 
meaning were systems that were already in place, as culture and language‖ (1990,: 13). 
The symbolic system therefore is an important instrument that when utilized can make 
the user a reflection or part of the community (Bruner, 1990). Through the process of 
actualization, meaning moves from the private stage to the public in culture and 
language. (Bruner, 1990, p. 35). Understanding conflicts and identities in their symbolic 
and cultural contexts therefore is the first and foremost step in engaging in the purpose 
driven activity of conflict analysis and resolution. Because of its relativistic ontology, 
social constructionism accepts the possibility of the multiplicity of social realities and 
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highlights the significance of social contexts. The possibility of a multiplicity of realities, 
especially as related to identities and contradictory definitions of conflicts in the Alevi 
case, is a key assumption in this study. These assumptions are especially meaningful 
within the realm of Alevi identity politics where a multiplicity of social realities coexist 
and sometimes contradict. Sunni‘s have difficulty understanding the worldviews, 
lifestyles, social concerns, priorities, internal divisions and controversies of Alevis. Alevis 
experience the same difficulty vis a vis Sunnis; they even have miscommunication and 
deep internal division among each other. It is naïve to relate these divisions and 
controversies solely to misunderstandings in meaning systems; they are also related to 
competing social, political, cultural objectives and projects. 
The famous Wittgensteinian aphorism: ―the way we think and the concepts and 
categories we use when we think are provided for us in the language or discourse that 
existed before we entered into it‖ highlights the social constructionist perspective 
(Wittgenstein, [1953] 1974). Consistent with these assumptions, the social 
constructionists argue that the world is described with the concepts already in mind 
(Gergen, 1999, p. 11). 
The world does not produce our concepts; rather our concepts help us organize the 
world in various ways.] The botanist, landscaper, and real estate agent see my 
yard differently because they each approach the scene with different mental 
categories (Gergen, 1999, p. 11). 
These assumptions do not presuppose cultural and linguistic determinism in social 
understandings. Instead, they emphasize the field of social possibilities. If the social 
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phenomena that we are dealing with are about subjective social experiences such as 
conflict, interpersonal or intergroup violence, identity formation and transformation, 
historical memories, or more positive forms of social relationality, social constructionism 
can help us to conceptualize how discourse and the linguistic formulations practically 
define these experiences.  Alevi ―identities‖ are therefore re-negotiated and transformed 
with the available cultural and linguistic resources. Historical, cultural, social and 
political narratives each play a role in the process of the making of meaning for Alevi 
identity. What is more important, however, is the practical use of the available resources 
within the Alevi identity struggle. 
Within historical processes, new resources and discourses such as revolutionary 
Marxist-Atheist resources, Kemalist ideas, human rights discourse, secularist discourse 
and the language of identity politics have been added to the Alevi cultural and narrative 
repertoire. My focus will be on the function of these resources in the process of identity 
negotiation, rather than their deep underlying meanings. Stories and narrative accounts 
also embody the emotional and normative attributions of the Alevi community. Narratives 
have been discussed within a broader social and cultural context with reference to public 
documents and some other secondary sources as well. In order for the researcher to 
understand the contexts and situations, the aim is to stay close to the participants that play 
any significant role in the process of the construction of these contexts and situations 
(Maykut & Morehouse, 1994: quoted in Shekedi, 2005, p. 5). 
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5.2. Relational Practice and Social Conflict 
The meaning of language as well as other symbolic and linguistics resources are 
acquired in their use rather than in their correspondence with events in the world 
(Wittgenstein, [1953]1974). 
language and all other forms of representation gain their meaning from the ways 
in which they are used within relationships. The individual mind (thought, 
experience) does not thus originate meaning, create language, or discover the 
nature of the world. Meanings are born of coordination‘s among persons - 
agreements, negotiations, affirmations. From this standpoint, relationships stand 
prior to all that is intelligible (Gergen, 1999, p. 49) 
The meaning of social traumas and victimhood psychology, as well as other cultural and 
linguistic elements of Alevi identity, therefore are also constructed in social interactions. 
A constructionist approach takes the project of studying people‘s own understanding of 
identity to a deeper level and examines how the notion of inner/outer selves is used 
rhetorically, to accomplish social action (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006, p. 4). The way to 
unravel the social phenomena and the social and interactional processes that are 
mentioned above is to focus on the function and use of the symbolic and linguistic 
resources. As Benwell and Stokoe emphasize, discourse is a public and dynamic process 
and ―it is in this realm we understand and interact who we are to each other‖ (Benwell & 
Stokoe, 2006, p. 4). 
Identity has been relocated from the private realm of cognition and experience to 
public realms of discourse and other semiotic systems of meaning making. Rather 
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than being reflected in discourse identity is actively, ongoingly dynamically 
constituted in discourse (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006, p. 4). 
It is within this realm I will explore some of the abstract notions such as collective 
traumas or the emotional and normative aspects of identity negotiation. 
This research enterprise itself is a process, or a struggle for creating meaning out 
of the social, practical and linguistic experiences and practices of Alevi citizens in 
Turkey. Meanings, and more importantly the functions of conceptions of the past and 
future for Alevis, pscychocultural narratives of the Alevi community, and the moralistic 
constructions of the ideal social and political order for the Alevi community, are the main 
themes of this research. Emotional elements of conflicts such as humiliation, 
victimization and psychocultural traumas and narratives are also examined in this 
research. Social constructionism allows us to reconstitute conflict generating resources 
such as historical traumas and animosities in more promising and positive ways (Gergen, 
1999, p. 34).  The available concepts and categories that help generate conflictual 
relations under the identity politics frame can also contribute to the constructive 
renegotiation of the moral and political boundaries of conflicting identities. 
My interactions with my informants may be different than other researchers since 
I also have my own preconceptions as a conflict analyst, which emphasize the processes 
of social interaction. It is my aim here to portray a meaningful analytic narrative of the 
Alevi identity movement. My conceptual tools are diverse but I also have an intention to 
develop keys that would allow at least the mitigation of some of the tensions in the 
identity struggle of Alevis in Turkey. I have a goal of exploring the possibilities of keys 
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that may help understand and resolve identity based conflicts. The research enterprise 
itself is a process of creating meaning out of social, practical and linguistic experiences 
(Harré & Slocum, 2003). Agreeing with the social constructionist assumptions, which 
argue that every story and every narrative has an objective or aim, this research and 
narrative tries to explore the cultural and symbolic fields that reproduce the conflictual 
yet non-violent engagement of Alevi and non-Alevi identities in Turkey. The general 
questions that explore the ways in which moral and political boundaries of identities have 
been maintained and transformed and the role of violence and cooperation narratives 
guide this research. 
A combination of life story narratives and public narratives and discourse have 
been gathered as the empirical data. As the theoretical literature emphasizes, identities 
and personal stories cannot simply be thought of as a personal matter; they are embedded 
within the cultural and social milieu (Vygotsky, 1986). This study agrees with the 
theoretical approaches that argue that the stories or narratives embody the rich and 
sometimes intricate phenomena of life, and personal and collective experiences better 
than other forms (Lieblich et al., 1998). The life stories of individuals with regard to their 
being Alevi, transformations of their identity, critical moments and personal accounts 
related to key events in their lives are considered as important social resources. Elements 
and the intimate details of the collective stories are expressed with the individual‘s 
voices. The changes and variations of pragmatic political concerns as well as public and 
personal narratives are crucial resources. 
Positioning theory is used as a theoretical and methodological tool to analyze the 
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identity bearing narratives and overall discourses surrounding Alevi identity. Meanings of 
the self, other, past/future, conflict and ―just order‖ for Alevis have been analyzed with 
the elements of the positioning triangle, which will be elaborated later in this chapter. 
5.3. Narrative and Social Research  
Narratives should be defined as discourses with a clear sequential order that 
connect events in a meaningful way for a definite audience and thus offer insights 
about the world and/ or people‘s experiences of it (Hinchman & Hinchman, 1997, 
p. xvi). 
Narrative is the name for the ensemble of linguistic, psychological, and social 
structures, transmitted cultural-historically, constrained by each individual‘s level 
of mastery and by his or her mixture of communicative techniques and linguistic 
skills… In communicating something about a life event, a predicament, an 
intention, a dream, an illness, a state of angst- it usually takes the form of 
narrative; that is, it is presented as a story told according to certain cultural 
conventions (Harré & Brockmeier, 2001, p. 41). 
Both Harré and Brockmeier‘s, and Hinchman and Hinchman‘s portrayals above, 
presents a human oriented social definition of narrative. Emotions, processes of meaning 
making and practical purposes have also been presented as significant elements of 
narratives. Labov‘s definition of narrative is a more formalistic definition. According to 
Labov, narratives are ―stories about a specific past event and they have common 
components such as abstract, orientation, complicating action, evaluation, resolution and 
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coda (Labov & Waletzky, 1967; Labov, 1972)
97‖. These structures help the teller to 
―construct a story from primary experience and interpret the significance of events‖ 
(Riessman, 1993, p. 19). The practical definitions above are key to my conceptualization 
of narrative in this study. 
 There has been a growing interest in narratives in many fields within the 
humanities and social sciences. Since the early 1980s (Mitchel, 1981; Bakhtin & Holquist 
1982; Bakhtin, 1986; 1986; Ricoeur; 1984; 1991; Sarbin, 1986; Polkinghorne, 1988; 
Bruner, 1987, 1990; 2004; Nelson & Fivush, 2004; Schafer, 1989; McAdams, 1997; 
White, 1975; 1987; MacIntyre, 1984; Hinchman & Hinchman, 1997; Cronon, 1992; 
Somers, 1992; 1994; Mischler, 1995; 2001). The ―discovery of story forms is an 
important innovation‖ in research enterprises in the humanities and social sciences (Harré 
& Brockmeier, 2001). According to Brockmeier and Carbaugh, social and cultural life 
comes into being through narrative means and narratives are a new and ―humanistic‖ way 
of organizing human experience (Brockmeier & Carbaugh, 2001, p. 9). Narrative forms 
comprise an important philosophical and methodological framework for the study of 
social conflicts as well. 
The analysis of narrative forms and stories has been specifically utilized in 
research on identity, culture and literature with regard to historical and moral accounts. 
Positioning theory, which is a variant of narrative theory, is relevant for the study of the 
relational dynamics of groups and social processes of conflict – as well as conciliation. 
                                                 
97  Riesman‘s simplified operational definition of Labov and Waletzky‘s elements. An abstract is the summary of the substance of the narrative, orientation is the 
time, space, situation, participation components, complicating action are sequence of events, evaluation is the significance and meaning of the action, attitude of the 
narrator, resolution is what finally happened and coda (returns the perspective to the present) (Riessman, 1993, p. 18).  
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Public knowledge and information about conflict, violence, confrontation, cooperation 
and peace are formulated and communicated in narrative forms. It is possible to compose 
numerous narratives from a very limited set of events and episodes. As it is described 
concisely by Benwell and Stokoe ―positioning theorists examine the co-construction of 
identity between storyteller and audience‖ (2006, p. 139). Speakers adopt and oppose 
subject positions that were assigned to them in the master narratives and sometimes 
propose alternative subject positions through their own discourses and counter-narratives. 
Available linguistic and discursive resources that are embedded in their cultural 
repertoires usually define the possibilities and limits of narratives. The key questions in 
relation to narratives and Conflict Analysis & Resolution are: 
Is there a possibility for a shared semantics or shared storylines? How do the storylines 
intersect? How do they dissect? How do the storylines of the outsiders contribute to the 
narratives of conflict, or are they trying to confirm their perspectives? 
In her 1997 book, Mieke Bal points out that narratology should be used as a 
heuristic tool for cultural analysis in the interpretation of cultures (Bal, 1997). 
Brockmeier and Carbaugh also use Bal‘s intellectual development and the transformation 
of her approach to narrative as an example of the process of the transformation of 
narrative and narratology as a discipline. Narratology has transformed from being a 
discipline that analyzes the structures and forms of narratives, to an approach also useful 
for a cultural analysis in the humanities and social sciences. 
It is important to state the difference of ―first order‖ and ―second order‖, or 
―ontological‖ and ―representational‖ narratives here (Elliott, 2005). ―First order stories 
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are the stories that individuals tell about themselves and their own experience‖ (Elliott, 
2005, p.12). As McAdams, Josselson and Lieblich mentioned, ―life stories may be seen as 
bringing different aspects of the self together into a unifying and purpose-giving whole‖ 
(2006, p. 5). Whereas second order narratives present social and historical knowledge. 
Researchers make sense of the social world and other people‘s experiences by second 
order narratives (McAdams, Josselson & Lieblich, 2006, p. 13). The focus of second 
order narrative can be individuals‘ stories as well as social episodes or collective stories. 
Who people are takes shape in the interaction of first order and second order stories. 
There may be an analytic distinction between these two types of narratives, but there is a 
perpetual synergistic interaction between meaning making and action. 
5.4. Narratology and Discourse Analysis 
Language games, to refer once more to Wittgenstein (1953), are not isolated 
linguistic entities but all kinds of human practices shot through with the uses of 
words. People communicate by a number of means, including the verbal. 
Typically, narrative and other forms of verbal communication occur 
contemporaneously with and not independently of other material and symbolic 
activities, and it is in this sense that we call linguistic production (as result as well 
as process) discourse (Brockmeier, 2002) 
Brockmeier‘s (2002) concise and practical definition of discourse is helpful to 
define the concept beyond its linguistic context. Vivienne Burr also defined discourse as a 
systematic, coherent set of images, metaphors, and so on that construct an object in a 
particular way (Burr, 2003). Human beings communicate by a number of means, 
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including verbally. Typically, verbal communication occurs contemporaneously with and 
not independently from other material and symbolic activities, and it is in this sense 
called linguistic production (Harré, Brockmeier& Mühlhausler, 1999). In their study of 
environmental discourse, Greenspeak, Harré, Brockmeier & Mühlhausler (1999) 
analyzed the discourse subtypes ranging from all kinds of natural scientific, moral, and 
literary narratives. 
Subcategories, genres and forms of narrative are countless: myth, folk and fairy 
tale, natural and fictive stories, memorial speeches, justifications of action, 
advertisements, excuses and certain historical, legal, political, religious, 
philosophical, and scientific texts. [poetry, drama, traditional and literary epics, 
travel literature, essays, music, film, ballet visual arts and forms of popular 
culture such as advertisements and fashion] (Harré & Brockmeier, 2003; Harré, 
Brockmeier & Mühlhausler, 1999). 
Narratology is, on the other hand, a theory of narrative. It examines common 
features of narratives, as well as what enables them to differ from one another.  It also 
aims to describe the narrative-specific system of rules presiding over narrative production 
and processing (Bal, 1997). The methodological approach examines the informants‘ story 
and analyzes how it is put together, the linguistic and cultural resources it draws on, and 
how it persuades the audience of authenticity (Riessman, 1993). A broader definition of 
narratology is the ―theory of oral and written genres of language, images, spectacles, 
events, and cultural artifacts that tell a story‖ (Bal, 1997). ―The story, whether formulated 
in linguistic or in other forms (visual, musical or performative) is the substance of 
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narratology‖ (Bal, 1997). 
In their comprehensive analysis of environmental discourse, Harré, Brockmeier 
and Mühlhausler have taken a diverse set of discursive resources such as communicative 
activities, conversation and other symbolic forms of face to face interactions (e.g. the 
telling of old and new folk tales along green storylines in local contexts) and cognitive 
activities such as argumentation and reasoning, expressive activities such as singing and 
praying, and the production and reception of electronically mediated texts. Similar kinds 
of linguistic resources are utilized here for the purpose of laying out the linguistic 
resources of the new Alevi identity. The primary source of narratives in this research is 
life story interviews, but the data also includes Alevi folk songs; efsanes (legends and 
tales), menakibnames (moral and didactic stories) are important genres of narratives that 
have sustained and been transmitted through Alevi oral culture. Currently the written 
genres of history, moral and political accounts, and declarations also contribute to Alevi 
literature. This research is not concerned with the richness of Alevi- Bektasi literature
98
, 
yet the personal accounts and public narratives cannot be contextualized without these 
elements. 
Three general sets of narrative analysis models have been classified by Mishler, 
each set having its own subsets. The first set of models emphasize the temporal order, or 
―the correspondence between the temporal sequence of actual events and their order of 
presentation in the text of discourse‖ (Mishler, 1995, p. 90). The second set of models 
examines the textual coherence and structure. The ―strategies through which different 
                                                 
98  There are several monographs related to this 
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types and genres of stories are organized and how they achieve structure and coherence‖ 
are the main areas of interest in the second type (Mishler, 1995). The set of models or the 
approaches that is most useful for my analysis is the third set, which examines the 
cultural, social and psychological contexts and functions of stories (Mishler, 1995). 
The textual representation of sequential events, or in other words, the relation of 
real events and their ordering in narrative account, is the domain of research in the first 
set. There is still an assumption of a match between language and reality. In the second 
set, which has structuralist and poststructuralist orientations, the focus is on the narrative 
forms that carry meaning (Mishler, 1995, p. 102). The ways through which the narratives 
are constructed and the linguistic resources which have been problematized are relevant if 
they are related to the purpose in this study. My emphasis will be on the model which 
focuses on the ―works‖ the stories do and the functions of narratives. The contexts and 
effects of the narratives are more important as a part of the identity negotiation process 
than textual organization and representational features. 
In his famous essay "how to do things with words", J.L. Austin emphasizes the 
performative character of language (Austin, [1961] 2000). The processes of description 
and definition are also a performance of some kind, according to Austin (emphasis by 
Gergen, 1999). These processes are not neutral objective processes; we describe and 
define them through the available cognitive resources with particular intentions. The 
performative character of language emerges from ―speech acts‖. Speech Acts are defined 
as ―socially significant actions which accomplish something within the interpersonal 
world‖ (p. 37). Different than the acts, actions have certain intentions and the meanings 
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of these acts emerge and potentially change during the social episode (Harré & 
Moghaddam, 2003, p. 6). 
Harré takes Austin‘s notion of performative language and speech acts to higher 
level. Harré argues that ―categorizing sequence of speech acts as narrative assigns them 
to a certain range of jobs‖ (Brockmeier & Harré, 2001, p. 51). 
―Narrative is the name for a special repertoire of instructions and norms of what is 
to be done and not to be done in life (Brockmeier & Harré, 2001, p. 51)‖. 
Therefore individual are integrated into a generalized and culturally established 
canon with the help of repertoire of instructions and norms. Stories and narratives can 
turn into performative acts or actions according to this perspective, which I find useful. 
Narratives, from this perspective, are beyond the definition of resources for 
understanding the meanings of social episodes and processes. 
5.5. Positioning Theory and Analyzing Intergroup Relations 
Positioning theory explains how Tutsi identity… was objectified as degenerate, 
criminal, and vicious through the storytelling power of news articles and 
broadcasts.  Indeed, these media offered a sense of empowerment that comes 
from righteous hatred of an enemy and fomented violence among oppressed 
Hutus as the demonization campaign by anti-Tutsi propagandist further fabricated 
identity differences through the categories of virtues and vices (Rothbart & 
Bartlett, 2007, p. 228). 
Positioning theory is a theoretically significant resource that allows for the 
exploring of action and the function components of cultural, linguistic, and narrative 
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resources in a dynamic and integrative way. The theoretical elements of social 
constructionism have been integrated as a theoretical model to examine real life 
situations. As emphasized by Rothbart and Bartlett above, the theory explains how 
elements of language are used normatively to determine the relational interactions of 
social entities such as Tutsi and Hutu identities. Positioning theory is defined as the 
―study of local moral orders as ever-shifting patterns of mutual and contestable rights and 
obligations of speaking and acting‖ (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré & van Langenhove, 
1999; Harré & Moghaddam, 2003; Moghaddam, Harré & Lee, 2008). Harré and van 
Langenhove define position as a ―complex cluster of generic personal attributes, 
structured in various ways, which impinges on the possibilities of interpersonal, 
intergroup and even intrapersonal action through some assignment of such rights, duties 
and obligations to an individual or a group‖. What is really important in positioning is the 
difference between what is logically possible and what is socially possible (Harré & 
Moghaddam, 2003). Rights and duties limit the possibilities of action. 
―Positions are relational, in that for one to be positioned as powerful others must 
be positioned as powerless‖ (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999). Storylines are written 
from particular positions. This interactive and dialogic (maybe more complicated) 
process dynamically shapes relationships in various different forms. Contingent, flexible 
and dynamic attributes of positioning provide more promising ways to conceptualize 
identity than its predecessor ―role theory‖. Interpersonal, inter-group or intra-group 
conflicts may arise when storylines adopted by different actors are incompatible or in 
direct opposition to each other. ―It is in the constant interplay of mutual recognition of 
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one‘s own and the other‘s position that the particular version of public self appropriate to 
the occasion is constructed‖ (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999, p. 15). One of the 
advantages of  positioning theory is that a group does not have a fixed attribute such as a 
group image, or a group stereotype associated with it, but the group plays ongoing parts 
in many and diverse storylines (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999, p. 15). Therefore the 
positions constantly emerge/shift and change as narratives get revealed. Identities have 
associated norms defining the rights and duties of the subjects. The salience of the self-
categorization and interpretation of rights and duties are also dependent on social 
interactions (Moghaddam, Harré & Lee, 2008). 
In any moment and among some group of people in a certain social setting there 
is what people can do, their skills and capacities, what people actually do, and the 
constraints of the moral order, what people in these circumstances may do. 
Positioning theory is the tool for exploring the relation between what is possible 
and what is permitted. 
Lan Tan and Moghaddam stress that by applying positioning theory to intergroup 
relations, social phenomena such as ‗intergroup relations‘, ‗group conflicts‘ and ‗group 
stereotypes‘ can be more clearly understood in terms of a discursively constructed world 
(Lan Tan & Moghaddam, 1999). Positioning is relational and positioning someone in a 
particular way is done relative to the others‘ position. In intergroup positioning, this is 
achieved by assigning rights and duties to the categories of ―us‖, ―them‖, ―we‖ and 
―you‖. ‗Group conflicts‘ may arise when storylines adopted by different groups are 
incompatible or in direct opposition to each other. 
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Intergroup positioning is fundamentally achieved through the use of linguistic 
devices such as ‗we‘, ‗they‘, ‗us‘, ‗them‘, ‗I‘ (as a member of a certain group, 
‗you‘ (as a member of a certain group), and specific group names (Lan Tan, & 
Moghaddam, 1999, p. 183). 
For understanding meaningful social interactions at any given episode, 
positioning theory combines background conditions. The relational histories of the 
groups and history of their past relations are important background conditions.  ―In terms 
of positioning theory, a group does not have a fixed attribute such as ‗a group image‘ or 
‗a group stereotype‘ associated with it, but the group plays ongoing parts in many and 
diverse storylines (including its own) (Lan Tan & Moghaddam, 1999, p. 187)‖. Social 
forces, or in Austin‘s terms, illocutionary forces, play an important role in the 
actualization of background conditions in any gives situation. In intergroup relations, 
therefore, the relative positions of groups may change depending on the situation of 
storylines and the social forces that are active. 
5.5.1. Elements of the Positioning Triangle 
Harré and van Langenhove argue that if one looks to three basic features of 
interactions, one is indeed able to understand and explain much of what is going on and 
how social and psychic phenomena are ‗constructed‘.  These three basic features are: 
 the moral positions of the participants and the rights and duties they have that say 
certain things (positions) 
 the conversional history and sequence of things already being said (storylines) 
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 the actual sayings with their power to shape certain aspect of the social world 
(speech acts). (Harré &van Langenhove, 1999, p. 6). 
―Positioning theory is a methodological framework based on the position/act-
action/storyline triad, which draws upon the analogy that all of social life is a 
manifestation of conversations‖ (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999). Position within this 
triangle are defined as the cluster of rights and duties to perform certain actions with a 
certain significance as acts. (Harré & Moghaddam, 2003, p. 5). Positions demand certain 
rights, duties and obligations (Harré & Slocum, 2001). Positioning someone or a group of 
people as benevolent can be considered to be attributing to those actors a moral 
superiority in a particular context, but it may also encumber certain duties and 
responsibilities. These moral responsibilities and obligations may also deny access to a 
certain set of selfish acts. In any case, positions restrict a certain set of actions whereas it 
makes others more likely to be actualized. 
Speech acts are related to what people do with discursive tools in various contexts 
(Austin, 2000). Speech and other acts are socially meaningful and significant 
performances (Harre & Moghaddam, 2003, p. 6). Positions are not only expressed and 
actualized with speech acts. There are a multiplicity of ways to express positions 
including non-verbal expressions through physical action (holding hands, punches), 
symbolic expressions (wearing colors, waving placards) and collective actions (marches, 
rallies, voting) as well as speech (Louis, 2008,p. 26). Both narratives and illocutionary 
forces or speech acts are discursive productions and are related to positions, but the 
structure of these discursive productions are different. Their functions, however, are 
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integrated into the positioning triangle. 
Declarations consist of those speech-acts in which the speaker gives some sort of 
report on how things or events appear from the speaker‘s point of view. 
Narrations, on the other hand consist of those communicative productions in 
which there is a storyline (Harre & van Langenhove, 1999, p.8). 
The act of positioning thus refers to the assignment of fluid ‗parts‘ or ‗roles‘ to 
speakers in the discursive construction of personal stories that make a person‘s actions 
intelligible and relatively determinate as social acts. 
Table 5.1.: Posioning Triangle 
 
 
 
 
(Harré & van Langenhove, 1999, p.18) 
By means of this triad conversations can be analyzed to uncover their episodic 
structures (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999). We can understand how conflicts are 
expressed and actualized through discourse forms. From the point of view of positioning 
theory,  a given complicated conflict situation can take two main forms: 
• The antagonists may share a story but, by adopting contrary positions, use 
that story line to express and so to nourish a conﬂict. 
• The antagonists may have adopted irreconcilable story lines, such that two 
positioning triads exist and there is no discursive bridge from one to the other 
position 
Speech acts  storyline 
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(Harre & Slocum, 2003, pp. 111-2)  
These characteristics can also be applied if there is an intra-group contradiction and 
disagreement over the definition of the conflict. Different storylines may be emphasized 
in order to present the conflict in a desired way. In particular, if there are different goals 
to be achieved by those definitions, the competition counter-positioning gets more severe. 
These assumptions help me to make sense of the complicated and highly competitive 
struggle to define the Alevi social realm. 
5.6. Social Political and the Moral Position of the Researcher 
My subject position is an academician with a Sunni background. This position 
affected my informants‘ attitudes toward and interaction with me, resulting in the need 
for me to take some time to develop a sincere and open encounter with my informants; 
yet the experience was a dialogic one. During the process of interaction with my 
informants, my attitude, language and knowledge was also transformed. I had a chance to 
transform the attitudes and understanding of my informants as well. At the end I was able 
to handle and communicate with a multiplicity of discourses on Alevi identity. My 
proficiency on this multiplicity of discourses and the repertoire of public and private 
Alevi storylines was not enough for me to fully gain the trust of the Alevi community. 
Birth into an Alevi family, or having primordial ties are still an important requirement of 
being part of the Alevi moral community. 
My interaction with my informants was also an important experience for 
recognizing and testing the limits and the boundaries of my own social identity. My 
encounters and interactions with Alevis temporarily made me feel Sunni. But my 
277 
 
Sunniness was different than the Alevi understanding of Sunni. There were references to 
mainly two types of Sunnis, ―Good Sunnis‖ or ―Democratic Sunnis‖, who are 
secularized, modern and does not practice the pillars of religion, and are either socially 
democratic or liberal in terms of their political views. ―Bad Sunnis‖, or ―Şeriatçı‖, are the 
conservative Sunnis that practice the pillars of religion, whose wives wear the ―Turban‖ 
and who support conservative-right parties. The second form of Sunni is described as 
Wahhabi, whereas the first group has been defined as democratic and secularist. There 
may be some other categories in between these two but, the in between categories are 
described according to proximity or distance between these two main categories. Even 
when I was with the intellectuals and elites of the community, I could sense the negative 
attitude toward conservative Sunnis. I personally had not experienced any negative 
treatment, because of my credentials, yet there was still a skepticism since I was 
conducting my research for an American university. In a sense, I was forced into a 
position that was defined by my informants. I sometimes tried to resist the static position 
that was assigned to a ―Sunni‖ researcher like me. Third order positioning was definitely 
different than the first two positions. The possibility of a coexistence of the elements of 
two controversial moral orders and positions were recognized, at least at the interpersonal 
level. 
The question ―are you Alevi?‖ was routine in my interaction with my informants. 
My immediate response was ―no‖, usually followed by comments to create some form of 
credibility. In order to create credibility I had to distance myself from their understanding 
of the ―Wahhabi‖ version and convince them that I was actually a ―democratic Sunni‖. 
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Although there are a multiplicity of social and political positions and versions in between 
these two categories, I felt I was caught between these two categories. An important 
factor for creating credibility was my reference to my family‘s hometown of Erzincan, 
which was a mixed city with a high Alevi population. I made sure to demonstrate that I 
had knowledge about Alevi culture, tradition and life style, and that I am indeed 
respectful to these. I have heard about mostly positive experiences from my family with 
their Alevi neighbors and friends. There were some bitter experiences as well during the 
ideological struggle of the 1970-80s, but these experiences were contextualized within 
the anarchical conditions of the period.  
My educational background was also important for creating credibility within the 
Alevi community. I am a graduate of Boğaziçi University and Sabancı University, both of 
which are respected elite educational institutions in Turkey. Conducting Ph.D. research in 
a university in the U.S. was also respected. Education and academic research have always 
been respected among Alevis, which accounts for my hospitable treatment while doing 
my research. Not sharing the same social and political agenda and moral references with 
the entrepreneurs of Alevi identity politics was an important boundary between me and 
my informants, however, I was treated very positively because of my other credentials. I 
had access to intimate discussions while I was an observant during informal 
environments which I was not able to access during the formal interviews. I believe my 
informal contacts and communications have strengthened my arguments. Positioning was 
a dynamic process of the negotiation of rights, duties, responsibilities and expectations in 
my case. During my interaction with my co-researches I personally tested the possibilities 
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of alternative positions. 
5.7. Research Process and Procedures 
My personal interest in Alevi culture, music and Alevis as a social group predates 
my academic interest in the Alevi identity. Like many other Sunni‘s in Turkey, I used to 
have a much more coherent understanding of Alevi identity before I was exposed to the 
Alevi social realm. In order to improve my understanding, before beginning the field 
research and formal interviews I collected and read some of the contemporary Alevi 
literature that is mainly published by Alevi researchers, journalists and authors. It is a 
very diverse and rapidly growing literature that reflects the social and political aspirations 
of the Alevi community, as well as the internal debates and discussions. There is also a 
wide variety of sources that give particular accounts of Alevi culture and history that are 
not as useful to the objective of this research. These resources are important because they 
are also helping to transfer oral literature into a written one. I had observed the traces of 
these resources throughout my entire research, yet the written resources were not enough 
to represent the diverse versions of oral narratives. 
I had informal conversations with some of my Alevi friends before commencing 
formal interviews. What was more interesting for me was not the limited information that 
I gathered from my pre-field interviews related to Alevi culture and tradition, but the 
surprisingly controversial meanings that were attributed to the notion of ―Aleviness‖ or to 
―Alevi identity‖. I also followed websites and e-mail groups to become more acquainted 
with the relevant discussion topics for various Alevi social networks. Alevi periodicals 
and the books that were popularly circulated in early 1990s have almost disappeared and 
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been replaced by Alevi TV, radio stations and websites. I developed a better awareness of 
the sensitivities of the different Alevi groups, and improved my grasp of Alevi public 
discourses and cultural and linguistic repertoires as a consequence of these efforts.  
5.7.1. Main Data Source 
The Multiple Case Narrative approach has been used to gather narrative data. The 
Multiple Case Narrative is defined as ―a research methodology used by researchers to 
collect data from a large number of people as part of the same study‖ (Shkedi, 2005, p. 
20). Rather than having an in depth study of a life story of single individual or a 
particular event or story, this study examines the life stories of many informants. The 
main characteristic of the Multiple Case Narrative approach is that the ―researcher spends 
a relatively small amount of time meeting and talking with each of the informants and 
collecting information from them‖ (Shkedi, 2005). 
For the categorization of data sources, the distinction between primary and 
secondary sources of data is a helpful differentiation. The primary sources of data, for 
Skedi, ―comprises the informants‘ stories, descriptions, explanations, illustrations, 
interpretations, views, thoughts and any other descriptive verbal types of data‖. In this 
research,  in-depth interviews with 70 informants constitute the primary data. The 
interviews were quite comprehensive in terms of their contents. Formal interviews with a 
purposefully selected group of Alevi citizens including, journalists, intellectuals, authors, 
academicians, association leaders, businessmen, women, youth, dedes, religious figures, 
politicians, and other ordinary citizens constitute the primary source of research data in 
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this study. My average interview was around 2 hours. The shortest interview was 
approximately 18 minutes, whereas the longest one was 5.5 hours. Both cases were 
extreme situations (appendix). 
In addition to the primary sources, I used a wide variety of secondary sources. 
According to Shkedi, secondary sources of data are not derived from personal stories and 
experiences (Shkedi, 2005, p. 57). The secondary sources of data are multiple, such as the 
observation of the context and references to texts such as Alevi journals, books, web-
sites, e-mail groups; all important sources which I refer to in this research. The secondary 
sources of the data are also relevant for the contextualization of arguments and findings. 
Interviews were used for collecting and compiling primary data. A wide range of 
practices can be included under the definition of interview. For example, survey 
interviews are tightly structured with standardized response categories and to closed 
questions. The notion of interview adopted in this study is a constructionist notion rather 
than a positivistic one. I adopt Mishler‘s notion of interview, according to whom 
interview is defined as sites where the partners co-construct and create meaning. 
(Mishler, 1986). The purpose of the interview is not just to gather factual information. 
The purpose of in-depth interviewing is neither simply to get answers to 
questions, nor to test hypotheses. At the root of in-depth interviewing is an 
interest in understanding the experience of other people and the meaning they 
make of their experience (Seidman, 1991, quoted in Shkedi, 2005). 
For the purposes of understanding the meanings within a social context, a semi-
structured in-depth interview was the most helpful instrument for primary data collection.  
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Although I had my questions to guide my informants (appendix), these questions were 
more of a stimulant for gathering the details of life stories and experiences, than a 
structure for leading particular sets of answers. I kept my own interventions to a 
minimum during the interviews in order to keep the conversations consistent with the 
purpose of the research. 
As Skhedi mentions in Multiple Case Narrative, the data collected from many 
informants allows our descriptive and explanatory story to be both broad and deep. My 
overall story is a collage of a wide variety of narratives. I tried to balance the elements of 
deeper and broader analyses with the secondary data. Some of my informants are publicly 
known figures, whereas many others have been contacted via a snowballing technique
99.
 I 
included in my list of my informants people representing different segments of the Alevi 
community, such as youth, academics, religious leaders, association and foundation 
leaders, and ordinary citizens; all having different perspectives. 
One emergent difficulty was the uneven representation of Alevi women in the 
public sphere. Despite the egalitarian and inclusive narratives with regard to women, 
Alevi women are marginalized or not represented equally at the leadership level of Alevi 
social and cultural institutions. There are far fewer interviews with Alevi women than 
Alevi men. However, the inequality of gender represented in the interviews is parallel to 
the unequal representation of Alevi women in the public sphere. 
                                                 
99 Snowball samples begin from a core of known elements and are then increased by adding new elements given by members of the original sample. They are so 
called on the analogy of the increasing size of a snowball when rolled down a snow-covered slope. Such samples are often used where there is no available sampling 
frame listing all the elements for the population of interest, for example illicit drug-users. Hence snowball samples are not random and not statistically representative 
of the population under consideration. They are, therefore, not amenable to inferential statistical techniques. A Dictionary of Sociology 1998, originally published by 
Oxford University Press 1998.  
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5.7.2. Research Logistics and Field Settings 
Formal interviews for the research were started by March, 2006. The interviews 
continued for almost a year. Parallel to the formal interviews I occasionally visited 
Cemevi‘s (religious and cultural centers of the Alevi) and some other Alevi community 
centers. In these contexts I observed religious ceremonies (Cem), communal activities 
and rituals such as funerals and prayers. Within the period of a year I conducted 
interviews with 70 individuals in 3 major cities of Turkey: İstanbul, Ankara and Malatya. 
61 of the interviews were tape recorded with the consent of the informants. I 
asked my informants to sign informed consent forms and informed them about the 
content and scope of the research project (appendix). I did not experience any problems 
and was not involved in any seriously controversial encounters during my field research. 
The only difficulty I encountered was that some of my participants‘ were willing to sign 
the informed consent forms. Although many of the informants agreed to sign the 
informed consent forms, some declined to sign. Their hesitation was not related to the 
content of the informed consent form, rather, they were hesitant to sign a document.  
Those who signed the document declared their consent orally. Turkish people are 
reluctant to signing documents that are provided by persons that whom they do not know 
closely. In most cases the contracts are oral except for the finance and trade deals. I have 
provided an extra copy of the consent for almost all of my informants. 
The tape-recorded interviews have been transcribed verbatim. Because of the 
quality of the recordings in a couple of interviews, I had to rely on handwritten notes. The 
outcome of the verbatim transcripts constituted around 3,000 pages of data. I also have 
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more than 3 notebooks full of field and interview notes. Relevant narratives and excerpts 
have been translated from Turkish. Clean transcripts focus on the content of what is said 
(Elliott, 2005, p. 52). There may also be transcription styles that may record details 
including pauses and intonations, non lexical utterances such as ―umms‖ and ―errs‖ 
(Elliott, 2005, p. 52). My interviews are not conversational interviews. My role was 
limited during the interactions. This research deals with a rich narrative repertoire, and an 
emphasis on the intonations and pauses would make limited contributions to this 
research. 
I have taken detailed handwritten notes during four of the interviews, in which I 
was not able to tape record and which were conducted with two individuals together. 
These are considered individual interviews because personal experiences and views are 
been emphasized in these ―two person interviews.‖ There was a comfortable space for 
sharing personal as well as private accounts in most cases. Since I do not focus mainly on 
the private aspects of life stories, the two person interviews did not create any problem 
for the quality of the data. In addition to the formal interviews with 70 individuals there 
were also couple of group interviews and short focus group discussions that I conducted 
at various cemevis, associations, public events and conferences. There are direct or 
indirect references to those discussions within the research. 
İstanbul and Ankara are the two largest cities in Turkey, and have the largest 
urban Alevi population. My main interests are İstanbul and Ankara, therefore 90% of the 
interviews were conducted in these two cities. The majority of the Alevi associations, 
cemevis and the Alevi authors/intellectuals are also located in İstanbul and Ankara. I 
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spent 6 months of the research time in İstanbul and the rest in Ankara. The reasons for the 
selection of these cities are that Istanbul and Ankara are the two biggest cities in Turkey 
with a large population of Alevis. The percentage of Alevis within the overall population 
of these cities is lower in comparison to cities like Sivas, Tokat, Amasya and Malatya. 
However, in addition to the reasons that are mentioned above, Alevis in the urban context 
have experienced a period of mandatory coexistence with the non-Alevi subjects. This 
experience has had a significant impact on the transformation of Alevi identity, which is 
primarily the area of interest for this study. The way this coexistence and redefinition of 
identity has been formulated and expressed is an important piece of the puzzle. 
In addition to the formal interviews I conducted, I also participated in some of the 
important ceremonies for Alevis in 4 different cities. Some of these events were 
traditional rituals as well as commemorations of historical events and personalities. There 
are also emerging traditions, commemorations and celebrations that contain the elements 
of historical and cultural resources and reframe these with social and political 
perspectives. I consider my experiences and learning from these activities to be the 
secondary source of data in this study, as they were crucial for the crystallization of some 
of the conceptions developed during the research. A selected summary of the events that I 
participated during the field research are as follows: 
 June 11, 2006, 6th annual ―Barışa Semah Dönenler‖ (Turning ―Semah‖ for 
Peace). A ceremony and gathering that was held in the Olympic Stadium in 
İstanbul. More than 30.000 Alevi citizens participated in the event. A thousand 
Alevi‘s performed an Alevi religious dance ceremony at the stadium. There were 
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concerts by popular Alevi and non-Alevi singers. As its title indicates, the 
ceremony was dedicated to peace and friendship. 
 July 2, 2006, Commemoration of July 2, 1993 Sivas events. There were a panel of 
events and several Alevi associations condemning the events that lead to the 
deaths of 37 Alevi intellectuals, who were killed in the city of Sivas during the 
burning of the ―Madımak Hotel‖. The gathering in 1993 was a commemoration of 
Alevi folk poet Pir Sultan Abdal, who was remembered with his rebellious? 
 July 11-19, 2006 I went to Malatya, which is one of the cities in Eastern Anatolia 
where there is a large Alevi population. I participated in the Cem ceremony in 
Zeynel Abidin Cemevi. I had informal talks with Alevi youth and elders in the 
cemevi. 
 August 17-18, 2006, I participated in the commemoration ceremonies for Hacı 
Bektaş Veli‘s at the central Anatolia city of Nevşehir. Hacı Bektaş Veli is the 
legendary founder of the Bektaşi Order. There were public conferences, ritual 
ceremonies, concerts and many other activities in the town of Hacı Bektaş during 
the commemoration. It is simultaneously an important venue to observe Alevi 
public intellectuals, communal leaders politicians and social activists. 
 March 17-18, 2007, ―Abant Platformu‖ a dialogue forum that was supported and 
sponsored by the Sunni religious community inspired by Fethullah Gülen. This 
was mainly a dialogue forum that brought intellectuals and academics with 
different perspectives and worldviews together to discuss the controversial social, 
political and cultural issues of Turkey. The 13th of Abant Platform, which was one 
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of the most controversial and serious of the forums, was about Alevilik. There 
were 45 presentations and 100 Alevi and Sunni participants with diverse views in 
the forum. The discussions, debates and event the verbal fights were a great 
laboratory experience, which is also included in the research. 
These are just few of the important episodes that I had a chance to participate in during 
my field research. There are various other local cultural and social events, festivals and 
conferences that can be considered to be elements of identity politics. 
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Chapter 6 
 Between Differentiation and Marginalization: Renegotiating the Axiological 
Boundaries of Alevi Identity 
 
 
 
This chapter explores the dynamics of the boundary negotiation of Alevi identity 
and particularly addresses the following questions: 
What are the sources and limitations of Alevi identity in the new social and 
political milieu in Turkey? 
How have the boundaries and sources of Alevi identity been reproduced and 
transformed? 
How are the ―self‖/―other,‖ and ―us‖/―them‖ relationships being reconfigured 
within the new social realm? 
Boundary making and negotiation are considered axiological debates. Therefore, 
in this chapter I emphasize popular narratives and life stories as the means of boundary 
negotiation. It is a common assumption of social constructionism that identities and 
boundaries in social conflict are no more than the means to constitute identities and 
conflicts. The questions mentioned above have quintessentially been addressed from 
normative and practical points of view, where the popular discourses as well as moral 
289 
 
stories of the urban Alevi population have been delved into. 
The axiological process of boundary negotiation has two practical objectives. On 
the one hand, Alevis are trying to protect and reproduce the boundaries of their identities 
in new social and political environments with new narratives, some of which are 
presented as ancient narratives, so that they are not assimilated into the majority Sunni 
population. On the other hand, they are trying to challenge the biased discourses, cultural 
practices and psychocultural boundaries that generate misunderstandings and hostilities 
between Alevis and other social groups and identities in Turkey. In a sense, it is a robust 
struggle for the refining and sterilization of the boundaries of Alevi identity by allowing a 
secure sphere of engagement with the ―other.‖ 
There is, however, a tension between these two objectives. Securitization and 
consolidation of ingroup identity/―us,‖ by nature includes the moral denigration of the 
outgroup/them. Negotiating the moral qualities of the self is at the same time negotiating 
the moral features of the other. This tension makes the entire process of Alevi identity 
negotiation a more challenging and controversial task. While presenting the sources of 
Alevi identity and self definition with reference to personal and collective narratives, this 
chapter also highlights the tension between these two dynamics. 
Rothbart, and Korostelina argue that ―(p)rejudices or negative attitudes toward 
other groups are influenced by attributed differences in such beliefs, including visions of 
the ideal society, and the exclusion of the outgroup from such a society‖ (Rothbart & 
Korostelina, 2006, p. 1). During the construction of the ideal definition of Turkish 
national identity, Alevis were outside the ideal vision of Turkish identity ―Turk, Muslim, 
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Sunni, Hanefi, secular and preferably Balkan originate.‖ Although the majority of Alevis 
are Secular-Turks, their distinctive practice and understanding of Islam is different than 
the mainstream Sunni understanding and practice of Islam. Their understanding and 
practice of Islam could not be represented in the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 
(Administration of Religious Affairs). Having been excluded from the official ideal 
vision of Turkish national identity, the Alevi were also unable to fit within the popular 
Sunni understanding of Islamic culture and identity in Turkey. This created further social 
alienation, yet solidified the intra-group/intra-communal ties. 
The second important practical objective of the narratives of Alevi identity 
politics is to end the social, political and economic marginalization of Alevi identity and 
culture in Turkish society. They want to take equal share in both the distribution of wealth 
and political power in Turkey. More specifically, they want an equal share in government 
spending for their religious and cultural institutions and activities, and they want high 
ranking civilian and military bureaucratic posts for Alevi citizens. Besides the political 
and economic marginalization, the more widespread form of marginalization is 
social/cultural, and the discrimination that expresses itself in everyday practices and 
discourses. There are certain deep rooted prejudices and pejorative public discourses that 
create boundaries between Alevis and Sunnis in communal contexts. These negative 
public imaginations morally and culturally humiliate Alevis, which is why I refer to the 
process of boundary negotiation as a process of sterilization and sanitation. 
Almost all Alevis have encountered these challenges at some point in their lives, 
particularly in contexts where they have to encounter ―others,‖ such as schools, work 
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environments and military service. For many Alevis these symbolic encounters and 
sometimes confrontations are critical moments or turning points in their practical 
understanding of ―Aleviness.‖ They experience the cultural limitations of their group 
identity in a negative way in such situations. I heard and recorded many such stories in 
my field interviews, which will be further explored in chapter 7. Many of my informants 
have psychological wounds and scars in relation to these negative encounters. The 
stereotypes highlight the boundaries between Alevis and other social groups and these 
stereotypes and discriminatory narratives delegitimize and humiliate members of the 
Alevi community. Prejudices related to Alevi and Kızılbaş identity have deep historical 
and cultural roots and, even in modern environments, these prejudices have resulted in 
inappropriate innuendos which fueled tensions. 
6.1. The Alevi revival counters the meta-narrative of the official Turkish National 
Identity 
The Alevi revival emerged as a comprehensive challenge to the ethnic and 
religious assumptions of the meta narrative of official Turkish national identity.  There 
are no references to the ethnic, religious and sectarian diversity of Turkish society in 
official discourse; rather there is a bundled supposition which defines Turkish society as 
99% Muslim. The Turkish understanding of Islam, as represented by the Department of 
Religious Affairs (Diyanet) is generally the Hanafi
100 
sect (madhab) of Sunni Islam. The 
                                                 
100  ―Hanafites are the followers of a religious school named after the jurist Abu Hanifa, which grew out of the old Kufan and Basran law schools. The Hanafites 
are distinguished from the other law schools by recognizing that Qur'an and Hadith are not sufficient for all issues, so that qiyas and ra'y (personal opinion) are 
legitimate. Nowadays this school prevails in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, USSR (Turkistan, Bukhara, and Samarkand), China, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. 
Hanafites‖ The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions. Ed. John Bowker. Oxford University Press, 2000. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University 
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majority of the Kurdish population in Turkey follow the Shafi version of Sunni Islam. 
Even Shafis have been feeling marginalized by some of the practices of the Diyanet until 
very recently. There is an increased sensitivity among the Diyanet in terms of other sects 
but there is still a long way to go in order to reach a more inclusive structure among 
Diyanet
101
.  Although the vast majority of the Alevi population does not have any 
problem with the Islamic roots of their identity, they do not want to be homogenized 
under the Sunni/Hanafi rubric of Islam. Alevis consider the 99% Muslim narrative to be 
part of an assimilation project; they want their differences to be recognized. 
[A. Y. K. ]: Those people cannot embrace Alevilik. For centuries they had done so 
many bad things, they had insulted, degraded oppressed and now they are talking 
about a change. They used to say that Alevilik was outside the domain of Islam, 
and now they are recognizing that Alevilik is within Islam. They understood the 
change, but what will happen to the mosques and assembly houses. They used to 
claim that 99 % of Turkish population are Muslims, but nobody had recognized 
what versions and kinds of Islam do all these people adopt, how do they practice 
their religious rituals. If the Alevilik is recognized within the system they have to 
reconsider and restructure the relevant institutions. Diyanet nowadays have 130 
thousand staff, they have their holiday resorts, offices like palaces, they send 
____________ 
Press.  George Mason University.  13 June 2009  http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t101.e2942. The ―Ottomans ruled for a 
long time over a heterogeneous, demographically and ethnically diverse area working legal system and well-established notions of law were indispensable for the 
preservation of their empire. The Ottomans relied on the Islamic legal tradition, mostly according to the doctrine of the Hanafi school of law‖. Engin Deniz Akarli 
 "Ottoman Empire: Islamic Law in Asia Minor (Turkey) and the Ottoman Empire"  The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History. Oxford University Press, 
2009.  George Mason University.  13 October 2009  <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t277.e601.  
101  Even Shafis have been feeling marginalized by some of the practices of the Diyanet until very recently. There is an increased sensitivity among the Diyanet in 
terms of other sects but there is still a long way to go in order to reach a more inclusive structure. This issue will be discussed later 
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religious attaches to other countries. They have their private drivers and they are 
living like a dynasty. [Of course] They will deny Alevis and they will refrain 
sharing their privileges with us. 
 
The myth of a homogeneous Turkish national identity has previously been 
challenged by the emergence of the Kurdish ethnic movement, and Islamist movements. 
No viable alternative narrative or narratives have been developed to replace the meta-
narrative that is being challenged and criticized severely. A crucial aspect of reaching 
social peace and harmony in Turkey is to find an alternative narrative or narratives that 
can emphasize a common ground which will give a sense of belonging and 
―togetherness,‖ and at the same time appreciate the ethnic, religious, sectarian, social and 
political diversity of the Turkish society. This might also signal a significant 
transformation in the legitimation process of the Turkish regime. Until then, the political 
and social struggle for recognition, at least at the narrative level, will continue. 
This meta-narrative and social imagination which is formulated by secular 
concepts represents the vision of ethnically and religiously homogeneous society. Islam, 
as the category of the official Turkish meta-narrative of identity, just represents a nominal 
category of belonging rather than an all encompassing social identity with its social, 
political and cultural aspects. This aspect of the meta-narrative of Turkish identity faces 
the criticism of Islamists and people who see Islam as a broader social and political 
project. Rather than recognizing this diversity and accepting it as a cultural and political 
opportunity and source of cultural richness, this imagination created a consciousness of 
294 
 
marginalization and nurtured the discourses of victimization, not only for Alevis, but also 
for Kurds and Islamists as well (Kasaba, 1997; Taşpınar, 2005). 
These feelings of victimization and marginalization widened the gap between the 
excluded groups and the state elite. On the other hand, the people who have been feeling 
excluded accused the groups that fit the ideal definition of the political center. Unlike in 
Iraq, Lebanon and Pakistan, where there is a growing Sunni-Shiite tension, there is no 
identity consciousness based on the Sunni definition of Islam in Turkey. Muslim identity 
is seen as the default identity, but no specific value has been attributed to ―Sunniness‖ 
until it is faced with the salient Alevi or Shiite identity. Differences between Alevi and 
Sunnis become more evident when the Islamic identity is challenged by non-Muslims, as 
with the case of the Cartoon crisis and some other Islamophobic assaults. Secular Sunnis 
and the majority of the Alevi community may interpret these as freedom of speech, or 
may have no response, but the more conservative Sunni‘s or average believer are often 
more reactionary to these assaults. 
Although the vast majority of Alevis define themselves within the domain of 
Islam, their Aleviness is in most cases paramount to their Islamic identity. The ―other‖ of 
Sunni Muslim identity in urban Turkey, especially in the contexts where there is not a 
separation of Alevi and Sunni villages, is the non-Muslim identity. The ―other‖ of the 
Alevi identity in most cases is the Conservative Sunni, or in their terms ―Şeriatçılar,‖ and 
for the Kurdish Alevis, ―ülkücü‖ (ultranationalist) nationalists, or in their own terms 
―Fascists.‖ The monolithic way of understanding the other is changing. 
There are different ways to attribute higher moral values to the Alevi worldview 
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in Alevi public narratives. Through underlining the authenticity of its interpretation of 
Islam and distinctiveness within the Turkish social and cultural context, the value of the 
Alevi ethos has been boosted. Another way to praise the Alevi ethos is to emphasize its 
pluralistic and syncretic vision both as a creed and as a lifestyle. The public expression of 
Aleviness does not create much social and political controversy but the narratives of 
marginalization, victimization and moral superiority are expressed vis a vis certain sets of 
imagined or real ―others.‖ The multiplicity of the ideal self definition of Alevism has 
been built in opposition, or counter to the multiplicity of constructions of ―Sunni 
understandings‖ that are mainly the product of the Alevi imagination. This is why 
analyzing versions of ―Alevi constructions of Sunnism‖ is also crucial for understanding 
the dimensions of Alevi self definitions. Heightened in-group value and esteem also 
increases the possibility of tension with ―out groups‖ or others. 
There are certain features of the negotiation of the discursive boundaries of Alevi 
identity which require special attention. These features are primarily related to the 
transformation of the social and political context of Alevis. First, the boundaries of Alevi 
identity that used to be drawn as primordial attachments in isolated contexts or hidden in 
the rural contexts are now being drawn along axiological lines. The criteria of exclusion 
and inclusion in the modern urban context needs to be normative and these norms should 
convince the subjects. Normative boundaries are less secure but more promising in terms 
of developing positive relations with the ―other‖ than the primordial/ethnic boundaries. 
Secondly, as social interaction and mobility have increased for both Alevis and 
Sunnis, the fixed images of ―us‖ and ―them,‖ ―Alevi and ―Sunni,‖ ―ingroup‖ and 
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―outgroup,‖ are changing drastically. More Alevis and more Sunnis today are recognizing 
that there are a multiplicity of ―us,‖ multiplicity of ―Alevi understandings,‖ and 
multiplicity of ―ingroup,‖ as well as a multiplicity of ―them,‖ ―Sunnis,‖ and ―outgroup.‖ 
In terms of the management and resolution of identity based conflicts, this is a desirable 
situation, but for the alchemists of Alevi identity building, this situation creates a much 
more complicated and intricate task. 
Thirdly, the political language of the earlier Alevi activists who have been 
involved in the leftist struggle and the secular Alevi elite have been either a dialectical 
Marxist language or a language based on cosmopolitan values, such as enlightenment 
values and universal Human Rights discourse. The political discourse of these activists 
and elites has not taken into consideration the uneducated Alevis, or the Alevis that paid 
special attention to the belief dimension of the Alevi creed. Now, in order to embrace the 
grassroots level publicly, they acknowledged the necessity of broader cultural and 
religious narratives and resources. Some of the Alevi elite consider this process to be a 
retroactive move, but cultural and religious resources are increasingly becoming the 
elements for boundary making. Next, I will explicate more on these three features of 
boundary negotiation. 
6.1.1. From Primordial Ties to Collective Axiology: 
Alevis experienced a comprehensive confusion when they moved to an 
environment where the basis of identity is not collective rituals and an endogamous 
community. The primordial ties and boundaries are no longer secure and sustainable 
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ground for the reproduction of the boundaries of their identity. Many Alevis experience 
the impermeability of the primordial boundaries, especially in marriages and the labor 
market. Their identity claims and recognition requests are quintessentially modern 
requests, therefore they have had to switch to normative judgments to convince the new 
generation of Alevis about the moral superiority of their way of life. Storylines and 
discourses about the normative ground of Alevi identity and traditions also needed to be 
meaningful and persuasive to outside interlocutors. 
Collective Axiology
102
 is an important concept for defining the normative 
boundaries of identity groups. The virtues and moral features that are inherited from the 
―perceived group history‖ are important aspects of the collective axiology.  
A collective axiology defines boundaries and relations among groups and 
establishes criteria for ingroup/outgroup membership. Through its collective 
axiology, a group traces its development from a sacred past, extracted from 
mythic episodes beyond the life of mortals, and seeks permanence. Transcending 
the finitude of individual life, a collective axiology extends retrospectively from 
the salient episodes of the past to a prospective vision, presumably into the 
otherwise uncertain future. An individual‘s identity and values that are acquired at 
birth and left behind at death exist before that birth and behind that death 
(Rothbart, & Korostelina 2006: 4).  
The distinctive values, moral narratives and public discourses on critical events have 
                                                 
102  A collective axiology is a system of value-commitments that define which actions are prohibited, and which actions are necessary for specific tasks. It 
provides a sense of life and world, serves to shape perceptions of actions and events, and provides a basis for evaluating group members (Rothbart & Korostelina, 
2006, p.4) .  
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become more important for drawing the boundaries of the ―Alevi identity‖ or ―Alevi 
identities.‖ 
Assigning critical or negative features to an outgroup,‖ or ―them,‖ is as important 
as assigning positive normative categories to an ―ingroup,‖ or category of ―us.‖ In that 
sense, the negotiation of Alevi identity is at the same time a negotiation of the features of 
the Sunni identity. In order to de-legitimize the moral ground of the ―other,‖ 
condemnation of certain actions, perspectives and threat narratives were crucial. 
The polis of every identity group realizes its unity through the categories of right 
and wrong, good and bad, virtues and vices. These categories are passed on 
through storytelling practices, and are used to justify, rationalize, condemn, and 
denounce specific actions. In recounting episodes of violence and impending 
threat, storytellers often dwell in the realm of values. Negative valuation inheres 
within the threat, and is inseparable from its significance for the threatened group 
(Rothbart & Korostelina, 2006, p. 3). 
Within this new social environment one of the central paradoxes of Alevi identity 
negotiation is the balance between differentiation and marginalization. In order to define 
themselves and draw boundaries with other social and political entities in the modern 
urban social, political and economic context they needed to differentiate themselves from 
other groups with reference to certain moral qualities and narratives. While legitimizing 
and positively discriminating the category of ―in group,‖ they had to de-legitimize the 
categories of ―out groups‖ to a certain extent. In this way, they are able to mobilize the 
in-group easily. 
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Historically, politically and culturally the essential ―other‖ for the Alevi identity in 
Turkey is the ―Sunni identity,‖ which in itself is a bundled concept. In order to 
differentiate itself from other identities, such as ―Sunni identity,‖ ―Kurdish identity,‖ or 
―pan-Turkist identity,‖ they needed to first create modern and normative forms of 
otherization as opposed to ethnic and sectarian divides. Alevi narratives related to 
―Sunniness‖ are mostly related to Alevi self definition and boundary construction, rather 
than the ―actual‖ situation of ―Sunnis‖ in Turkey. In that sense, the narratives related to 
others are also a rich resource for understanding the Alevi self definition and 
representation. 
Challenging the homogenizing notion of the official Turkish national identity 
discourse is also another objective of Alevi identity politics. Even though there are no 
formal restrictions on or discriminations against the legal rights of Alevi citizens as 
―individuals,‖ being recognized as equal citizens under the law does not satisfy their 
quest for recognition. There still is not a legitimate ground to make this criticism over 
ethnic and sectarian lines within Turkish social and political order. Being considered 
equal citizens under the Turkish law does not make them feel equal because of their 
experience of having been historically discriminated against and marginalized. They have 
further requests in relation to group rights and the claims based on group rights have 
often been denied by the Turkish State. Besides the position of the Turkish State, the 
majority Sunni population has also been sceptical and biased against Alevis. These biases 
are experienced by many Alevis within the spheres of mandatory engagement such as 
schools, military service, work environments and many other contexts. 
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The previous experiences of victimization and marginalization in historical 
narratives have resulted in the moral denigration or normative de-legitimization of the 
malignant other. The morals of the narratives of traumatic historical episodes are often 
related to the immediate requests about group rights in the contemporary social and 
political environment of Turkey. Victimhood narratives, such as the Karbala Massacre, 
Babaî Uprisings during the Seljukid State, Selim I‘s massacres during his struggle with 
Shah Ismail, the Dersim Events of 1938, the Maraş Events of 1979 and Sivas Events have 
special roles in Alevi cosmology. Mythic narratives on historical controversies marked 
the margins of moral boundaries. 
6.1.2. From Alevi vs Sunni to “Alevis” vs “Sunnis”: Diversification of the social 
ground 
Maintaining the difference between ―us‖ and ―them‖ is getting much more 
difficult for the Alevis in the modern urban context. ―Us,‖ or Alevis, have never been as 
diverse as before; and some segments of ―them,‖ mainly secular Sunnis, have never been 
as proximate and similar to ―us‖ before.  The social and political stratification and 
cultural diversification are increasingly becoming a reality for Alevis. The Alevi 
community is getting more heterogeneous and multi-layered as a consequence of this 
ongoing process. This dual process of the homogenization of Turkish society in terms of 
cultural practices and way of life, thus integration of Alevi citizens to the ―mainstream,‖ 
as well as the rapid internal diversification of Alevi community has been perceived as a 
source of ambiguity and fear in terms of identity maintenance. 
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Social, economic and political variations among the Alevi community are 
common and are increasing with the rapid processes of modernization, urbanization and 
economic growth. The cultural and economic backgrounds of Alevi citizens and their 
social and economic interests are becoming increasingly diversified. This diversity also 
allows different groups from the Alevi community to get in touch and build 
communication channels with many different segments of the Turkish society. Social and 
economic diversification has also lead to the development of overlapping and 
crosscutting interests with Sunnis who are of a similar status. 
A very common story which illustrates the confusions about the definitions of 
Alevilik, which I heard several times during my field research, is the story of the elephant 
and the four blind men. The number of the men can be increased or decreased, and the 
characteristics of the elephants are defined differently in different narratives, but the 
moral of the story is the same in all versions. Thus, I would like to quote the story from 
Shindeldecker‘s translation, with the orientation as well. The story is mentioned in a 
document that was prepared for the purpose of introducing the elements of Alevilik to 
foreigners, and can be found with a simple web search. 
various approaches to Alevism today remind me of the story of the four blind men 
who encountered an elephant for the first time. Each tried to describe his 
impression of the elephant to his friends by holding onto one part of the elephant. 
The first blind man, holding onto the elephant‘s trunk said, ―It‘s a large, flexible 
hose.‖ The second, running his hands over the elephant‘s ears, declared, ―No, I 
beg to differ, it is much more like a floppy, thick blanket.‖ The third, wrapping his 
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arms around a leg, cried out, ―I‘m sorry, gentlemen, but you are mistaken. This 
thing called an elephant is a very large, ancient tree. I can‘t even reach all the way 
around it.‖ The fourth, running his hands along the elephant's body, yelled out, 
―You men don‘t know what you‘re talking about! This elephant is so broad and 
tall, it‘s more like a house than anything you‘ve described! (cited in 
Shindeldecker) 
 
The author's conclusion, or orientation, is common among almost anyone I heard telling 
the same story. It is a clever way to explain a complicated matter. 
Learning about the nature of today‘s Alevism is much like the elephant and the 
blind men. You may receive as many opinions as the number of persons you ask. 
It all depends on the perspective of the person with whom you are speaking. 
(quoted in Shindeldecker) 
 
For this research the main questions or the concerns in this study are different. I talked to 
many people, more than half of whom have important positions and roles in the shaping 
of opinions on contemporary Alevilik. I am investigating, ―what keeps the different parts 
of the elephant together.‖ I am trying to answer the question, ―what has been keeping the 
elephant as a species different from other species.‖ Is it a different species in its new 
ecosystem? 
Many of the new generation of Alevis experience the bewilderment and the 
anxieties of the blind men trying to describe the elephant. They are not as lucky as the 
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blind men, because the entity they are trying to describe is related to their own self 
definition. They have to have an idea about the life story, moral features and habits of the 
elephant, as well as having to convince the ―outsider‖ about the life story, moral features 
and the expectations of the elephant. The most important challenge for Alevis is that 
―outsiders‖ have a pretty negative and biased understanding of the elephant which leads 
to its exclusion and marginalization from the animal kingdom. Shared emotions of pain 
and bliss, and shared moral and mythic stories primarily help to maintain Alevi identity. 
Alevis have traditionally lived in solitary places in rural Anatolia due to their fear 
of persecution. Improvements in communication and media have accelerated the 
interaction and communication of Alevis and Sunnis; this is a positive step towards 
coexistence. As the communication, interaction and Sunni population‘s knowledge of and 
acquaintance with the Alevi community increases, stereotypes and negative perceptions 
about Alevis lessen. Alevis started to see the ―other‖ in a more diversified way. Despite 
all these social and political changes and transformations, if the boundaries between 
Alevis and Sunnis are still impermeable, it is mainly due to psychological and psycho-
cultural dynamics. As both ―in-group,‖ ―us,‖ and ―out-group,‖ ―them,‖ get more 
fragmented and layered, the process of boundary making gets much more complicated. In 
such a situation collective emotions, memories and pscychocultural traumas play more 
important roles to keep the elephant together and differentiated from other species. 
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6.1.3. From Marxist and Universalist Political Language to the Incorporation of 
Cultural Elements and Beliefs 
Modern narratives related to class struggle, human rights, social justice and 
―fundamentalist secularism‖ have been included in the repertoire of Alevi narratives 
related to Alevi self definition, starting from the 1960s. In fact, the politization of Alevi 
claims have been shaped along these discourses. Most of these modern narratives are 
shared by non-Alevi citizens as well, which explains why it is getting more difficult for 
the new generation of Alevis to draw boundaries based on these teachings. Paradoxically, 
as the narrative repertoires of Alevi identity expand and increasingly include modern 
universalistic elements, the traditional elements became more significant in identity 
differentiation. Marxist and humanist discourses have had a lasting impact on Alevi 
understanding, which will be elaborated in chapter 8. Some people from the Alevi elite 
consider the primacy of humanist and Marxist political discourses to be a threat, because 
new Alevi youth are primarily exposed to this new understanding without knowing the 
rich cultural and belief oriented background. 
[ R. Ç. ]: What can we hope from those who define the Alevi creed in terms of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights? This came up in Turkey during the 60s, 
when it was claimed that [the Alevi creed] contained [elements of] Marxism and 
after the fall of Marxism what was left was the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and the old Marxists could [very well] defend this position without having 
to preserve Marxism. This is an attitude which sees the Alevi creed as a social or 
political instrument in the light of] contemporary [developments]. Following that, 
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we need to consider upon what base the Alevi creed has been placed. Should we 
define the Alevi creed in such a way, or should we define [the Alevi creed] in 
terms of an ethnic [primordial] group. This is a major question. This is 
increasingly becoming a source of confusion especially for Alevi youth. 
 
Alevis have been faced with the challenges of modernization after they started to 
become urbanized, beginning in the early 1960s. The political language of the Alevi elite 
had been shaped along Marxist and egalitarian humanist lines. In Turkey, the ethnic, 
religious and gender based criticisms of the homogenizing republican identity building 
processes emerged earlier. The religious, ethnic and other identity struggles were 
reproduced in modern social environments and resulted in successful institutionalization. 
The involvement of many Alevis in the left-right struggle during the 1960s and 1970s had 
postponed the development of consciousness based on an Alevi identity. The rest of the 
first generation of migrant Alevis preferred to hide their identity and avoided 
confrontations based on sectarian divisions.  In fact, rather than being a marginal 
deviation from the traditional Alevi identity, Marxist social and political discourses have 
structurally transformed the sources of modern Alevi identity and Alevi cosmology. 
Alevi identity politics has been trying to contain or integrate the ideological 
elements of Marxism, atheism, Kemalism and humanism that had already been 
incorporated into the early periods of urbanization and modernization. This is another 
complicated equation which contributes to the complexity of the processes of boundary 
making and maintenance. It is not possible to purify the Alevi identity and Alevi 
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teachings from the modern narratives and sources any more. A visible characteristic of 
Alevi identity negotiation is at times a controversial and at times a complimentary 
interaction of modern and traditional narratives. Features of this axiological ambiguity 
will be outlined with reference to public and personal narratives in the latter parts of this 
study. 
Rural rituals and mythic religious narratives do not resonate with the population 
born and raised in the urban environment. Heroic stories, figures, legends and cosmology 
based on ―martyrdom‖ are important elements of traditional Alevi cosmology and 
identity. Marxist and humanist discourses were more meaningful to many working class 
Alevis and educated Alevi youth. Traditional figures such as Ali, Husseyin, HBV and 
PSA are still relevant, since they are foundational figures, but they have been reproduced 
or reinvented (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1992) according to the requirements of the new 
cultural and political context. They created their own heroes, but this time as a struggle 
for abstract ideals such as human rights, democracy and egalitarianism. In this way, they 
were able to make transnational and trans-historical connections with the other groups, 
both in Turkey and in the international arena. This new mythic history was an attempt to 
integrate the traditional elements with the prospective vision. 
Attempts to re-interpret and represent Alevi history according to this new 
meaning and value system were only partially successful because of the avoidance of the 
religious belief dimension of the Alevi teachings. Without these contents it was 
impossible to attract the masses to the new Alevi institutions and rituals. Alevi self 
definition changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and failure of Communist 
307 
 
regimes. In addition, Marxist political language, which excluded belief oriented elements 
became less relevant. The most essential and practical dimension of Alevi cosmology 
now is its ability to satisfy the need for a belief system. The modern sources mentioned 
above often contradict the traditional Alevi beliefs, thus the perpetual tension between 
these different sources leads to ambiguities in the axiological boundaries of Alevi 
identity. 
The trajectories of boundary making in Alevi identity negotiation along these 
features will be shaped accordingly. Elements of rituals, symbols and a belief system will 
be more visible in Alevi political discourse. Alevi political discourses will reconcile with 
the belief dimension of Alevi culture and tradition. There will evolve a multiplicity of 
relational forms with the multiple ―other,‖ which will further fragment the Alevi group 
perception. There will however be a multiplicity of possibilities for positive engagements 
with the other, which will ameliorate the intergroup relationships. These increasing 
numbers of relational forms will be judged according to the axiological criteria. I will 
now examine the semantic and historical components of the Alevi normative system and 
its practical use in narratives and popular discourses. 
Alevi perceptions of the nature of their identity need to be identified. It is 
therefore crucial to understand from the perspective of Alevis how they try to draw the 
boundaries of their identity; how they include and exclude other people from this identity. 
The remainder of this chapter will examine the public and private narratives that are 
gathered during the field research according to the positioning triangle, which was 
described in detailed in the previous chapter. 
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Positioning is relational and positioning someone in a particular way is done 
relative to the other's position. In intergroup positioning, this is achieved by assigning 
rights and duties to the categories of ―us,‖ ―them,‖ ―we,‖ and ―you.‖ ‗Group conflicts‘ 
may arise when storylines adopted by different groups are incompatible or in direct 
opposition with each other. Previously established storylines and moral positions of the 
―others‖ may be questioned and criticized to legitimize the position of the ―self.‖ Since 
positions are defined as relational, for one to be positioned as powerful, virtuous, 
enlightened and pro-social justice, others have to be positioned in a reverse way (Harré & 
van Langenhove, 1999). Storylines are written from particular positions, and if the 
storylines are foundational historical narratives they are sometimes modified in discourse 
practice. This interactive and dialogic (maybe more complicated) discursive practices 
dynamically shape relationships in various different forms. 
The analysis will specifically address the features of the following themes:  
 The way individual and social identity have been defined  
 How the ―Other‖ or out group definition is made 
 Debate over the essence and requirements of being an Alevi (sources of identity) 
 Role or position of Islam, Marxism and Secular values in their self definition  
 Discussions and moral judgments related to Alevi heroes  
According to Harré, if we examine the features of the public and private 
discourses surrounding a conflict with the analytic frame he provides, storylines, 
positions, illocutionary forces, and utterances, we can have a pretty accurate grasp of the 
conflict generating social processes (Harré & Slocum, 2003). Harré and van Langenhove 
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(1999) define position as a ―complex cluster of generic personal attributes, structured in 
various ways, which impinges on the possibilities of interpersonal, intergroup and even 
intrapersonal action through some assignment of such rights, duties and obligations to an 
individual or a group.‖ The boundary negotiation is happening around the questions and 
the issues that are mentioned above. Descriptions of the issues help us to understand the 
perceptions around the conflict, thus helping outline the moral boundaries of the Alevi 
group identity. More importantly, according to the social constructionist understanding, 
the means by which conflicts are expressed may be the very substance of the conflicts 
themselves. In a similar vein, the means by which identities are expressed may be the 
substance of the identities. Understood in this way, there are always possible paths for 
more constructive means to fashion intergroup relationships. 
As mentioned before, in addition to positioning there is the difference between 
what is logically possible and what is socially possible (Harré & Moghaddam, 2003). In a 
given complicated conflict situation from the point of view of positioning theory, conflict 
can take two main forms. 
• The antagonists may share a story but, by adopting contrary positions, use 
that story line to express and so to nourish a conflict. 
• The antagonists may have adopted irreconcilable story lines, such that two 
positioning triads exist and there is no discursive bridge from one to the other 
(Harre & Slocum, 2003, pp.111-2)  
In the case of Alevi identity negotiation vis a vis the ―Turkish State,‖ including its 
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institutions such as the Diyanet and the ―Sunnis‖ (mostly the conservative Sunnis), there 
are both conflicting storylines and common storylines with conflicting positions. As I 
mentioned above, Alevi identity negotiation as a process both challenges the precipitated 
negative storylines, prejudices and negative value attachments, as well as presents its own 
ethos superior to others. 
Now I will analyze the discursive resources that I collected in my research along 
the following analytic line which I adopted from Harré and Slocum‘s research (Harré & 
Slocum, 2003, p.131). The practical outcome of positioning is assigning certain rights, 
duties and responsibilities to ―self‖ and ―other.‖ 
i. Various (storylines), important narratives 
ii. Positionings of others and oneself in each storyline 
iii. Social force or the illocutionary utterances in storylines (speech or other acts) 
6.2. Defining Alevilik as a Progressive Ethos 
One of the bestselling books about the Alevilik, Alevi Phenomena: A Short History 
of Social Rebellion, includes the following statements in its introductory chapter: 
In this book I tried to examine the place of Alevilik within the history of social 
contention…With this investigation I tried to present the social-historical 
background of Alevilik as a resistance movement. The features of this social 
resistance movement in the contemporary context are egalitarian, liberalistic 
(libertarian), partaker, democrat and humanist (Şener, 2004, p. 8). 
The more significant aspect of this statement is not presenting Alevilik as a social 
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struggle or social contention but describing it with modern progressive values such as 
egalitarianism, liberalism, libertarianism, democracy and humanism. This understanding 
portrays the Battle of Karbala as a human rights struggle and Hussein ibn Ali as a martyr 
for democracy and human rights. These positions are visible in personal narratives as 
well. 
Collective axiology and the storylines in the references related to group history 
and virtues are used to shape the future. Some of the metahistoric narratives and popular 
storylines that are related to particular events or phenomena may be crucial in shaping the 
collective axiology. Alevi collective axiology is analyzed according to four major 
categories: (i) social and political orientations, (ii) religious orientations, (iii) 
philosophical orientations, and (iv) perceived historical relations with the ―other.‖ Before 
delving into the moral positions, storylines and various acts of the informants I will 
analyze the narrative of the ―Council of the Forties,‖ which epitomizes the fundamental 
features of the ―Alevi collective axiology.‖ 
6.2.1. Features of the Alevi Collective Axiology 
During my field research I heard versions of the following narrative several times, 
both from members of the Alevi intellectual elite and from ordinary Alevi citizens. It is 
also mentioned in popular books on the Alevi creed. Together with the ―Karbala 
Massacre of 7
th
 century,‖ the narratives of the ―Sivas Events of 1993‖ and the narratives 
related to Atatürk, founder of the Turkish Republic, the narrative of the ―Council of the 
Forties‖ is the most frequently mentioned storyline in Alevi public narratives. The 
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significance of the mythic storyline of the ―Council of the Forties‖ is that the foundations 
of Alevi moral and ritual system have been shaped according to the narrative of the 
―Council of the Forties.‖ Modern, secular themes such as the equality of men and 
women, democracy, and egalitarian ethos have been associated with the ―Council of the 
Forties‖ narrative in the contemporary context. Many secondary stories have been 
produced from the ―Council of the Forties‖ narrative. In most cases, the narratives are 
uttered by Alevi citizens with an enthusiastic and proud attitude. 
As with many other foundational narratives of the Alevi belief and cultural 
system, there are a multiplicity of the versions of the ―Council of the Forties.‖ In a sense, 
it is microcosm of the Alevi collective axiology, and one of the foundational narratives 
that is shared by almost all Alevis that are interested in the traditional Alevi value system. 
Narratives are, at the same time, the sources of the most important Alevi rituals, cem and 
semah. Like many of the foundational narratives of the Alevi collective axiology, the 
popular version the ―Council of the Forties‖ storyline is also challenged103, nonetheless 
the alternative versions did not reverberated within the Alevi community. 
The “Council of the Forties” and the fundamentals of the Alevi value system 
On his way to miraç
104
, the Prophet Muhammed was stopped by a roaring lion. 
Muhammed was ordered to put his ring into the mouth of the lion, the lion calmed down, 
and he continued on his way. On his way back to his home from miraç with the buraq, the 
Prophet Mohammed encountered a dervish lodge. The Prophet Mohammed wondered 
                                                 
103  Ünsal Öztürk presents a controversial account of the ―Council of the Forties‖ narrative and relates the origins of the Alevi belief and ritual system to the 
Mesopotamian sources ―Ünsal Öztürk, Damlanın İçideki Gerçek: Alevilierin Büyük Sırrı (2. baskı), Ankara: Yurt Yayınları.  
104  Miraç: Prophet Muhammad while resting in Kaaba in Mecca had gone to the Noble Sanctuary (Temple Mount) in Jerusalem with a winged steed buraq. He 
was taken to heaven, spoke to earlier prophets and was taken by the archangel Gabriel to the presence of Allah (oxford reference online)  
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what was going on in the lodge and wanted to enter. He knocked at the door, and 
someone asked ―Who are you?‖ 
The Prophet Muhammed answered, ―I am the prophet and I want to enter.‖ 
 Someone from the lodge replied to the prophet, ―If you are a prophet you should 
go to your umma (people); there is no place for a prophet here.‖ 
This happened twice, and as the Prophet was about to leave, the unseen voice told 
him to give a different reply after knocking on the gate, whereupon Muhammad again 
knocked on the gate, followed by a voice from inside asking who he is. 
This time he replied, ―I am one of you, I am a man [human being], and I want to 
see you.‖ Following this reply the gate opened, and Muhammad walked in. He was 
welcomed upon entering. 
Muhammad saw a meeting upon entering; he even counted the number of those 
attending. There were exactly 39 people. Moreover, this meeting consisted of men and 
women: 22 were men; 17, women. Muhammad was shown his place. He sat down in the 
indicated spot, and asked, ―Who are you people?‖ 
He received this reply, ―We are called the group of forty.‖ 
―But I only counted 39 people.‖ 
―Salman-ı Pak is in Persia,‖ was said in response, and Muhammad asked about 
their homelands and who is big and who is weak, and which one is paramount. The 
following answer was given: ―We have no big or weak ones, they are both equally 
paramount. One of us is forty, and forty are one.‖ 
Whereupon, Muhammad demanded that the gathering prove this. At this stage, Ali 
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extended his arm and removed his shirt. From among them, one said that it is permitted, 
and Ali caused his arm to bleed lightly with the edge of his knife. A drop of blood fell 
from his arm. This was followed by a drop of blood flowing from each person‘s arm. A 
drop of blood pertaining to the 40
th
 person also entered through the window. This was the 
blood of Salman-ı Pak. Later, Hazrat Ali bandaged his arm, and all of them stopped 
bleeding. 
Upon his return from Persia, Salman-ı Pak carried a single grape with him. He 
gave it to Muhammad and wanted him to share it. Muhammad crushed the single grape in 
a cup and distributed the resulting liquid among the gathered men and women. The forty 
drank the grape‘s juice. They all became drunk. Saying ―Ya Allah,‖ they all engaged in a 
ritual dance (cem). Muhammad joined them. In a moment of great joy and enthusiasm, 
Muhammad‘s turban dropped to the floor. It was cut into forty pieces. Each person tied a 
piece around his or her waist. Muhammad asked the group of forty who their [spiritual] 
guide [master] was, and they replied that their master [guide] was Hazrat Ali. In this way, 
the Prophet learned of Ali‘s presence at the gathering. Ali then joined the Prophet. 
Muhammad and saw the ring he had given the lion during his Miraj on Ali‘s finger. He 
embraced Ali and held him to his bosom (Mélikoff, 2007; Yaman, 1998; Erseven, 1990; 
and many oral accounts). 
Many elements of the Alevi normative system have references to the ―Council of 
the Forties‖ narrative. The Council is considered to be the microcosm of the Alevi 
community. By adapting the moral conventions of the council people feel connected to 
the ―Alevi community.‖ Solidarity, fraternity and egalitarianism are presented as the 
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moral principles of the council. The other important point in the narrative of the ―Council 
of the Forties‖ is the presence of men and women, which implies equality. According to 
the narrative there were 17 women 22 men in the council and they danced together. The 
Prophet Mohammed could not enter the council as a prophet; he could only enter as a 
member of the council. It also represents that ―the truth, reality‖ is not out there (Miraç) 
but is corporal: exist among the people. The spiritual leadership and significance of Ali is 
also referred to symbolically in the narrative; Ali was the lion who had the inner 
knowledge. Alevilik thus represents ―esoteric‖ knowledge, and in that sense as well, 
Alevilik is referred to as the ―essence of Islam,‖ or ―Batıni (esoteric) version of Islam.‖ 
Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 below summarize my investigation on the moral positioning 
of the Alevi ―self‖ and the Sunni ―other.‖ Several hundred personal and collective 
narratives, mainly from research interviews, as well as from books and Alevi journals 
have been examined. Elements of these positions can be found in pamphlets, documents 
and books written by Alevi authors, and these moral positions have been repeatedly 
mentioned in personal accounts and descriptions. In most cases the moral position is 
defined in contradiction to a real or an imaginary ―Sunni other.‖ 
Table 6.1.: Positioning Social & Political Orientations 
Positioning of self/ Alevi Positioning of 
other/Sunni 
Egalitarian Hierarchical 
Democratic Autocratic 
Matriarchal Patriarchal 
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Monogamy Polygamy 
Social Democracy Capitalist 
Progressive Regressive 
Secularist Pro Sharia (Şeriatçı) 
 
In Alevi public discourses, Alevis social and political orientations have often been 
presented as a progressive social movement. The most common positions related to Alevi 
social and political ethos are egalitarian, democratic, and social democratic political 
views that are against the patriarchal social structure. Especially in the public discourses 
of the extreme left groups, Alevi social and political teachings have been presented as a 
form of Liberation Theology (Bilici, 1998). 
In terms of their religious orientations, Alevi people describe their belief system 
in a more ―protestant‖ form, where they define the established Islamic institutions as the 
invention of the Umayyad legacy. The Alevi understanding of Islam is perceived to be the 
Turkish version of Islam. They strongly support that prayers should be performed in 
Turkish rather than in Arabic. A loose formal structure and an eschatological system 
based on love and harmony is emphasized, as opposed to the ―fear and punishment 
based‖ Sunni eschatology. 
Table 6.2.: Positioning Religious Orientations 
Positioning of self/ Alevi Positioning of 
other/Sunni 
Turkish version of Islam Arabic version of Islam 
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Path of Ahl-al Bayt Umayyad path 
Heterodox Orthodox 
No clergy class Clergy class 
Prayers in Turkish Prayers in Arabic 
Belief based on love Belief based on fear 
Formal rituals are not 
central in the creed 
Highly formalized 
practices and rituals 
Terrestrial view Heavenly vision for after 
life 
 
In terms of the philosophical orientations, Alevi teachings and worldview are 
presented in relation to Enlightenment views that are based on reason, as opposed to the 
―dogmatic, medieval style‖ positioning of the Sunni philosophical orientation. The 
contradictory view in this category is the common form of positioning as an ―esoteric‖ 
and symbolic philosophical system. For Bektaşis the esoteric meaning of truth and 
religion is crucial but it is not necessarily in contradiction within an enlightened 
worldview. The most important dimension of the philosophical positioning for the 
purposes of boundary making, nonetheless, is the positioning of the Sunni philosophy and 
worldview as a dogmatic, backward and superstitious view. Most Alevis consider the 
Sunni philosophers to be outdated thinkers that reproduce dogmatic views. 
Table 6.3.: Positioning Philosophical Orientations 
Positioning of self/ Alevi Positioning of 
other/Sunni 
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Enlightened Dogmatic 
Reason Dogma 
Renaissance Medieval 
Scientific Superstitious 
Humanist Fundamentalist 
Esoteric (Batıni) reality Zahiri 
 
In terms of defining historical relations with the Sunnis, Alevis position 
themselves as a victimized and marginalized community by the hegemonic Sunnis. The 
victimhood narratives will be analyzed comprehensively in chapter 8, but it is important 
to note that attempts to develop positive relations with the political center are 
controversial issues within Alevi groups. The opposition dimension of the Alevi ethos is 
essential for many and it is crucial to maintain the boundaries with the other. Sunnis were 
historically the groups that were loyal to the Ottoman political center but, Alevis had 
chosen a different path. 
Table 6.4.: Positioning Historical Relations with Sunnis 
Positioning of self/ Alevi Positioning of 
other/Sunni 
Minority Majority 
Victim Perpetrator 
Periphery Center 
Marginalized Hegemonic 
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6.2.2. Storylines 
Alevis have an enlightened worldview: The bikini case  
[ A.E. ]: I don‘t believe in superstition, we do not believe in dogma. We say that 
God is man. That‘s why a man brought up in that kind of tradition is far removed 
from dogma. When one is removed from dogma, one is open to enlightenment. 
Alevis are enlightened people. Let‘s for example now go to a certain village. 300 
[of its inhabitants] are Alevi, 300 [of its inhabitants] are Sunni, in total [a 
population of] 600. Maybe you can get three people willing to wear a bikini or 
bathing suit out of these 300 Sunni, maybe even five. But from 300 Alevi 
villagers at the very least half of people would emerge. That will say I will take 
advantage of nature [by means of bathing in a bathing suit], what‘s it to do with 
God? Why shouldn‘t I take advantage of nature? In Alevi communities nobody 
will tell of heaven or hell. I am getting to be sixty-five, I‘ve never heard it. Apart 
from the last ten years. It says that it is in this world, it‘s in this world. If you are 
[a] moral [person], if you are respected, if you are not dependent upon anybody 
you‘re in heaven. If these circumstances do not prevail, you‘re in hell. 
 
No dogma/no clergy in Alevi worldview 
[A.E. ].: There is no dogma. The Kuran says this or the Kuran says that. 
T.K.: Is that where the fundamental difference lies? 
A.E.: The biggest fundamental difference arises from this. And secondly, there is 
no clergy class among Alevis. 
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T.K.: What about the dedes? 
A.E.: Dedes are not recognized as spiritual [authorities]. If need be, you will 
complain to a dede.  
T.K.: In the end, they are a clergy class? 
A.E.: No, we do not ascribe holiness to them. When for instance a dede reaches a 
conclusion in an assembly, he cannot do that without consulting those at his side. 
All the progressive men and women are Alevis  
T.K.: What do you see as the main differences between the Alevi and Sunni creeds 
in Turkey? 
[D.B.].: First of all, I see the separation of men and women as a serious 
difference, secondly, whatever he/she may be, an Alevi is sharing in life, in 
comparison with a Sunni Muslim, he/she is more of a social-democrat. And of 
course, you can better able to engage in a reasonable conversation with an Alevi. 
Well, that‘s how I see it, I see it like that. I do not differentiate between Sunni 
[and] Alevi. I have lots of friends among the Sunni population. Anyway, after 
having gone through a progressive phase [in their lives] the majority of people is 
Alevi, as far as I can see. 
 
Cemevi (Assembly houses ) date back to the Council of the Forty; they are not newly 
invented  
[ C. Ş. ]: The history of assembly houses is as old as the history of Islam. When 
there were no mosques, assembly houses were already in existence. When the 
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Prophet came back from his Night Journey after having spoken to Allah, he met 
the Council of the Forty. The place where this meeting was held was an assembly 
house. Later, in the first stages of Islam, the places of worship did not possess a 
minbar or a minaret. After Islam became known to Turkish culture, one of its most 
important spaces was the dergah [convent] of Ahmed Yesevi. Go to the the 
dergah of Ahmed Yesevi, there is a huge assembly house there, a house with a 
square. That domed house they call a dergah came from Central Asia to Anatolia. 
Go to the dergah of Hacı Bektash, there is still that assembly house, that a house 
with a square. The dergah of Abdal Musa is like that too, as well as the dergah of 
Seyyid Adbal Gazi. I have a piece of writing about this. Only in Turkey there are 
502 historical assembly houses, dergahs. In fact, even in Europe, in the Balkans 
and such. If we compare it to the mosques that were built at the time, those 
dergahs are very different from those mosques. 
 
Sunnis Became Wahhabis whereas Alevis Represent Renaissance  
[ D. B.]: After Wahhabi ideas started penetrating the Diyanet, things have turned 
out like this. And also, this is a result of religion, faith being influential in politics.  
The Alevi creed is something which can achieve harmony with all of these groups 
in view of its universal values. In addition, Turkey‘s intellectual classes have the 
responsibility to be the vanguard in these affairs. In other words, just like Hajji 
Bektash was at the vanguard of these things in the 13
th
 century in Anatolia. Just 
like Yunus Emre, Hajji Bektash were at the forefront of a new world order, of a 
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new understanding of the world. As a matter of fact, they were contemporaries to 
the Renaissance in the West. A little later we stay behind, and those people forge 
on ahead. In other words, the social order and values that were at the core of the 
Renaissance were the same as the values that were advocated by these men. If we 
had stayed in Hajji Bektash‘s path we could have experienced the Enlightenment 
and Renaissance as well. Sunni understanding in Turkey now represents Wahhabi 
worldview, whereas Alevi worldviews is the continuation of Renaissance and 
Enlightenment values. 
Alevi Creed is scientific by nature, which unites humanity and reality  
[ F.G. ].: For one thing, the Alevi creed is a belief which unites humanity and 
reality. In this way it is also scientific [in nature]. Let me at least say that it won‘t 
be carried on to future generations, if it abandons this trait, if it abandons its 
worldly trait. In this way we can look at 72 nations with one [single] gaze. The 
equality between men and women, if the belief [system] is being continued on an 
even level, if these things cannot be, it will be impossible [to continue]. 
Sunnis are more authoritarian and their interpretation of religion is formalistic  
T.K.: Well, in your opinion then, what do the differences from Sunni Islam look 
like in this respect? 
[ F.G. ]: There exists a whole series of differences in understanding, from the way 
of looking at God to being determinative in your daily relations, to being 
authoritarian, to determining everything in the light of your faith. They interpret 
Islam in very formalistic ways. There are differences in the [several] parts of 
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worship, formal rituals are important for them. There isn‘t even any reason to 
bring these up, there is no point even saying these things. There, everybody can 
worship as he wishes, everybody can fulfill the requirements of his faith as he 
likes. In other words, I have no interest in discussing Sunni Islam from my point 
of view.  
From the ritual perspective we have no common ground with Islam at all  
[ A. E.]: Islam may also have been included [in the Alevi creed], but Islam‘s rules 
are clear, its practices too, as well as its Sunnah, [as a matter of fact], we don‘t 
have any common ground left with Islam. In [the] Islammic tradition, it is 
permissible] to have a fourth, even a fifth wife, whereas Alevis ostracize the one 
who takes a second one. People do not even drink your tea anymore. They don‘t 
even greet [said person]. The societal status of a woman in Islam is null. But in 
the Anatolian Alevi [tradition], the matriarchal family structure lives on. You 
cannot just marry off any old Alevi girl like that. Certainly, you ask her opinion 
[first]. After six or seven months of marriage an Anatolian girl, is proclaimed head 
of the family with a grand ceremony of tying a headscarf, upon the condition that 
she is pregnant. This tradition remains active in at least a thousand villages. We do 
not have any formalized form of prayer. The mosque is not like among our group. 
T.K.: Aren‘t Alevis Muslim? 
A.E.: They are definitely not. They are not. Islam has its rules. Do we behave in 
accordance with these rules? Do we perform ritual prayers [salah]? Do we fast? 
Do we perform the Hajj? Are there any who perform the Hajj? Nobody performs 
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the Hajj. There are no Hajji dedes or babas in our villages. We have no connection 
whatsoever with Islam. 
Alevi worldview is terrestrial  
[A.Y.]: The countenance of the Alevi creed faces this world. The Alevi creed is 
not a belief which is concerned with the other world, with heaven or hell. It is a 
belief that tries to solve all [problems], that tries to bring everything to a 
conclusion in this world. For this reason there is no blueprint for the next world 
[available]. It is a belief centered on this world, and not frightening. We can say 
that it is a belief which is completely based upon love, joy, happiness. Whereas 
the other monotheistic belief systems are grounded upon fear, the Alevi creed 
places more emphasis on enjoying [the benefits of] this world, and has accepted 
the principle of living in this world, of living in this world in a humane fashion 
Is drinking a progressive act ?  
[ Ş.K.]: All kinds of drinks are consumed, but in most cases, rakı [Traditional 
anniseed liquor] is drunk. In the Bektashi tradition, the name given to rakı is 
Akyazılı. The name of wine is kızıl . . . Either Akyazılı or kızıl . . . [are] both great 
Bektashi saints.  
T.K.: Well, is this something that has always been practised?  
Ş.K.: This is something in practice since the Ottoman period. Draughts were 
taken. These draughts are taken.  
T.K.: Now, what I do not understand, alcoholic beverages . . .  
Ş.K.: Why do we consume alcoholic beverages? Alright, now we are getting to 
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this issue. If we don't drink, there would be no queries . . . no questions would be 
asked, we‘be be too embarassed. We partake of alcohol in such a measure as not 
to get drunk just to get some courage. Secondly, so as not to get bored. This 
[thing] can last up to five, six, or seven hours. Anyways, it is not just talking all 
the time. There are also musical intervals. There can be music, there can be semas 
[ritual dance]. The Bektashi and Alevi creeds . . . the Alevis have forgotten about 
this, but the Bektashis still practise [this tradition]. The real schools of 
communication are these conversational get togethers. The assembly (Cem) 
consist of rituals which are performed several times througout the year. 
6.3. Legitimizing Alevilik as a Belief: Authentic vs Pluralist Positions 
The Prophet’s Ghadir Khumm105 Speech and the Date Grove of Fadak 
―The injustices against Ali and his lineage, in other words against the Ahl al-Bayt 
has started with Prophet Muhammed‘s wish to leave a written will after his death. 
Following the prevention of this, prophet wanted to assign Ali as the Imam in his 
place but this was also stopped. Because, earlier during his final pilgrimage, when 
he was resting in the place called Ghadir Khumm, Prophet Muhammed had 
announced to the public that Ali was to be his heir after his death. The first three 
caliphs have acted against the prophet‘s will and by becoming caliphs they have 
usurped the right of Ali. What‘s more, they also wanted to seize the date gardens 
                                                 
105  Place between Mecca and Medina where the Prophet Muhammad is reported to have pronounced Ali ibn Abi Talib the mawla (patron, master) of those for 
whom Muhammad was patron. Shiis interpret this statement as an affirmation of Ali's rightful position to lead the Muslim community after the Prophet, and annually 
celebrate the incident on the eighteenth of Dhul-Hijjah. Sunnis, however, view the Prophet's words as merely one of many expressions of his Companions' merits and 
note that this confirmation of the Prophet's esteem was needed to dissipate the ill feelings and accusations arising from Ali's strict handling of Yemeni booty 
immediately before (Oxford Reference Online). 
326 
 
―Fedek‖ which Fatima, the wife of Ali, inherited being pregnant during this event 
and she lost her unborn child. She could not bear with all these suffering and she 
passed away shortly afterwards‖ (Yaman, & Erdemir 2006: 21). 
 
Taking over of Fadak Grove from Fatima was violation of Prophet‘s will and 
Allah‘s order (Şener 2004: 27). 
 
After his final pilgrimage on his way back to Madina, the Prophet stopped in a 
place called Ghadir Khumm (Gariku Humm). There were almost a hundred 
thousand pilgrims together with him and the Prophet had spoken to the crowd: 
―Whomsoever‘s mawla I am, he is also Ali‘s mawla. O Allah, befriend whosoever 
befriends him and be the enemy of whosoever is hostile to him.‖ The Prophet was 
saying to the Muslims that in order to live Islam the proper way and to solve your 
problems the basic guides were the Quran and the Ehl-i Beyt ( Zelyut 2005: 154) 
There are different accounts of the ―Hadith of Ghadir Khumm‖ and dispute over 
the ―Grove of Fadak‖ among the Shia and Sunni scholars, where the Alevi view on the 
subject is similar to the Shia view
106
. There are however minor differences in the moral 
conclusions between the Shia and Alevis. What is more important for the purpose of this 
study is not the historical facts or methodological discussion of the dispute over the 
Fadak Grove in terms of the Hadith interpretation, but the symbolic significance of the 
                                                 
106  Sunni scholars state their argument with reference to the Hadith ―We the prophets do not leave heirs‖, for the detailed discussion of the Fadak issue wikipedia 
provides sources http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fadak#cite_note-49, for the Shia point of view on the subject ―Fadak; The property of Fatima al-Zahra,‖ 
http://www.answering-ansar.org/answers/fadak/fadak_of_al_zahra.pdf 
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event in Alevi public narratives and how these narratives shape the Alevi axiology. These 
two stories have been mentioned many times during the field research; the Alevi citizens 
who are more interested in the belief dimension of Aevilik were more interested in 
highlighting these episodes. 
The quotations from three different books by Alevi authors and writers represent 
and also shape the general understanding of the Alevi public about the subject. There are 
however, a multiplicity of moral conclusions derived from these same storylines.  In 
almost all of these narratives there is a special emphasis on the authenticity of the Alevi 
creed. There is a general belief among many Alevis that in order to monopolize the 
political power and economic resources, the Umayyad family tried to change the 
foundations of Islam. There are even some popular narratives that trace the Sunni-Shi‘i or 
Alevi-Sunni struggle back to the pre-Islamic competition between Hashimite and 
Umayyad families. 
The Shi‘i-Sunni differentiation is related to the pre-Islamic competition and 
struggle between Hashemite and Umayyad families. Mecca was a trade center at 
that time and when Hashim took the control of the city, chief of the Umayyad 
Family, Umayyad had to move Damascus and continued his influence there. 
(Kaleli, 1997, p. 9) 
I will not get into the details of the factual mistakes in the statement above since the 
purpose of this study is not factual discussion, but the origins of how sectarian conflict or 
difference has been positioned as a conflict of material interest and/or a family feud. It is 
at the same time very difficult to challenge these convictions or established positions with 
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factual data or any form of logical argumentation. Challenging these convictions and 
beliefs is at the same time challenging the foundations of the identities of these people. 
The Fadak Narrative and Ghadir Khumm narratives try to assign certain responsibilities 
to Sunni groups by creating a collective shape and guilt psychology. They also pretend to 
argue that since the beginning of Islamic history Alevis have been struggling to protect 
the authentic Islam, ―Ahl-al Bayt‘s understanding of Islam,‖ rather than the distorted 
Umayyad vision that is represented in Sunni teachings. 
Table 6.5.: Positioning Legitimacy as Authenticity 
Authenticity claims of Alevis Positioning of the Sunnis 
 
 More Islamic, it is the essence and 
undistorted version of Islam 
 Struggling to protect authentic Islam 
from Umayyad hegemony 
 Path of Ahl-al Bayt and 12 imams 
 Purity of heart and soul is what really 
matters in religion 
 
 
 Against the Prophet‘s path 
 Against Ali and Ahl-al Bayt 
 Still continuing the pre Islamic Feuds 
 They represent some features of Jahiliyya 
(pre-Islamic Arab) traditions 
 Arabic customs took the form of 
Wahhabism today and the Diyanet has 
some Wahhabi inluences 
 
In general there are certain common storylines that are associated with the 
―Alevilik as authentic Islam‖ position. Some of these storylines are:  
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 ―Ali‘s right of caliphate has been violated and extorted by Abu Bakr, Omar and 
the Umayyad family. The Sunni legacy is the Umayyad legacy and the Alevi 
legacy is the path of the Prophet and his Ahl-al Bayt.‖ 
 ―Sunnis are not loyal to the legacy and will of the prophet. They interpreted Islam 
according to their own interests.‖ 
 ―Umayyads were obsessed with material interests, material goods and power; they 
even seized the property that belonged to the Prophet‘s daughter.‖ 
 ―They have not even kept the Prophet‘s will; how can they protect and defend 
Islam?‖  
 ―The Sunni understanding of Islam is misguided because they are avoiding one of 
the fundamental sources of Islam, which is the legacy of Ahl-al Bayt.‖ 
Purity of the essence vs the formal rituals  
T.K.: In your opinion, do those who represent Sunni Islam today, represent an 
Umayyad version of Islam? 
[ L.K.]: Now we have to use [the expression] Umayyad Islam, for otherwise, if 
you were to employ another definition, then the logic of since you‘re a Muslim, 
[you might as well] come to [our] mosque would be valid. Because [of the fact 
that the Prophet] Muhammad and Hazrat Ali are employed as symbols, because 
[of the fact that] the twelve imams are employed as symbols, we give the 
appearance of being [part and parcel of] Islam, but our application, our [way of] 
life does not accord with the [kind of] Islam [which is being] lived today. Praying 
five times a day, conforming to five articles [of faith] is not a belief being 
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practiced by an Alevi, in fact we even proclaim the Kelime-i Şehâdet [testimony 
of faith] differently -- La ilaha illa Allah. Muhammadun rasulullah [‗There is no 
god but Allah. Muhammad is the messenger of Allah‘] -- as said by Sunni 
Muslims, Alevis say [additionally] Muhammadun rasulullah Aliyi valiyullah, 
adding Hazrat Ali‘s sainthood [vilâyet] to Muhammad‘s prophethood, [which] 
shows that this expressions expresses difference.  
T.K.: In that case, the Alevi understanding of Allah and Muhammad is different as 
well.  
L.K.: We accept Allah in his inward form, we do not accept Allah in his external 
form, we bring down Allah from the heavens to the earth‘s surface by means of 
the beauty of man. Sovereignty is a practice which has been introduced by HBV 
[Hacı Bektaş Veli]. The first gate is Shariah, or the first school if we were to bring 
it down to a contemporary level, that is what primary school is, it is the base 
which teaches the alphabet, Tariqah is the secondary school, Maarifet the high 
school, [and] haqiqah university. The one who enters university has become Haq 
[the truth] and Halq [the people], now if someone tells you to come to the 
Shariah, you have already surpassed that stage [and] have reached a mature spot. 
In the Alevi creed you have four gates and forty stations, after you have reached 
this proscribed and other prayers [namaz niyaz] become nothing but formalism. If 
you take the Maqalat of HBV [Hacı Bektaş Veli], you read that taking ablutions, 
washing your hands and face, is not cleanliness, [but that] purity [cleanliness] of 
heart is of the essence, now if your heart isn‘t clean performing five daily 
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ablutions is of no significance. 
[A. A. A.] 
This year they called people for a talk on CEM radio. They called two people, 
who will be in authority, he will show himself they said. They asked about the 
Fadak Date Grove. I said Abu Bakr took the Fadak Date Grove from Fatima. 
Fatima said my father bequeathed this grove to me, do you have any witnesses? 
I do  
Who? 
Hazrat Ali 
Your husband lies they said.  
I said would the sword of Islam, the Prophet‘s son-in-law, Fatima‘s husband, the 
father of Hasan and Hussain, lie over a date grove? 
Oh, he says I am a folk poet, if my tongue stops, my heart will talk, if I lie I will 
be ashamed. The liar is the enemy of Allah, the liar is caustic, would I lie I asked. 
You ask me is this a register or a book. You will be assimilated, if you say 
Uthman was martyred, not Hussain, but Uthman was a martyr. 
Alevi Creed represents the truth of Islam  
[ A.S. ].: Together with [the fact that] the Alevi creed is Islam in and of itself, 
together with [the fact that] the Alevi creed represents the truth of Islam, as a 
result of the pressure and suppression it has experienced due to the Ummayads 
and of the continuation of that mentality [which has] given rise to pains, 
pressures, massacres and oppression, in other words, a group of people saw 
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themselves, [when] in the center. In [the fold of] Ummayad Islam, of the 
Ummayad understanding [holds sway], ostracized. This is a big mistake. Whereas 
in fact, the Alevi creed, love, peace, brotherhood, non-resistance [are] the essence 
and the truth of Islam, and it [really] is an authorization which teaches us that man 
knows his Lord through his temperament, through his spirit. At the same time, 
Islam is not a one-dimensional structure. For that reason it has collected all other 
faiths [in its midst]. It has collected all other interpretations [in its midst]. 
Arabic, Persian, and Turkish versions of Islam  
[A.R. U.]: We particularly say Alevi Islam. As a resulf of [the inclusion of] the 
word Islam a lot of ignorant people level criticism. Because the Alevi creed is [a 
branch of] Islam. Its book is the Kuran, its prophet is Muhammad. Its custodian is 
Hazrat Ali. And the Ahl al-Bayt as they are the the family of the Prophet 
Muhammad are sacred according to the Alevi creed. In the world, three separate 
interpretations of Islam exist. In the form of main headings. One of its 
interpretations is called Sunni Islam, which is an interpretation adorned with Arab 
customs and culture. Then there is the Iranian or Shi‘i interpretation, which is 
adorned with Ajem customs and habits, with Persian culture. And the third is the 
interpretation of the Turks. This is the Turks‘ interpretation, which they 
transported from Mawera-un-Nehr, nourished by the Ahl al-Bayt. I am saying 
these things as a dede who has traveled the lands of Central Asia. There is an 
Alevi creed adorned with Turkish customs and habits. Its mother tongue is 
Turkish. 
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Alevilik is theTurkish Islam 
―They try to present the Arabic customs and traditions as the ideal definition of 
Islam. If we keep the prayers in Arabic and try to maintain Arabic customs and traditions 
we can be assimilated into Arabic culture. Customs that are foreign to us are becoming 
part of our tradition. There is a necessity for the purification from the Arabic customs and 
Alevi tradition is perfect for this.‖ 
I traveled to Macedonia. They do not speak a word of Turkish. They speak 
Macedonian. We ate, prayers were to be said. Then the baba started praying in 
Turkish ―Allah Allah diyelim, kadim billah diyelim.‖ I was surprised and asked 
what was going on. They replied that our prayers are in Turkish. Just like you do 
not know Arabic, yet you yearn for Arabism, you read Arabic, we, in turn, read 
Turkish. Turkey is the source of our light. I read it in an article by the late Ahmed 
Taner Kışlalı. It really affected me. He says that when a nation does not talk in its 
own language, when it does not worship in its own tongue, if it talks and worships 
in the tongue of a different nation, then this nation will unbeknownst adorn its 
faith with the customs and habits of the nation, the language of which it uses [in 
praying and talking]. They have now adorned our country with the customs and 
habits of another. Look, shaking a woman‘s hand is adultery. Showing the locks of 
one‘s hair befits going to hell. These habits are whose habits? Was there ever such 
a custom among the Turks? We never knew in out Alevi villages, in our Sunni 
villages that shaking hands was a sin. But now it is. Well it is an expression of 
Arabicization. It is an expression of cultural imperialism. We are talking about 
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cultural imperialism, and that imperialism has now entered our country. By saying 
that it is the culture of Islam, that man has imposed his own culture. 
The Alevi Creed safeguarded the Turkish Identity  
[ A.S.]: Because in Anatolia, the Alevi creed has safeguarded the Turkish identity. 
What has made the structure of Anatolia, its culture, while the Turkish language 
wasn‘t even spoken, Hacı Bektaş Veli translated the Kuran into Turkish using his 
own language, and has devised his own mystical system by perceiving the 
esoteric interpretations hidden inside the Kuran. Particularly, those who try to turn 
Pir Sultan into [a proponent of] atheism] do not read his poetry in earnest. They 
use this in a deliberate manner. In other words, it is better to say that these people 
perform a farce under the guise of the Alevi creed, by assuming an Alevi identity. 
6.3.1. Plurality or syncretic Tradition 
Another way of legitimizing the Alevi beliefs and worldview is to present Alevilik 
as a pluralistic and syncretic tradition, which has been influenced by a multiplicity of 
traditions, religions and civilizations. This ―progressive‖ view is diametrically opposed to 
the first vision, which emphasizes the purity and authenticity of Alevilik within Islam. 
This position values the wisdom and cultural experiences that are inherited or adopted 
from pre-Islamic Turkic, Anatolian, Asian and Mesopotamian cultures and civilizations. 
Among the Alevi dedes and citizens with traditional views who emphasize Hazrat Ali and 
Ahl-al Bayt, the syncretic and eclectic view is not embraced and respected. 
Table 6.6.: Positioning Legitimacy as Plurality 
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Positioning Alevilik as Pluralist Ethos Positioning of the Sunnis 
 Plurality of beliefs and traditions had 
affected Alevi ethos 
 Adopts all kinds of wisdom 
 Simple to understand and practice 
 Adopts itself to the changing context 
 More cosmopolitan embraces all 
humanity 
 Stayed backward 
 Closed to wisdom 
 Too complicated 
 Sectarian and discriminatory 
 
The main assumption is that there have been many cultures, traditions, religions 
and lifestyles in both Anatolia and in Central Asia. Alevilik has been influenced by all 
these traditions and has been enriched with the positive elements of all these experiences 
and reached toward perfection. It is therefore an archetype of a perfect worldview and life 
style that has never been detached from its Turkic roots. Alevilik embodies the 
characteristics of Ancient Anatolian civilizations. It has elements from Sumerians, 
Hittites, Asyrians, Rome, Christianity, Central Asian religions and cultures, Manicheism, 
Buddhism, Shamanism etc
107
. ―Islam and the elements of the twelve Imam Shiism are the 
most important components in this flawless blend.‖ 
The current state of Alevilik is the perfection and maturation of all these 
traditions. This notion considers the ―Sunni version of Islam‖ as a backward system of 
thought and life style, which lagged behind in the deserts of Arabia. Most of my 
informants were highly self-confident about the advanced characteristics of their beliefs 
                                                 
107  The syncretic and heterogenous charecteristics of Alevilik is discussed in Chapter 2, I will just emphasize the popular discourses and normative and practical 
purposes of these arguments in this chapter. For further reading related to the Heterodoxy argument. 
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and way of life. The name of a book written by one of the Alevi authors, who is also one 
of my informants, is Alevilik: Binbir Çiçek Mozaiği (Alevilik: A Mosaic of A Thousand 
and One Flowers) (Kaleli 1995). The title of the book tells a lot about its content. The 
pluralistic and syncretic positions criticize Sunni beliefs for being bigotted and 
exclusionist. 
This syncretic and eclectic Anatolian tradition has certain simple rules that have 
been clarified by Hacı Bektaş Veli, who is considered to embody the wisdom of the 
Anatolian people, including the pre-Islamic traditions. A man/woman should be able to 
master his hand, body and tongue. He should be able to control his spouse, his job, and 
his food, in order to stay within the Alevi creed. Further common knowledge about the 
Alevi creed has to do with the four doors and forty stations. 
[ F.G. ]: His disposition should be open [and] generous, his table [should be] 
welcoming. He said that he should be able to hold a secret, to hide a shameful 
[thing], to control his anger when his passion flares. Now, that is the first 
condition of the Alevi creed. Another condition of the Alevi creed, a second credo 
exists and that is four gates and forty stations. Shariah, Tariqah, Maarifah, 
Haqiqat. Hacı Bektaş Veli compared the Shariah to a ship. Like Noah‘s ship, he 
said. Tariqah is a sea, Maarifah is diving into the sea and Haqiqah is diving into 
the sea to get hold of the pearl of truth [wisdom]. The Shariah belongs to your 
worship. In other words, it is those who pray to Allah. The Tariqah belongs to the 
pious ones, those who pray in fear and doubt. Maarifah, then, belongs to those 
who have achieved knowledge (of Allah). Finally, Haqiqah belongs to the lovers 
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(of Allah). He said to enter this building, this building is the Shariah. He [also] 
said that Tariqah is the front door, and admonished against entering through the 
backdoor. Enter via the front door. Don‘t enter without obtaining the landlord‘s 
blessings [though]. That‘s what it says in the Kuran. 
The simple and to a certain extent axiomatic statements such as ―three requirements,‖ and 
―four doors and forty stations‖ draw blurry boundaries between the Alevis and other 
people. Rather than their contents, the practical use of these axioms in discourses on self 
definition are more significant for boundary maintenance. Many people among the 
Sunnis as well may agree with the principles of mastering his hand, body and tongue, 
meaning staying away from stealing, adultery and lying, or principles of the four doors 
and forty stations, but formulating these axioms in this way to describe the self is unique 
to Alevis. Keeping the vague and inclusive content to define boundaries presents the 
Alevi ethos as inclusive, but expressing that vague content in popular and specific ways 
brings limitations to the all-encompassing mentality. 
The Alevi Creed is peculiar to Anatolia 
[ F.G.]: I think that the Alevi creed is a belief system which is peculiar to 
Anatolia. It has no connection with Islam. There are a number of religious motifs, 
cults from Islam, such as Karbala to the belief in Hazrat Ali, present. But next to 
these we have also been influenced by other beliefs, but of course the largest 
influence comes from Islam. We have to regard this as natural. We have lived 
[side by side] for thousands of years in the same geography, the beliefs of our 
neighbours was Islam and [particularly] Sunnism. As a result, it is not possible not 
338 
 
to have been under the influence, or to have taken over certain aspects.  
The Alevi creed is eclectic and inclusive and pre-Islamic origins are significant  
[ A. B ]: The basic sources of the Alevi creed go back to Shamanistic beliefs. 
From there it spread to such geographical locations as Bukhara, Samarqand, 
Tashkend, Khorasan, Mawera-un-Nehr, and later became acquainted with the 
religion of Islam. Later on it moved to Anatolia. It was influenced by the various 
civilizations present [in Anatolia] prior to the Turks. Sumerians, Hittites, Lydians, 
Phrygians, Ionians, Romans, Byzantines, Seljuks, Urartu. In its belief systems are 
[traces of] Shamanism, Mazdeism, Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism, Hindu beliefs, 
Brahmanism and Christianity. The Turks got into contact with Islam, when the 
faith was three-hundred years old. But our ancestors tied the Turks to the Ahl al-
Bayt, tied them to their lineage. They discover that they had sprung from their 
lineage. This actually was a result of placing themselves in a lofty spot and 
consolidating that station. 
Many of the scholars, activists and Alevi citizens that support the syncretic and 
heterodox belief position do not deny the dominant influence of Islam in terms of culture 
and belief in Alevi identity. Nevertheless, too much emphasis on the Islamic influences 
contradict with the social and political objectives espoused by Alevi groups. They have 
problems with the hegemonic discourse of ―we are 99% Muslims;‖ they believe that this 
position denies their rights. Besides their academic concerns, they prefer this storyline for 
practical concerns as well. ―The Alevi creed is a syncretic, heterodox belief system that 
has been influenced by different cultural experiences. Islam, Kuran, and Hazrat Ali are 
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just a taste within this blend. Trying to link it with the origins of Orthodox Islam, which 
is called Sunni or Umayyad by Alevi adherents, contradicts the essence of the Alevi 
creed.‖ 
It is strongly emphasized that the symbols and rituals in the Alevi culture are 
different and they necessitate certain privileges. ―Our interpretation and practice of 
'religion' or 'Islam' is different, therefore we need certain privileges and regulations in 
order to practice these,‖ is the general conclusion of these highly regarded academic 
arguments. Many Alevis are deeply disturbed by statements made by Sunnis such as, ―We 
also love Ali as much as you do,‖ ―If Alevilik equals to Ali and his path we are equally as 
Alevi as you,
108‖ and ―Hacı Bektaş is our common value.‖ They want their particular way 
of understanding Islam, the Prophet Mohammad, Ali and his path, and Hacı Bektaş Veli 
to be acknowledged and recognized. 
Ali of Alevilik had a different meaning  
[ H.Ş. ]: At the moment, I regard the Alevi creed as a sect [Madh'hab]. The Alevi 
creed is a way of believing. This way receives its elements from numerous 
sources. It has also fed numerous sources with its own waters. Just like it was 
influenced by the belief in a god of the heavens in Central Asia, by Shamanism, 
by Brahmanism, and when it got to Anatolia it was influenced by [various] 
Anatolian cultures and that‘s how a [unique] synthesis came about. The name of 
this synthesis is in my opinion the Alevi creed. The Ali of the Alevi creed is not 
completely [commensurate] with the Ali of the Four [Rightly Guided] Caliphs, in 
                                                 
108 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, once made such a comment ant these comments are not received as a positive gestures by many Alevis. 
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my opinion. There is also an Ali in Anatolia. This Ali can be Khidhir, if need be; 
can be Atatürk, if need be; can be Ali of the Four [Rightly Guided] Caliphs, if 
need be. This Ali is an Ali who stands up against injustice, who protects the 
innocent. I think that the Alevi creeds contains such a philosophy. I see this as a 
philosophy which does not infringe upon anyone‘s rights, which says ―it is not 
mine‖ to that which is not mine, which sees all mankind as one, be they Jews, 
Armenian, Circassian, Orthodox, [or] Catholic. 
An eclectic political view  
[ V.K.]: In history, it [the Alevi creed] emerged as a sect [Madh'hab]. This is also 
a political view. When I say political, I mean that at the time, it [the Alevi creed] 
was being appropriated by a number of peoples in Anatolia. While appropriating 
it, they also added different faiths, peoples, ideologies, dreams of that age, 
daydreams, the world they wanted to make [into the mix]. They also added their 
nightmares of course. They added everything and it's blended. It became a new 
view of the world. Consquently, it [became] a religion which took over certain 
rhetorical and narrative symbols of Islam. It appropriated Hazrat Ali for instance. 
It took [the Prophet] Muhammad in a different way. It took these [elements] and 
used them. But it used them for its own ends. As a result, it became a different 
kind of interpretation. A sect [Madh'hab]. When interpreting this, do we see that it 
has been completely based on the religious [aspect]? No, it has not been 
completely based on the religious [aspect]. The societal and political aspects have 
always carried their weight as well. In that case, it [the Alevi creed] is also a 
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societal as well as a political viewpoint.  
Hajji Bektaş Veli’s path is the translation of Islam into Turkish  
[.H.M.]: Those taking Ali‘s side, saying those who tread in Ali‘s path in Anatolia, 
the Alevi creed is a mystical interpretation of Islam. Now that is what the Alevi 
creed [has become]. It was Hacı Bektaş Veli who brought the Alevi creed to 
Anatolia. Now this reverend person interpreted the Kuran, the religion of Islam in 
a Turkish way. He said if a man possesses those twelve characteristics then he is a 
perfect man who sees God with the eyes of his heart. A man has to first of all be 
able to master his hand, body, tongue. He should be able to control his spouse, his 
job, his food. 
6.3.2. Pro Social and Economic Justice 
Most Alevis narratives present their social struggle as something that is for the 
interest of all of humanity, as well as the battle between good and evil. As summarized in 
Table 1, there is a common belief that the Alevi belief system and principles have 
universal value and provide sufficient paths to provide peace and justice to the humanity 
as a whole. This is how almost the entire Alevi elite position themselves and present their 
identity struggle. Morally, their discourses try to legitimize their identity claims by 
portraying them as being for the peace and progress of the entire Turkish people, or even 
for the interest of the entire humanity. None of my informants had any doubt about the 
significant contributions of the Alevi creed to the establishment of a more just social and 
economic system in Turkey. There is also the general conviction that many of the leaders 
of the labor unions and socialist activists of the 1960s and today‘s progressive figures are 
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somehow related to Alevi beliefs and values. These arguments have been supported by 
certain historical narratives. Even Marxist metaphors have been used to describe the 
relationship between the Prophet Mohammed and Ali. Some other Bektaşi saints have 
also been presented as ―Messianic‖ progressive activists. 
It was a struggle between dynasty and social justice; unfortunately dynasty 
prevailed, but Alevis never stopped struggling for the cause of social justice  
[ C. A. ] : As far as I can see the reasons behind this [separation] do not involve 
faith, but self-interest. But there is a power here, in other words, grabbing hold of 
power in view of its own wishes, there is a mentality which advocates forming 
one‘s own dynasty, establishing one‘s authority. This mentality has tied a horse to 
the House of God [Baitullah, mosque], [has turned it into] a stable. And the 
mentality of Muawiyah [Companion of the Prophet Muhammad and later founder 
of the the Umayyad caliphate in Damascus] has besieged the Kaaba, has tied its 
horse to it. They did this, we didn‘t do it. The lineage we believed in, the side of 
Hazrat Ali defended this: ―you are committing a wrongful deed, you are against 
the thoughts of the Prophet, against his philosophy, against his structure, against 
the kind of societal structure he supported, against that kind of a social structure.‖ 
In other words, Hazrat Ali defended [the side of] the Prophet‘s words. On the 
other side, you had those who said, I will grab hold of power, I will use 
everything in view of my personal gains, in fact, I will even change [the words of] 
the Kuran.  
The Prophet Muhammad and Hazrat Ali are like Marx and Engels: Ideological 
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metaphors to portray important figures  
[ D.B.]: If Marx and Engels wouldn‘t have been contemporaries, Marx would 
have just been reduced to standing in some corner with his theory. Engels is the 
man who rendered this theory understandable, [who] popularized [it]. Just like he 
had popularized it, a great implementer like Lenin brought it to life, has upset the 
world for 150 years. Because Engels had brought this philosophy down to the 
level of daily life, and due to Lenin Marxism came to life. In this context, the 
duality of Muhammad and Hazrat Ali was responsible for nursing the 
philosophical base [needed] for adapting the faith to daily life among all other 
religions, and in this way they were ahead of all other religions. Still, in my 
opinion, you can see that Kant and Hazrat Ali are the same – how many centuries 
there are between the philosopher Kant, I don‘t know, 
T.K.: There are 11 centuries [between them] presumably. 
D.B.: Hmm, there is a gap of 11 centuries, but in spite of these eleven centuries 
there is naught difference between them. Now, in this state, the Alevi creed has 
become comprehensible due to [the actions of] Hazrat Ali, due to [the actions of] 
Muhammad and Hazrat Ali. The fact that both lived at the same time, [the fact 
that] Muhammad opened this door for Hazrat Ali, [the fact that] Hazrat Ali 
walked through this door [so as to upset] the circumstances. There lies a deep 
philosophical maturity way beyond the perceptions of man at that time, even way 
beyond the perception of today‘s man. 
Resistance to injustices is a genetic trait for Alevis  
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[ A. Y. K.]: If you ask a lot of people, they will tell you that Pir Sultan Abdal is a 
revolutionary. What is revolutionism? Isn‘t breaking apart one system and 
replacing it with another? But if we look at Pir Sultan Abdal‘s life, did he strive to 
obliterate the sultan or was he part of a movement that was drawing local and 
central government‘s attention to the injustices suffered by the people, to 
inequality? As far as I can see, he said the latter. Or, he was not about to demolish 
the Ottoman sultans and to establish a republic. He agitated against injustice, but 
was not a revolutionary as we know it from our dictionaries or books. Besides, it 
is part of the Alevi creed. Because there has been a movement against injustice, 
against inequality ever since the Karbala, ever since [the days of] Hazrat Ali. The 
trait of resistance to injustices is genetic for us. If today you commit an injustice, 
if two people with convictions fight, the Alevi [person] will take sides against the 
unjust one. He‘ll be at the side of the one who is right. This is always the case. 
6.3.3. Moral Qualities of Alevi Heroes 
 Images of heroes and epic narratives are important genres in the Alevi public 
narratives. For centuries, oral narratives of the epic stories related to Ali, Shah Ismail, 
Ebu Muslim Khorasani, Hamza and recently Atatürk, have been recited among Alevi 
communities. These epic poems and narratives have sometimes been performed together 
with saz (lute) by the Alevi singers and folk poets. For centuries the Kızılbaş/Alevi 
identity has been maintained by these oral narratives and rituals. Like many other aspects 
of Alevi identity and culture these heroic narratives and the images of heroes are also 
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partially adopted to the requirements of changing circumstances. These heroic images are 
models for the new generation of Alevis and their conception of these personalities can be 
very different than Sunni or other groups‘ conceptions of these people. 
The portrayals of Atatürk, Ali, the Prophet Muhammad or enlightenment 
philosopher Kant and Abbasid General Abu Muslim Khorasani (700-755), have a 
completely different symbolic and normative significance for Alevis. Even within the 
Alevi-Bektaşi community there are different normative portrayals of these heroic images. 
For example, there are people who emphasize the course of Ali, some others emphasize 
his knowledge and wisdom, and there are people who highlight his mystic qualities and 
ability to access the esoteric meaning of religion. Shah Ismail is perceived as a ―Turkic 
poet,‖ ―heroic leader,‖ ―social and political revolutionary,‖ ―Messiah,‖ and ―enemy of 
Ottoman bigotry‖ by different people. Presenting the founder of modern Turkey, Atatürk, 
as a Messiah or reincarnation of Ali, or considering Shah Ismail to be like a prophet, are 
unique exercises for Alevis. 
There are hundreds of narratives related to both heroes and villains in my research 
data. I formed a list of the ten most common positive value attributions. The most 
frequent ways to respond to the questions, ―Why is this figure important to you?‖ and 
―What are the qualities of these figures that make them important to you or for Alevis in 
general?‖ are listed as: 
Table 6.7.: Most common forms of positive value attributions/positioning for the 
Alevi “heroes” 
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Most common forms of positive value attributions/positioning for the Alevi “heroes” 
1. Struggled for secular/humanist values  
2. Defended the secular foundations of the Turkish Republic 
3. Struggled for democratic values and human rights 
4. Possesses enlightened and progressive worldview 
5. Activist for economic equality/justice 
6. Activist for social equality/justice  
7. Defended the esoteric (batıni) dimension of faith 
8. Inspirational for the maintenance of Alevi culture and identity 
9. Inspirational for the maintenance of Turkish identity 
10. Brave leadership  
  
Among the set of moral qualities that are important for defining the Alevi axiological 
system and virtues, they pick those that are most relevant to their own self portrayal. The 
moral features, life experiences, and positive and negative deeds of these heroic images 
are presented as historical facts. ―Mythic personalities and features‖ are much more 
relevant to the construction of the Alevi identity and axiological system than the 
―historical personalities‖ of the heroes that are mentioned below. As Rothbart and 
Korostelina mention, ―stories of violence and victims, dangers and safety, enemies and 
heroes, foster construction of normative boundaries‖ (2006, p.36). The descriptions of the 
life histories of the heroic figures have often been justified and legitimized by discourses 
of ―scientific fact‖ or ―historical evidence.‖ 
Such constructions defy explanation through the familiar scientific categories of 
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true/false, rational/irrational, and real/unreal. Appeal to empirical data, coherent 
scientific theories, and corroborated causal hypotheses alone can demonstrate 
negativities of the dangerous Other. (Rothbart & Korostelina, 2006, p.36) 
 In Table 7, I categorize the Alevi heroes according to their significance position in 
the Alevi personal and public narratives. I then assign the normative justifications of the 
significance of the heroes according to the ten items list. Within the list, the most 
important figures are the Prophet Mumammed, Ali and Atatürk; they all are archetypes of 
perfect human beings according to my informants. These three images embody all the 
positive aspects of the Alevi collective axiology. In Vamık Volkan‘s terms, they are the 
poles of the tent and if we remove these poles from the Alevi collective imagination it 
creates a deeper level of confusion and chaos (Volkan, 1998). The people who criticize or 
attribute negative values to these archetypal images of perfect human beings may suffer 
excommunication from the Alevi community. There are monographic studies on the 
significance of many of the figures mentioned in the list for the constitution of 
contemporary Alevi identity. 
Table 6. 8.: Alevi Heroes and their Moral Features 
 ALEVI HEROS and their MORAL FEATURES  
ARCHETYPES of 
PERFECT HUMAN 
BEINGS 
 Prophet Muhammed (571-632) 
 Ali (Ali ibn Abi Talib/ 600-661) 
 Atatürk (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk/ 1881-1938) 
SPRITUAL and 
NORMATIVE GUIDES 
 Hüseyin (Husayn ibn Ali/ 626-680): 1, 3, 4, 6, 7,  8, 10 
 Hacı Bektaş Veli (Hacı Bektaş Veli/ 1209-1271): 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
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of CONTEMPORARY 
ALEVIS 
 
****109 
  
10 
 Şah İsmail Hatayi (Shah Ismail Khatai/ 1487-1524): 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 
 Pir Sultan Abdal (1480-1550): 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
 Yunus Emre (1240?-1321?): 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
 
*** 
 
6. Mevlana (Mawlana Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Rumi/ 1207-1273): 4, 
7, 9 
7. Hoca Ahmet Yesevi (1103-1165): 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10 
8. Fatıma Zehra (Fatima al Zahraa/ 605-632): 8 
9. Imam Cafer Sadık (Ja‘far ibn Muhammad as Sadıq/ 702-765): 4, 6, 
8, 10 
10. İzzettin Doğan (1940- ): 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 
11. Cemalettin Çelebi (Ahmet Cemalettin Çelebi/ 1862-1921): 1, 2, 3, 6, 
9, 10 
**  Hallac-ı Mansur (Mansur al Hallaj/ 858-922): 1, 4, 7, 8, 10 
 Hasan ibn Ali (Hasan/ 624-680): 3, 8 
 7 poets (Fuzuli, Yemini, Virani, Hatayi, Pir Sultan Abdal, Nesimi, 
Kul Himmet- Hatayi and Pir Sultan Abdal mentioned above): 1, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
 Veliyettin Ulusoy (1942- ): 1, 2, 4, 7, 8 
OTHER IMPORTANT 
FIGURES  
(Anatolian dervish and activists) 
 Baba İlyas ( died 1239?): 5, 7, 10 
 Ede Balı (Sheikh Edebali- 1206?-1326): 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
 Sarı Saltuk (died 1298?): 8, 10 
                                                 
109 The number of stars (*) represent the significance and emotional attachments that are presented in the list. This is not a quantitative list but the hierarchy in the 
list is is abstracted according to the people‘s emotional attachments in their narratives. 
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 Kızıl Deli (1310?-1402?): 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
 Ebu Muslim Horasani (710-755): 9, 10 
(People who struggled and died for secularism and social justice) 
 Uğur Mumcu (1942-1993): 1,  2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10  
 Bahriye Üçok (1919-1990): 1, 2, 4, 10 
 Ahmet Taner Kışlalı (1939-1999): 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 
 Deniz Gezmiş (1947-1972): 3, 6, 10 
(Singers/Saz players and folk poets) 
 Ali Ekber Çiçek (Folk poems and bağlama/1935-2006 ): 4, 8, 9 
 Arif Sağ (1945- ): 2, 8 
 Ruhi Su (1912-1985): 4, 8, 9 
 Aşık Veysel (1894-1973): 1, 8, 9 
(International/ Historical Figures) 
 M. M. Ghandi (1869-1948):  3, 5, 10  
 Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): 3,4  
 Karl Marx (1818-1883): 5 
 Nelson Mandela (1918-): 3, 6, 10 
 
  
 All the names in the list were mentioned at least once as important and inspiring 
figures for Alevis. The list is formed according to a hierarchy; the figures that are 
mentioned more frequently and regarded in the most respected manner are positioned 
higher on the list. However this is not a list based on quantitative judgments based on 
frequency. Emotional attachments and value commitments play a more important role in 
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forming the list, and these qualities are difficult to quantify. In the list there are several 
types of people. The most significant category according to the list is the ―Anatolian/ 
Turcoman Dervishes and mystics‖ such as Hacı Bektaş Veli, Yunus Emre, Mevlana 
Celaleddin Rumi, Pir Sultan Abdal, Hoca Ahmet Yesevi, Shah Hatayi, Sarı Saltuk, Kızıl 
Deli, Baba İlyas, Edebalı. Grand poets such as Fuzuli, Yemini, Virani, Nesimi, Kul 
Himmet and mystic philosopher Hallac-ı Mansur can also be considered related to this 
first group. Besides being enlightened, democratic and progressive, some of these figures 
are also portrayed as role models that combined activism for justice and equality with 
their sufi practices. 
 The second group of heroes are the members of the Ahl-al Bayt such as Hüseyin, 
Hasan, Fatıma Zehra, and the İmam Cafer Sadık. These figures have a significant place in 
Alevi iconography. The image of martyrdom for the Alevi community is both a source of 
grief and pride. The myth of martyrdom will be discussed in a more detailed way in the 
next chapter, but it is important to keep in mind that more secularized segments of the 
Alevi community, or the discourse exemplified in the Ankara Discourse
110
, tend to avoid 
and deny these figures. The third group of people are the important Alevi leaders/dedes 
such as İzzettin Doğan (dede), and the postnişin of Hacı Bektaş Dergah Veliyettin Ulusoy. 
In particular, the dede or Bektaşi baba (father) names from different institutions which 
were also mentioned that were not particularly specified in the list. The leadership of 
these contemporary figures is highly contested; they have both groups of supporters as 
well as critics. In non-Alevi contexts as well, the leadership of İzzettin Doğan and 
                                                 
110  Discussed in chapter 8 
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Veliyettin Ulusoy is taken seriously. These figures have high social legitimacy and impact 
on both Alevi and Sunni groups. 
 The fourth group of heroes is composed of Alevi folk poets, singers and 
traditional saz virtuosos such as Aşık Veysel, Arif Sağ, Ruhi Su, Ali Ekber Çiçek and 
Neşet Ertaş. These figures are loved and respected by all Alevi, but they have special 
significance for Alevi youth. The interest of Alevi youth in Alevi culture, tradition and 
rituals often is related to their interest in Alevi music and dance. Traditional Alevi music 
and the ritual Alevi dance, semah, are important for them to ―re-discover,‖ and be proud 
of their Alevi identity. CD‘s of these singers and poets can be found in the homes or 
offices of many Alevis. For many Alevi youth they are the activist Alevi dervishes of our 
age. The last category of heroes includes the globally famous intellectuals/activists of 
social and economic justice. 
Atatürk is an archtype of a perfect human being: Those who do not like Atatürk 
cannot be Alevis  
[M.Ç.].: In the Alevi community there is a deep respect and attachment to [the 
figure of] Mustafa Kemal. In fact, in light of the conditions of the day, those who 
do not like Atatürk cannot be Alevis.  
T.K.: Why is that so? 
M.Ç.: Between the era of Atatürk and today‘s era, between the opportunities 
which he gave Alevis and those of today is a rift. I mean, it is not the case that 
Atatürk did anything for the Alevis in particular, that he said now do this and now 
do that, that he said let‘s give it all to the Alevis. He was a head of state. He was 
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obliged to treat all citizens equally. But the most important thing for you was to 
change from a status of being a [mere] slave to the status of citizen. He introduced 
the secular system. At the very least, he promoted you from being a [mere] slave 
[of Sultan] to humanity. He said you have these kinds of rights. The things that 
Mustafa Kemal said more or less coincide with the things that Alevis have been 
clamouring for, for more or less a hundred years.  
Ali is the prototype of a perfect human being  
 
[ T.A. ]: Hazrat Ali on his own does not make up the Alevi creed. The place of 
Hazrat Ali in the Alevi creed is as the prototype of the perfect man [insan-ı kâmil]. 
That‘s how take [Hazrat Ali] to be. At times, Hazrat Ali with the imperfections in 
his life, with his deeds, with his policies does not fit into the teachings of the 
Alevi creed. For example, where monogamy is an essential part of the Alevi 
creed, Hazrat Ali himself had many wives. The Imams have also practised 
polygamy. But within the Alevi creed, having more than one wife is seen as a 
defect. In spite of that, what is the reason for Hazrat Ali‘s preeminent place in the 
Alevi creed? In the Alevi creed, the concept of God-Muhammad-Hazrat Ali is 
accepted as a single concept, they cannot be separated from one another. When we 
accept the [divine] light of these three [figures] as one, we evaluate the concept 
called God as the prototype of the perfect man on top. We fill up its content, 
Islam, [or] Chistianity does not [supply any meaning]. We decide what we mean 
by the concept of Allah-Muhammad-Hazrat Ali.  
Both Ali and Muhammed are perfect human beings 
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[ T.A ]: [We see] Hazrat Ali very different, and [we see] the Prophet Muhammad 
very different. As Sunnism see Muhammad, he is the last prophet, and everything 
he did was right, he was a prophet. In the Alevi creed, there is no prophet, such a 
position is unacceptable, not to Hacı Bektaş, nor to Hazrat Ali. For us the standard 
is the perfect man, whatever his name. His name could have been Hazrat Ali, it 
could have been Mustafa, it could have been something else. For us Muhammad 
is a [a prototype of the] perfect man, these names have been ascribed in this 
setting. You need to look at the contents [of these names]. In the Alevi creed, 
somebody who cannot unravel [social] ranks will never earn a place on the road to 
[becoming the] perfect man.  
Atatürk could manage what the other leaders failed to do  
For example, in the 16
th
 century, Pir Sultan Abdal said if he would have been in 
the city of Istanbul, let‘s remove the Ottoman sultan. This is a yearning. He put 
this into his poetry. That‘s what he was yearning for. That‘s what he struggled for. 
But in the end, he was defeated, and beheaded. If he would have been in the city 
of Istanbul he would have said let‘s remove the crown of the state together with 
the state. 350 years later, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk appears, [and] he realizes what 
Pir Sultan Abdal had been expressing in his poetry. He sent the sultan away with 
his crown, on an English ship, to where he belonged. At the very least, if there 
exist such a desire in the Alevis and in Pir Sultan Abdal, [and] later on 
organizations are set up in their names in Turkey, at the very least one should 
consequently feel respect for Mustafa Kemal. 
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What Pir Sultan Abdal couldn‘t achieve by sacrificing his head, Mustafa Kemal 
did without losing his head. 
Atatürk was the last Jelali  
Why do Alevis really care about Mustafa Kemal? As you know, Alevis were 
defeated at Kösedağ, they were defeated at Otlukbeli, they were defeated at 
Çaldıran, they were defeated at the Shahkulu uprising, they were defeated with 
Mahmud II, Kuyucu Murad and such got his name because he threw Alevis into 
pits [kuyu] while they were alive. All these were lost. The Alevi never came out 
victorious. The Alevis only came out victorious once. We won one time with 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, whom we call the last Jelali [reference to a 16
th
-century 
rebel movement]. That was with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. It is all but natural that 
Alevis would harbor warm feelings towards such a figure.  
Atatürk is the Reincarnation of Ali  
[ A. K.] : With the closure of convents and zaviyahs, blows were delivered to 
Alevis. Now what was this republic that is being proclaimed. Atatürk saved us 
from the sultanate. The generation of Atatürk think of him, what shall we call it, a 
reincarnation of Ali.  
T.K.: Is there really such a belief amongst Alevis?  
A.K.: Yeah, amongst a significant section.  
T.K.: Were there those who really believed that?  
A.K.: They believed. They expressed this from the past till now. Naturally 
enough, in 90% of Alevi homes you can see Atatürk‘s picture right next to a 
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picture of Hazrat Ali.  
T.K.: In other words, the equation between Hazrat Ali, Hacı Bektaş Veli, and 
Atatürk is omni-present? 
A.K.: That‘s what I said, but of course, I do not see Kemalism in the same light as 
Atatürk. But the community‘s perception is different, particularly starting from 
[the foundation of] the republic till now. The community has taken and 
appropriated Atatürk as their own. 
Atatürk was reincarnation of Ali, Hacı Bektaş Veli  
[ A.S.] : When Atatürk first travels to Anatolia he had a meeting with the 
honorable Cemalettin Çelebi. Cemalettin Çelebi is from the stock of Hacı Bektaş 
Vali. They stay in the Bektashi convent for three straight days, and Atatürk 
informs him of his ideas [and plans]. 
The dervishes who hear of his ideas [and plans] . . . Hacı Bektaş Vali‘s ideas, 
Hazrat Ali‘s ideas. Atatürk is reincarnation of Ali they say, and they pledge their 
lives to Atatürk, become attached to Atatürk in such a strong way. Naturally, 
during their conversation Cemalettin Çelebi says to Atatürk, all these things are 
very nice, but are you going to found a republic. That is also of major interest to 
us. He takes Cemalettin Çelebi‘s hand in his fist. Says to him upon the condition 
you do not tell anybody I can tell you that we will found a republic. Thereupon, 
Cemalettin Çelebi secures soldiers for Mustafa Kemal‘s cause as well as whatever 
there is to be found in the convent, however much money there is, whatever 
valuable is available, including the blankets, he hands over. Can you imagine such 
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a thing? Military as well as material support, the Alevis were so taken up by their 
dedication that they even hand over the bracelets on their arms, whatever they 
have they bring out. They support the foundation of the republic. 
Justifying Atatürk’s decision to close Bektaşi  
T.K.: The Bektaşi convents are closed, in other words, the basic institutions of the 
Alevis. How do they react? 
[ A.S.] : In this way, at that time, I am [simply] stating what how I see it. It was 
necessary at that time to close down the convents. No concessions could be made 
to anybody. Particularly in convents, there were groups that represented a 
Wahhabi mentality, an Umayyad mentality. The simplest example of this as you 
know was in the Kubilay event [Menemen] that was experienced [later on]. 
Consequently, this type of events, retrogressive [Islamist] activities were present 
in partliament, as well as in the [wider] country, activities which aimed at taking 
over the republic by means retrogressive [Islamist] actions continued [unabated]. 
The Mevlevis [and the] Bektashis had sacrificed themselves for the country and 
had become supporters of Atatürk, which reiterated constantly. But there were 
also [a lot of] retrogressive [Islamist] activities. In my own personal view, they 
needed to be shut down at the time. 
T.K.: How do the Alevis see Atatürk at present? 
A.S.: The Alevis see Atatürk as a kind of prophet. Before anything, that‘s what I 
should point out. Alevis sees Atatürk as having received Turkey from Allah as a 
boon, and they see him as a savior and a saint. 
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Atatürk was our dede: there is a sincere belief that Atatürk was the reincarnation of 
Ali and/or Hacı Bektaş Veli  
[ H. Ş.] : The most talked about topic in our house was Atatürk. And not just in 
my family, if I were to talk for the region of Arguvan, when we were born we 
were shown two dedes. Atatürk [was our] dede, and our father‘s father [was our] 
other dede [grandfather]. In general, that‘s how we are brought up. 
T.K.: How were you told about Atatürk? 
H.Ş.: They said he saved us from everything. It was said if Atatürk wouldn‘t have 
been, we would have suffered the same as we had at the hands of the Ottomans 
after the Ottoman period. You know, during the Ottoman period a lot of mosques 
were erected in numerous places, going to a mosque on Friday‘s was made 
compulsory a lot of the time. 
Atatürk was a Bektaşi  
T.K.: To which side of the political spectrum do you feel close in a Turkish 
context? 
[ Ş.K.].: Of course, I feel close to Atatürk. I feel close to the followers of Atatürk.  
In our view Atatürk was a Bektaşi. That‘s what we believe. 
T.K.: Not hidden or anything? 
Ş.K.: We know. 
T.K.: Well, at the outset of the republican period was a reaction against religion, 
convents and such were closed. How did the Bektaşis react to that? 
Ş.K.: Closing down convents was a necessity. 
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T.K.: Weren‘t the Alevis, Bektaşis upset by this? 
Ş.K.: No. A lot of Bektaşi babas say as much. They say if we wouldn‘t have 
approved they wouldn‘t have closed down the convents. But we know this for 
sure, Atatürk only closed down the Bektaşi and Mevlevi convents temporarily. He 
closed them down upon the condition of re-opening them after ten years. But, he 
didn‘t live long enough to re-open these convents. We‘ve written sources [which 
indicated that], in 1936, he attempted to re-open the convents.  
T.K.: Were there some people in the government that supported such moves?  
Ş.K.: In the past, a lot of people [had] Bektaşi [affiliations]. For instance, Recep 
Peker was a Bektaşi. Refik Saydam, who became Prime Minister after Atatürk, 
was a Bektaşi. I‘ve told you about Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar. Kazım 
Karabekir was a Bektaşi. 
Abu Muslim Khorasani defeated the Umayyads; Honored Alevis  
[F. G.] : When we were kids, we used to read Abu Muslim Khorasani‘s tomes. 
These are important for every Alevi. He is a historical personality. I was able later, 
years later, to learn who Abu Muslim Khorasani was. Again, as you know, sayings 
connected to Shah Ismail were read. I learned about him not in my senior high 
school years, but during my university years. Pir Sultan Abdal is important 
because of his resistance to suppression, to pressure. 
Heroism or wisdom; which describes Ali best?  
T.K.: Where is Hazrat Ali‘s position in this scheme of things? What is the position 
of Hazrat Ali in the eyes of Alevis and Bektaşis? 
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[ Ş. K.] : The only difference is this. According to an Alevi were are followers of 
Ali [Alevi] . . . He was a courageous man in the eyes of Alevis. In our view, 
Hazrat Ali was a learned person and a virtuous man. His other characteristics are 
not as important as his courage. His mild-manneredness and his virtue are of 
interest to us. One also needs to be tolerant of that. There is no sense for an Alevi 
person not to talk about Hazrat Ali‘s virtues to an illiterate person. The Hazrat Ali 
which occupies his heart should be the sword in his hand, able to strike, able to 
break. Because people who have been ostracised by society live with such a hope. 
Martyrs for democracy and secularism: Uğur Mumcu, Bahriye Üçok, Ahmet Taner 
Kışlalı, Turan Dursun and others  
[M. Ç.].: Uğur Mumcu was no Alevi, but his picture is in every Alevi‘s house. 
First of all, in mine.  
T.K.: Why is Uğur Mumcu so important? 
M.Ç.: Why he is important from an Alevi point of view? Because he was totally 
loyal to Atatürk. Because he was honest, because he fought with his conscience, 
because he was plain and open. A lot of Alevis would say, I‘d die in his cause. 
This is an important thing to say. You will find very few Alevis who do not like 
Uğur Mumcu. 
T.K.: Who else is there like that? 
M.Ç.: It makes no difference. Those who have been killed, that have been 
slaughtered. We had an ideology in the calendar, the pictures of all those killed 
after 12 September were there. The Alevi community has a deep respect for all 
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those people. It is not important if they are Sunni, they don‘t even think about it. 
The one who has fought in Atatürk‘s path, defended the secular republic and was 
slaughtered because of that. That is enough. 
In this chapter I tried to examine the dynamics of boundary negotiation, which I 
described predominantly as an axiological process. The main paradox of Alevi identity 
negotiation in the modern, urban context in Turkey is the balance between differentiating 
themselves with reference to a certain cluster of moral qualities from the rest of the  
predominantly Sunni Turkish society and ending their socially and economically 
marginalized position. The entire practical process of boundary negotiation is related to 
keeping this delicate balance. 
Elements of the Alevi collective axiology are explored for understanding the 
complicated process of boundary negotiation. Rather than looking at some foundational 
books and sources, I collected the popular narratives and normative accounts and 
analyzed them according to the positioning triangle. One of the strengths of the 
positioning approach is the ability to portray the practical functions of the storylines and 
discursive positioning. The normative claims of the Alevi collective axiology have been 
shaped along several lines of arguments. The elements of these positions are displayed in 
tables. 
Features of the Alevi collective axiology are summarized under five main 
headings. In terms of social, economic, philosophical and religious orientations, the Alevi 
collective ethos is presented as much more progressive and up-to-date in comparison to 
the Sunni collective ethos. The portrayal and moral construction of the Alevi collective 
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ethos and axiology is at the same time a construction of the Sunni collective axiology as 
its ―other.‖ In relation to the Sunni other, many Alevis consider themselves victimized; 
peripheral groups whose rights have historically been exploited. The Alevi collective 
ethos has also been positioned as authentic, pluralist, and pro-social and pro-economic 
justice. These argumentations and narrations that are referred to ―describe‖ the normative 
features of the Alevi worldview, and are predominantly acts of legitimizing the Alevi 
collective ethos in the eyes of Alevi citizens, Sunni citizens and the Turkish State. 
Discussions of the Alevi heroes and important public figures have a special 
significance for exploring the Alevi collective axiology. The way these figures have been 
described and their qualities which are appreciated by the Alevi community help us to 
understand the elements of the Alevi normative system. They are at the same time models 
for the new generation of Alevis. The list of ten predominant forms of positive value 
attributions to heroes is also a short summary of things to do in order to be a ―better 
Alevi.‖ The list of ―villains‖ will be explored in the next chapter since those figures are 
mostly related to the traumatic historical episodes or related to the collective fears of 
Alevi citizens. 
In the next chapter, I will explore the fears, threat perceptions and historical 
traumas of the Alevi community, where I will have a better chance to analyze the 
emotional components of identity negotiation. Besides the domain of norms and values, 
collective emotions also help to keep the identity group in an integrated form. 
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Chapter 7 
Between Traumas of the Past and Fears for Future: Psychocultural Narratives of 
Alevi Identity 
 
 
In the previous chapter I address the question, with regard to the narrative of the 
elephant and the four blind men, ―What keeps the elephant together?‖ In other words, 
despite all these transformations and wide variations of definitions, on what normative 
basis do Alevis maintain a separate identity? The Axiological resources and normative 
narratives, which were essential for the making of group boundaries, were highlighted in 
the previous chapter. In addition to the first question I will also address the following 
questions: how have the Alevi-Sunni, and Alevi-state (Umayyad Dynasty, Anatolian 
Seljukid Empire, Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic) contentions been 
maintained for such a long period of time; what are the collective emotions, victimhood 
narratives and psychocultural traumas that led to the maintenance of these contentions for 
such a long period of time; and how can the historical and biographical narratives help us 
to decipher the emotional sources of the Alevi discontents? 
Analyzing the psychocultural narratives of the Alevi movement is a window to 
understanding meanings and social contexts of emotions. Between the traumas and 
anxieties of the historical memories and threat perceptions related to the ambiguous 
future, there is a rich area for the exploration of the psychocultural narratives of Alevi 
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identity. These psychocultural narratives often influence the social interaction of 
Alevis with the ―outsiders‖ in the forms of speech and other acts. The abstract fears, 
traumas and mythic historical narratives have been substantiated and embodied in the 
images of contemporary personalities and institutions. Without understanding the 
meanings and cultural backgrounds of these emotions it is difficult for Sunni 
politicians, scholars and bureaucrats to have reasonable communication with leaders 
of the Alevi movement. The language of possible Alevi-Sunni and Alevi-State 
reconciliation should also include and incorporate emotional and symbolic resources. 
Alevi discourses about their public memory and narratives of their history are 
loaded with emotional attributions. Historical narratives are often used to legitimize or 
de-legitimize certain courses of action and certain public figures that are related to 
their contention. Alevi social and political activism is presented as a continuation of a 
centuries-old contention and the names of the heroes that are mentioned in the 
previous chapter are an inspiration to new generations. With the same logic, villains of 
history such as Yezid, Hızır Paşa and Yavuz Sultan Selim (Selim I) are still active in 
the social imaginations of Alevis. For many Alevis, the problems they have been 
facing now are centuries-old, and the features of the historical villains are embodied in 
the characters of contemporary personalities. Fears, humiliations, traumas and 
common threat perceptions are the shared collective feelings that help to keep Alevi 
identity integrated to a certain extent. 
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7.1. Primacy of Psychocultural Analysis 
Marc Howard Ross defines psychocultural dramas as the ―polarizing events about 
non-negotiable cultural claims, perceived threats, and/or rights connected to narratives 
and metaphors central to a group‘s identity‖ (Ross, 2007). For the cognitive dimension, 
the aggregation of accounts of a group‘s origin, history and conflicts with outsiders, 
including its symbolic and ritual behaviors, is at the core of a shared system of meaning 
and identity (Ross, 2007; p. 24). Pscyhocultural dramas provide the culturally and 
emotionally driven accounts and narratives of these events. Many accounts of the critical 
events in the Alevi personal and collective narratives that are analyzed in this chapter are 
about the psychocultural dramas of the Alevi community. These narratives are sometimes 
transmitted through oral genres such as poems, folk songs and legends. Oral 
transmissions are common forms of narrative practices for Alevi psychocultural dramas. 
Written and visual accounts, reenactments through social action and ritual performances, 
pilgrimages, and festivals are also means through which these dramas are kept (Ross, 
2007).  
For Ross, these narratives must be central to the analysis of ethnic conflict and 
steps are taken to mitigate it, because emotions help with the framing of the world and 
shape action. 
The narratives surrounding a conflict are not just reflectors of the conflict but 
operate as well as exacerbators and inhibitors of further conflict, and play a causal 
role in making certain courses of action more plausible and appealing than others. 
(Ross, 2007, p. 28) 
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Narratives around Alevi-Sunni contention are not conducive to a form of positive 
transformation. Besides the social, economic, political, legal and psychological 
impediments to mutual recognition, the discourses of interaction between Alevis and 
Sunnis has been shaped along dialectic and de-legitimizing forms. The Alevi 
community‘s generally biased attitude towards especially conservative Sunnis in Turkey 
and the central-right and Islamist politicians is an impediment to a healthy dialogue. 
The misguided policies have caused the issue to become not only a national but 
also an international problem. Without a doubt, the conservative government in 
Turkey and the Directorate of Religious Affairs are to blame. Rather than trying to 
gain an understanding of the question of Alevism and Bektashism, officials who 
are in charge insist on imposing their religious conservatism on the masses. 
(Yaman & Erdemir, 2006, p. 9) 
The notion of chosen traumas and glories are also related concepts that are 
applied in psychocultural analysis (Volkan, 1991; 1997; 1998; 2001; Svazek 2005). The 
concept is especially useful for understanding the deep rooted sectarian divides in Iraq, 
Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and also the Alevi-Sunni divide in Turkey. Every year at 
the day of Ashura
111
, commemoration ceremonies are held to remember the martyrdom of 
Husayn ibn Ali, who was the Islamic prophet Muhammed‘s grandson, at the Battle of 
Karbala. Sectarian divides have been maintained with certain rituals and symbolic forms 
in Northern Ireland, and in Shia-Sunni divided Muslim communities (Bryan, 2000a; 200b 
Buckley & Kenney, 2005; Schubel, 1991; Chelkowski, 1985). 
                                                 
111  10 Muharram 61AH (680 AD) 
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Shiites annually perform an extreme form of remembering a chosen trauma by 
commemorating their religious leader al Husayn ibn‘Ali through ritualized self-
flagellation in the anniversary of his martyrdom. (Volkan, 1997, p. 49) 
Alevis commemorate the Karbala Massacre differently than Shii‘s but 
remembrance of the Karbala Massacre is also an important component of the Alevi ritual 
cem. Commemoration of Hacı Bektaş Veli, founder of the Bektaşi order; Pîr Sultan 
Abdal, and the recent Alevi trauma of the ―Sivas Massacre‖ of 1993, as well as 
remembering other painful experiences such as the Maraş Events of 1978, are 
mechanisms for the maintenance of Alevi identity. These occasions are at the same time 
important sites and spaces of activism for many Alevi associations. The enterprise of 
collective remembering is not only the process of revealing the past, but also a process of 
negotiating moral values, as well as social and political priorities, and the desires of a 
communal or identity group (Bhabha, 2004). These feelings have both been presented in 
collective narratives and story forms and also through more conceptual and abstract 
models such as memorials, museums, rites and other commemorations (Ross, 2007). 
Victhimhood, fear or threat perceptions, and humiliation caused by marginalization and 
slander, are the important emotional drives for the Alevi identity movement as a whole.  
Psychology of Victimhood 
―Victimhood is about an unjust traumatic loss that is being denied by the 
‗descendents‘ of perpetrators. To perceive oneself as a victim requires naming the pain 
one has suffered, blaming the offender, and claiming some type of restitution (Huyse, 
2003, p. 60)‖. Victimhood represents the element of continuity in Alevi identity. The 
367 
 
perpetual feeling of victimhood has historically been maintained and the language and the 
discourses of victimhood have been adapted to the conditions of changing social and 
political environments. The debates on the moral responsibility of victimhood are often 
lively debates that also help the negotiation of the moral boundaries of the identity 
groups. The basic stance is that a victim: 
 is not responsible for what happened 
 is always morally right 
 is not accountable 
 is forever entitled to sympathy 
 is justified in feeling moral indignation. (Zur, 2005) 
Whether at the inter-personal, inter-group or international levels, these features 
more or less summarizes the characteristics of victim psychology. Dealing with historical 
grievances, especially the psychology of victimhood is crucial in order to transform the 
relationships into a positive form. Joseph Montville argues that any conflict resolution 
strategy that does not address the psychological needs of the victims and victimizers can 
only have a superficial effect on the resolution, especially of ethnic and sectarian conflict 
(Montville, 2006). 
Ways have to be found to help adversaries face the historic burdens on their 
relationship, to help them present their historic grievances but also, especially, 
acknowledge the wrongs they have inflicted on the other side, a process must be 
established in which the losses of victims are recognized and made part of the 
public record for all to see. (Montville, 2006, p. 368)  
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The state of denial or misrecognition of historical controversies also feeds the fear 
of a potential repetition of violent past experiences and perpetuates the psychology of 
victimhood. Victimhood, therefore, reproduces itself in different forms according to 
changing circumstances, unless a process of societal reconciliation is achieved. There are 
ways in which a person or a group of people who are the victim of political, ethnic or 
religious violence can receive additional hurt after the direct cause of victimization has 
disappeared () –  this is called re-victimization by Luc Huyse (Huyse, 2003). The sources 
of re-victimization are not just emotional, in many cases there are legal, political or social 
practices that remind the group or the individual of the past victimization by: 
i. Denial of the status of victim; 
ii. Unfulfilled expectations in dealing with official agencies; 
iii. Unwanted effects of victim-centered initiatives; and  
iv. Social stigmatization and exclusion. (Huyse, 2003, p. 61) 
For many Alevis all four of the conditions of re-victimization that are mentioned by 
Huyse are still continuing. Their pains have never been acknowledged by Sunni citizens 
and the Turkish officials; their expectations in terms of official recognition have not been 
satisfied; and the discrimination and marginalization against them are still going on in 
many areas. 
Besides the implicit or explicit daily practices of discrimination and marginalization 
and the unfulfilled expectations that cause re-victimization, the victimization process 
involves the remembrance of past victimization. Explorations of psychocultural dramas 
also examine the ways in which those attitudes and perceptions have been formulated and 
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reproduced. Memories of past victimhood, sufferings and traumas have been formulated 
and presented in different narrative forms. 
we dream in narrative, daydream in narrative, remember, anticipate, hope, despair, 
believe, doubt, plan, revise, criticize, construct, gossip, learn, hate, and love by 
narratives. (Hardy , quoted in Gergen, 1999, p. 70) 
According to Demetrius, historical enmity, dehumanization, and victimization are 
instrumental in the perpetuation of aggression on both the national and international level 
(Demetrius, 1990). When activated, these historical enmities and victimhood psychology 
contribute to the drawing of definite boundaries between groups of people. Victimization 
also represents a sense of shared collective guilt that brings a social cohesion, according 
to Demetrius (Demetrius, 1990, p. 101). 
Victimization is the embodiment of the drive to sacrifice. Sacrificial rituals have 
been performed since humans first gathered into tribes. It became a way of 
appeasing and perhaps even coming into contact with gods. Victimization 
represents that tribal ritual that brings about collective cohesion through a sense of 
collective guilt. Thus victimization also becomes a defensive process against 
feeling of overwhelming guilt. (Demetrius, 1990, p. 101) 
The feeling of victimization and the emotions that are associated with victimization such 
as guilt, shame and humiliation, bring a form of social cohesion in the Alevi case. Shared 
victimhood and shared threats have been manipulated by the entrepreneurs of Alevi 
identity politics. Victimhood, common threat perceptions and shared collective emotions 
became the quintessential unifying factors for the scattered Alevis that are living in the 
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urban context. In most cases the common ground for shared emotions among urban 
Alevis are: fear of assimilation; fear of Islamic radicalism; the feeling of victimhood; the 
problem of marginalization; and to a certain extend humiliation. Whereas in the rural 
context, the connections and ties are based on face-to-face interactions, common religious 
ritual practices, marriages and shared social space. 
The psychology of victimhood does not automatically lead to conflicts between 
groups or provoke a cycle of counter-violence, but the politization of victimhood plays a 
vital role in inter-group violence (Enns, 2007). In the Alevi case, it is equally interesting 
to investigate the questions: Why has the discourse of perpetual victimhood not generated 
violence for the Alevi cause? Why were the Alevis over-represented in left wing 
organizations such as TIKKO, DEV-SOL, TKP-ML that had been involved in 
revolutionary leftist violence especially before 1980 coup? The moral commitments and 
the teachings of the Alevi creed do not allow for violent collective responses. On the 
other hand, at the personal level, the victimhood psychology, feelings of insecurity, 
humiliation in daily practices, and the social and economic marginalization and 
discrimination motivated many Alevis to get involved in revolutionary leftist activism. 
For the psychocultural analysis of the Alevi identity movement, different forms of the 
feelings of victimhood, humiliation and fear are the central drives. These themes emerge 
in many aspects of personal and collective narratives. 
7.2. Integrating Neo-Durkheimian and Neo-Freudian Agendas: Forms of Narratives 
The roots of the problem lie in the fact that Alevis and Bektashis, and their 
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understanding and interpretation of Islam have been oppressed by groups who 
have enjoyed official support for many centuries, and who assume that they have 
the monopoly on Islam. Unfortunately, over the course of history, any approach 
that fell outside the scope of these groups were suppressed and discriminated 
against through slanders of sexual perversion. (Yaman & Erdemir, 2006, p.9)  
The ongoing practices of denial and cultural slanders are a source of permanent 
humiliation in the daily lives of many Alevis. Although they do not encounter slander 
often, the occasions in which they do face these prejudices and humiliating 
experiences have become important turning points in their perceptions of their 
―Aleviness.‖ Without understanding these emotional elements it is impossible to 
comprehend the social actions, narratives and emotional responses of the people in the 
Alevi identity movement. Fears related to the possibility of extermination, direct 
violence, and assimilation with other more sophisticated cultural and structural forms 
of violence are proximate possibilities for many Alevis. Although Alevi associations 
and community leaders seek certain legal protections and policy changes from the 
government, deeply emotional fears and traumatizing historical experiences cannot be 
satisfied through legal and political measures. 
There are no legal rational mechanisms to deal with the intense emotional 
dimensions of threatened identities. Even the conciliatory gestures of right wing, 
nationalist and Islamist politicians are interpreted as assimilatory tricks. The governing 
AKP‘s recent Alevi policy, which will be discussed in the conclusion chapter, is also 
interpreted as such. Historical memories symbols, and ways of remembering certain 
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episodes help to comprehend some of the irreconcilable feelings. Most of the books 
that were written by Alevi activists/intellectuals have statements related to threat 
narratives and statements reminding the reader of traumatic historical experiences. The 
quotation below, which is from the foreword of a recent book on Alevi identity and 
history, is one of the examples of such a statement. 
As Alevilik, a creed which had been in danger of systematic assimilation for 
centuries was about to rediscover its identity. External forces tried to refute and 
make futile this liberation and representation opportunity. Unfortunately today we 
are faced with a similar tension and resistance which we had experienced 
previously during Ottoman and Seljukid times……This book manifests a clear 
stance against the assimilationist pressures. It also tries to understand a creed 
which is delegitimized and prohibited in its native land. (Erdoğan Aydın, ―Kimlik 
Mücadelesinde Alevilik.‖ İstanbul: Kırmızı Yayınları, 2007)  
Having a defensive and sometimes even unfriendly demeanor toward the ―others‖ 
or ―outsiders‖ has been considered a legitimate attitude by many Alevis. In fact, the 
overall mentality of ―we are surrounded by enemies who are either trying to exterminate 
us or to assimilate us‖ is a common fear. We are surrounded by external (Yezits, 
Muaviyes and imperialists) and internal enemies (Hızır Paşas and secret service‘s or deep 
state‘s agents) that have all sorts of means to wipe out Alevis. Entrepreneurs of Alevi 
identity politics try to legitimize their ideological stance with these discourses. This 
overall emotional mood that is blended with fear, anguish and resentments represents 
many features of the threatened identities. The strong emotional content has often been 
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exploited by social and political entrepreneurs to consolidate the integrity of the Alevi 
identity. Even the policies of the AKP government and some state institution‘s policies 
that can be considered favorable to Alevis are interpreted as policies with a hidden 
agenda. These policies have been interpreted in relation to victimhood and assimilation 
narratives. 
Suspicion towards outsiders, cynicism and a defensive mood both in discourses 
and practices are visible features of Alevi interactions with non-Alevis. As a researcher I 
personally was the subject of suspicion until I built trust and rapport with my informants. 
My academic credentials and references were also helpful in overcoming the suspicion 
and cynicism. It took a while for me to understand the sources of the reactionary and 
cynical attitude. Only after hearing many parallel narratives expressing the fears and 
traumatic experiences was I able to empathize with and understand the concerns of my 
informants. 
7.3. Kızılbaş: Cultural and Historical Sources of the Metaphor for Marginalization 
and Humiliation  
As a concept, Kızılbaş emerged during the 16th century during the Ottoman Safevi 
Conflict. Kızılbaş is the historical name of Alevis, and refers to the Turkmen tribes that 
were supporters of the Safavid leaders Sheyh Cuneyd, Haydar and Shah Ismail (Mélikoff, 
[1993]; 2006, p. 33). The Kızılbaş concept emerged for the first time during the period of 
Sheyh Haydar (1460-1488), who was the father of Shah Ismail (Mélikoff, 2006, p. 52). 
―Kızılbaş‖ (red head) refers to the red headpiece that had been worn by the warriors in 
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the Safavi army. These headpieces had twelve gores representing the twelve imams. The 
Ottomans called the Turcoman followers of the Safavid order as Kızılbaş, which was later 
used as a pejorative term for other groups as well. Kızılbaş, afterwards, was a reference to 
the heretic (rafızî, mülhit, zındık), rebellious groups. 
The Kızılbaş concept refers to the phenomena of heterodox Turkish folk Muslims 
who were supporting the Safavid order and Shah Ismail against the Ottoman Empire 
throughout the Ottoman-Safavid conflict of the 16th century (Mélikoff, 2006). During 
this time, more negative meanings and connotations including the heretic, rebellious and 
sexually perverted were also included in the concept (Mélikoff, 2006)
112
. Accusations of 
―unclean,‖ ―rebel,‖ ―atheist,‖ ―their food cannot be eaten,‖ ―people of low moral values,‖ 
―sexual perverts,‖ ―untrustworthy‖ and ―disloyal to state‖ are a few of these stereotypes 
that are associated with the concept of ―Kızılbaş.‖ Many other insults and stereotypes 
have been included in the concept of Kızılbaş over the course of centuries. Although the 
Kızılbaş is mainly a Turcoman phenomena, it has also been used to define the rebellious 
Kurdish tribes, when the Revolt against the central political authority was emphasized 
(Mélikoff, 2004). Kızılbaş has been used against other rebellious groups that were 
Muslim in origin. 
The religious and political propaganda against the Kızılbaş groups has been 
mixed. There was a necessity for legal legitimation to suppress Muslim groups that were 
struggling against the central authorities. The blend of religious heresy, social and 
political rebellion, and sexual perversion was a suitable match to de-legitimize any group 
                                                 
112 In the Ottoman documents, they are called zındık, heretic, râfizi, schismatic, and also "shi'ite", mülhid, atheist Mélikoff (1998). 
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at the popular level and the notion of ―Kızılbaş‖ had integrated all these negative and 
pejorative elements into its content. Interestingly, the notion of Kızılbaş, which was 
related to the Turcoman phenomena, had later been used to define the other heterodox 
tribes that struggled against the political and religious authorities of the Ottoman center.  
Denouncing Safavids as well as Kızılbaş as infidels renders their persecution 
legally correct and even obligatory. In fact they were portrayed as heretics (râfızî) 
and even unbelievers in order to justify military actions (___). 
Besides its historical and cultural meaning and ―social reality,‖ Kızılbaş had 
turned into one of the strongest and most popular metaphors to marginalize and suppress 
the rebellious Muslim groups in Anatolia. Alevis had inherited all the slander, prejudices, 
stereotypes and pejorative terms that are associated with the Kızılbaş concept. Although 
these slanders and pejorative terms are not pronounced publicly, they are discussed with 
rumors and whispers. Within the Alevi struggle for recognition there was a distanced 
position against the Kızılbaş concept but they cannot escape from the culturally loaded 
term and its implications in their daily lives. These negative cultural connotations and 
slandering are sometimes expressed in terms of innuendos and more direct accusations, 
mainly because of ignorance or the biases of uneducated Sunnis. The Alevist identity 
struggle consists of both the implicit actions to distance contemporary Alevi social and 
political phenomena from the historically loaded Kızılbaş concept, and to create a new, 
modern and secular understanding of Alevi identity.  
376 
 
7.4. Return of the Repressed: Humiliation and the Turning Points in the Personal 
Life Stories 
 The majority of my informants have experienced psychological wounds because 
of the humiliations they experienced in school, work places, military service, in their peer 
environments, and neighborhood contexts. It is not common to encounter slander and 
humiliating comments in public environments, but they are common in inter-personal 
contexts. These slanders and humiliating comments and public remarks often constitute 
the important turning points in Alevi citizens‘ understanding of their individual and 
collective identities. According to Sara Cobb (2006), Leary (2004), Putnam (2004) 
critical moments generate changes in persons, relationships, social processes and political 
institutions. Those personal experiences, public spectacles and, sometimes unintended, 
public discourses may have lasting impacts on the nature of inter-personal, inter-
communal relations as well as intra communal relations, thus lead to the transformation 
of the conflictual relationships.  As Cobb (2006) describes turning points are ―moments in 
a conflict when a group's dynamic changes—times when something extraordinary 
emerges that occupies a nuanced space between a heightened moment of conflict, and the 
next moment where that conflict has been diffused or exacerbated‖ (p. 148). Putnam 
(2004) also mentions that the critical moments often enlarge and complicate the conflicts. 
Intense emotions, tension and anxiety are often inherent to the turning points. 
One of the public examples which created an enormous outrage was the ―Güner 
Ümit Affair‖ which is explained in chapter 3. Güner Ümit‘s innuendo about the sexual 
perversion of Kızılbaş allowed many Alevis to publicly condemn the slandering against 
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Alevis. It was a reaction to the centuries-long humiliations because of slandering, false 
accusations and stereotypes. Extinguishing candles (orgy), ―they are not clean,‖ and ―they 
have tails,‖ are also stereotypes that have been maintained among the Sunnis for 
centuries. Expressions of these discourses often constitute forms of turning points in both 
public and personal narratives of Alevis. 
This guy carried the Sunni prejudices to the public sphere 
[B. Ü.]: One day you have Güner Ümit. I want you to specifically write this down 
in your thesis. I want you to in some way express the truth about this man, the 
truth which is not being brought out in the open, or I am saying it was done by 
Allah, a good thing this happened. Throughout [a period] of five years, five years 
in a row, the Alevi creed was said to be like this, Sunni Islam was said to be like 
that. But why? It happened after the Güner Ümit event. This is one of the 
important events that I want to stress.  
I said thanks [to the Lord]. Somebody came out and expressed this [in] the media. 
Among the people are [these rumors that] Alevis extinguish candles, rape their 
daughters, do this, piss on a prayer carpet, no they throw the Kuran in the toilet, 
they piss all over you. Such things all of a sudden exploded in front of us. I 
wanted this [to happen] from Allah, in other words. Like I said, may we thank 
Güner Ümit. If this man wouldn‘t have been, if he wouldn‘t have made such a 
blunder, then this whole Alevi – Sunni matter would not have been carried into 
the public sphere. 
We had observed that in the case of an existential threat, people can get mobilized 
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easily. 
[V. K.] : This was an event which took place as a result of a social consensus, not 
because it was done to Star TV, or because it was ill- or well-intentioned. But this 
suddenly erupting and not at all organized protest when this program was cut 
from Star TV‘s broadcasts was important. Like that protest [which arose as a 
result] of the disentanglement of the building works above that hearth in Şahkulu. 
These are all things which weren‘t organized but spontaneously erupted as 
protests of Alevi youngsters. This is very important in my view. It showed this. 
When they wanted to, Alevi youths could take the initiative in a peaceful manner 
and make themselves heard in society, without feeling the need to become 
organized. Because this [happened] in places where there were no big foundations 
or state institutions or big threats against the state. These were all transformations 
which had to do with societal existence. 
I started to wear zülfikar after the event 
[ B. Ö.]: When I was in senior high school the Güner Ümit even took place. In 
secondary school, me and my friends would walk around wearing a golden 
representation of Zülfikâr [Hazrat Ali‘s double-edged sword] around [our] necks. 
Everybody would say stuff, our Alevi girl has come by, in fact even my Alevi 
teachers would say you are stressing it quite openly, I would reply nobody can 
interfere with however much I want to stress it, maybe it was my own peevishness 
that came out in the open that I started wearing the sword around my neck after 
that event. After the Güner Ümit event took place, some of my friends would 
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come to me and say my family told me that I must have Alevi friends for our 
candles were extinguished. In a serious way this event was talked over, at least in 
our school, people came to me with questions all the time, as if religion was my 
centre [of life] and I had easy access to that center, or maybe it was because of the 
Zülfikâr that people thought this girl is an Alevi we can ask her. The moment 
Alevis woke up, such a thing happened that people reacted, the Star building was 
occupied. Güner Ümit again started his Turnike program, he was forced to drop it. 
Because he received too many reactions from the Alevi community, well, I 
received at least a hundred mails. 
Besides of the struggle for the legalization of cemevis as religious places, 
criticism against the compulsory religion courses is an important argument of the Alevi 
mobilization. Negative experiences in the compulsory religion courses for many Alevis 
constitute the first encounter with the system that is created by the ―oppressive other.‖ 
Humiliation either leads to the denial of identity or the development of a reactionary 
identity. In both cases interpersonal and intergroup relations develop negatively. 
Religious courses and the humiliation during youth 
[ H. Ş.]: I remember my secondary school days, when we would have religious 
class we would enter with fear. But we never could properly memorize those 
prayers. We‘d have to get up in class and perform the ritual prayer [salah, namaz], 
we could never do it. And we would be ostracized, even among our own 
classmates. That‘s why, after 1980, we would start saying we‘re Alevis, after 
those events in Gazi in Istanbul. 
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I failed because of being Alevi 
[ B.Ö.]: In senior high school I had to stay behind one year, because I was a bit 
radical, and because I did not hide my being an Alevi, I‘ll never forget, we had an 
extremely nationalist history teacher, his name was Veysel. My average mark was 
46, I needed a low mark on my oral, I even worked hard, but he didn‘t even feel 
the need to give me an oral exam. A friend of mine who had an average of zero 
passed, but I stayed behind because of that class. In secondary school another 
such thing happened. I had to do a make-up exam in the summer – it was the first 
time I saw anybody staying behind because of religious class – my family laughed 
a lot about it, asking me how I could stay behind because of religious class, I said 
that I didn‘t know, it is beyond my control. We had to memorize three prayers for 
the exam, and I picked three short ones. But they weren‘t surrahs, they were ayats. 
I told you to memorize surrahs, not ayats. Bang he gave me a zero. As such I 
didn‘t really care about it. I didn‘t really experience all that much of 
discrimination. Where I was living there was no discrimination really. 
We were humiliated by the teacher because of the religious classes 
[ C. Ş.]: At the time the biggest problems were caused by religious classes in 
school. Religious classes were voluntary. They were voluntary in this way: those 
who did not want to take part in the class were supposed to present a written 
application. After having handed in the application, they‘d be exempt. For 
example, in senior high school, in our class were fifty pupils, ten of whom had 
submitted an application not to enter religious class. Their religious teacher would 
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teach them once a week. He would always be obdurate. We said we submitted a 
petition, we are exempt from those classes, we were not supposed to be in that 
class at all.  
T.K.: Which year was this? 
C.Ş.: between 1965 and ‘70. The religious teacher would put us in the class on 
purpose, he would take the roster. In spite of the fact that we were exempt from 
the class, he would still call us. After having called the roster, he would say stand 
up, he would never tell us to leave. We would get up and go out one by one. He 
wouldn‘t allow us to leave as a group, now when you leave one by one, this gives 
rise to certain reaction. Everybody would knock against the door and get out. 
After that, out of the fifty pupils in the class 40 are your enemy. Of course getting 
out of the room while knocking against the door was a reaction against the 
teacher, but your classmates would perceive it as directed against them as well. In 
fact, they would see it as [an attack] on their faith. Afterwards, by way of revenge, 
this would take the form of a fight in another class. It would evolve into fights in 
the city streets, in the city lanes. It would become a source of discomfort. 
I was accused of being an atheist 
[ E. G.]: Before 1980, there was no such thing as a compulsory religious class, it 
was voluntary. At the time I was attending senior high school, I didn‘t want to 
take part in religious classes, I handed in my written application. And when I first 
entered the class, the religious teacher was holding the piece of paper in his hand, 
I stood up, he told me ―are you an [atheist] or are you an unbeliever? Why don‘t 
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you want to take religious classes?‖ I became flustered over my whole body, a 
thousand things went through my head, but I couldn‘t say a thing. Get out he said. 
Now towards my friends, my honor was deeply hurt in my circle, I was 
embarrassed, the way people look at you changes. In every aspect of life, while 
going to school, while walking around with somebody, for instance a simple 
instance, some time ago, the nephew of the general director entered the attorney‘s 
exams, a written examination, Turkey‘s best, he was among 200-300 best, but 
following the exam, they asked him, where are you from and what does your 
father do, alright leave now. Can you pass or fail a test like that? 
I even considered changing my name 
[ H. T.]: I thought of changing my name. Because my name is Hıdır, it is obvious 
that I am an Alevi, I thought a lot about changing my name. But now I am proud 
of my name. It changed in senior high school, it continued right up to senior high 
school. You go through a bad time as a kid, if you get picked upon because of 
your name. 
Slander and accusations in workplaces and school 
[ A.R.U.]: But of course. How can you not go through such things. Every place 
you, you will be insulted [cursed] to your face. To your face, I mean they were 
cursing Alevis. Well, we would hear these insults [curses], our heart would break 
as we didn‘t have the mettle to say I am an Alevi. There were no ifs and buts 
about it; they would say things are such right to our face. Sometimes we couldn‘t 
take it anymore, and we exploded. And once we exploded, our neighborly 
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relations would come to an end. We have also lived through such things. We have 
also experienced these. Strong indictments, what kind of immoral propositions, 
what kind of immoral gossip. The Alevi creed has accepted morality as a religion, 
what will you be able to teach these people who have turned morality into [their] 
religion, you cannot teach them anything, I don‘t [really] know what you can do. 
They would say such things to our face. We knew of such things. Many a time, so 
that our [adherence to] the Alevi creed would not become known, or because we 
didn‘t engage in defending the Alevi creed in the face of such incriminations, we 
just cut them short. And we told our children, be sure not to say that you are 
Alevi, and if they ask you whether you pray in the proscribed fashion [salah, 
namaz], just tell them you do. We told them if they ask you whether you fast, say 
you do. We were really engaging in taqiyya [dissimulation]. We were forced to 
engage in taqiyya. We have lived through these troubled days. While I was 
working at Sümerbank, in an official capacity. We were eating. At night. All of 
our colleagues together, in conjunction with the technical staff as well. The 
electricity cut out. When the electrics went, one of our engineering colleagues left, 
he returned after a while. He said this is the work of the Kızılbaş [Redhead, 
derogatory term for Shi‘ites]. How do you mean it is the work of the Kızılbaş? 
Look there, the candles have extinguished. When the electricity went out and 
candles were lighted it became the work of the Kızılbaş. Of course, the majority 
of the people there were Alevi. So, we said how are the Kızılbaş? They will 
extinguish candles. Did you see such a thing with your own eyes? Have you ever 
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experienced such a thing? No, my grandfather told me. What was your 
grandfather? He was an ignorant person who has not even finished his primary 
education. But you are an engineer. How can you fall for your grandfather‘s 
words, how can you slander the most honorable people in the world? He was 
stunned when we said that. He was an engineer and an intellectual. He belonged 
to the elite group of society. Why? It happened in a subconscious fashion. But we 
have experienced such things. 
In Bursa, prior to the 1950s we were known as the Kızılbaş who eat people. In a 
place like Bursa. Because we were living in exile, they called us the Kızılbaş who 
eat people. And your people, you are in a respected position, you are from the 
stock of dedes, you have a lot of pupils, you are in a position of leadership with 
respect to faith issues. You are going to that place in a position of leadership with 
respect to faith issues, yet you get called a Kızılbaş who eats people. That is your 
name. But those people who are called Kızılbaş who eat people, have never even 
killed a chicken in their lives. They are people who cannot even kill a chicken. 
But this is what is being said. And it is said in a loud voice. 
Alevis are not Clean 
[ B.Ü ]: Of course. A military unit is a nice thing, on the one hand. You get to 
know a lot of different people, and bond with them. They say you become a man 
in the army. Of course. You become a man, you become a [grown up] person 
[human being]. One day in the army, I was talking to the hoca (chaplain). Of 
course, he tells [stories], I tell [stories]. The hoca speaks of the Prophet, speaks of 
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Hazrat Ali, he talks about it, I talk about it. I had not said that I am an Alevi. One 
day such a conversation started up again, he said this: Where I come from, you 
there are Alevis, these are dirty people. Well hoca, why do you say such a thing 
about these people? It is not like you know. These people are very dirty. They are 
gypsies. But my hoca, I am an Alevi. He immediately left where he was sitting, I 
can still see it in front of me. 
Extinguishing candles 
[ M. İ.]: That story of the extinguished candles, or, things like, no, to become a 
Muslim they first went to a church, I was in Istanbul for my lower secondary 
education, I went to the same school for my higher secondary education as well. 
The girl sitting in my bench was called Sevgi. A simple girl from Thrace. She told 
me that, when Alevis make a promise green smoke emerges from their mouths, I 
retorted with an oh . . . Why are you saying this, because I am an Alevi too. I was 
working for the newspaper G. The person in the story is a journalist. At the time, 
on the economy desk were us two Alevis. A. A. and me. A. was going on a 
business trip somewhere, to Erzincan I believe. This other colleague of ours said, 
but look out, over there you have these Kurds with tails. This person had 
graduated from the Maarif Koleji [a selective high school of high standards], he 
had been to Europe, he had received a good education, he was a child of a family 
with means. We thought that he was making a joke or something. So, we said, is 
that so, how long are those tails? He retorts, I am telling you in all seriousness. 
So, Abbas asks our colleague what are these Kurds with tails like, as he is a Kurd 
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as well as an Alevi. He said there are Alevi Kurds over there, my grandmother 
always told me. Whereupon my other colleague slipped down his trousers and 
said, have a look at my backside, can you see my tail. The person who said this 
was a journalist. Of course, the number of people saying such things has 
decreased. With [today‘s policy of] openness on the television networks, such 
[opinions] are nowadays laughed at. 
In order to be a Muslim you first need to become Christian: The case of “Hülle” 
[ A. Y.]: An Alevi needs to change his religion before he can become a [true] 
Muslim, he needs to become a Christian first as he cannot become a Muslim 
directly according to some people. There is this thing called hülle [Islamic law 
interim marriage; considered necessary before a man can remarry a woman whom 
he has divorced three times in succession]. We have been despised historically. 
There is no tradition like ours that value honor. 
They do not eat our meals. They say that we don‘t distinguish between our 
mothers and female family members at our assemblies, even an animal does not 
do such a thing. The issue of morality is very strict amongst Alevis. 
7.4.2. Humiliation, Denial of Identity and Alevi Involvement in Left-Wing Violence  
There are hundreds of episodes of folk rebellions, social and economic 
contentions in Anatolian history, some of which are mentioned in chapter 2. The majority 
of these rebellions and contentions have been initiated by the Turcoman tribes, and after 
the 16
th
 century they were called the Kızılbaş of Anatolia. The sources of many of these 
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contentions have been social and economic marginalization and discontent, whereas now 
they are being claimed by Alevi activists to be the antecedent of the contemporary 
struggle for the recognition of Alevi identity. Feelings of permanent marginalization, 
victimization and humiliation, together with the discourses of revolutionary resistance 
have motivated the massive involvement of Alevi youth in extreme left organizations. 
The vast majority of the members and supporters of the revolutionary leftist organizations 
such as DEV-SOL, TIKKO, and TKP were Alevi
113
. Almost all of these organizations 
have been involved in certain violent practices. TIKKO has a more specific membership 
and militant profile, and in a particular are from the Tunceli (Dersim) region (Kurdish 
Alevi). These acts of organized violence during the 1970s, 80s and early 90s had not been 
perpetrated for the Alevi cause, but it was always much easier for these organizations to 
recruit militants and members among Alevi citizens. 
It was not uncommon to encounter the allegorizations that considered Marx, 
Lenin and Mao to be the Pir Sultan Abdal or Shah Ismails of the century. Even the 
secularized Alevis or atheists referred to the atrocities of Yazid, the oppressive legacy of 
the Umayyad dynasty and the martyrdom of Hussein in their discourses on social 
resistance. Religion and sect are not important concerns for these Marxist oriented or 
secularist groups, what really mattered for these people were the ―perennial struggle 
against the oppressive central authorities and dogmatic, highly politicized and biased 
interpreters of religion. The resentments that had prevented the integration of the Alevi 
                                                 
113  Personal contact with the police chief who was involved in the cases related to extreme left organizations in Turkey. Some of my informants were also 
actively involved in those organizations; they personally confirmed police chiefs‘ statements. 
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community with the rest of Turkish society thus had also been tailored to proxy causes. 
Alevi citizens have always been under the scrutiny of the Turkish state and their loyalties 
to the Turkish State have been considered questionable. The cycle of marginalization, 
humiliation, oppression, rebellion, mistrust and further marginalization and contention 
has been maintained for centuries in different forms. The name of this new struggle 
starting from the early 1990s is the ―struggle for the recognition of the Alevi identity.‖ In 
the current democratic context of Turkey there are multiplicities of non-violent, 
democratic channels for conducting the struggle. The pscyhocultural drives of fear, 
victimhood psychology, humiliation and traumatic memories are important motives 
behind the ―Alevist movement.‖ Psychocultural dramas and collective and personal 
narratives are important gateways for understanding the meanings of Alevi identity and 
the Alevi identity struggle. 
7.5. Narratives on Emotions 
Rules for narrative construction guide our attempt to account for human actions 
across time (Spence, 1982). There are certain rules and conventions according to which 
Alevi narratives are also told. Turning points in the narratives manifest the changes in 
emotional and evaluative states, whether in positive or negative terms. The connections 
of past and future are related in the light of these evaluative positions that create new 
relational moments. In the rest of this chapter I will analyze the important turning points 
for Alevis and their evaluation of these events and processes. 
In the case of Alevi narratives, the goals of the narratives is to end social, 
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economic, cultural and religious marginalization and to attain recognition of their identity 
claims. Personal and group information related to past and future are storied according to 
their personal and group objectives. The memories pertaining to the past are retrieved 
according to certain narrative conventions. Kenneth Gergen‘s models for narrative forms 
are elucidative for categorizing my narrative data related to the critical moments and 
turning points of Alevi popular historiography. 
There are three main prototypical forms of primitive narratives: ―those in which 
progress toward the goal is enhanced, those in which it is impeded, and those in which no 
change occurs‖ (Gergen, 1986, p.27). In progressive narratives there is a progress 
towards the designated/valued goal, whereas in regressive narratives there is a digression 
from the goals. The third category is the one in which there is no positive or negative 
change with regard to the designated goal  
When events are kinked in such a way that one steadily progresses toward a goal 
we may speak of progressive narrative; if one is continuously moving away from 
the valued state it may be called regressive narrative. The last if these prototypical 
forms may be termed the stability narrative that is a narrative that links incidents, 
images or concepts in such a way that the protagonist remains essentially 
unchanged with respect to evaluative position (Gergen, 1986, p. 27) 
In addition to the primitive narrative forms there are other more complicated or combined 
narrative forms. In tragedy there is a rapid downfall after the achievement of high 
position, in other terms rapid regressive narrative follows a progressive narrative 
(Gergen, 1999, p. 72). Comedy and melodrama narratives are the reverse of the tragedy: 
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regressive narrative is followed by a progressive narrative (Gergen, 1986; Gergen, 1999). 
In comedy or melodrama the intended goal is eventually achieved after a single or a series 
of unsuccessful attempts. ―Positive state of affairs is interrupted by a calamity, and the 
remainder of the story is occupied with a series of events that finally restore order and 
tranquility‖ (Gergen, 1999, p. 72). One of the most commonly practiced narrative forms 
for Alevi historical narratives is the heroic saga in which history or life stories are 
understood as a series of ups and downs in a struggle. Some unfortunate or unsuccessful 
steps are taken to achieve a particular goal (Gergen, 1986; Gergen, 1999). What is more 
important in the heroic saga is the persistence of certain moral qualities or goals 
regardless of successes and failures. The struggle itself and the heroes that are 
maintaining the struggle, in the Alevi case, the heroes mentioned in the previous chapter, 
are glorified and the images that try to prevent the struggle are morally condemned. 
The ―happily ever after‖ narrative is the progressive narrative that is followed by 
a stability narrative (Gergen, 1999). This is the ideal narrative form for the fairytales that 
end happily; it may also be relevant for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This is the 
category of narrative that I could hardly encounter during my research; however I tried to 
encourage my informants to imagine the possible paths towards such a direction in order 
to have an idea about ideal solution options. 
7.5.1 Critical Moments and Turning Points in Historical Narratives 
 It is very common to hear from almost all the Alevis about the historical 
background of their ―identity struggle.‖ The contemporary Alevi struggle for recognition 
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is presented as a continuation of a centuries-old struggle. There are ups and downs; tragic 
events and glories; heroes and villains, during this ―imagined history.‖ Some Alevi begin 
the struggle with the early Islamic period, some others with the Shah Ismail- Yavuz 
Sultan Selim confrontation, and some others with the Babaî revolts of the 13
th
 century. 
There are even perspectives that start the ―Alevi identity struggle‖ from the ancient 
Anatolian civilizations. No matter when the narratives initiate the sources and the 
beginnings of the Alevi history, they present it in the form of a struggle. There are ups, 
downs and certain continuing dynamics in the narratives and emotions such as fear, 
humiliation, shame, trauma, and threat perceptions which are connected to these 
dynamics. 
 Rather than presenting a chronological list of the important events and turning 
points of Alevi public narratives, I present them according to the models of narrative 
forms that I explicated above. Four main categories of narratives are: progressive, 
regressive, tragic and heroic. In addition to these four categories I emphasize another 
category, which I call faltering narratives. The happily ever after narrative represents a 
wish for the Alevis. The evaluation of the progression of narratives is done emotionally 
and normatively. 
7.5.2. Complicating the Drama's Archetypes of Evil and their Followers: The Villains 
in Alevi Public Narratives 
 In the Alevi historical imagination there are certain figures that are presented as 
the archetypal evil personalities, who attempted to destroy or humiliate the predecessors 
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of the Alevi community. These personalities are the main actors of the traumatic events 
and the psychocultural dramas for Alevis. Their legacies are still a serious concern and 
source of fear and anger. Opponents or other enemies of the Alevi community even today 
are described and de-legitimized in relation to these archetypal images of evil 
personalities. It is common for Alevis to refer to Sunnis they don‘t like or they don‘t trust 
as Yezit or to call some of the right wing politicians as Muaviye. Hızır Paşa is also a 
common idiom that is used to de-legitimize Alevis that seem to cooperate with Sunnis 
and forestall Alevis from reaching their collective goals. Yezit, Muaviye, Ebussuud and 
Hızır Paşa are the four major archetypal images of evil. There are other important images 
of villains, which will be examined below but these four names appear as reference 
personalities with their negative characteristics. 
i) Yezit (Yazid ibn Muawiya ibn Abu Sufyan/ 645-683): He is considered to be the 
primary culprit of the Karbala Disaster and the enemy of Ahl-al bayt. He is associated 
with pure destruction, killing and attempts to annihilate ancestors of ―Alevis‖ by 
violence. Even the secular or ―atheist‖ Alevis use the idiom of Yezit against their Sunni 
rivals or enemies. For a long time Alevis called their enemies ―Yezits.‖ Calling someone 
Yezit is the worst form of insult for Alevis and it is frequently used against conservative 
Sunnis. 
ii) Muaviye (Muawiya ibn Abu Sufyan/ 602-680): Muaviye is the father of Yezit and son 
of Mecca notable, Abu Sufyan. Muaviye was considered to be the arch enemy of Ali (Ali 
ibn ebu Talip), his father was considered to be the enemy of the Prophet and his son is the 
murderer of Hussein. Political conspiracies, coalition formation, and dirty political and 
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religious tricks to promote self interest are associated with Muaviye
114
. There are many 
reasons mentioned why Alevis don‘t like Muaviye, but two events are graphically 
described by many people to de-legitimize Muaviye. In the Battle of Siffin, Muaviye‘s 
troops used the pages of the Quran to stop Ali‘s troops, and in the arbitration affair 
(hakem event) he is believed to be the cheater. Muaviye is associated with coordinating 
complicated political tricks, using religious sensitivities to cheat and promote the specific 
interests of his own tribe. 
iii) Ebussud (1490- 1574) (Grand Mufti/ Sheiykhulislam of Suleiman the Magnificient): 
He was the supreme judge during the Suleiman I and Selim II. He brought local laws in 
conformity with Islamic law (sharia). He is known as being against esoteric sects and 
decreeing legal justification for their oppression and killing. He was accused of 
producing technologies de-legitimizing Kızılbaş, inventing certain legal procedures, 
instruments, and spreading slander in order to oppress and assimilate Kızılbaş and other 
esoteric sects. 
iv) Hızır Paşa (No exact info about his birth but he was in charge in the 1560s): Hızır 
Paşa is considered to be the archetypal image of a traitor within Alevi community. There 
                                                 
114  ―After the assassination of third caliph Uthman, Mu'awiyah, governor of Syria, refused to recognize 'Ali as the new caliph, calling instead for vengeance for 
the blood of his murdered kinsman. 'Ali responded by invading Syria. The two armies met along the Euphrates River at Siffin (near the Syrian-Iraqi border), where 
they engaged in an indecisive succession of skirmishes, truces, and battles, culminating in the legendary appearance of Mu'awiyah's troops with copies of the Qur'an 
impaled on their lances—supposedly a sign to let God's word decide the conflict. 'Ali delegated Abu Musa al-Ash'ari as his representative, while Mu'awiyah sent 
'Amr ibn al-'As. The two men, on the basis of the Qur'an and the traditions (Hadith) of the Prophet and in the presence of witnesses, were to decide whether 'Uthman 
had been guilty of abusing the divine law. If he had sinned and his murder was justified, then 'Ali's position as caliph would be secure; a verdict of innocence, 
however, would justify Mu'awiyah's attempts at vengeance and dislodge 'Ali. In a meeting at Adhruh (in present Jordan; some suggest Dumat al-Jandal, in present 
Saudi Arabia) in February 658, the arbitrators decided on 'Uthman's innocence. 'Ali immediately denounced the decision as invalid and reneged on his oath to be 
bound by the arbitration; Mu'awiyah, meanwhile, was proclaimed caliph by some of his Syrian supporters. In January 659 the arbitrators met at Adhruh, formally 
deposed both 'Ali and Mu'awiyah, then discussed the candidacy of 'Abd Allah ibn 'Umar and Mu'awiyah for the caliphate; no decision was reached. 'Ali and 
Mu'awiyah retained their own partisans, but, as Mu'awiyah's authority began to expand into Iraq and the Hejaz (western Saudi Arabia), 'Ali's diminished to Kufah, his 
capital. With 'Ali's assassination in 661, Mu'awiyah was free to establish himself as the first caliph of the Umayyad house‖. "Siffin, Battle of." Encyclopædia 
Britannica. 2009. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 22 Apr.  2009  <http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9067690>. 
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is not clear information about his historical personality and his biography but there are 
clear negative convictions concerning what he is believed to have done against Pir Sultan 
Abdal. He is accused of cooperating with the enemies of Alevis and oppressing his own 
people. 
 The entire narratives related to these archetypal images of evil and the heroic or 
tragic events around these personalities can be considered as mythico-histocial events 
(Rothbart & Bartlett, 2006). The temporal, moral and emotional order around these 
events and personalities are configured uniquely according to the concerns, priorities, 
challenges and emotional states of Alevis. Having mentioned the archetypes of evil 
personalities and moral and emotional backgrounds of these figures and associated 
events, I will explicate more on the ―lesser evils‖ or ―villains‖ for Alevis. There may be a 
study that is solely related to this subject because there is an enormous body of narratives 
and stories in relation to villains and accounts related to their faults. Just like analyzing 
the heroes, discussing and analyzing the villains helps to reveal moral values, collective 
emotions such as fear, amity, animosity, significant events and Alevis‘ understanding of 
their unresolved traumatic experiences and future expectations. It is also helpful to reveal 
how the historical and contemporary villains are related to each other for practical 
purposes. 
Below, I have summarized the list of villains and the deeds and misdemeanors 
that are associated with their names in tables 9, 10, 11 and 12. For the purposes of 
simplification and clarity I categorized the frequently mentioned villains in four lists. The 
episodes and some of the events associated with these figures will be referred to in the 
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narratives below. The first list is composed of figures from the early Islamic history, 
mainly among the companions of the Prophet Muhammad and Ali. One of the major 
differences between Alevis and Sunnis in Turkey is the different ways in which they 
approach Sahaba (companions of the Prophet Muhammed). Alevis are much more critical 
of the Sahaba; they are even outspoken about their hatred of some of the most well 
known Shaba. 
[ D.K.]: For one thing, the way Sunnis look at the Companions of the Prophet is 
wrong. There is an understanding that a companion is faithful. In other words, a 
companion would never lie. There is something in the vein of the hadith, known 
as sahabetünnebi sadikun. These are true, they are trustworthy. Consequently, we 
do not sanctify every companion. If you say sahabah, it is over for them, they are 
seen like the stars in the sky, whichever one you cling to will bring you to the 
right path. I do not agree. In my view, for a sahabah to be true means that there 
can be no falsified chain of transmitters to the Prophet. In other words, while 
recounting a hadith, they would never say the Prophet said this while knowing full 
well he didn‘t. But people, the Prophet even gets criticized in the Kuran. I criticize 
the fact that while the Prophet‘s remains were on display, the Caliphate was 
immediately chosen. It was really done very hastily. Was there a fault by Abu 
Bakr, was it the fault of Umar, especially Uthman. I think so. 
Table 7.1.: List of Villains 1: Figures from Early Islamic History (Sahabah) 
Table 7.1. List of Villains 1: Figures from Early Islamic History 
(Sahabah) 
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Villains (Turkish 
pronunciations are bold) 
Reasons mentioned for the moral blame 
Yezit (Yazid ibn Muawiyah 
ibn Abu Sufyan/ 645-683) 
Culprit of the Karbala Massacre,  
Massacred Hussein 
Greatest ―evil‖ personality of all times, 
Enemy of Islam,  
Enemy of Ahl-al Bayt 
Muaviye (Muawiya ibn Abu 
Sufyan/ 602-680) 
Was the arch enemy of Ali, 
 Coordinated the conspiracies against Ali 
He was considered to be a Machiavellian figure 
Haccac-ı Zalim (661-714) He was the mayor of Hijaz and Yemen,  
Ruthless enemy of Ahl-al Bayt 
Ömer (Omar ibn-al Khattab)  
602-680 
Extorted the caliphate right of Ali,  
Threatened the members of the Ahl-al Bayt 
Ebu Bekir (Abu Bakr as 
Siddiq/ 573-634) 
Extorted the caliphate right of Ali,  
Denied Fatima‘s right to the  Fadak Date Grove 
Osman (Uthman ibn Affan/ 
579-656)  
Gave privileges to Umayyad Family 
Was a weak leader 
Ebu Süfyan (Abu Sufyan/ 
560-650) 
Leading figures of Quraish 
Tribe in Macca 
Father of Muawiya, 
Leading figure in Umayyad Family 
Ayşe (Aisha bint Abu Bakr/ 
died in 678) 
(Prophet Mohammad‘s Wife, 
Fought against Ali in the battle of Jamal 
Tried to mobilize sahabah against Ali 
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Abu Bakr‘s daughter) 
 
 The second set of villains is from Ottoman History. The Alevi understanding of 
popular Ottoman historiography is completely different from the Sunni understanding of 
Ottoman historiography. For Alevis, the Ottoman State was established on the Alevi 
Bektaşi principles of tolerance and humility. The establishment of the ulama legacy and 
Kızılbaş rebellions were considered a disaster for Alevis. Alevis believe that as the 
Ottoman Empire grew and became more cosmopolitan, it excluded and persecuted 
Kızılbaş Turcomans.  
[A. Y.]: Centre-Periphery (political and social) in Seljuk times the Babâî 
uprisings, the Jelalî revolts in Ottoman times disclose that Alevis represent the 
periphery. Dervishes and Bektashi babas are the ones who founded the Ottoman 
state, [after having been] founded by the coloniser Turkish dervishes it spread to 
Anatolia and the Balkans. When the Ottomans started assuming a more 
cosmopolitan kind of empire, these dervishes get pushed to a second tier and there 
is a development towards a more centralized state formation, [and] in this context 
the Bektashi babas become neglected. This separation becomes most visible in the 
course of the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry struggles. 
For them, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Modern 
Turkish Republic was a blessing. The Ottoman legacy left very dark memories in the 
Alevi public imagination. Many of the Alevi heroes were the figures that struggled for 
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justice with the Ottoman central authorities and were then executed by the villains. The 
list below is an abridged list that only includes the figures that have the highest positions 
in the list villains. 
[ F.A.]: As such, Sunni Islam, the Alevi creed were formalized after the 16
th
 
century. Up to that point there had been no such thing as Sunni or Alevi. All Sunni 
Muslims were Alevis. When Mevlana [Rumi], Hacı Bektaş Veli came to Anatolia 
there was no such [distinction between] Sunni Muslims and Alevis. Islam had 
been spread to everybody by means of the fact of the Ahl al-Bayt. The Seljuk state 
was a state pertaining to the Ahl al-Bayt. The Ottoman state was like that too until 
it got to [the reign of] Sultan Selim I [Yavuz]. This separation occurred after [the 
reign of] Sultan Selim I [Yavuz]. The Byzantines, Sultan Selim had his mother, his 
father, his brothers killed when he got to the throne, after that he inserted religious 
affairs into the palace [administration], up to that point these had been 
administered from Mekka and Madinah, but through conquest he got hold of 
them. Up to that point, they had had no contact with those administering religion. 
Saying the palace [of pleasure and enjoyment], they became Party to bigotry, and 
caused society to become enemies of one another. 
Table 7.2.: List of Villians 2 Figures from Ottoman History 
Table 7.2. List of Villains 2: Figures from Ottoman History 
 
Villains (Turkish 
pronunciations are bold) 
Reasons mentioned for the moral blame 
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Selim I (Grim-Yavuz) 
(1465-1520) 
Massacred 40000 Kızılbaş in Anatolia 
Defeated Shah Ismail and Kızılbaş ideals, 
Beginning of the oppressive rule against Kızılbaş, 
Defamations against Kızılbaş started at this time,  
Established the sharia order and distorted the tolerant ethos of 
Anatolia, Tried to destroy or assimilate Alevis 
 
Ebussuud (1490- 1574) 
(Sheyhulislam of 
Suleiman the Magnificent) 
Decreed fatwas against Kızılbaş,  
Source of the accusations, slanders and religious stereotypes, 
Made the Ottoman Empire a sharia state 
Issued fatwas to de-legitimize and massacre Kızılbaş 
Hızır Paşa  
(No exact info about his 
birth but he was in charge 
in 1560s) 
Executed Pir Sultan Abdal, who was a legendary rebellious folk 
hero, and other Kızılbaş people 
Betrayed his own people 
He was political opportunist in order to advance in Ottoman 
bureaucracy oppressed people of Anatolia 
Kuyucu Murat Paşa  
(around 1535-1611) 
Was grand vizir of the 
Ottoman Empire between 
1605-11) 
 
Executed tens of thousands of Turcomans/ Kızılbaş during Jelali 
Uprisings 
Buried people in pits 
Was a ruthless killer 
Mahmut II (1785-1839) 
(30th Ottoman Sultan) 
Abolished Bektaşi order and gave the administration of Bektaşi 
lodges to Nakshbandi order 
He even ordered the destruction of Bektaşi tombstones 
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Abdülhamit II 
(Abdul Hamid II/ 1842-
1918) 
34th Sultan 
He had the Islamist agenda of trying to convert Alevis into Sunni 
He was an authoritarian figure who tried to oppress progressive 
forces in the Ottoman Empire 
Mehmet VI 
 (Vahdettin/1861-1926)  
36th Sultan 
Tried to stop Atatürk in the Turkish Independence Struggle 
Cooperated with imperialist Britain 
 
 The third list includes the Turkish politicians from recent past and contemporary 
figures. The list is composed of right wing and Islamist politicians including the current 
Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In general, right-wing and Islamist politicians are 
considered motivated to turn Turkey away from Atatürk‘s ideals of a modern, secular, 
nation state. These images are often associated and compared with the images from early 
Islamic history. It is not uncommon to find people calling Necmettin Erbakan, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan and Kenan Evren as Yezits or Süleyman Demirel and Turgut Özal as 
Muawiya. The level of de-legitimization is boosted by associating the contemporary 
villains with the ―more established historical villains.‖ 
Nothing Happened by Chance 
They first turned the call to prayer (ezan) into Arabic. You listened. 
They said ―You can even bring the Caliphate back if you really want.‖ You 
assumed that this was democratic request. 
They opened the Quran courses and İmam Hatip schools all over. Religion 
courses became mandatory constitutionally. You accepted that. 
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The veiling (tesettür) became widespread and the number of mosques exceeded 
the number of schools. You considered it as freedom of religion. 
They then interrupted your lifestyle and killed the people who do not fast. You 
were surprised.  
They killed the scientists and writers 
They smashed the journalists and MPs, burned your poets and dancers 
You kept questioning the identities of the perpetrators 
At the end they will KNOCK your door; you will have no one to help yourself 
other than you! 
(No author specified, Pir Sultan Abdal: Kültür Sanat Dergisi, Issue 62 (Special 
issue on 13
th
 year of Sivas Events of 1993), June 2006) 
The poem/declaration that is published without a name in the Alevi periodical 
summarizes some of the frustrations and fears of the Alevi citizens with regard to the 
changes in republican ideals. The villains mentioned in the list 3 and 4 are the people 
responsible for the deviation from republican ideals. 
Table 7.3.: List of Villains 3: Politicians (Contemporary) 
Table 7.3. List of Villains 3: Politicians (Contemporary) 
Villains (Turkish 
pronunciations are bold) 
Reasons mentioned by my informants for the moral blame 
Kenan Evren (1918- ) 
7th president of Turkey 
 
Organized 1980 coup and established an authoritarian regime,  
Oppression of Alevis and creation of semi-authoritarian order, 
Ordered mandatory religion courses,  
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Waged the idea of Turkish-Islamic synthesis 
Necmettin Erbakan 
(1926- ) 
Islamist Former PM 
Leader of fundamentalist religious ideals for a long time,  
Against secularism, 
Against Atatürk and Alevis,  
Wants to create sharia based state,  
(Yezid of our age) 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
(1954- ) 
Turkish PM, Former 
mayor of Istanbul 
Ordered to demolish Karaca Ahmet Cemevi when mayor of 
Istanbul  
Have the secret agenda to establish religious state,  
Discriminated Alevis in government jobs  
Süleyman Demirel 
(1924- ) 
Served 7 times as PM of 
Turkey, 9th president of 
Turkey 
Opened İmam Hatip schools,  
Violated secular principles of the republic,  
Used religion for political purposes,  
Always denied Alevis 
Temel Karamollaoğlu 
(1941- ) 
(Former Mayor of Sivas) 
Was the mayor of Sivas during Sivas Events,  
Encouraged fundamentalists 
Şevket Kazan (1933- ) 
(Former Minister of 
Justice during Erbakan 
cabinet) 
Defended suspects of Sivas Events,  
―Mum Söndü‖ accusation (candle went off) 
Publicly humiliated Alevis  
Fundamentalist wants to create sharia based state 
Adnan Menderes 
(1899- 1961) 
Tried to bring the sharia back, 
 Tried to abolish Atatürk‘s secular reforms 
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Bülent Arınç (Head of 
parliament 2002-2007/ 
1948- ) 
 
Fundamentalist Islamist,  
Wants a regime change,  
Polarizing figure that encourages extreme religious tendencies 
Turgut Özal  
(8th President of Turkey/ 
1927-1993) 
Capitalism in Turkey had been strengthened during his period 
He supported the religious oriented groups and Sunni sects 
George W Bush (1946- ) 
US President (2001-2008) 
Had imperialist agenda,  
Waged wars all over world and killed thousands of innocent people 
 
 The fourth list is a more generic list that includes some public figures, institutions, 
political parties, people with a particular mentality, and even states. Intense emotions 
such as fear and hatred are felt, and accusations are made against the actors and generic 
titles in this list. For example, the concepts of ―yobaz‖ (bigot), ―gerici‖ (retrograde) and 
―şeriatçı‖ have similar connotations; for Alevis they try to bring religious bigotry and a 
medieval style theocratic regime. The understanding of ―U.S.‖ (United States) in the 
Alevi political and emotional lexicon is much different than the understanding of U.S. in 
the minds of other groups in Turkey. All the major political conspiracies are somehow 
connected to the U.S. according to Alevis. Rather than giving political agency to Islamist 
groups and religiously oriented communal groups in Turkey, many Alevis consider the 
emergence of these groups to be part of an American agenda in Turkey. 
Unlike the previous century, it is impossible to live an isolated life in the 
contemporary world. Whenever there is a problem in one part of the world, people 
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and countries from the other parts can get involved. For example Fetullah, who is 
sponsored by US, Diyanet and EU are trying to Sunnify the Central Asian Turks 
who had forgotten about their Aleviness 
EU cannot fulfill the expectations of Alevis in terms of pressing for the liberal 
agenda in Turkey. (Murtaza Demir, Kuşatılmış Bir İnancın Tarihi Alevilik. 
İstanbul: Nokta Kitap 2008). 
It is difficult to bring all these villains together for the purpose of ―Sunnifying Alevis,‖ 
but it is not uncommon to hear such statements from well-known Alevi leaders. Some 
left-nationalist (ulusalcı) Alevis even describe the EU as if similar to the Entente Powers 
of WWI that tried to impose the Sevres Treaty on Turkey. 
We are definitely opposed to the EU. Because they are not sincere. They apply a 
double standard. They are imperialist powers that want to divide our country. 
They are not going to accept Turkey anyway. There is no such possibility. We 
would also like to live in London, in Paris, we would like to travel there but those 
are just pipedreams. The people who are supposed to accept Turkey into the EU, 
[at the same time] supply people in the southeast with weapons, landmines, tanks, 
rocket launchers, [and] are helping the feudal system in place. Let the people from 
Europe, the people from Germany come to a place where feudal remnants are 
[still] in place. Would you like to see such a thing? So, why don‘t they subscribe 
to such a thing, those who support the continuation of such a structure, who are 
defending it, bowing and scraping in front of those hajjis and hocas, and then 
practicing revolution, you are going to say we are revolutionaries while you are 
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bowing and scraping in front of feudal lords. If the EU would have committed the 
necessary investments, if they would have channeled the money there over all 
those years that area would never have gotten to its current desperate state. P.21. 
There are also many Alevis who consider Turkey‘s EU integration process to be the right 
path for the liberalization of Turkey.  
[A.Yl.]: The EU [accession] process is very important for us. We value the EU 
above all else. And the problems are going to get resolved with the EU. Even if 
we don‘t join the EU, the EU [accession] process, if the ones in power are not 
being hypocritical, if the EU [accession] process is taken seriously then in a legal 
sense it can secure a lot of things, it can secure equality. If what they call the laws 
of conformity [to EU standards], if these laws of conformity can be realized. If the 
EU‘s laws find their counterpart in real life, if they become accepted, if the EU 
standards become accepted in a way, if they spread out among society, among the 
state [‗s institutions], they are a prerequisite for Alevis. These are all things that 
will end injustice, lawlessness, discrimination. 
There are always rumors about the ―deep state‖/―secret state‖ in Turkey, which is seen as 
one of the beneficiaries of the maintenance of Alevi-Sunni tension in Turkey. Analyzing 
these narratives reveals the deep collective emotions of many Alevis. 
Table 7.4.: List of Villains 4: Public Figures, Institutions and Groups 
Table 7.4. List of Villains 4: Public Figures, Institutions and Groups 
Villains (Turkish 
pronunciations are bold) 
Reasons mentioned for the moral blame 
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Yobazlar (Bigots) / 
Şeriatçılar 
Wants to return Turkey to the Medieval darkness,  
Enemy of progressive Alevi ideals (other of Alevi image) 
They are enemies of Atatürk and fundamental principles of the Turkish 
Republic 
They assassinated the secularist progressive intellectuals and threaten 
progressive people in Turkey 
Deep State/ Secret State 
(Derin devlet) 
Tries to create internal conflict between Alevis ans Sunnis, 
Obstacle to democratization efforts in Turkey 
Responsible for the instigation of Gazi Riots of 1995 and for violence in 
1970s 
 MHP of pre 2000‘s 
(Nationalist National Action 
Party) 
Fought against Alevis in 1970s, 
Perpetrators of the violent massacres against Alevis such as Maraş, Çorum, 
Sivas,  
Abdullah Öcalan 
(Imprisoned PKK chief 1948- 
) 
Wanted to divide Turkey, 
Murderer of kids  
Separatist Terrorist 
US Green Belt Project in 1970-80s supported religious movements in Turkey 
Greater Middle East Project was imperial project to control Islamic World 
Support for moderate Islam and AKP, 
Supported the right-wing violence against Alevis in 1960s and 70s 
Imperial claims over Turkey and the Middle East 
Wants to create a Kurdish state in the South East Turkey 
Güner Ümit 
(Former Quiz show star) 
Publicly mentioned ―candle went of‖ defamation, 
Publicly humiliated Alevis. 
Gülen Movement 
 (Islamic scholar and leader 
Try to create Moderate Islamic regime, 
 Try to assimilate Alevis, wants to take control of Turkish state,  
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of social/ religious 
movement)  
American protegé 
EU (UK, Germany, France 
specifically mentioned) 
Wants to divide Turkey,  
Supports Kurdish separatists, fundamentalist religious movements and 
Atheist Alevis,  
Never gave up the dream of Sevres Treaty, 
Imperial claims over Turkey, wants to divide and rule 
 
In the rest of this chapter some of the key psychocultural narratives that have been 
compiled in field research will be analyzed according to the fivefold narrative 
categorization explicated above. The first group of narratives are related to the dramas of 
the past, where the heroic, tragic and glorious progressive narratives will be revealed. The 
second group of narratives are mainly related to the fears of Alevis related to their future. 
The third group of narratives is related to humiliations that Alevis experience in their 
daily lives and cultural and historical origins of these cases of slander and stereotypes. 
7.6. Bringing the Heroes, Villains, Moral Struggles and Emotions into Action: 
Analyzing the Repertoires of Psychocultural Dramas 
7.6.1. Heroic Saga 
It is a highly regarded form of narrative genre among Alevi public narratives that 
plays a significant role in the formation and maintenance of Alevi identity. It is at the 
same time the most commonly mentioned genre for stating and defending the moral 
positions and collective emotions. Many of the episodes, ―real‖ or ―imagined,‖ start with 
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unjust practices and oppressions of the ―villains‖ and these practices are responded to by 
a heroic resistance and revolt by the actors that Alevis associate themselves with. The 
leaders and the followers of the resistance are glorified and their courage is always 
appreciated. Songs and poems also cited the names of these people in Alevi oral culture. 
At the end, in most cases, the struggle does not reach the expected outcome but the 
struggle itself is glorified because of its moral commitments and heroic stance. 
Many Alevis relate themselves to other the people who struggle against injustice. 
These struggles have been presented in mythic storylines. Emotions such as hope, pride, 
inspiration, and traumatic loss but moral victory are associated with these narratives. For 
many Alevis, the success of these heroic struggles had the potential for shaping an 
entirely different Turkish history. They are considered missed opportunities for creating a 
better world. Leaders of these struggles such as Shah Ismail and Pir Sultan Abdal are 
considered to be iconic heroes. Frequently mentioned heroic narratives are: 
 Battle of Karbala [cult of martyrdom] 
 Rise of the Safavid Movement in Anatolia and Shah Ismail‘s loss at the Battle of 
Çaldıran, 1514 [cult of messianic revolution] 
 Execution of Pir Sultan Abdal by Hızır Paşa, [cult of resistance for 
social/economic justice] 
 Celali Revolts of Anatolia [cult of resistance for social/economic justice] 
 Baba-i Revolts [cult of messianic revolution] 
Karbala Massacre and the cult of Struggle and Martyrdom 
The narratives of the Battle of Karbala (Muharram 10 61-IC/ October 10 680 CE) 
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are probably the most well-known and dramatic heroic struggle and martyrdom case. 
There are different versions of the Karbala narratives by Shiite Muslims, Sunni Muslims 
and Alevis. The Alevi version of ―Karbala‖ will be emphasized here. There are heroic, 
mystic expressions of the event and every year during Muharram, on Ashura (the 10
th
 
day), Shiite Muslims organize mourning/passion play (taziye/ matem) rituals. Narratives 
related to the Battle of Karbala also play an important role in the maintenance of the 
Alevi identity in Anatolia, and the continuation of the appraisal of the struggle for justice 
and mourning of victimhood. 
 According to Alevis, the lineage of the Prophet Muhammed (Ahl-al Bayt) had 
been subjected to oppression and injustice 1,400 years ago. This oppression and injustice 
has been perpetuated in the practices of the Umayyad version of Islam which is defined 
by ―Sunni Islam.‖ One particular bestselling book, Alevilik Olayı: Toplumsal Bir 
Başkaldırının Kısa Tarihçesi115 introduces Alevi history with the Hashemite and 
Umayyad struggle, specifically the debate over the election of the caliph after the Prophet 
Muhammed‘s death. Alevis and Shiites believe that the caliphate was Ali‘s right and was 
seized by Abu Bakr, Omer, Uthman and the Umayyad lineage. The Battle of Karbala is 
the epitome of the Alevi-Sunni struggle in popular Alevi narratives, which is a highly 
contested argument within the academic and non-academic literature. None of the 
authors, even those who consider Alevilik to be outside Islam, deny the significance of 
the Battle of Karbala on the formation of Alevi identity. We can find the more graphic 
and detailed accounts of the Battle of Karbala in books written by Alevi journalists and 
                                                 
115  ―The Phenomena of Alevilik: A Short History of Social Uprising, (35th ed.)‖ Cemal Şener, Etik Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004. 
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researchers. For the purpose of description I will refer to a version found in the 
Encyclopedia Britannica, which provides a descriptive narrative. I will refer to the moral 
and emotional dimensions of the Battle of Karbala in Alevi narratives. 
―When Yazid I succeeded his father, Muaviyah I, to the caliphate in the spring of 
680, the many partisans of Muhammad‘s late cousin and son-in-law Ali ibn Abi 
Ṭalib—who collectively felt that leadership of the Muslim community rightly 
belonged to the descendants of Ali—rose in the city of Kufah, in what is now 
Iraq, and invited Hussein to take refuge with them, promising to have him 
proclaimed caliph there. Meanwhile, Yazid, having learned of the rebellious 
attitude of the Shiites in Kufah, sent Ubaydullah, governor of Basrah, to restore 
order. The latter did so, summoning the chiefs of the tribes, making them 
responsible for the conduct of their people, and threatening reprisal. Hussein 
nevertheless set out from Mecca with all his family and retainers, expecting to be 
received with enthusiasm by the citizens of Kufah. However, on his arrival at 
Karbala, west of the Euphrates River, on October 10, he was confronted by a large 
army of perhaps 4,000 men. Hussein, whose retinue mustered only 72 fighting 
men, gave battle, vainly relying on the promised aid from Al-Kūfah, and fell with 
almost all his family and followers. The bodies of the dead, including that of 
Hussein, were then mutilated, only adding to the consternation of later 
generations of Shiites. Grandson of the Prophet and many members of the 
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Prophet‘s family had been massacred with the order of Yazid116.  
As mentioned above Yazid epitomizes many of the evil things that are attributed to the 
Umayyad dynasty and their ―contemporary representatives and inheritors.‖ Yazid was 
graphically described as an evil and oppressive ruler who was drinking alcohol, spending 
his time with women and spending the money of the Umma for his fun‖ (fe Şener, 2004, 
pp. 37-41). Hussein, at the same time, represents the ideal typical heroic characteristics 
and noble values such as struggling for justice and protecting religion corrupted rulers 
who would manipulate it for their own good and personal interests. The martyrdom of 
Hussein is an inspiration for resistance against oppression and unjust practices. Alevis 
believe that in the Battle of Karbala the entire Ahl-al Bayt wanted to be martyred. Many 
Alevis associate themselves with this martyrdom, as well. 
 The Battle of Karbala is an important heroic and tragic narrative. Historically all 
the Alevi/Kızılbaş rebellions and struggles have somehow been related to Karbala. The 
contemporary Sivas Events, Gazi Riots and various other assaults on Alevis are 
interpreted through the symbolic repertoires of the Karbala Event. Karbala is one of the 
major ―chosen traumas,‖ in Volkan‘s terms, or ―pscyhocultural drama,‖ in Ross‘s 
conceptual frame or ―critical event‖ (Das, 1996), ―turning point in narrative‖ (Cobb, 
2006; Leary 2004; Putnam, 2004; Wheeler & Morris, 2001) or mythic narrative, which is 
defined as a ―sacred episode that becomes a prototype of a normative order‖ (Rothbart, & 
Korostelina, 2006, p. 38). Yazid is the iconic representation of evil in the Alevi normative 
                                                 
116  From Encyclopedia Britannica with minor revisions. Battle of Karbala (islamic History) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/312214/Battle-of-Karbala 
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order and Sunnis have historically been defined as ―Yazid‖ which is a very strong form of 
otherization and de-legitimization. Karbala is the archetypal narrative of victimhood for 
Alevis, which is glorified as a heroic narrative because of its value commitments. During 
my field research I heard the versions of Karbala, in which the contention had been 
defined as a struggle for secularism and human rights against the sharia order. There were 
even citizens who described Hussein and members of Ahl-al Bayt, who were martyred in 
the Battle, as the ―martyrs of democracy.‖ Even though anachronistic, these definitions 
represent the sensitivities and moral commitments of some contemporary Alevis. 
Shah Ismail (Shah Hatayi) and the Ottoman, Kızılbaş Struggles 
The origins and historical background of the Ottoman Safevid Conflict is 
discussed in chapter 2. Here, I will discuss the significance of Shah Ismail's image in the 
Alevi social imagination. The origin of the Alevi/Kızılbaş community‘s negative attitudes 
and feelings toward the Ottoman Empire is mainly related to the Ottoman-Safevid 
confrontations and the Alevi‘s support for the Shah Ismail. Hatayi‘s poems are still cited 
in Alevi cem ceremonies. The Ottoman State and Turkish Republic‘s skeptical attitude 
towards the Kızılbaş communities dates back to this bloody struggle. There were 
historically Turcoman/Alevi uprisings before the emergence of Safevism, but in the case 
of the Ottoman-Safevid struggle, Kızılbaş had taken side with the arch enemy of the 
Ottoman Empire. There was a clear commitment to Shah Ismail and the Ottoman Sultan 
had lost his ground in East Anatolia. 
Kızılbaş, the Sunni division among the Turcoman populations of Anatolia, was 
determined based on loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan or Safevid Shah. Sunni Turcoman 
413 
 
villages stayed loyal to the Sultan; their rituals were not much different than the Kızılbaş 
community's. Many of the stereotypes and negative images related to Alevis date back to 
this period. Kızılbaş Turcomans had been suppressed by violence, and 40,000 Turcomans 
were estimated to have been killed by Selim I‘s forces. After the Kızılbaş massacres, 
Kızılbaş groups moved to solitary places in Anatolia. Kızılbaş were always considered to 
be a rebellious, or a potential threat. The terror of the Kızılbaş Massacres has an 
important place in Alevi public narratives. The Kızılbaş Massacres can be considered 
another important chosen trauma, psychocultural drama, or a turning point in Alevi state 
relationships. None of the Alevis that I spoke with associated themselves positively with 
the Ottoman legacy and Ottoman past. 
The storyline of permanent victimization and marginalization during the Ottoman 
era is always supported with ―Ottoman-Safevid Conflict.‖ One of the prominent Alevi 
authors once said that within the presence of a mix of Alevi-Sunni scholars and writers, 
the ―Yavuz Sultan Selim- Shah Ismail struggle was a conflict between two Turkish rulers, 
if Shah Ismail had defeated Yavuz Sultan Selim rather than the vice verse, our names, the 
ezan we hear five times a day, our rituals might have been much different today.‖ Alevis 
think that the Sunnification of the Turcomans started after the Ottoman-Safevid Conflict. 
It is believed that until that time all Anatolian Muslims were Alevi. It is difficult to 
substantiate these arguments but it is definitely believed by the majority of Alevis. In a 
sense, Shah Ismail‘s defeat was the beginning of the trouble periods for the Anatolian 
Alevis and they have been losing ground ever since, as they are assimilated and 
oppressed. Shah Ismail‘s movement against the Ottoman State was considered a heroic 
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fight, but at the same time his defeat at the Battle of Çaldıran (1514) is considered chosen 
trauma and a catastrophic loss. Alevis believe that they have been paying a high price to 
survive and maintain their identity for almost five centuries. 
The moral significance of the Yavuz Sultan Selim- Shah Ismail conflict according 
to Alevis is the Sunnification and Arabization of the Ottoman Empire afterwards. Shah 
Ismail was a Turkish speaking ruler, writing his poems in Turkish, which is one of the 
reasons why he has had such an influence on Turcoman tribes. The Turkish language and 
Turkish understanding of Islam (Alevilik) has lost ground from the Umayyad 
understanding of Islam, and the Arabic language has become more influential.  Shah 
Ismail and his legacy has been supported on a nationalistic basis, as well. Alevis believe 
that they have protected and maintained Turkish culture and language with their oral 
tradition and rituals, otherwise Turkish culture might have been assimilated into Arab 
influences. 
Some prophetic or divine features had been attributed to Shah Ismail in 
popular Alevi narratives and in some poems
117.
 Besides being a political rival to 
Ottoman Empire, Shah Ismail and his movement was a Messianic
118
 revolutionary 
movement and Shah Ismail was considered to be the Mahdi
119 by many of his Kızılbaş 
                                                 
117  For the discussion of attributing divinity to Shah Ismail, Mélikoff, 2007, pp. 67-83), Mélikoff even argues with reference to popular narratives and poems, 
there were groups that deified Shah Ismail. Besides being a political rival to the Ottoman Empire, Shah Ismail was also 
118  Messianism  is the belief that a religio-political figure will appear at the end of time to lead society to justice. Shared by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 
Islamic messianism combines the belief that Jesus is the Messiah and will return at the end of time with the belief that a divinely appointed Mahdi (guide) will appear 
around the same time to deliver people from tyranny and oppression (Oxford reference online). 
119 Mahdi is the Divinely guided one. An eschatological figure who Muslims believe will usher in an era of justice and true belief just prior to the end of time; an 
honorific applied to Muhammad and the first four caliphs by the earliest Muslims. Not mentioned in the Quran. The concept was developed by the Shiis and some 
Sunnis into that of a messianic deliverer who would return to champion their cause. Common themes run through both traditions: he will be of Muhammad's family; 
he will appear when the world is irretrievably corrupt; his reign will be a time of natural abundance; he will spread justice, restore the faith, and defeat the enemies of 
Islam (Oxford reference). 
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followers in Anatolia and in Iran. The Babaî revolts in the 13
th
 century were also 
Messianic Turcoman Revolts and these movements were considered the origins of the 
Anatolian Alevilik by some scholars (Ocak, 1996). The Seljukid army could only 
suppress the Babaî Revolts with the help of legionary Frank soldiers. The messianic 
nature of divinely inspired social revolution movements had historically created 
excitement and led to the mobilization of Turcoman groups. They considered 
themselves always at the periphery and marginalized position, and the Messianic 
movements were intended to transform society. Central governments therefore 
(Ottoman and Seljukid) were always skeptical of Kızılbaş Turcoman tribes.  
Besides social and economic dissatisfaction, the massive involvement of Alevi 
youth in revolutionary Marxist organizations have other explanations. The cultural and 
historical influences, rebellious and revolutionary tendencies,and messianic mystic 
ideas have also contributed to the involvement of Alevi youth in these movements. 
Historically, the conflictual interactions between Alevis and the central political 
authorities have been shaped along these cultural sources. Poems and mystic, 
messianic propaganda were very influential instruments of mass mobilization that still 
prevail in the public memory and social imagination of Alevi communities. Together 
with the poems of Pir Sultan Abdal, Shah Hatayi‘s poems played a role in the shaping 
of the cultural imagination of Kızılbaş groups vis a vis the Ottoman State. 
Pîr Sultan Abdal and Hızır Paşa  
Pir Sultan Abdal is one of the most famous and respected Alevi-Bektaşi poets and 
loved by Alevis throughout history. He was not just a poet and folk hero, but also an 
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Anatolian folk rebel who struggled against the unjust order with his non-violent 
resistance. His instruments were his poems and his saz (lute). Pir Sultan Abdal inspired 
the Alevi youth and social activists, especially the people who were involved in the 
extreme left groups and organizations, including the violent ones. Narratives of Pir Sultan 
Abdal are still as popular and influential within the Alevi social cosmology and collective 
repertoire. As with the case of the Battle of Karbala, social resistance, struggle with the 
unjust political authorities and victimhood at the hands of the ruthless oppressors are 
highlighted. The Ottoman treatment and social, economic marginalization of Alevis have 
been emphasized in the narratives of Pir Sultan Abdal.  
The villain in the case of Pir Sultan Abdal stories is the famous image of ―Hızır 
Paşa. In terms of being an evil personality he cannot reach the level of ―Yazid‖ but he is 
often considered to be a traitor or betrayer who cooperated with the political authorities to 
oppress his own people in order to improve in the ranks of the power. It is commonly 
used in order to criticize and de-legitimize Alevis who are considered to be damaging to 
the Alevi cause. (Çamuroğlu). According to popular Alevi narratives,the promoting of 
assimilation and the contributing to the continuation of marginalization were the 
characteristics of the ―Historical Hızır Paşa,‖ (as well as of his more contemporary 
―incarnates‖). 
 There are few official records related to the life and struggle of Pir Sultan Abdal. 
He may have been involved in some minor insurrections but the available knowledge 
about his struggle is derived from his poems (Mélikoff, 2007, p. 76). Because of his 
poems his ―struggle‖ has been kept alive and transferred to other generations. Pir Sultan 
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Abdal was born in the village of Banaz, which is now within the territories of the city of 
Sivas. The Pir in front of his name represents that he was from a dede family. His real 
name was Haydar. His struggle lasted during the reign of Suleiman the Lawgiver (known 
as Suleiman the Magnificent 1520-1566). Legendary Safavid leader Shah Ismail‘s (Shah 
Hatayi) son, Tahmasb (1524-1576) was in power while there was ongoing hostility 
between neighboring states. Pir Sultan Abdal was very much influenced by the poems 
and personality of Shah Hatayi. 
There was a dervish called Hızır among the followers of Pir Sultan. Hızır went to 
Istanbul to become successful. In Istanbul, Hızır climbed up the ranks very fast and 
became a paşa (general) and then general governor. According to the popular narrative Pir 
Sultan Abdal told Hızır, before he had gone to Istanbul, which he will be a general and 
execute him. Hızır was appointed to suppress the uprising in Anatolia and captured Pir 
Sultan Abdal (Mélikoff, 2007; Gölpınarlı & Boratav, 1991). Hızır Paşa ordered that Pir 
Sultan Abdal cite three poems, none of which included Şah120 and Pir Sultan Abdal cited 
three poems praising the ―Şah.‖ Pir Sultan Abdal was executed and Hızır and was cursed 
by Alevis. Many poems have been orally transmitted with the name of Pir Sultan Abdal, 
there is however no clear evidence of which belong to Pir Sultan Abdal. In the 1970s, Pir 
Sultan Abdal‘s poems were modified according to the Marxist lexicon. The rights of the 
oppressed and marginalized people were appraised in Pir Sultan Abdal‘s poems. 
 Pir Sultan Abdal‘s struggle represents a moral or mythic story rather than a 
                                                 
120 Şah  refers to both Shah Hatayi and Ali and in some extreme versions of Shiism it may also refer to God. In the case of Pir Sultan Abdal the ―Şah‖ refers to Ali 
according to Mélikoff (Mélikoff, 2007, p. 77). 
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historical story. Oral narratives and legendary acclamations about his personality are 
more important than the factual evidence. Pir Sultan Abdal‘s struggle also represents a 
heroic saga. Moral integrity and dignity have been appraised, as opposed to the self 
interested moves of ―Hızır Paşa‘s.‖ 
Most Alevis believe that the confrontations between Kızılbaş tribes and the 
Ottoman central administration and the Turcoman rebellions in Anatolia during the 
Seljukid administration were mainly because of economic unrest. 
[A.Kn.]: Only in Anatolia there have been about 400 uprisings. In the Seljuk and 
Ottoman periods, and of these about 300, I am not giving you any certain 
numbers, maybe it was even more, were Alevi uprisings. Why did I mention that 
so many uprisings took place? If there are that many uprisings in a society and if 
in case of all these uprisings in the official accounts it is said that those who 
participated were stuff. They were atheists, without a lord, without a faith, there 
were accusations that they were Kızılbaş. They rose up against the Ottomans, and 
they say there was unity and such? The basic cause of these uprisings was hunger. 
The land was taken away from the citizen or a third was taken of that what he has 
produced. The one who works if the villager, the craftsman. Whom are taxes 
taken from? From them. There are three to five people on top who benefit; it‘s 
always been like that. Now if I have to give one third, one second and I cannot 
make ends meet with the third left then there is only one thing I can do: rebel, 
revolt.  
T.K.: Were Alevi rebellions caused by economic concerns in most cases?  
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A.K.: Not most of the time, nearly always Alevi movements, uprisings have had 
such reasons. Look at the story of Pir Sultan‘s life; you‘ll see the same thing. 
You‘ll see the same thing in case of Kalender Çelebi. Look at the Baba Ishak 
movement; you‘ll see the same thing. Look at the Bozok, the Jelali rebellions, 
you‘ll see the same thing most of the time. You‘ll see the same thing in case of the 
Shaikh Bedreddin rebellion. 
7.6.2. Tragic Narratives 
Tragic narratives are the sources of deeply irrecoverable traumas. They are related 
to the tragic events of the past that still traumatize the members of the Alevi community. 
These are deep rifts that created damages in the social imagination of Alevis. Alevis 
believe that after these events and processes they had experienced a deep downturn and 
they could never return to their pre-downturn situation. Fear of repetition of these events 
is less of concern in comparison to the previous set of events. They had not just led to 
fear and anxiety but deeper levels of desperation and hopelessness. These events and 
processes have damaged Alevi perceptions of the Turkish state (Ottoman State and the 
Turkish Republic) and other groups in Turkey (ultra-nationalists and Islamists). 
Unlike the implicitly crafted and designed nature of regressive narratives, the 
traumatic events are considered to be particularly designed and practiced to destroy, 
assimilate or deeply hurt Alevi communities. The Alevi position in the tragic narratives is 
the victim position. In the heroic saga they consider themselves mainly heroes, who 
struggled for some noble causes but had been victimized because of their defeat. The 
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position in the tragic narratives is a passive role based on pure victimhood and suffering. 
A clear recognition of the historical guilts and constant sympathy from outsiders, mainly 
from the ―descendant of the perpetrators,‖ is sought. The struggle for the tragic narratives 
within the current Alevi movement is therefore a struggle for recognition and 
acknowledgment. 
Many of my informants had untold traumatic personal stories in relation to tragic 
events as well. It is difficult to imagine a separate Alevi identity in Turkey without 
referring to tragic narratives. Frequently mentioned tragic narratives are: 
 Selim I‘s (Yavuz Sultan Selim) Kızılbaş massacres 
 Establishment of the ulema regime in the Ottoman Empire starting with the reign 
of Suleiman the magnificent (1520- 1566) 
 Closing of the Bektaşi lodges and abolishing of Janissary Corps, 1826  
 Maraş Massacre of 1980 of Malatya, Çorum and Sivas Events of 1979 
 Dersim Rebellion, 1938 
 September 12, 1980 military coup 
Ebussud and Center Periphery Relations in the Ottoman Empire 
 According to many Alevis that I spoke with, and to the popular Alevi narratives, 
Sunni ulama played a significant role in the marginalization of Alevi communities in 
Anatolia. After the Safavid Movement and Jelali Revolts of the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, 
Kızılbaş Turcoman had completely been separated from [mainstream] Sunni society, due 
to religious arguments. The Shaikh-ul-Islam released fatwas which stated that ―these 
people are not Muslims, their lives and goods are rightfully yours [halal].‖ Two Muslim 
421 
 
Turkish rulers thus tried to legitimize their struggle religiously as well. For many Alevis, 
Sunni ulama legacy, especially ―Ebussud legacy‖ epitomizes the peripherilization of not 
only the Alevis but also the other marginal sufi networks of Anatolia. Following these 
confrontations, the Alevis become inwardly focused. Dedes tried to fulfill the functions of 
the state in the fields of the law, education, and even in medicine. There were even dedes 
who specialized in all kinds of ramshackle trades. 
[A.Y.]: Slanders abounded at this time, such sayings as Alevis don‘t wash, or the 
meat being cut by an Alevi cannot be eaten. The Shaikh-ul-Islam invented such 
things to please the [Ottoman] sultan. The life, blood, and possessions of the 
Kızılbaş are permissible [to take]. The Shaikh-ul-Islam was subservient to the 
state. 
[C. Ş.]: Of course, together with this religious stamp, [Alevis] have always, 
throughout history, been ostracized by the central authority, such as the end of 
Hazrat Ali and his family, or the end of Ahmed Yesevi or Hacı BektaşWali and 
those who believed in him, they have always been humiliated, not favorably 
looked upon, neglected. In other words, in the Ottoman period killing [Alevis] 
was incumbent [upon Sunni Muslims]. In other words, the organization of 
religious minorities made them subject to a whole host of existing societal 
injustices. This being the case, the reaction against injustice sort of became the 
essence of the faith. Something which was a religious difference, has in time 
evolved into a societal-based differentiation. It became the ideology of revolt. And 
in the face of the injustices they suffered, their leadership was oftentimes assumed 
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by their religious leaders. Like Pir Sultan, like Baba İshak, they have in later eras 
also assumed leadership roles. Like Shah Ismail. In other words, the religious 
leaders of that era, were forced to also assume social leadership in the face of 
societal injustices. [In this way,] religious leadership gradually transformed into 
societal, political, [and] ideological leadership. 
The Diyanet as the incarnation of the Ebussud Legacy 
Today the rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey, the increasing public visibility 
of Islamic symbols in the public sphere and the Diyanet‘s (Administration of Religious 
Affairs) influence in Turkish society are considered to be similar to the establishment of 
the ulama legacy in the Ottoman Empire and the marginalization of Turcoman tribes. The 
argument related to the establishment of the ulama legacy is today associated with the 
policies of the Diyanet. For many Alevi, the Diyanet represent the religious bigotry and 
intolerance (Wahhabism) that attempts to assimilate the Alevi community through dirty 
tricks and policies. It is assumed they are under the influence of Wahhabism and are 
trying to assimilate Turkish nation and convert it into the Wahhabi notion of Sunni Islam 
and Arabize them. 
[C.Ş.]: When looking at Alevi history, in the relationships between the Alevi 
adherent and the central Islamic authorities, the latter‘s spaces were always in the 
shape of mosques. All kinds of reactions to the Alevi creed, be they all kinds of 
negative policies that could go as far as murder, have always originated in the 
mosque. Of course, when things turn out like this, when its religious peculiarities, 
its societal peculiarities combined, then [we can see that] the Alevi creed has from 
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time to time been perceived as the ideology of an opposition political movement. 
Whatever the Alevis have suffered throughout history, they always paid the price 
for not attending the mosque. They have always suffered because they did not 
accept the Sunni version [of Islam]. In other words, they were primarily regarded 
as a potential threat [to the central authority]. Today as well, the same threats 
continue. Diyanet, Islamist groups and assimilated Alevis try to force us to go to 
mosques and forget about our tradition and rituals. Governments use these groups 
to push their agenda of controlling us. 
 Alevi community and teachings have often presented as the other, in contrast to 
the Diyanet‘s understanding of Islam. In order to legitimize their version as the better 
version, that which will protect the authenticity of the Turkish belief system and 
tolerance, Alevis presented a bigoted version of the Diyanet. The Diyanet in fact is an 
institution that was established by Atatürk himself in order to both regulate and control 
religious practices and teachings in Turkey. The notion of the Diyanet, with its thousands 
of mosques, imams and personnel, has been presented as a strong enemy of Alevis. 
Leaders of the Alevi community presented themselves as trying to deal with this ―enemy‖ 
with very limited resources and formal training. Any initiative that is sponsored by the 
Diyanet has been received with certain skepticism. For example, the Diyanet initiated a 
project, which is led by an Alevi scholar, to publish Alevi classics, which has not been 
appreciated and has been interpreted as another step to define and manipulate the Alevi 
community. 
In contemporary Turkey, the Directorate of Religious Affairs fulfills the duty of 
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protecting and nurturing Sunni Islam which has attained the de facto status of 
―Official Islam.‖ The institution attempts to maintain the status quo rather than 
adapting to the charging times. With its gigantic budget that is much larger than 
many of the government ministries, this institution has not only been defining 
―true‖ Islam for decades but it also refuses to recognize or get to know those who 
are outside their definition of ―true‖ Islam. The directorate has so far ignored the 
demands of Alevis (Yaman, & Erdemir, 2006, p. 11). 
Narrative of the oppressive state 
 One of the main unresolved debates within the different currents of the 
contemporary Alevi movement is the question of how the relationship with the Turkish 
State should be. Almost all the parties agree on the historically oppressive nature of the 
―Sunni Turkish States‖ and support this discourse within their narratives. There is a high 
level of mistrust with the state and the memories, especially the memories of the Ottoman 
Legacy, are not easy to deal with. The more practical question is, ―Should we stick to our 
tragedy and keep standing against the state?‖ or, ―Can we take some progressive steps 
and attain certain achievements by engaging with the state?‖  The people who support the 
engagement policy argue that Alevis had a much better position during Atatürk‘s era. 
Some groups argue that it is because Alevis have always chosen to stay at the periphery 
of politics that they have suffered deeply. That having good relations with the ―Secular 
Turkish State‖ may serve the interests of Alevis is an idea that is getting more popular 
among the urban Alevi businessmen. Some others strongly criticize the policy of 
engaging with the state, especially the right wing governments, with the belief that there 
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is no such thing as a ―Secular Turkish State.‖ They instead argue that the Turkish 
Republic is essentially a ―Sunni State‖ just like its predecessors. 
The Turkish Republic, after the single Party period, is also seen as the 
continuation of the Sunni state tradition. One of the hallmarks of the narratives about 
Alevi identity is with regard to the oppressive state, which is substantiated by many of the 
tragic narratives. The majority of the Alevi activists believe that it is an essential 
characteristic of Alevis to stay away from the ―Sunni State.‖ It is difficult to challenge 
this established narrative, the only possible way to deal with this narrative in order to 
reach reconciliation is to work on the alternative narratives. The Turkish State has 
avoided acknowledging the pains of the Alevi/ Kızılbaş‘s and Alevi Kızılbaş‘s has 
avoided engaging with the right wing governments, which has contributed to the 
maintenance of the narrative of the ―oppressive state.‖ 
[A.Y.]: In the Ottoman period, the Sunni creed reached an extreme point. Even 
Bektashi gravestones were being destroyed. The Ottomans were very tolerant and 
they even accepted the Jews fleeing from Europe. But the situation of the Alevis 
was very bad, they were marginalized, were kept outside the system. They were 
outside the system, in religious, political, social terms, particularly after the whole 
Safavid affair the issue became politicized, and that‘s why we have become a 
closed society. The perception of the official religion sees the Alevis as outside of 
Islam. As a result, the structure cannot support it.  
T.K.: Does this stem from the people or from the state? 
A.Y.: In fact, there are quite a few members of the public with permissive views. 
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The perception of the state is humiliating. The fact that Alevis were kept outside 
the offices of the state has had many negative effects on the condition of the 
Alevis. 
The State is the state of a particular tradition 
[A. B.]: The State is the state of a particular tradition. It is a state which continues 
the traditions of the Seljuk and off the Ottomans. It is [something which forced 
Alevis to] rebel, which does not conform to the majority that [tried to] be 
separated [from us] and which did not look like them . . . [they, the Alevis] were 
seen as an internal enemy whose rights were trampled. You can‘t even say they 
weren‘t right. When talking about the Republic however, the Republic is an 
interesting [issue]. Everybody was involved in saving the homeland. But in the 
development of the homeland that was saved . . . when it comes to accruing 
interest the Alevis and the Kurds were alienated. Same thing happened in the 
Ottoman Empire as well, Alevi, Bektaşis were the founders of the Ottoman State 
but they had been marginalized by the Sunni ulama. 
The Events of Dersim, 1938 and the Story of Kurdish and Zaza Alevis 
There are mixed opinions on the Dersim Events of 1938, it is in fact a dividing 
line between Kurdish/Zaza Alevi and Turkish Alevis that constitute the majority. There is 
an overall agreement on condemning the violence and killings but Turkish Alevis 
interpret the event as a feudal struggle against the Republican Regime. The Dersim 
Events of 1938 are also seen as foreign instigated uprisings that were designed to weaken 
the young Turkish Republic. On the other hand, the Dersimi (Dimilî) identity is a strong 
427 
 
identity and the Dersim Events of 1938 are the chosen trauma of Dimilîs. After the 
Dersim Events many families were exiled to other parts of Turkey. The people who had 
experienced these exiles, and their descendants had never forgotten their traumatic 
experience. 
[A.R.U.]: My family was forced to migrate to a small village in Bursa after the 
Dersim Events of 1938. We are from a dede family and nobody respected and 
even saluted us in Bursa. My family even did not participate in the rebellion but 
we were considered as suspicious people. We were not allowed to move out of the 
village where we were located. My family missed their home and those years 
were very painful years. We were expected to forget about our culture, tradition, 
rituals, identity and get assimilated. Of course I also heard about the atrocities of 
the state when suppressing the Dersim Uprisings. Uncontrolled violence was used 
there to suppress the rebellion, but what happened in the aftermath of the Dersim 
Events was more painful. 
Critical Approaches to Dersim 
Dersim narratives of the Dimilî are delegitimized by more conservative nationalist 
Alevis, who view the uprising as a feudal struggle that was instigated by the British and 
French for their own interests in Musul and Hatay. There are also stories that are related 
to the atrocities of the feudal lords of Dersim tribes. For some Alevis, the Dersim Events 
of 1938 and its aftermath were a traumatic experience; for some others,they were viewed 
as mistakes. As the nationalistic tendencies among the Alevis increase and the Kurdish 
and Dimilî (Zaza) identity movements intensify, the disagreements between the Dersim 
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and Koçgiri narratives also increase. The people who have a distanced and critical 
attitude towards the ―Turkish Republic‖ tend to emphasize the legacy of the Dersim 1938 
as a policy of destruction and assimilation. 
[M.Ç.]: I know a province by the name of Tunceli, I am not aware of a province 
called Dersim. 
T.K.: You know, some say we are from Dersim. 
M.Ç.: Some may say so. That was a province in the Ottoman period. As far as I 
know, the people over there have no rights whatsoever, are totally dependent upon 
the goodwill of the feudal Ağa [Chieftain]. A well-respected friend of mine once 
told me, a minstrel friend. A living event. They used to call their house slave 
servants. His wife probably made him a knitted shirt by hand. At that time there 
was no such thing as synthetic textiles. She made it from wool according to her 
own imagination. This man he stood up against the Ağa. The Ağa like the knitted 
shirt when he saw it. He was going to take the shirt, he pulled his gun and was 
going to shoot the man and take it. But he understood that he would damage the 
shirt in this way. He cannot accept the fact that the shirt is going to be damaged. 
But the man inside the shirt is of no importance. Look, that is the mentality. Those 
who know, now pray to Atatürk day and night. The people sent from Tunceli at 
that time, if they were asked where are you from, they would go and research it. 
Now what do you think these say about Atatürk? Even when they have been sent 
away into exile. They say we will send you to this place and give you a 300 acre 
piece of land. They reply alright. They are even willing to move. Then he says are 
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you also going to give some land to this servant? Yes, we will give him a piece of 
land too. In that case, I won‘t go. There you have two salient examples. If you are 
against the building of schools, if you are against the building of roads, why did 
you rebel? As far as I know there was a feudal system in place. Did those Ağas try 
to change the system. Mustafa Kemal, why did you bring the capitalist system 
here did he do something them or what. You are now defending the Ağa, people 
who stick up for the feudal system. Are we to say shameful if you‘re a Sunni, and 
brave if you‘re an Alevi, what does it mean to be somebody who owns 120 
villages. There, a lot of excessive things have happened there in the course of that 
movement. A whole number of innocent people have been burned next to the 
land. 
Mustafa Kemal did what needed to be done, just like he did in 1925 to Shaikh 
Said. He did the same thing in ‘37. Both were opposed to the secular republic. 
One was supported by the British. Mosul was lost. Together with Shaikh Said. In 
the second instance, you had the events of Hatay in ‘37. That was supported by 
the French. In the one instance, they reached their goal, in the other they didn‘t. 
What is called the events of Dersim were not movements directed against Alevis. 
Now they are trying to show Atatürk in this light, and to hurt him in this way. 
Atatürk did not have a goal like that. He wanted to disrupt the feudal lords. Those 
who were advocating a return to the autonomy they had enjoyed in Ottoman 
times, it was an uprising of a Party of feudal lords. 
How to Relate to the Mosque? 
430 
 
 The meaning and the social/political function of the mosque has been a 
controversial issue for Alevis. Sunnis perceive the mosque as the institution for the 
practice of daily religious rituals (namaz/salah) as well as a social space. Alevis on the 
other hand consider the mosque to be an institution of assimilation and oppression. These 
perceptions have been supported by some tragic narratives. They relate many of their 
great pains and traumatic losses, such as the assassination of Ali, to the mosques. The 
primary objective of the Alevi identity movement is to acqurie legal status for their 
cemevis (assembly houses) as a place of worship. ―Returning to mosque‖ represents the 
acceptance of domination. The other problem for many Alevis is finding a convincing 
answer to the question posed by Sunnis, ―If you are also Muslim, why don‘t you come to 
mosque?‖ This questions may sound naïve, but most ordinary Alevis who consider 
themselves authentic, unspoiled Muslims have difficulty explaining these questions. 
Some Alevis argue that there should be no such institutions as mosques, while some 
others argue that cemevis were older and more authentic institutions. 
T.K.: They say that Hazrat Ali also partook of the proscribed prayers [salah, 
namaz]. 
[ L.K.]: Now they say this if you love Ali, if you follow Ali‘s way, Hazrat Ali was 
the first Muslim to pray five time a day and he was murdered in the mosque while 
praying. However, history tells us a different story, at the time there was no 
mosque, the mosque was the place used by the Caliph as his center of 
administration, now if he would have attended the mosque in the company of the 
community of believers, could anyone have hidden there to strike at Ali. Now 
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nobody know, we have no historical knowledge, but the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs has under the heading of the Alevi creed, without even mentioning the 
noun Alevi, portrayed Ali in this way, as the fist Muslim to pray five times a day. 
If Ali was killed in the mosque while praying [is a story which] means, if you love 
Ali and follow his way, you should also come to the mosque, that‘s the reasoning. 
Look now they are turning our Assembly Houses into mosques, they have added 
taps to the bottom parts [of the buildings] trying to alter the way of worshiping, 
[for example,] two, three years ago, Baki Öz died and his remains were removed 
from the Kartal Assembly House, the Assembly House had hired a hoca who had 
graduated from an İmam-Hatip high school, two people lift up the [coffin], when 
the hoca says, oh, assembled believers we are about to perform the funerary 
prayer for the deceased, let those who have not taken their ablutions, take their 
ablutions now. We looked and saw immediately three to five people getting up to 
do their ablutions at the taps, we were amazed, now Sunni theology professors 
have come out and declared that funerary prayers are not salah [namaz, 
proscribed ritual prayer], and you do not need to get your ablutions, they say.  
 Building mosques in Alevi villages is considered to be the most commonly 
practiced instrument of the ssimilation campaign. For some Alevis, mosques are like the 
traps and resistance against the building of mosques in Alevi villages is considered to be 
one of the fundamental objectives of the Alevi identity movement. For some others 
however, mosques are considered requirements for the religious practices. The narrative 
of ―mosques are novelties in the Alevi villages,‖ and, ―mosques are instruments of 
432 
 
assimilation,‖ have also been challenged by Alevis who are more sympathetic to 
mosques. 
Following 1980, a campaign to erect mosques in Alevi villages was begun, in [the 
province of] Tunceli mosques were built in 101 villages. Among these was the 
mosque in Çorum, the lawyer Hasan Hüseyinoğlu, a CHP member, was among 
them who founded the mosque, a Shi‘ite foundation was also set up there, money 
was sent to the foundation and trillions were kept in a bank. At the time I was the 
chairman of the Alevi Bektashi Council of Representatives, [and] two people who 
had introduced themselves as Jaferi Alevi wanted to see me. Two people, they 
were young like you, wearing nice clothes and speaking proper [non-dialectic] 
Turkish, they were sweet, sympathetic persons, and one of them told me this: they 
insult you while your funerals are being done at [regular, Sunni] mosques, you 
can [instead] perform your funerary rites at our mosque, we are well-disposed 
towards Alevis, [as a matter of fact] we are Alevis too, we are Jaferis. In fact, at 
the time our Assembly Houses were not as numerous, so that they said, they even 
such nice things as you can perform your prayers [rituals] at our mosque. I knew 
what they were after, they were trying assimilate us, get us into the mosque 
[through the backdoor]. 
I said alright, but I will come together with my dede, together with my fur [to sit 
on, a kind of honorary status symbol], I‘ll come with my saz [traditional stringed 
instrument] and my song, I‘ll come with men and women to partake in our 
ceremonies, whereupon they said no, that is not possible. They said can a saz be 
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played in a mosque, what is done in a mosque, in a mosque you pray [salah, 
namaz]. That‘s what the Sunnis say too, so what‘s your difference? He lost his 
composure, trying to assimilate us into the mosque [like that]. 
[O.E.]: There have for example been villages with mosques of very old. There are 
a lot of claims that they have been newly built following 1980. Like, that was 
made after ‘80. There are claims that this was done after the events of 12 
September [1980, military coup]. There are no doubt [mosques] built after 1980, 
but you also have villages with 200-year old, 300-year old mosques. There are 
villages with historical mosques. There is for example such a village in [the 
province of] Çorum. Its name is Büyük Camili [The One Adorned with a Big 
Mosque]. It is an Alevi village. There is also a village called Obruk in Çorum. A 
mosque of about two-hundred years. For instance, the Sunni villagers in the 
vicinity used to come here on Fridays to attend Friday prayers [Cuma namazı]. 
There is a village called Palabıyık, tied to the centre [the city of Çorum]. There is 
a very old mosque present there. You can see such things as well. But the Alevi 
creed [consists of] the senior member of the Bektashi, of its tariqah organisation. 
For example, an Alevi citizen will not start praying on his own, he‘d ostracized 
from his community. He won‘t be able to get his son married, an Alevi wouldn‘t 
give him his daughter. [On account of the fact that] you have now become pious. 
 The narrative of complaint below is especially interesting. My informants, who 
are in their late fifties, were complaining about the Diyanet for not fulfilling its duty of 
providing religious services for Alevi towns and villages. There is a complaint about 
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discrimination against Alevi villages by building mosques, and providing religious 
training and other services. This disagreement also creates confusion for the government 
and the Diyanet as well. 
We need an imam from the Diyanet 
[ H. A.]: I am a person who has Alevi roots. I pay taxes in this country. There is a 
Ministry of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in this country. I come from the village of 
Karadağ, also known as Cevizliköy, in the district of Mecitözü in the province of 
Çorum. In my district, there are 28 villages without an imam. There are 43 imams 
in the whole of the district. I want this imam to be in my village as well. When my 
grandchild is born, when the child is born, I want that the ezan [call to prayer] is 
whispered in his ear. When my father died I went to the kaymakam [official 
charged with governing a provincial district] of the district, and I asked him to 
give me an imam as my father had died. The imam arrives with his driver, I don‘t 
know what he said, I don‘t know which verse he read, I don‘t know how to say 
the Besmelle [invocation of Allah], whatever he says he said, and after that my 
father was buried in the graveyard, I do not know how to recite the Fatiha at his 
graveside during a feastday. It is my natural right, my friend. I want an imam in 
my village. 
T.K.: Or is it because the villagers don‘t want one that there is no imam? 
H.A.: It is a practice of the state, none of the Alevi villages has one. Show me an 
Alevi who works at the Diyanet, and I‘ll leave this country. You won‘t find one. 
That is a double standard practiced by the state. That‘s why I want the EU. The 
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EU says that the Alevis are a minority. I am not a minority, my friend. I do not see 
myself as a member of a minority. I see myself as a first class citizen of this 
country. I mean, this flag is mine, this country is mine. If need be, I am prepared 
to die for them. But if the state gives you a mosque, with electricity and water, if 
it pays the wages of the imam, then I want an assembly house in my village. If it 
doesn‘t give me an assembly house, then I want an imam who will teach my child 
how to take his ablutions and read the Kuran. I should be able to go to a mosque, 
and you should be able to go to an assembly house. In the end, we are brothers. 
Well, this man is an Alevi. Now I didn‘t hear the ezan [call to prayer] until I was 
twenty years old. I grew up in a mountain village in Çorum. I was a conscript 
soldier. You also went to the army. We are serving in the same barracks. We are 
the guardians of this nation. You get up and say your five proscribed prayers 
[salah, namaz], I do not. You go to the mosque, I do not. Why my friend? I do not 
see a mosque in the army. There should be a mosque in my village. Alright, I may 
be an Alevi, but if there are twelve imams, if there is a Kuran, if we Ya Allah, if 
we say Ya Ali, if he is the Prophet‘s son-in-law, then it is my right to learn about 
this religion. How can the state take this right away from me? Could you explain 
this to me. If there is Shariah, I would lovingly accept it. Somebody else came 
along [and] set a church and teaches his own religion, my state prevents me from 
learning about my own religion. If we call it a culture, if we accept it as a culture, 
then it should be evaluated as such. Let me do it in this way. I teach my child the 
Alevi teachings in my home. In school, he receives religious education. The child 
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is caught between the two, the place he‘ll go after that will be the church. I don‘t 
know if I am wrong 
Sivas (1978), Maraş (1978) and Çorum (1980): Psychological wounds of the 
Ideological Confrontation  
Many Alevis were parties of the ideological polarization in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Alevi was almost equated to leftist, or Marxist. Alevi neighborhoods the cities like 
İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir and Malatya were refered to as little Moscow, and Alevi citizens 
were stigmatized as atheists, or Kızıl (Red) Communinists at that time. Some people even 
believe that Alevis had been pushed to the left by the discrimination by the state on 
purpose. Many Alevis believe that the ideological violence of the era was a plot. ―There 
was a general trend of development of positive relations between Alevis, Sunnis, Kurds 
and Turks but that trend was tried to be prevented by policy of ideological polarization 
which is sponsored by the deep state and foreign services.‖ Again the responsibility is 
attributed to a third Party. 
[A.B.]: Now we had [certain] friends in our neighborhood, our neighborhood was 
a mixed up kind of place, a neighborhood that had just evolved from a slum 
dwelling [gecekondu], it was a place where every newcomer to the city could 
build his own hovel. In that sense, [the population] wasn‘t homogeneous at all. 
There were people from Arguvan. There were people from Malatya. There were 
people from Doğanşehir. There were people from Sivas. There were people from 
Adiyaman. Kurds, Turks, Alevis, Sunnis. There were Sunni as well as Alevi 
Kurds. It was that kind of a jumbled up neighborhood. In the neighborhood tight 
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neighborly relations evolved, we were close, trusted and depended upon each 
other. In those years everybody knew who everybody else was but nobody went 
by without being greeted. In other words, we wouldn‘t differentiate between 
Sunni or Alevi neighbors. People would help one another. They would celebrate 
together on feast days. Muharrems were celebrated jointly. In other words, among 
the people mutual friendship, respect and love were common. 
T.K.: Were there times when that wasn‘t the case? 
A.B.: Particularly in conjunction with [the events of] 12 March [1971, a military 
coup was held that resulted in a rout of the Turkish left], the state tried to disrupt 
these affairs.  
T.K.: Why did it want to disrupt them at the time? 
A.B.: Because [the state] wanted to dismantle the left. Because they wanted the 
people to be at each other‘s throats. And this of course continued right up till 12 
September [1980]. This policy was kept in place until 12 September [1980]. 
The Alevis saw that the state moved a lot of its support to the mosques. They were 
themselves experiencing a lot of difficulties, secretly holding assemblies, holding 
assemblies in big houses, rather than in assembly houses. 
There is a general feeling that the Alevi were the victims of ideological violence 
in the 1970s. Mixed Alevi-Sunni cities, such as Sivas, Malatya, Çorum, Erzincan, Maraş 
and Tokat were environments of ideological violence. Despite the ideological nature of 
the confrontations, storylines and painful memories around these grievous events play 
significant roles in the repertoires of Alevi victimhood narratives. Currently, the tragic 
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memories of the Malatya, Sivas, Maraş and Çorum events shape the very negative image 
Alevis have of ultranationalists. Alevis still expect a clear public apology for these 
events; of course the actors do not want to acknowledge the events as ―Alevi-Sunni‖ 
confrontations. 
[H. A.] 
The state staged an intervention in Cyprus within the space of three hours, but 
could not do [something similar] in Maraş in the space of three days.  
[M. İ.] 
T.K.: At that time the Çorum and Maraş events took place. The event of Sivas 
took place. How were these events perceived at the time? 
M.İ.: Of course, we were very much affected by [what happened in] Çorum. 
There was relative resistance in the events of Maraş. They attacked Alevi 
neighborhoods, but the Alevis said enough and started attacking opposed 
neighborhoods. In my opinion, Maraş is an event than [what took place in] Sivas. 
In Sivas, people attacked those whom they didn‘t know but who were known to 
be leftist or Alevi, in Maraş it wasn‘t like that. [The events of] Maraş are maybe 
the most severe in the world. Maybe Yugoslavia can be put up as an example. In 
Maraş, they were killed by the neighbors whom they greeted. Neighbors you meet 
at the same corner shop and at whose weddings you danced, attack you with axes 
in their hands. Or the women carry [canisters of] gasoline so that their husbands 
can put their houses alight. In those days, we were in a [continual] state of 
mourning, we were crying [all the time]. 
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T.K.: Why do you think the events in Maraş happened? 
M.İ.: They had to pick a pilot area. The trials took place in Malatya, Elazığ, Sivas, 
and Erzincan, but the Grey Wolves [Ülkücü, paramilitary extreme right-wing 
organization] really proceeded very methodical in Maraş. Let‘s say, maybe they 
found people well-suited [to their goals and methods] over there. Today it is 
publicly known that beforehand CIA agents had been there to investigate the 
likelihood of an Alevi confrontation. Their names are not given. As a result of a 
provocation in Maraş, all Grey Wolves [Ülkücü] fell upon Alevi neighborhoods 
[armed with] chopping knives, axes, and jerrycans. 
T.K.: Well, how was it perceived in Alevi community? Compared to the events of 
Sivas, was it more like something which was kept in the subconscious? 
M.İ.: We have never forgotten [the events of] Maraş. We‘ve always kept [it 
memory] alive. Because it was the first event that really shocked us, and the 
numbers of dead was so high. There were children [among the dead], there were 
raped women. It was as if an occupying force had entered enemy territory such 
was the devastation. Women and children made up a lot of the dead. That affected 
us deeply and caused a trauma. We still have not been able to live through this 
trauma. 
[A.E.]: Between 1980 and 1990, society became hostile. The government chose 
sides in this conflict. When the government took sides, tremendous pressures 
were applied to Alevi children and such. In religious classes, the average score 
was between 70 – 80, they left school after religious classes. They didn‘t make it 
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into universities. A lot of government employees resigned. They were plotting 
against their children at universities. They were being beat up at their dormitories, 
at their places of work if they didn‘t fast. They gave these Alevi kids a lot of 
suffering. Of course, this time they were insistent on purpose. If a hundred people 
died, if I am not mistaken, seventy of them were Alevis. I know they were all 
Alevis, starting from Deniz, from Mahir Çayan to who knows who. Because they 
come from a structure which is constantly in the process of being critical. Now 
coming from such [an atmosphere of] critical [awareness] to university, this 
groups would quickly suss out what Western capitalism has done. And against that 
there was a reaction. For this reason, they dragged me to the police station five 
times, the first thing they asked me are you an Alevi? That was their first 
question.  
The September 121980 Coup: Alevis are Victims Again  
 Ideological confrontation of the 1960s and 1970s had a long lasting impact on the 
urban Alevi population. The end of the ideological confrontation and violence had not 
brought peace and prosperity to Alevis. In fact, they paid the price of the ideological 
confrontation disproportionately. The September 12, 1980 military coup forcefully 
suppressed the ideological confrontation and violence but because of the right-wing 
nature of the coup Alevis continued to suffer in the post coup context as well. Someone 
from almost each Alevi family ended up in prison after the coup. Some of them had been 
charged by being a member of extremist organizations; many people had been tortured 
and lost their jobs. Right wing activists also suffered from the coup, but Alevis believe 
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that they had been disproportionately punished. 
T.K.: What effects did the military coup of 12 September have? 
[A. B.]: The events of 12 September had a deep impact. Very deep impacts, [that 
were] apparent [on] 12 September. If every militant arrested on 12 September 
received 10 lashes, an arrested Alevi would receive 15. Because they were Alevi 
in particular. And leftist Alevi youths were shown to have been at the root of all of 
the chaotic circumstances prevailing before September 12. Even if leftist Alevi 
youths themselves rebelled against their own traditions, against [the authority of] 
their dedes. 
[M. İ.]: In this coup, the ones most affected were again the Alevis. All youths 
were inside [in jail]. Their villages would get raided on a daily basis. They were 
not able to peacefully sleep even for one day. A certain section [of the Alevi 
population] lost their jobs. 90% of government officials whose jobs were 
terminated were Alevi. The 1402‘s [people whose jobs as government officials 
were terminated as a result of a law nr. 1402].  
T.K.: Were other leftists treated more favorably? 
M. İ.: No, but because a huge number of leftists turned out to be Alevi, that‘s how 
it happened. Or, there was no concern to differentiate between either Sunni and 
Alevi leftists. They looked at leftists as a big whole, nevertheless we were able to 
observe this: this misguided method of struggle has brought us a lot of harm. Just 
imagine, one mother‘s child in jail in Amasya, another child in Çanakkale prison. 
These people were poor and distressed to begin with, and in the end they saw that 
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the left could not offer [viable] solutions either. On the other hand, you have 
leftists who tell me they have not given up on their ideologies. But there is 
something amiss somewhere. We did give up on our beliefs, but did not receive 
any kind of support from others. They still live in slum dwellings [gecekondu]. I 
think they have now en masse decided that some things need to change.  
T.K.: In other words, they understood that the struggle of the left has not given 
any relief to their demands? 
M. İ.: No, I will continue to be a leftist, but I am not going to sacrifice my 
children. I am going to continue the struggle using an Alevi platform and I am not 
going to disguise my identity. In the end, the other groups have not given up on 
their beliefs either. Among them, there are [lots] partaking in proscribed prayers 
[salah, namaz] as well as other forms of supplication. But they weren‘t as poor as 
we, we were besieged from all sides. At first, it was attempted to establish a kind 
of left-leaning form of solidarity, [and] when that collapsed it was thought that it 
could be achieved through falling back on the Alevi creed, and how this identity 
corresponded to the ideology that was being advocated, and thus the opinion arose 
that it was not necessary to confine one‘s Alevi identity to the back. It is no 
obstacle to being a leftist, nor does it turn us into proponents of a lifestyle which 
advocates belief in predetermination [kadercilik, which supposedly the form 
Sunni Islam takes]. 
[M.D.]: In general, 90% of Marxists, Leninists are Alevi. Coups were held. The 
left was arrested after 1980. A lot of youngsters were taken away after 1980 
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simply because it was an Alevi neighborhood. And they were absorbed into [all 
kinds of] organizations. They were taken away. After they had been taken away 
the police forced them to disclose other names by means of torture. Who took part 
in these actions . . . who are your friends? And they were taken home by torture 
and brought somebody else back at one o‘clock in the morning. Now they arrested 
that person, and tortured him. You also name one or two people. People cannot 
withstand torture, it is something which is beyond the human will. I have also 
been tortured heavily. Am I able to withstand such pains, or very few people can 
withstand the pain . . . [very few are able to] withstand, to resist. It is something 
beyond your volition; after all, it is very painful. But it doesn‘t leave marks. In 
other words, such pains cannot be endured. We spent time in prison 
7.6.3. Regressive Narratives  
In these cases the consciousness about the ―Aleviness‖ had been raised through 
negative circumstances. These shocking events or processes are storied as the elements of 
threat perceptions; they feed the collective fear perceptions as well. These events or 
processes divert Alevis further away from their group objectives or from the acquisition 
of their rights. What is more important for the regressive narratives are that the particular 
events or turning points are considered to be the beginning of a downward trend of 
further complications and difficulties. Because of the ongoing mistrust of the perpetrators 
of these acts, the impact of these events is still an ongoing process, and events similar to 
these are a distinct possibility. In a sense, regressive narratives say ―we were already in a 
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complicated position but because of these events our future expectations are taking a 
more critical downward trend.‖ 
All these events are storied as the components of a well-planned conspiracy 
against Alevis and the modern secularist people in Turkey, who have a vision and 
objectives similar to Alevis. The planners of these conspiracies are mainly the actors who 
are mentioned in the list of villains in tables 3 and 4. The possible outcomes or the 
undesirable endpoints of the regressive moves are described as ―the establishment of a 
sharia state (theocracy),‖ ―Iranization,‖ ―Wahhabization,‖ ―return of the Ottoman social 
and political order,‖ ―division and exploitation by imperialist power‖ and most 
importantly the ―assimilation of Alevi identity.‖ Whenever Alevis are trying to emphasize 
their threat perceptions or indicating their intense fears, they refer to these recent cases 
and argue that ―things can be much worse if we don‘t do x, y, z.‖ They are in a sense the 
elements of speech acts. Both the threats and the discourses on threat perceptions can be 
considered threat perceptions. 
Threats can be verbally formulated, and take the form of speech-acts. A speech-
act has three components: locutionary, the uttering of some words; illocutionary, 
the effective meanings ascribed to those words; perlocutionary, the consequences 
of many sorts that ensue from the utterance of the words stood as having a certain 
illocutionary force (Harré, 2006). 
Since my informants felt or have been feeling the impacts of these events and 
processes closely, their responses to these regressive trends are also more emotional. 
They often make unnecessary generalizations about the persistence of the threat and 
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persistence of the evil intentions of the perpetrators.  
Victims form stories about the Other that convert the threat from private episodes 
confronting individuals to a shared public danger. The evolving public discourse 
makes sense of the violence by conveying the ―truth‖ about the perpetrators 
(Rothbart & Korostelina, 2006, p. 32). 
 For the purposes of understanding the Alevis emotions I analyzed how they associated 
themselves with these events and with the actors of these events. Regressive narratives 
that are frequently mentioned during my field research are: 
 Sivas Events of 1993 
 Gazi Riots of 1995 
 Collapse of the Karaca Ahmet Cemevi with the order of Mayor of Istanbul, 1994 
 Rise of AKP, Fetullah Gülen Movement and idea of moderate Islam in Turkey 
 Green Belt Conspiracy and rise of ―political Islam‖ in Turkey 
 Greater Middle East Project and American support for AKP 
 Rise of the right wing parties and regression in republican reforms 
 Assassinations of secularist elite, Turan Dursun, Bahriye Üçok, Uğur Mumcu, 
Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, Mustafa Özbilgin 
“The Sivas and Gazi Massacres”: A Turning Point in the Struggle for Identity 
“Forgetting Sivas is a Betrayal, If you Forget They Will Do it Again” 
―Their memories, their struggle and their stance will survive forever like a flag‖ 
(Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Sanat Dergisi, issue 62, June 2006) 
The two quotations above that are taken from the Alevi periodical that was 
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specifically published to commemorate the 13
th
 anniversary of the Sivas Events of 1993 
reflects the sentiments related to the event. For many Alevis, Sivas represents the Karbala 
Massacre of our age. Commemoration ceremonies for the Sivas Events of 1993 are a new 
genre of Alevi rituals and there is an enormous body of written literature on the Sivas 
Events of 1993, which is also called the ―Sivas Katliamı (Sivas Massacre),‖ or 
―Madımak121 Katliamı (Madımak Massacre.)‖ The emotional responses of the Alevis to 
the Sivas Events were fear, increased perception of fundamentalist (şeriatçı) threat and 
victimization. The number of Alevis that started to see themselves under existential threat 
was remarkable because many people thought the police and the other officials allowed 
this thing to happen and did not intervened until things got out of control. 
The institutionalization and rapid spread of Alevi associations and civil society 
organization in the aftermath of Sivas was a defensive response. There are mixed views 
about this rapid and reactionary growth of the Alevi institutions. Some Alevi leaders 
consider reactionary growth as an anomaly since the social and political language and 
action frames had also been shaped by these defensive concerns. Many others however 
consider the new institutions and raised awareness as a positive steps for the Alevi 
identity movement. 
It was a strong shock and wake up call for Alevis 
[A.Kn.]: The Sivas massacre of 2 July were an important turning point for Alevis. 
It is interesting, but the 2 July Sivas massacres were very important for Alevis to 
come to their senses. In other words, Alevis were shaken [to their core] and got to 
                                                 
121  Name of the Hotel that was burned by the rioters. 
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their senses. And look at all the foundation dates of foundations, of assembly 
houses, they were all set up after 2 July 1993.  
T.K.: You mean, this drive towards a greater form of institutionalizations was in 
large measure a reaction?  
A.K.: From the point of view of institutionalizations. From the point of view of 
bringing Alevis to their senses, in that respect I would use the word positive. 
T.K.: Does the fact that this institutionalization was in large measure a reaction 
have any kind of negative effects now? Or could it have evolved in a different 
manner? 
A.K.: It could have evolved in a different manner, but that would have been a very 
slow process. If there are 30 assembly houses in Istanbul today, it would only be 
10 to 15 [otherwise]. July, 2
nd
 really played an important role here. In the way of 
institutionalizing, turning the Alevis into a block, it became a means for Alevis to 
be joined together. The process of institutionalizing started out as a reaction, but it 
has taken on a different momentum now. Now Alevis do not just simply act by 
way of reaction. They have now started to analyze where they are going, and the 
state they are in.  
[E.G.] & [T.E.]: Those Alevis who were on the left side of the political 
[spectrum] said this cannot be done like this, we are now supporters of this cause. 
They removed themselves from leftist politics. They reminded the community of 
its past. People who were in the know, people who investigated [these things] 
started to be of assistance in these circumstances. 
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T.K. Who was at the forefront? 
E.G.: The Sivas massacre was the main catalyst. The Sivas massacre became [the 
reason for] Alevis to reclaim their faith, their culture, their traditions, their past 
and their future, it became the rebirth of a community which had been languishing 
for a long time. The Alevi creed which had for thousands of years not accepted 
injustices in Anatolia, had in the past 20-30 years, with the advent of politics, 
migrated to the cities and experienced a weakening [which led to a certain] 
languor. The events of 2 July 1993 showed just how dangerous it was for a 
community on its historic journey to be languishing. They saw that it was 
necessary to reclaim their own culture, their own past, their own creed and people 
of Alevi background started to care about the Alevi creed in a serious manner and 
to return to their own culture. We had an interest in the Alevi creed up to that 
point, but we did not take it that seriously. 
There is a tendency to present the threats to Alevis as threats to the fundamentals 
of the Turkish Republic. Interpreting the threats and the perpetrators as more established 
and coordinated bodies is a common mentality. They try to convince the 
secularist/Kemalist groups that ―our threat is your threat; your threat is our threat.‖ They 
prefer to present the identity struggle and threat perception broader as a struggle to save 
the fundamentals of the ―Atatürk‘s Republic.‖ 
The September 12 Regime is Responsible for Radical Islam and the Sivas Events 
T.K.: How did you perceive this? In other words, who did it, what happened, why 
was it done? 
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[A.K.]: The way of perceiving 2 July is very mixed. In other words, it is very 
difficult to determine how 2 July came about, who organized it, and why it was 
done and to speculate about these things. A lot of things are being said. It 
happened like this, it happened like that. As it was done in this way, or it was done 
in that way. But beside all that, the way I see what went down on 2 July: 
following 12 September, religion and Islam were being propagated towards 
society in a strong way. As a result of this propagation radical Islam started to 
emerge. 
T.K.: Who did the propagating? 
A.K.: It was done by those who were personally responsible for 12 September. It 
came about as a result of the constitution which was promulgated by the military 
coup of 12 September. And the imposition of compulsory religious education in 
schools, I am telling you this as an example, before 12 September it was 
voluntary. In other words, after 12 September, we can say that the propagation of 
religion and the rise of radical Islam had become topics of conversation. At a time 
of Islamic radicalization, there was a point of view which did not tolerate those 
who thought differently, which is part and parcel of radical Islam. And as a result 
of these developments, the events of 2 July occurred. But I cannot say that this is 
the only reason. 
T.K.: Were the events seen as acts specifically directed against Alevis? 
A.K.: You need to think of the republic and the Alevis as together, because [the 
state] doesn‘t say kill the Alevis, it was an uprising against the republic which was 
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founded in Sivas and which will be brought to an end in Sivas. Aziz Nesin was 
nothing but a pretext, among those who died were Sunnis as well as Alevis, it is 
not possible to differentiate, it shouldn‘t be seen as an act specifically directed 
against Alevis, but it was something which happened in the context of an Alevi 
event, which is why it has taken on the badge of an Alevi [outrage]. There is the 
template of a Shariah state, and those who want to found one, like happened in 23 
December 1930 in Menemen, one dimension of that was also a rebellion against 
the republic. 
The Objective of the Sivas Events was to end the Turkish Republic and change the 
regime  
[M.Ç.]: The events in Gazi were a total provocation. Of course, there were groups 
of people who came themselves, but there were also groups trying to manipulate 
them at that time. These men said ―secular Republic was founded here, it will be 
brought down here‖. These men put their goals out in the open. The strength of 
the CHP was not sufficient to stop all those.  
Of the 34 people who died, 17 were Sunni Muslims. That is very interesting. It is 
not right after that to reflect this event solely in the form of a Sunni – Alevi 
[opposition] and to perceive it as being the sole responsibility to the Alevis. Not 
the Alevi community, but the national identity of Turkey was targeted there. And 
Turkey‘s national integrity got hit very hard there.  
The Real Objective is to Bring the Sharia Rule 
T.K.: How did you see those who did it? 
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[A.E.]: I see it as such. This is a movement of those who want to bring Shariah to 
Turkey, of those who want to disrupt the present system, those circles trying to 
reach their goals. This was an open [act of] provocation. There is really no 
conflict between the Sunnis and the Alevis of Anatolia. 
Continuation of the historical objectives of destroying Alevis 
T.K.: So, what kind of an effect did the events of Sivas and Gazi have on the 
Alevi community? What was the perception? How did it affect you? 
[A.Y.]: 14: The Alevi community has been thinking, has been saying since forever 
that it was subject to a form of discrimination. Such massacres are nothing new to 
the Alevis. You also have these [things] in an historical perspective, but before 
1980 you also had event similar to what happened in Çorum, Maraş, Malataya, 
Sivas. But in the events which started in Sivas and were continued in Gazi, you 
could detect that these were not massacres done by Sunni people. In other words, 
there is a dimension superseding the Alevi-Sunni conflict present in this stuff. If 
you closely investigate the Sivas massacre you will see that it was organized in a 
very special manner, that is was done under the supervision and control of the 
state. As long as injustices and discrimination against the Alevi community 
continues Sivas will continue to bleed. If the injustices towards Alevis were to 
disappear, if the assembly houses, the Alevi belief centers, were to be recognized, 
if the attempts to assimilate Alevis were to stop, if even – what do I know – the 
population of Sivas in a way were to apologize to the Alevi community and the 
Madimak Hotel turned into a museum, maybe then the 2
nd
 of July wouldn‘t be as 
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commemorated as it is [now]. 
T.K.: If the Madimak Hotel was turned into a museum, would it have a positive 
impact? 
A.Y.: Alevis are people who have a feeling that the state [should] not [be] a mono-
religious, mono-ethnic entity, but rather a pluralist and a democratic state which 
accepts every citizen on the basis of equality. Now such a feeling does not exist 
[correspond to reality]. The state looks at the Alevi creed as if it were something 
else, it looks at it as if it were the other. It doesn‘t regard [Alevis] as equal 
citizens. 
 There are certain self criticisms related to some of the events that happened prior 
to the Sivas Events. The invitation of a figure like Aziz Nesin, who was outspoken about 
his atheism and criticisms towards Islam, was considered as a major mistake. The people 
who were against Aziz Nesin mentioned that ―Those people misrepresent Alevi culture, 
beliefs and worldview and present us as anti-Islamic.‖ 
Alevis also had the mistake of misrepresenting themselves 
[H.M.]: Aziz Nesin was used as a pretext. In my view they shouldn‘t have 
brought Aziz Nesin along. The man said in a courageous fashion do not take me 
along. He said I am an atheist. I do not believe in Allah, I do not believe in the 
Prophet Muhammad, I do not believe in Hazrat Ali. In spite of him being an 
atheist, they took such a courageous person along. It is that simple. But, on top of 
that, Aziz Nesin should not have been used as a pretext. If the [province‘s] 
governor, the security forces, the gendarmerie would have taken requisite 
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precautions this would never have happened.  
T.K.: So, what kind of reactions were there amongst Alevis?  
H.M.: They were upset with the state. Is such a thing permissible? Those people 
were burned for eight hours. Now today, look at it, and two years after the 
Madimak event took place. The event of the Gazi neighborhood. Agents 
provocateurs went there, caused a provocation and brought the gathered Alevis in 
opposition to the police, in opposition to the forces of the state. In nineteen years 
Alevis were killed there with bullets and a second Alevi community was brought 
to desperation like that. Like I said, the state shouldn‘t besiege the Alevis. 
Self-criticism 
[C. Ş.]: There were two kinds of reactions in the Alevi community. One [side] 
was because such a thing was done to emotionally blame the other side, and this 
still being done [now]. The other way, for instance, those latest events in Sivas are 
not being approved by even Alevis. Organizing such a ceremony there, bringing 
Aziz Nesin there, I also do not approve of doing such a ceremony to the extent of 
challenging [the population of] Sivas. If you look at the then current climate, as 
you know, Salman Rushdie occupied the agenda at the time. Salman Rushdie in 
the global agenda, the order to kill Salman Rushdie, Aziz Nesin went and 
translated the Satanic Verses into Turkish, and published it in the periodical 
Aydınlık. Aziz Nesin went out and started selling copies on the Taksim Square [in 
Istanbul]. This was not an Alevi problem. Like Aziz Nesin was called to Sivas to 
be the keynote speaker at the Pir Sultan Abdal ceremonies, he expresses the same 
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sentiments there. What is its connection with the Alevi creed? Whatever the intent 
might have been, in the end it was a provocative act which brought Sunnis out 
against Alevis. This is what that ceremony was organized by those politicized 
Alevis. 
Gazi: Turkey’s Soft Underbelly 
 The Gazi Riots of 1995 were another negative downturn for Alevis. In the Gazi 
case, many of my informants accused the deep state/secret state, (or illegal organizations 
within the bureaucracy), of instigating confrontations between Alevis and Sunnis, and 
Turks and Kurds. The Gazi Riots were perceived completely as a provocation that 
threatened social peace and stability in Turkey. Many Alevis believe that the Gazi Riots, 
and the provocations before and after the event revealed the conspiracies of the secret 
state against the Alevi community. The Gazi Riots were related to the political and 
economic marginalization of Alevis and deep states role in the continuation of 
marginalization rather than to the fundamentalist religious threat. 
[A.K.]: Turkey has a [definite] Kurdish policy. Behind that you have the move 
towards organizing of the Alevis, on the other hand, however much trade unions 
were not effective in those days, those were times when municipalities turned into 
retrogressive parties and workers laid off. These municipalities [initiated] an 
operation which targeted leftists and Alevi individuals; I would like to stress this, 
in groups, to throw them out. There is going to be a reaction, reactions evolve. 
Alevis become organized. How are they going to get past such an operation? It is 
going to be done by means of assimilation. For years, in the Ottoman-Seljuk 
455 
 
period, whichever angle you look at these things, there are certain things that 
could be done by certain basic groups. You stick the knife into the soft underbelly, 
that soft underbelly is going to explode. According to the state, today‘s Turkey‘s 
soft underbelly is formed by the Kurds and the Alevis. The state has a lot of 
bellyache. The events of Gazi, a workers‘ neighborhood, an Alevi place of 
settlement called Gazi. Kurds, Alevis, a neighborhood of Kurds and workers. 
Look, this is very important. These people have nothing but their workforce. This 
house, from the moment that this fear started spreading, has got to be tamed by 
something this time. There is the fear of being tamed by means of hunger. If you 
do this, we will strike these houses, you‘ll be unemployed, and if we can‘t kill you 
this way we‘ll kill you that way. These sackings I mentioned before, in the 
municipalities were done in a very obvious fashion according to identity and 
according to your political affiliation. The Gazi neighborhood was a place that 
was picked on purpose. 
 Fears concerning the future (prospective) 
 The fear genre is the most prolific genre on the list of regressive narratives. Fear 
narratives can be found in the forms of storylines, public and private narratives, and 
speech and other acts. Rather than focusing on a particular event or an episode, a set of 
episodes or events are interpreted as the components of a much broader social process 
and an undesirable social transformation. Fear of sharia rule (anti-democratic Islamic 
regime), fear of Iranization (Islamic revolution), fear of Wahhabization (spread of 
religious bigotry), fear of Imperial domination and fear of assimilation are the most 
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vocally pronounced types of fears. Except for the fear of assimilation, which is the most 
common form of threat perception among Alevis, the threat perceptions that are 
mentioned above are also shared by the secularist people in Turkey. Since they are 
abstract they are difficult to address. Alevis believe that as a syncretic, heterodox 
religious community they have historically suffered from the oppressions of orthodox 
Sunni understanding. They are seriously concerned about a return to a social and political 
order that is based on religious orthodoxy, which they call ―sharia.‖ 
The reason for the disproportionate growth of Islamist groups in Turkey, 
according to many Alevis and secularist intellectuals in the aftermath of the 1980 coup, is 
the American support for the Islamic groups in containing Soviet expansion in the 1970s 
and 1980s. This policy is popularly known in Turkey as the ―Green Belt Project.‖ The 
development of the right wing and Islamist political movements in Turkey and increasing 
level of religiosity in the aftermath of the 1980 coup has often been associated with the 
narrative of the ―Green Belt Project‖. 
[M.Ç.]: Do you know. There was this Green Belt project in the United States 
during the period of the Soviet Union. In the framework of the Green Belt, all 
kind of Shariah-inspired movements in Turkey were supported. In fact, by means 
of Saudi Arabia. They have lots of means. In Turkey people like Özal appeared, 
being liberal towards what they call religious feelings. As President of the 
Republic of Turkey, as prime minister this man lost his balance to the extent that 
he even buried his mother at the feet of a Nakshibandi sheikh. If these movements 
become public knowledge, then Alevis in the cities, if you go to a funeral service 
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in a mosque you will get insulted. They were being buried while beseeching 
imams, hocas. 
In the contemporary context on the other hand, they explain the rapid growth of 
the AKP and increases in the percentage of moderate Muslims in Turkey with the 
American policy of the ―Greater Middle East Project.‖ There is an overall discourse that 
argues that the ―US supported moderate Islamic regimes to contain Islamic 
fundamentalism which is why the Islamist AKP came to power.‖ The AKP government 
and its supporters are often portrayed as American protégés. Many Alevis feel that they 
are the victims of the rise of Islamic radicalism in Turkey. 
T.K.: So, whatever is done will be a positive move? Whatever the AKP does, do 
you think they will reform themselves? 
[D.B.]: You cannot [engage in] faith politics, the AKP clearly engages in faith 
politics. As long as they engage in faith politics they cannot be persuasive. As far 
as personal gains go they are quite democratic, but as far as social gains go they 
are people [advocating] the Shariah. On the other hand, they are undermining 
themselves, as they do whatever America tell them to, as long as they are obliged 
to continue [a policy of] concordance with the EU [strictures], as long as they do 
this it might antagonize their social base. As we are approaching these people in a 
conscious way, [approaching] them as they are [extremists] who would introduce 
the Shariah if they could. While voting for these people, there are those who vote 
for them thinking that the state will become as they want it to be. 
Episodes such as the Sivas Events and the assassinations of the 
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secularist/Kemalist intellectuals are symptoms of Islamist violence according to many of 
my informants. They are concerned about some minor assaults as well. 
[C.Ş.]: Turkey is a country of political fluctuations. In other words, there is 
nothing to prevent someone from going into an Alevi assembly house, or to an 
Alevi‘s place of work to stage a provocation. On the other hand, the distinction 
between Alevi – Sunni is still being made, when appointing state officials, while 
processing the information of these officials. An Alevi person can still not get 
ahead in either civil or military bureaucracy. If they did succeed in getting 
positions in a secretive manner, once they get found out their records are 
tampered with. It is sufficient to stop someone from advancing in bureaucratic 
circles to start the rumor that he‘s an Alevi. Somebody who defends secularism, 
somebody who defends Kemalism, let‘s say somebody who defends modernism, 
even if he is not an Alevi, it is enough to start the rumor he‘s an Alevi, a Bektashi 
to cut his bureaucratic career short. 
Related to the fear of sharia there are two other generic fears: ―Iranization 
syndrome‖ and ―Wahhabization syndrome‖. Both of these fears are related to the concern 
about fears from spread of Orthodox Sunni understanding. There are no concrete bases to 
support these major threat perceptions although the institutions such as ―İmam Hatip 
Schools,‖ Diyanet, Sunni religious networks and AKP government are conceived to be 
the agents of these processes. One of the main reasons behind these fears, including the 
fear of assimilation, is the failure of the Turkish State and the other Sunni groups in 
Turkey to officially and culturally recognize and acknowledge the Alevi identity and 
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culture. 
Losing the republic: Iranization syndrome 
[L. K.]: We need to pursue a policy which has peace and love at its base, we need 
to elaborate a comprehensive policy so that our children will be able to live in a 
bright Turkey. We say that there is no separation on the basis of religion, 
language, race, sex in our philosophy I am obliged to respect every human being 
from whatever race as a creature of God. If tomorrow Turkey were to become 
[like] Iran, if it were to become retrograde then my grandchild would be the first 
one to be prosecuted in that atmosphere of pressure. These are the wrongs that 
were being done in our time, we need to think about these things in terms of we 
didn‘t rise up against these wrongs, why did we break up into forty pieces, you 
didn‘t like me, I didn‘t like you, I stayed outside, the other got into power. The 
Alevis need to obliterate their personalities of broken backs or otherwise, a 
society which is at war with itself cannot reach any [goal], that‘s what the 
imperialist powers say and they stay behind as a consumption society. As a 
society at war with itself does not produce anything, that‘s what‘s now happening 
and Turkey has gotten to the state of being a country which is being led by outside 
forces. 
Return of the Ebussud’s legacy: Imam-Hatip Schools and the Wahhabization 
Syndrome 
T.K.: Why do you consider those who graduate from Imam-Hatip schools as a 
threat? Aren‘t these also schools which are bound by the curriculum promulgated 
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by the National Education Ministry? 
[M.Ç.]: It is being seen in such a way, but Imam-Hatip schools are not thought of 
in terms of vocational training. There is no point in making individual 
interpretations about it either. They themselves say that it is our back garden. 
Erbakan has admitted as much in his own words. Isn‘t it the case that they were 
those who said that chancellors would stand to attention in front of [graduates 
from] Imam-Hatip schools? Its aim is not to educate religious functionaries or 
such. [At university] they prefer departments in politics, law, public 
administration. Isn‘t it so that in the religion of Islam, girls don‘t get to be 
religious functionaries. Then why are there so many girls as pupils in Imam-Hatip 
schools? That means that there is a different aim. To create people in line with 
their own lifestyles, to create [members of] their ranks. How many of them really 
love Atatürk? 
Fear of Sunnification and Assimilation are the Biggest Problems 
 In the previous chapter the problems related to the ambiguities of the boundaries 
of Alevi identity have been discussed. The fear of assimilation is also a fear related to the 
ambiguous and rapidly changing boundaries of the Alevi identity. Many Alevis feel the 
challenges of reconstructing their identity in a new social and cultural environment, lack 
of their own institutions, and forms of relationships as a serious challenge. Their fears are 
projected onto the ―other‖ through accusations of pursuing ―assimilationist policies‖ or 
―sneaky plans of assimilation.‖ Building mosques in Alevi villages and religion courses 
in schools are examples of assimilationist policies for many Alevis. There are, however, 
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some Alevi citizens that accuse the Diyanet and the ―Turkish State‖ for not providing 
religious education and services, and for not sending imams to their villages. Whenever 
the Diyanet and the Government pursue certain policies in relation to Alevis and try to 
provide certain services according to their understanding, these policies are interpreted as 
assimilationist policies by Alevi activists. On the other hand if the Government and 
Diyanet do not provide services they are accused of not fulfilling their duties by ordinary 
Alevi citizens. These confusions are related to the trust vacuum and historical background 
of the relationship between Alevis and the ―State‖; and ―Alevis‖ and ―Conservative 
Sunnis.‖ Some Alevis also argued that assimilation occurs in the schools, work 
environments and town contexts because of social pressure and peer pressure. 
Assimilation by Peer Pressure 
[A.Kn.]: But of course there was a mosque in the village. They go to the big city, 
they don‘t do all that much in the village anyway, [and] because it is close within 
the province they go to the big city. As they work as small tradesmen, as they are 
people engaged in commerce, this business at first starts with going to the Friday 
prayer with the people in their surroundings. Let‘s go to the Friday [prayer], let‘s 
go to the feastday [prayer, Bayram Namazı], and then saying let‘s go this and let‘s 
go to that, our companions end up praying at all times [five proscribed times a 
day].  
T.K.: Didn‘t they experience problems with the local population? 
A.K.: They didn‘t have any serious difficulties with the local population, but if 
you for instance express the issue, talk about stuff. They say stuff like, even if I 
462 
 
were not to go there, if I wouldn‘t go to the mosque the other traders wouldn‘t do 
business with me. Now you need to appreciate these concerns. Now I am turning 
back [and] walking around, [as if] it was an easy matter, it is not just another 
issue. 
Anatolia is Like the Cemetery of Dead Cultures; We Don’t Want to be one of Those 
[A.Y.]: We are in a state where the issue of building mosques in Alevi villages 
occupied an important place on the [current] agenda. The matter of assimilating 
the Alevis. I have a piece in [the periodical] Alevilerin Sesi, which I started 
writing about five six months ago, about the sneaky plan to assimilate the Alevis. 
It is a serious piece in this context, dealing with inequality, discrimination, 
lawlessness. After that quite some discussions evolved. The other thing is that I 
said that the assembly houses should be turned into faith, into worship centers. Its 
importance stems from this. You know since you‘ve been working on this. 
Officially, the Republic of Turkey has no religion. In other words, there is no state 
religion. For that reason, demanding that the state recognizes the Alevi creed is 
quite a statement to make. The state can get to know the Alevi creed through quite 
a few institutions. 
The active situation takes place like this. Legally speaking, the state cannot write 
down anywhere that there is a faith called the Alevi creed. But what can it do? 
When it recognizes the Alevis‘ faith center, I mean the assembly houses as places 
of worship, then the Alevi creed will have been recognized as an independent 
faith. The matter is that simple. In other words, as a jurist I see that the solution 
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could be this simple. If you recognize the Alevi assembly house as a place of 
worship then no problem is left.  
The Alevi creed is a dying faith in the 21
st
 century. Because if you just dig in the 
Anatolian soil, you‘ll come across hundreds of cultures that have come and gone. 
A new culture pops up at every meter. The Alevi creed can also die out and 
disappear. In other words, in the countryside, the Alevi creed lived in its own 
traditional fashion with its own traditional institutions. Now when these 
traditional institutions disappear, when the dede- talip (student) relationship, when 
the elements disappear, what will happen then? If you do not build anything new 
in its place – and the assembly house would be something new – then the Alevi 
creed is going to die and disappear. 
Building Mosques in Alevi Villages Intends to Sunnify Alevis: It is a Long Term 
Investment and a Sneaky Policy 
[A.Kn.]: The biggest problem experienced by Alevis is that of assimilation. In 
other words, Sunnification and Shi‘ification. At this moment, the government, or 
we can just say the state, inclusive of the Republican era, exert pressure on the 
Alevis, which was done as a natural course in the Ottoman period, [35.00], the 
activities to [either] Sunnify or Shi‘ify the Alevis continue [unabated]. It was 
being put into action systematically. The compulsory religious education is one 
example of this. Building mosques in Alevi villages is [also] an example of this. 
Opposing the descriptions Alevis give of themselves, [telling us] you are not 
Alevis, [as] the Alevi creed is such and such, are [more] example[s] of this 
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[policy]. That is the reason why they invite us into the mosque, telling us that we 
are Muslims, propagating the mosque as the place of worship for Alevis. And they 
are being obstinate in that. They have no understanding. They don‘t say, yes, you 
as a community express yourself in this way, you are such. They are still building 
mosques in Alevi villages. This year, in the village of İğdeli, in Kayseri, a couple 
of our friends have in a self-sacrificing and sensitive way pointed out to the 
Federation that a mosque was being built there, and the Federation intervened to 
thwart the construction of the mosque. 
T.K.: Who is building these mosques? 
A.K.: Let me tell you, one or two people from the village are being used. In other 
words, in every village there is a group of spineless [individuals]. They can be 
found all over the community. Well, in every village one or two people turn out to 
be spineless figures, they go to the Müftü, to the governor saying that it would be 
good to build a village in [their] village. In fact, even a number of village 
headmen do such things. 
T.K.: Would there be a problem if there was a mosque? 
A.K.: It‘s a problem. Would there be a problem if we were to set up a church in a 
Sunni village? With a priest attached to it as well. What‘s the point? Can you 
imagine now, while the country is in the midst of an economic crisis, you build 
mosques in Alevi villages, on the one hand, you appoint a hoca to that mosque 
and give him wages. But nobody goes to that mosque. What‘s its use? There are 
quite a few mosques without a hoca, send them there. Why are you building [a 
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mosque] in an Alevi village? It is something like this. You are going to a Sunni 
village to set up a church. Appoint a priest [as well]. You also give him wages 
from the state‘s budget. While nobody attends this church. However much this 
would wrong, building a mosque in an Alevi village is equally wrong. 
A.K.: I would leave that to the Ottoman period, if we take the past twenty years of 
the republican period, these assimilation efforts were made official after 1980, but 
not on this level. Now they are building a mosque in an Alevi village, appoint an 
imam as well, if visitors don‘t come today, they‘ll come tomorrow, if this one 
doesn‘t come, his child will, and if this one doesn‘t then the grandchild will, it is a 
trap patiently set up in front of us. Last year, I went to Thrace on behalf of an 
election campaign for the educationists‘ union, the majority of the Bektashis in 
Thrace have been assimilated, and as the MHP appears to support a Turkish-
Islamic synthesis, a lot of local government went to the MHP consequently. 
Without even being aware of it, our people begin to implement the Shariah. He 
doesn‘t think like that, he comes to the place arm in arm with his wife, but when 
he gets these, his wife sits in one place and he in another. When confronted about 
it, he cannot explain why he is separated from his wife, even becomes 
embarrassed, he comes with his wife, and sits down. If there is no-one there to 
make him aware of these things, the man gets Sunnified. He begins to accept 
Sunni customs. 
Empire strikes back: Fear of imperial conspiracies 
 The development and increasing social influence of ―political Islam‖ or 
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―conservative religious groups‖ in Turkey has been explained with a special emphasis on 
the American policies of the ―Green Belt Project,‖ ―Greater Middle East Project,‖ and 
conspiracy theories of great power intervention in domestic affair in the 1970s. There is a 
general tendency to explain the dynamics of Turkish politics with the influences of the 
Western Powers. Most Alevis believe that ―imperialist powers,‖ meaning the U.S., and 
other European countries have ―unfinished business in Turkey.‖ By manipulating the 
domestic actors in Turkey, they are trying to weaken and divide Turkey and exploit its 
economic resources. In particular, the ―ulusalcı‖ (secular/leftist/nationalist) trend among 
Alevi citizens and intellectuals is becoming more popular. The ―ulusalcı‖s believe that 
imperialists have a problem with Atatürk‘s independent Turkish Republic and and that the 
same imperialists are planning conspiracies to weaken Turkey. 
The support for Turkey‘s EU membership among the Alevi community is 
remarkable, but many Alevis feel a necessity to reiterate their loyalty to Turkey when the 
discussion is on EU membership. There is also a general tendency to explain the internal 
tensions within Turkey, such as left-right, Alevi-Sunni, Turk-Kurd, and secular- religious 
dichotomies, which are the instigations of foreign powers. The interesting thing is that 
despite the problems with the institutions of the Turkish State there are a growing number 
of Alevis who consider the ―Turkish Armed Forces/ Military‖ to be the guarantor of 
secularism and a barrier against imperial conspiracies. As the ―ulusalcı‖ ideology rapidly 
becomes more popular among the Alevis the negative attitudes against the EU and U.S. 
becomes more common. Among my informants and hundreds of people I talked with 
during the field research, not more than a handful of people indicated their belief in 
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Turkey‘s membership in the EU. Many people argued that the EU will not accept Turkey 
because of double standards even if we fulfill all the duties. Almost everybody 
complained about the EU‘s double standard against Turkey. 
Peace Corps Had Brought Trouble 
[K.A.]: You know these things are set in motion by economic crises. It is seen as 
[a conflict of] beliefs, but however basic causes are always economic. The Alevi 
creed is shown as the ostensible reason. I would like to point out the following in 
particular, as you know, after 1961; the Peace Corps came [here] from America. 
Some of their reports were systematized in certain centers. And these have been 
attempted to become opposed to one another. For example, an Alevi-Sunni 
conflict is not feasible in Mardin. What can happen there, a Kurdish-Arab can 
happen there. But in Maraş, an Alevi-Sunni conflict could flare up, and Azeri-
Kurdish conflict or a Turkoman conflict. Why? Because the dominant [ethnic] 
group, because it is an [ethnic] mosaic, appraised and used them efficiently there. 
T.K.: Are you saying that we're behind the ideological/ sectarian violence? 
K.A.: The information they gathered is very important here. The ones who were 
tried, the ones who did were from Maraş, but those who planned [these 
massacres] have never been brought to justice. Not in Maraş, not in Sivas, it‘s 
always stayed like that 
EU Controversy: Foreign Enemy or Catalyst for Positive Social Change 
[Ş.K.]: They are not going to accept us into the EU. The EU wants to divide 
Turkey. It wants to destroy Turkey. Like the policies that were practiced in 
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Yugoslavia, they are doing the same thing to Turkey now.  
T.K.: But, there are quite a few Alevis who take a positive view of this, in terms 
of their own political and social demands.  
Ş.K.: Those are not Alevis.  
T.K.: How would you define them? 
Ş.K.: Those are not Alevise. They want to us the Alevi creed for political ends. 
[A.S.]: I can express my personal views. On account of entering the EU, the 
country makes benefits available to a number of people. There is no sufficient 
authority available in the country. Turkey is a very rich country, while it is a very 
rich country in many respects today it is under foreign occupation in economic 
terms, [even] including agriculture, and Turkey is willingly not being developed. 
Because it is the most important country in the Middle East and the only country 
which has a living democracy in the region. The only country which can 
accommodate [diverse] religious identities within [its structure]. 
Look, Alevis, for the sake of their own benefit, won‘t sell out the country. Let me 
tell you this straight. Alevis will not sell off the country for their own benefit. 
Alevis will always move in accordance with their national interests, even they are 
being oppressed, even if they were destroyed. That is the basic raison d‘être of the 
Alevis. The Alevi [community] will not, on account of being given some money 
or that it was to be given self-determination, sell its own country.  
T.K.: How do you see the EU accession process? Do you think it will have 
positive effects for the Alevis? 
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A.S.: Of course, if we were to enter, but only if we were to enter under equal 
conditions, the Alevis would be able to express themselves more freely, maybe the 
Diyanet would even be abolished. If we abide by EU yardsticks, just like over 
there one tries to keep every faith alive, the conditions at the base of the 
secularism of democracy should also be in place here. Maybe, those who have a 
yearning for a Shariah state could then be thwarted, the secular democratic 
structure of the republic could then be safeguarded, as it seems obvious now that 
the intention of the AKP is to establish a Shariah state, as being reflected in the 
American as well as in the European press, as is also written in today‘s 
Cumhuriyet, otherwise it won‘t be possible to stop the current development. 
On the policy level there were criticisms against the EU and the U.S., but on the 
normative bases in terms of their social, political and economic system there is an overall 
appreciation and appropriation. Enlightenment values, freedom of speech, technological 
advancement and human development levels in the western countries have been 
respected. In terms of these values and norms Alevis see themselves more advanced and 
westernized than Sunnis. 
We Have Been Defending These Values since Hacı Bektaş Veli 
[C. Ş.]: It is not possible for the Alevis not to defend the values which were 
brought in by the EU. In other words, freedom of thought, freedom of belief, 
multi-cultural life, human rights, women‘s rights, children‘s rights, the rights of 
the environment, well these kind of things have been defended by Alevis ever 
since the time of Hacı Bektaş Veli. Well, they defend these things since the year 
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1200. Whoever defends these things, the Alevis will be on their side. At the 
moment, they defend these values that were brought in by the EU with tooth and 
nail. The Alevis in Turkey, more so than the conservative Sunnis here, see 
themselves as closer to the Western people who defend these values. In other 
words, in the light of the relationship with the EU, the face of the Alevis is turned 
towards democracy, towards human rights. It is not oriented towards the east. 
Who is in the east anyway? In the east, there is conservatism, despotism. There is 
the despotism of Islam in the east, the Arab despotism. For that reason the Alevis‘ 
faces are turned west, turned towards the enlightenment. But there are some issues 
in the relationship with the West, first of all, in its relations with our country, the 
fact that the West operates a double standard when dealing with Turkey, it attitude 
of hegemony, the double standard in the Armenian issue, we think that they act 
according to a double standard with regards to the developments in Turkey. 
7.6.4. Progressive Narratives  
Progressive narratives indicate certain successes and acquisitions for the purposes 
of reaching the vision of the ideal society for Alevis. The set of axiological principles that 
are indicated in the previous chapter, such as secularism, democracy, enlightenment, and 
social and economic justice are facilitated, and conditions for the satisfaction of Alevi 
collective requests are improved with these positive steps. Recognition of Alevi culture 
and identity by the Turkish state and the majority Sunni population is another ideal 
sitution that Alevis want to reach. For example, the publication of the book ―Alevilik 
471 
 
Olayı,‖ the Alevi Declaration, and the spread of Alevi associations brought a public 
visibility to Alevi identity and Alevi collective requests. The single Party period, 
especially the period of Atatürk‘s presidency (1923-1938), during which Republican 
reforms had taken place, is often considered to be a golden age for many Alevis. There is 
an overall appropriation of republican reforms by the Alevi community and the right 
wing politicians are accused of spoiling the golden age. 
[E.G.]: In Turkey the republican project experienced an impasse after the 1940s. 
In other words, at this point the republican project in Turkey is an unfinished 
project. The republic is taking steps backward now, not forward. Atatürk died 
before he could put everything needed for the republic in place. From then 
onwards, it has not been possible to speak of a contribution to the republic. This 
has offered opportunities to those communities who were not content with the 
abolition of the Shaikh-ul-Islam, with the abolition of the Shariah. In other words, 
in a way they have been encouraged by using certain things as pretexts, after ‘93, 
after 12 September, after the army opened up the way for religion. They have tried 
to prove their courage by staging a trial at Sivas. This event was directed against 
Alevis, as well as being a trial of a reckoning with the future of this country. 
Reaching a modern, secular, enlightened, egalitarian social and political order, 
and all the moral virtues mentioned in the previous chapter, are idealized. The steps that 
would facilitate reaching these objectives are progressive steps for Alevis. The conditions 
before and after these events are presented as dramatically different, for example the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire is interpreted as a ―transformation from slavery to 
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freedom,‖ or ―from oppression to liberty.‖ There is also a concern about the preservation 
and maintenance of these path breaking developments. The groups, individuals and 
institution that try to turn Turkey away from these ideals are included in the lists of 
villains or enemies of Alevis. Frequently mentioned progressive narratives are: 
 Collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
 Victory in the Turkish National Independence War 
 Establishment of the modern, secular Turkish Republic by Atatürk, 1923 
 Single Party period of Republican Turkey, 1923-1946 (golden age) 
 Publication of Alevilik Olayı, 1988 
 Publication of Alevi declaration, 1990  
 Rapid spread of Alevi associations and institutions, 1993- 
 Process of EU integration reforms (controversial) 
 Chosen Glories 
The Publication of the “Alevilik Olayı” 
[ F. G.]: In our leftist days, when we first got to know an Alevi – if we are going 
to tell the story in a correct fashion – the identity which really defined us was 
leftism not the Alevi creed, in those days I, like a lot of Alevi youths,  read Cemal 
Şener‘s book Alevilik Olayı. It was a turning point in the sense that many 
educated Alevis who were living in the urban environment for the first time 
encountered a written source about Alevilik. It was important for publicly voicing 
the Alevi identity.  
T.K.: Did these people writing on the Alevi creed have any kind of transformative 
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effect? What kind of reaction did Cemal Şener elicit in you? 
F.G.: In a sense it was a step for publicly legitimizing the Alevi creed and Alevi 
identity. In other words, today you are a member of a community which has been 
hidden, kept secret for years. You were always told to hide it, to keep it secret. 
And then you look and see that among books which are sold well is a work which 
tells this. In this way, it is certain that it had an effect in bringing [the Alevi creed] 
out in the open. 
The Cumhuriyet Serial 
[ M.İ.]: Now this caused such a transformation. When we started writing this serial we 
experienced difficulties in finding Alevis to talk to. They were afraid. They didn‘t talk. 
We went [to them] for about 15 days to convince them. Also, there was only one 
[television] station [at the time], TRT. We wanted to publish an ad. But the TRT did not 
accept the ad. When we made this serial, Cumhuriyet had a circulation between 80 and 85 
thousand, now it has a circulation of 180,000. A circulation increase of about a 100,000. 
We had prepared the serial for a 5-day run, but then we were told not to continue while 
we had made such a lot preparations. We tried to continue that first serial with readers‘ 
letters. Then when other papers saw the increase in the circulation of Cumhuriyet, they 
joined the queue. This was a turning point: I experienced how elderly dedes kissed my 
hand while tears were streaming from their eyes. As if somebody who was of more 
importance stood in front of them, they hugged and cried. For the first time they were 
able to express their identity proudly. 
[ D.B.]: In conjunction with [the appearance of] Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] the 
474 
 
Ottoman suppression ends. As a result, we Alevis regard Mustafa Kemal as [a 
kind of] Hazrat Ali. Mustafa Kemal has a respected standing among the Alevi 
community, which could be called sacred. For the first time in history Alevis were 
considered as equal citizens and the values we had believed for so long  
T.K.: But on the other hand, we see that during the first years of the Republican 
period the dervish convents, as well as the Bektaşi order and such were closed. 
D.B.: But that wasn‘t a bad thing, sir, now they do say such things today. In the 
light of today‘s realities, together with 4 Bektaşi centres that were closed 385 
Naqshibandi convents were closed. Now what out naive friends among our Alevi 
circle don‘t know, or which they ignore is the fact that when Mahmud II abolished 
the Jannissaries in 1826 all of the Bektaşi convents were surrendered to the 
Naqshibandis. All its books, documents were burned. All dedes were interrogated 
by the Naqshi organization, [and] they were killed on the grounds of being 
sinners, or whatever else was done [to them]. In fact, till we get to the Republic 
there was only [the village of] Hacı Bektaş left and [even] there Naqshis reside. 
There was nothing left, among the convents closed in 1924, not a single Assembly 
house (Cemevi) was found. 1:50:18. There wasn‘t any Assembly house left, they 
had all been closed down by the man [Mahmud II], after 1826. The law on 
[closing down] convents and zaviyahs did not affect Alevis below expectations. 
There hardly was any [ill-effect], but its influence on fundamentalism [irtica or 
retrogressive religious bigotry] was tremendous. It was what stopped [the spread 
of] fundamentalism [in Turkey], if it hadn‘t been stopped we would not have 
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gotten to the fifties, [now] would we have made it to the sixties. The Alevi 
community‘s fondness for Atatürk stems from it. 
[A.R.U.]: They began to get organized amongst themselves. This organizing 
effort came like a flood, if you allow the expression. It didn‘t seem very aware 
either. Everybody opened a foundation, everybody tried to do something, 
everybody started to express themselves. Years of silence gave rise to a crooked 
form of getting organized. 
7.6.5. Faltering Narratives 
In addition to the four categories of narrative forms that are adopted from 
Gergen‘s taxonomy (Gergen 1986; 1999), I would like to emphasize another category of 
narrative which I call ―faltering narrative.‖ Faltering narratives represent a state of wrong 
direction, confusions or lack of a clear direction. In a situation where there is no clear 
direction or target point or where there are multiplicities of final destinations back and 
forth, moves have been made for no beneficial purposes. In fact , these moves have been 
interpreted as a waste of time and effort. Retrospective analysis and inference of ―we had 
gone in the wrong direction because of certain confusions in the past but fortunately we 
have found the right way‖ is common in faltering narratives. Arguments such as ―we had 
hidden our identities for a long time when we first came to the city, but we are now 
comfortable to express it now,‖ ―we were involved in Marxist politics but now we re-
discovered the Alevi creed,‖ or ―we were involved in hometown (hemşehri) associations 
but we have a broader cause in the Alevi associations‖ are just few of the faltering 
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storylines. 
Faltering narratives are sometimes interpreted as straying away from the 
mainstream and the return to the ―right direction‖ after a period of confusion. Evaluation 
of the ―incorrect directions‖ or ―confusions‖ of the past has often been done from a 
standpoint which is considered to be the right one today. There are some cases in which 
concerns about ambiguous future directions are indicated. Feelings of sorrow, shame or 
confusion are the emotions that are frequently associated with the faltering narratives. In 
order to avoid the humiliation and discrimination in the urban contexts where Alevis 
mandatorily encountered the ―other,‖ Alevis had chosen three main directions, all of 
which were later deemed to be wrong directions. The majority of Alevi decided to hide 
their identities until the recent Alevi revival. The rest had either chosen to adopt a more 
cosmopolitan identity, like ―leftism /Marxism,‖ or they decided to focus on their local 
affiliations in hometown associations. We have to keep in mind that the priorities of the 
majority of the first generation migrant Alevis was economic survival.  
With regard to future directions for the Alevi identity movement, there is also an 
important debate which will be explicated in further depth in the next chapter. It is often 
easier for many Alevis to make judgments and evaluations about the past than to make 
clear statements about future directions. Competing discourses on Alevi identity have 
different value judgments related to a faltering past. Some people evaluate Alevi massive 
involvement in the leftist movement as a disaster, whereas some others see that struggle 
as consistent with the Alevi value system. There is an overall agreement among the Alevi 
on the confusion about Alevi identity between the 1960s and the early 1990s.  
477 
 
Some of the storylines that are classified as faltering narratives: 
 Process of migration and urbanization and disguise, 1960- 
 Wide scale involvement of Alevi groups in extreme left organizations, 1960-1990 
 Endless debates and competitions between different understandings of Alevilik 
Denial of the Identity and the Continuation of Victimhood 
The earlier institutionalization of Alevi citizens in the urban context has been 
shaped along two main streams. Hometown associations were a conglomerate of 
disconnected units that mushroomed in big cities like Istanbul and Ankara. They 
sustained a sense of unity and solidarity and served some social functions such as helping 
people finding jobs, or organizing cultural events. The target audience for the hometown 
associations was mostly the working class Alevis. Students and labor union activists had 
been involved mostly in legal (parties, associations, labor unions) and illegal (terrorist 
organizations, underground networks) leftist networks. People who had not been involved 
in these two kinds of organizations preferred to hide their identities to avoid 
discrimination and humiliation because of being Alevi. In fact, the percentage of the 
Alevis that had hidden their identity during this period was much higher than the 
percentage of the people who were involved in other forms of social networks. All these 
three trajectories have been considered deviations from the Alevi cause. It is common, 
especially among the Alevi dedes and groups of traditional Alevis, to assess the 
experience of the left wing involvement as intoxication or delusion. 
1968 and the Leftist Intoxication of Alevi youth 
[ A.R.U.]: Until 1968 there was no problem among the Alevi youth with regard to 
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living their faith. That faith continued [even] under that pressure. That was the 
first time that any kind of organized overture happened. The so-called ‘68 
generation, had a peace statement in the midst of these political events, a 
democracy statement, a freedom statement. 
A.R.U.: There was a statement for a better life. Alevi youth entered the ‘68 
generation thinking that it could speak more freely of its Alevi creed. It entered 
[alright], but what happened? Because of that Marx, because of that Lenin‘s 
materialism they became atheists. In other words, rather than being able to speak 
of their faith more freely, they experienced a handicap, they became atheists. They 
got poisoned there. And that poisoning also affected [the Alevi] community. 
Naturally, the dedes also got influenced by that. Faith was put on a back burner. 
When it was pushed back like that, the dedes too were confined to the back. And 
then one day, when the Alevi youth had come to its senses, when they woke up 
they saw that [their] societal unity had been disturbed, that they were in the midst 
of a moral breakdown. And they saw that things wouldn‘t work without a [base 
in] faith. And when they started looking for their faith anew, they also saw a void 
as they had also rendered the dedes without any influence. This was even more 
acute in conjunction with [a growing] urbanization. In the village everybody was 
Alevi. Everybody was able to freely express themselves. They could fast, they 
could perform their assemblies. Once we entered an apartment. Everybody was 
Sunni. The only Alevis were we. Now perform your assemblies, now live through 
your Muharrem [celebrations], say that you are Alevi. Just say that you‘re an 
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Alevi at your place of work, say that you‘re an Alevi when you‘re a student. We 
lived through such things. Of course, Alevis who saw that things would not be 
able to continue in such a fashion started getting organized seriously. 
The Lack of the Institutions of Faith in Cities Increased the Interest in the Leftist 
Movement 
[ A.Ky.]: Certainly, amongst leftist movement, the Alevis suffered most from. 
They were a bit more liberated. For instance, the other citizens were going to their 
mosques, listened to their imams and hocas. But, as for Alevis, no ties were [the 
mosque] left at the time, it was willy-nilly easier for them not to get swept up in 
these waves. Everybody knows that at time, in the market squares, people were 
reciting Pir Sultan Abdal‘s words, Shah Ismail‘s sayings, as well as the sayings of 
other of our folk poets. But nobody could say that they were Alevis‘ For example, 
the noun shah was taken to mean yar [lover]. Some words were changed in some 
places to the noun dost [friend, a reference to Hazrat Ali]. After that, all the people 
were together; one Alevi, the other Sunni. It wasn‘t said they were Alevis. They 
did not proffer respect to an imam or an hoca. It was being done here. Getting 
worn down, being beat, it all started from here. 
 Some people also accused the right wing politicians and the intolerance of the 
Sunni citizens for the Alevi decision to get involved in left wing politics. It is mainly 
because of the discriminatory nature of conservative right wing politics in Turkey that the 
Alevis were dragged to the leftist camp. For many active members of the Alevist 
movement, who were involved in the left wing politics prior to the 1990s, it was because 
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of the progressive values of the Alevi ethos that they were part of leftist movement. 
Reaction to whether Right Wing Politicians Dragged Alevis to Left 
[ D. K.]: What pulled the Alevis to the left was I think the reactionism against the 
rightists. Because they have always regarded the right, the rightists in an Erbakan 
kind of light, as Yazid [the second Caliph of the Umayyad dynasty, notorious for 
killing Hussain ibn Ali]. They see the Sunnis as Yazid. Because they see leftists as 
those who have given a kind or right to live, those who have opened up an area to 
live, [or] at the very least as people with whom they have no difficulties in a 
religious sense. Veering to the left, as a matter of fact, the CHP was not even left 
enough, so we started being sympathetic to [movements] more to the left. We had 
one common enemy, our single enemy is the fascists. We were forced to oppose 
them and that‘s where our Alevi personality came second and our leftist identity 
came to the front. 
My faith does not form a hindrance to my [dedication to] contemporary thought 
[ M. İ.]: Within the leftist movement, I have never hidden my Alevi identity. I 
was nevertheless subject to [their] humiliations and being laughed at by my 
friends. For instance, one night we were supposed to get together, I said that I had 
to attend a commemoration of Hacı Bektaş, they retorted by asking what business 
it was of mine to go there, do we go to the mosque to pray, so why do you have to 
go there – a friend of mine told me, and the others said the same. They said, like 
we now believe in Marx and left religion behind, you should also leave it behind 
now. But still some of my friends attended prayers at special feast-days [bayram] 
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upon their fathers‘ request. One bayram morning, we said let‘s go spray some 
slogans, they would say I have to go says bayram prayers with my father. My 
beliefs form no hindrance to [my dedication to the social] struggle. As such, 
struggling for [what‘s right] is at the root of my faith. Equality is at the base of my 
faith. My faith does not form a hindrance to my [dedication to] contemporary 
thought. Why should I quit anyway? But yours is a hindrance. You say that 
everything is down to trust in God. God gave you as much as befits you, but in 
my belief there is no such thing. Moreover, because our parents didn‘t raise us 
like that, they did not complain about us at every turn, as they supported us we do 
not need to re-investigate our faith. 
Hiding the Aleviness or Denial of Self 
 Hiding or disguising identity left deeper a traumatic impact on Alevi citizens. The 
people who were involved in the leftist politics at least believed they were doing the right 
thing for both Alevis and all the enlightened people in Turkey and abroad. Many Alevis 
still believe that leftist thought and action is consistent with their system of belief. For the 
people who were humiliated because of being Alevi and who decided to hide their 
identities out of concern for social and economic survival, it was more difficult to accept 
the period of disguise and denial. Hiding their identity because of oppression and survival 
concerns was also a significant argument in the discourses on victimhood and the 
psychology of victimization. 
[ A. S.]: Alevis have really lived through very hard days. They weren‘t even seen 
as second-class citizens in this country. They have always been ostracized. They 
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have always been ignored and it wasn‘t possible for an Alevi to travel to a city 
and announce that he is an Alevi. In particular if a saz was seen on the back of 
dedes, calling it a devil‘s instrument they would beat up the dede. They would 
break his saz. A lot of people, in order to be able to perform their rituals, took 
their saz to be or hid them in a secret place. A lot of people, in order to be able to 
live their faith [were forced to have their] dedes travel through villages as 
peddlers or salesmen. As a result, when they got to big cities and announced I am 
an Alevi, they would have been looked at with suspicion and would even be 
chased out. You even have Alevis in high positions at work who do not reveal 
their true identity. Not able to communicate their identities. But thank God today, 
they can divulge their identities at ease and even take pride. 
Trauma of Escapism 
[ A.R.U.]: We never really lived [in accordance with] our faith, we never showed 
out children. The assembly was a social event. We did the Muharrem fast only 
partially. The sacrifices that used to be made, are no longer made. The community 
has lost touch. Everybody got individualized. Everybody was more concerned 
with earning their daily bread, with the trouble of existence. There was a 
mentality which [said] if I live in those times however I live I shall live, however 
I can save myself, I‘ll save myself. 
 Faltering narratives indicate forms of regret and sorrow from personal and 
collective experiences of the past. Self criticism or intra-group criticism is also embedded 
in faltering narratives, though ―the oppressive other‖ is accused of responsibility for the 
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mistakes. 
Considering the Possibilities of the Happily Ever After Narratives 
Five narrative genres have been emphasized to analyze the emotional narratives 
on Alevi identity. Among these genres, tragic and heroic narratives have a special role in 
the constitution of Alevi ―identity.‖ Narratives about shared victimhood, shared traumas, 
shared threat perceptions as a common fate, and shared glories are the strongest 
cementers in the identity building processes. For conflict resolution, the most useful 
genre of narrative is the ―happily ever after‖ narrative, which means a stable narrative 
which comes after a progressive narrative. The happily-ever-after narrative means a 
condition of stability after reaching the valued or ideal state. It was common to hear 
complaints about imperfect conditions. It was also common to hear the demands 
mentioned in the list by activists who are struggling for the recognition of Alevi identity. 
It was more difficult to get more detailed information about the conditions of the 
―happily-ever-after‖ narrative. Having a secular, democratic, egalitarian and harmonious 
society are mentioned as the conditions of a happily ever after narrative. The repertoire of 
storylines related to the ―happily-ever-after‖ narrative is not rich enough compared to 
heroic, tragic and regressive narratives. I consider the happily-ever after narratives for the 
Alevi-Sunni and Alevi-State relations to be the comprehensive process of mutual 
recognition. The pscyhocultural impediments that are elaborated in this chapter are more 
significant obstacles to reaching the happily-ever-after condition than are the legal 
obstacles. 
There is a serious debate among Alevis over the question of ―where should the 
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Alevi identity go?‖ ―What should Alevis do?‖ There are a multiplicity of views on the 
answers to these questions which makes the possibility of the ―happily-ever-after‖ 
narrative much more difficult. In the next chapter I will elaborate further on the 
alternative discourses on Alevi identity and the implications of this plurality on the Alevi 
identity struggle. 
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Chapter 8 
 Between Alevilik without Ali to Essence of Islam: Fragments of Alevi Identity 
 
 
 
One of the most difficult tasks I encountered while doing my field research was to 
grasp the complexity of the discourses on Alevi identity. It seemed impossible to present 
a particular perspective as the representative voice of Alevi identity. There were people 
who believed and supported the idea that ―there can be Alevilik without Ali (Alisiz 
Alevilik) (Bulut, 1997). Ehl-i beyt and Islamic sources were just minor components of 
the syncretic tradition of Alevilik.‖ Some others were arguing that ―Alevilik is the 
essence and/or Turkish interpretation of Islam.‖ These people had different meaning 
systems and different social and political objectives, yet all defined themselves nominally 
as Alevis. Interpretations of the ―Alevi history‖ according to the various perspectives 
were also very different. There were many people, especially among the educated young 
generation of Alevis, who claim that they just happened to be born from Alevi families 
and they do not attribute any specific value attachment to their being Alevi, yet on some 
occasions they feel discriminated against because of their Alevi identity. These people 
were making references to different aspects of Alevi value systems and different 
narratives on Alevi history. 
From the perspective of ordinary ―Sunnis‖ who do not have an in-depth 
knowledge of Alevi social realities, Alevilik is perceived to be a homogeneous and highly 
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integrated and organized community. Because of the ―minority‖ position in terms of 
belief system in comparison to Sunnis, they are perceived as a more integrated and 
homogeneous community by other social groups in Turkey. The reality on the ground 
nonetheless is much more complicated. As I mentioned in the first chapter, the only two 
commonalities among the diverse definitions of Alevi identity were ―not being a Sunni‖ 
or ―being Alevi‖ and the shared traumas, glories and emotions of loyalty and attachment 
to abstract definition of the ―Alevi‖ group. The first set of commonalities is related to the 
boundaries of the Alevi identity and the second set of commonalities is related to 
collective emotions. Besides these common concerns there is a wide array of areas for 
diversity. 
Having mentioned the commonalities of Alevi identity in such a wide spectrum 
and having discussed the sources and fundamental elements of contemporary Alevi 
identity, I will highlight the contending discourses on Alevi identity in this chapter. I 
underline five ideal typical discourse positions on Alevi identity: İstanbul Discourse, 
Ankara Discourse, Bektaşi Discourse, Ethnic Discourse and Post-Alevi discourse. The 
five discourse positions are not strictly isolated from each other; there are overlapping 
dimensions and there may be individuals who display elements of different discourse 
positions. In almost all cases there is a dominant voice that falls into one of the five 
positions. Each position has its own set of storylines and associated speech acts and 
practical objectives. 
Rediscovery or re-making of the social identity within the new social realm 
generates its own confusions. In fact, the ―intra-Alevi‖ discussions illuminate the internal 
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differences and variations that have either been avoided or have not yet been noticed due 
to low levels of intra group communication. It has not always been the healthiest form of 
discussion, because of the wide scale accusations, slandering and attempts at 
marginalization. Sometimes divisive and pejorative, these inner debates among the Alevi 
community promote the public discussion of many of the controversial issues that have 
not been discussed properly and have not yet been resolved. Marginalized voices and 
perspectives have had opportunities to express themselves in the new context. Today‘s 
problems are not just related to the contemporary issues and problems of the Alevi 
community, they are also related to the unresolved historical confusions of the Alevis. 
The debates and controversies in the current context are related to the question, ―What 
should we do with Alevi identity for Alevi identity?‖ 
The available discursive resources, social and political language, and context 
shape the nature of the present-day discussions, which further complicates both the 
internal and external debates. These debates and confusions will not be settled until a 
common social and political vision emerges. The possibility of such a vision does not 
seem feasible, at least for this generation of Alevis. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
common emotional responses such as fear, humiliation, and threat perceptions to shared 
challenges are unifying factors for Alevi identity. The continuing debate and struggle is 
over who will determine the hegemonic discourse on Alevi identity politics. At this point 
there is no ―the hegemonic discourse.‖ There as a multiplicity of discourses and narrative 
genres, some of which are in competition with each other. The competition between these 
discourses is at the same time a power and influence game. They have different 
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prescriptions and paths to answer the question: what should the Alevis do? 
There may be overlaps between these discourse and narrative genres, some of 
which are peripheral, some others which are more vocal and dominant in the public 
sphere. The more vocal and publicly visible discourses utilize the media resources and 
mass communication instruments more successfully than the rest. This success does not 
necessarily reflect their intra-group influence and persuasiveness. They may be vocal and 
publicly visible, yet they may not be persuasive to the members of the Alevi community 
as well as to the ―outsiders.‖ This general state of confusion and competition is even 
relevant within the trans-generational realms of Alevi households. The editors of the 
volume ―Alevilik,‖ which was compiled with the academic and political discussions from 
the ―tahtacılar‖ mail group, offers an interesting question representing the confusion of 
the new generation of Alevis. 
My father thinks and says that ―Alevilik is essence of Islam, in fact we are the 
true Muslims‖. I believe that Alevilik is a separate belief system which has been 
influenced from Islam. My son says and believes that Alevilik is a philosophy and 
a way of life. What should we do now
122
? (Engin, & Engin 2004: 10). 
Similar forms of confusions and sometimes even intra-family controversies have 
frequently been experienced within Alevi circles. Encounters with the other social and 
cultural environments and other identities also affect the diversification of variables. The 
outcome of this ambiguity is the permanent state of fear and anxiety. The following five 
                                                 
122 ―Babam Alevilik İslamdır hatta hakiki Müslüman biziz diyor. Ben Alevilik kendi başına bir inançtır, fakat İslamdan da etkilenmiştir diyorum. Oğlum da 
Alevilik yalnızca bir felsefe, bir yaşam biçimidir diyor. Ne yapacağız şimdi? (Engin & Engin, 2004, p. 10).  
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quotations from my field interviews represent five different perspectives regarding what 
the Alevilik is about and what should be done with Alevi identity. The list is abridged and 
can be expanded with many other references. 
[ E.G.]: I see the Alevi creed as a way of life. It is a [kind of] catch all. The Alevi 
creed is a [form of] culture. 
[ H.Ş.]: At the moment, I regard the Alevi creed as a sect [Madh'hab]. The Alevi 
creed is a way of believing. 
[ A.E.]: Islam may also have been included [in the Alevi creed], but Islam‘s rules 
are clear, its practices too, as well as it's Sunnah, [as a matter of fact], we don‘t 
have any common ground left with Islam. 
[ F. G.]: It is clear that the Alevi creed is a religious belief [system]. It has to be 
with a religious belief [system] 
[ D. K.]: In other words Alevi creed is an ethnic identity. Because it is being 
perceived as an ethnic identity, my [social] circle, [even] my own family circle 
sees me as an Alevi. Even if you were a Christian, they would call you a Christian 
Alevi. 
Contending discourses and serious discussions not only divides the different 
communities but also the families as well. The question ―what should we do now‖ is a 
relevant question and concern for many Alevis because the answer to this question will 
determine the function and the re-organization of Alevi institutions and cultural 
resources. It will also identify the moral tone of the political claims and modes of 
interaction between the Alevi community and other ethnic, religious and identity groups. 
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Keeping the identity and Alevi demands ambiguous empowers the entrepreneurs of Alevi 
identity politics. These entrepreneurs; whether writers, academics, association leaders, 
communal leaders, dedes and businessman are like the alchemists of Alevi identity 
revival. 
8.1. Versions of Alevilik in the Academic Literature 
The complexity of the discourses on Alevi identity startled other scholars as well. 
Various scholars define the categories differently, yet there are commonalities between 
these definitions. Bilici, (1998) for example, points out four such groups: ―(i) Left-
Alevilik, using Alevi teachings as a ―liberation theology‖ much like the way Latin 
American popular Marxism used Catholicism; (ii) Mystical-Islamic Alevilik, which is 
organized around Haci Bektas Veli associations, supporting an individualist Islam and 
emphasizing the theme of ―love‖; (iii) Centre-Alevilik, politically Social-Democratic or 
liberal, represented by the Cem Vakfi; and (iv) Shii-inclined Alevilik, more 
fundamentalist and conservative, supporting the cause of Iranian Shiism and interpreting 
Alevilik within the Twelve Imams doctrine‖. Bilici‘s classification schema outlines the 
different ideological perspectives and social and institutional trends within the Alevi 
movement, however when examined from the individual level it does not grasp the 
entirety of the fragments of Alevi identity. 
Another taxonomy made by Ocak (Ocak, 1996) classified the approaches to 
Alevilik into four: ―(i) Kemalist-humanist approaches; (ii) Sunni-Islamist approaches; 
(iii) Marxist-liberationist approaches; and (iv) Turkish-nationalist approaches.‖ Ocak‘s 
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categorization is based on the differences in the ideological positions and worldviews. 
Erman and Göker adopted a similar version of taxonomy: (i) ―Kurdish Alevi populists; 
(ii) Social-Democratic Alevis; (iii) more religiously conservative Alevis; (iv) and Alevis 
emphasizing patriotism (Erman & Göker, 2000).‖ Erman and Göker‘s taxonomy is also 
related to the classification of political ideologies in Turkey. There are also taxonomies 
that classify Alevilik according to institutions such as Alevi Bektaşi Federasyonu (ABF), 
Cem Vakfı and Ehl-i Beyt Vakfı. All these institutions have different discourses on Alevi 
identity and the Alevi struggle. 
As the literature also highlights, there is not a single homogeneous Alevi 
community that is united around a particular theological or political center. Common 
features of these classifications can be summarized as the four main trends: (i) Marxist; 
(ii) social democratic/ secularist; (3) conservative; and (4) nationalist/patriotic streams. 
There are also interpretations of Alevilik, including but not limited to: Heterodox, Shiite; 
Secular; Marxist; versions that are similar to Sunni interpretation of Islam; and even 
atheist versions. It is not clear whether different positions pursue different interpretations 
because of their political and religious objectives or different political and religious 
objectives adhere to different interpretations. The main reason for the disarray of different 
periodicals, organizations, foundations and publication houses is the confusion or 
competition over the definitions. These distinct voices and versions of Alevilik have also 
been organized among the Alevi diaspora. 
Alternative discourse positions on Alevi identity that are emphasized in this 
chapter are substantiated with field interviews and other public narratives. Individual life 
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stories, personal voices and public collective claims are the main resources in the 
categorization rather than the institutions or political and religious positions. I have also 
incorporated the voices of the unorganized body of Alevi citizens who are not actively 
involved in the Alevi identity struggle. 
8.2. Alternative Discourses on Alevi Identity 
Discourses on contemporary urban Alevi identity in this study are classified under 
five major categories: Istanbul Discourse, Ankara Discourse, Bektaşi Discourse, 
Ethnic/Nominal Discourse, and Post-Alevi Discourse. Istanbul and Ankara
123
, in these 
definitions, do not refer to the geographical locations. Similarly, Post-Alevi does not 
necessarily refer to the total disconnection from other versions of Alevi discourses. They 
are rather names of ideal typical narrative genres that represent and constitute different 
versions of Alevi understandings. These genres do not have clear and impermeable 
boundaries, but the overall combination of these five narrative genres represent the 
outlines of the contemporary urban Alevi identity, with the exception of diaspora 
Alevis
124
.  
The main difference between these sometimes competing and sometimes complimentary 
genres is that they have different patterns and parameters of boundary making and 
ingroup/outgroup definitions. They also have different ways to express resentments to 
                                                 
123  Political scientist Mümtaz‘er Türköne has a classification in his description of competing nationalisms in Turkey. Türköne emphasize the abstract concept of 
Istanbul nationalism which has references to common, culture, history and experiences of a centuries-long coexistence as opposed to Ankara and Diyarbakir 
nationalisms, both of which refer to competing ethnic Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms. These five narrative genres in the Alevi case are rather components of a 
broader discourses of Alevi identity politics.   
124  There are many academic studies on the Alevis in Europe:  Sökefeld, 2002; 2003; 2004; 2006; Wilpert, 1987; 1988; 2008; Mandel, 2008; Massicard, 2003; 
Rigoni, 2003; Zirh, 2008. 
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marginalization and victimization. These five versions of Alevi discourse have extensions 
all over Turkey and even among diasporic Alevis in Europe. Sometimes three or four of 
these discourses may coexist or contradict within the same family. This multiplicity and 
complexity turns the boundary formation and negotiation process into a more difficult 
one that constantly creates internal and external tensions. 
For the Istanbul discourse, different cultural practices, traditional Alevi rituals, 
and an ―un-orthodox‖ understanding of Islam are the main parameters of boundary 
making. Beliefs, rituals, moral values and communal rapport are essential elements of the 
Istanbul discourse. There is a particularly critical attitude against the ritual practices and 
understandings of conservative Sunni or in their terms ―Şeriatçı‖ Islam.  In terms of 
group definition, the Istanbul discourse represents a religiously oriented communal group 
approach. The Ankara discourse has more of a political and ideological mode of 
boundary making: inclusion and exclusion. The concepts and implication of the 
arguments are very political and politicized. Boundaries have been drawn over the themes 
of social and political contentions with the state establishment and the other groups, 
mainly conservative Sunnis, in Turkey. The political language and mode of organization 
and collective action that is represented by the Ankara discourse resembles a modern 
contentious social movement. 
The boundary making practices of the Bektaşi discourse is at the ethical level. It is 
believed that they are open to all human beings. As opposed to the zahiri (external) 
meaning of Islam, they wish to be understood to be following a batıni (esoteric) 
interpretation. Like the other discourse categories they are also unsympathetic to 
494 
 
orthodox Sunni understandings and practices in Turkey and elsewhere. The primordial 
and kinship ties are not important for Bektaşi discourses on self expression. The Bektaşi 
discourse produces an ethical language that addresses a wider audience. In terms of social 
impact and social mobilization, the Bektaşi discourse is not a strong instrument, but it 
contributes a lot to the legitimacy of Alevi-Bektaşis within the Turkish-Islamic culture. 
For the ethnic or nominal discourse, the boundaries have already been set, 
because of the family lineage or kinship ties. It can be defined primarily as a primordial 
identity without a salient or strong sense of group attachment. Whoever has been born to 
Alevi parents has this default identity. Actual problems and discriminatory practices often 
help to increase the salience of this primordial attachment. In many circumstances social 
and political value have not been attributed to this attachment. In ethnic discourse some 
of the discriminatory practices in marriage, schools, job searches and stereotyping 
solidify the boundaries of the identity. The Ethnic discourse is the voice of the silent 
majority that is neither proud nor ashamed of being born an Alevi. Alevi identity in ethnic 
discourse is a ―sub-identity‖ to other identities, such as being a Turkish citizen, Muslim, 
woman or a professional in a field. The ethnic discourse is not formulated to be a self 
definition as primarily Alevi, but ends up being defined as such. 
The most complicated boundary making pattern is in the post-Alevi discourse. On 
one hand, they have been born from Alevi parents and are proud to be Alevi. On the other 
hand; they do not believe that there is an essential and irreconcilable difference between 
Alevi and Sunni teachings and practices. They come from same source and they believe 
that the minor differences have been manipulated by the political entrepreneurs that try to 
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use Alevilik for political purposes. Post-Alevi discourse has been accused of being 
―assimilated Alevis,‖ or ―Sunnified Alevis‖ by some Alevis because of the resistance to 
strict boundaries between Alevis and Sunnis. The Post-Alevi discourse argues that main 
the sources of Alevi identity and Alevi culture are Islamic and therefore there are more 
overlaps between Alevi and Sunni identities than there are controversies. They have 
mixed feelings about the companions of the Prophet, sahabah, some of them even have 
positive feelings about the sahabah which is not a common attitude among Alevis. Their 
self definition has not been formulated as opposed to a particular ―other‖. 
The diasporic discourse on Alevi identity is a different phenomenon that has its 
own dynamics and institutions, challenges as well as opportunities, and therefore it is 
kept outside of the domain of this study. The influence of diaspora narratives on Alevi 
politics in Turkey will briefly be discussed. 
Most outsiders, especially people or institutions that have a distanced attitude 
towards the Alevi community tend to hear one coherent genre and understanding when 
they are trying to deal with the Alevi community. For example, Marxist left-wing people 
tend to accept the Ankara discourse as the voice and representative of Alevis. Nationalist 
people tend to emphasize the Bektaşi and Istanbul discourses, whereas the conservative 
Sunnis perceive the post-Alevi discourse to be the ultimate representative of Alevilik and 
consider other discourses to be the deviant voices. This is a problematic approach 
because rather than trying to understand the complexity and variation among the Alevi 
community they try to push them for a particular position and take a side in the 
competition of ideas . These kinds of external interventions cause serious discontent and 
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criticism among the Alevi community. Alevi community leaders often feel threatened by 
these interventions and present these statements and attitudes as part of an assimilation 
campaign. 
These five positions demand certain group rights. They have similar goals but 
their methods of approaching their goals manifest differences. There are differences of 
opinion in every social group or social movement but overall the social and political 
impact of this struggle should be taken as a totality. My main data is about life story 
narratives and public discourses therefore I have taken social economic as well as 
individual perspectives into account. 
8.2.1. Micro Narratives: Common Life Trajectories in Personal Storylines 
Before getting into the details of the alternative discourse on Alevi identity, I 
would like to tease out some of the general patterns in which Alevi citizens relate their 
Aleviness in their personal life storylines or biographies. Where Alevilik stands in their 
lives and how they relate to it in their life trajectories gives an idea about collective 
processes as well. It is quite uncommon to find people without an Alevi family 
background to define themselves as Alevis. Sunni-Alevi marriages are still rare but it is 
increasing, especially among the generation that were born in the post 1980 context of 
Turkey. It is common among this particular, more secularized, generation to deny any 
allegiance to Aleviness and Sunniness, or just to be interested in the cultural or folkloric 
aspects as indicated in patterns vii and viii below. There are, however, professional urban 
Alevi and Sunni citizens that are interested in the Bektaşi order and life style. 
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In many urban Alevis‘ lives there is either a moment or a process of awakening 
with regard to their Alevi identity. This awakening is usually due to several reasons: 
satisfaction of basic social and economic needs and shifting of the priority to identity and 
belief needs; negative personal experience with regard to being Alevi (religious classes, 
slandering etc); negative collective experiences such as the Sivas Events or the Güner 
Ümit Affair; and global transformations such as the collapse of Communism and the end 
of the cold war. The list above can be extended with several other items, but what is more 
important here is that it is difficult to encounter a stable Alevi identity trajectory in the 
urban context, unlike the relatively more stable Alevi identity in the rural contexts. 
―Aleviness‖ below refers to being born from Alevi families. 
i) Aleviness---urban migration-- disguise (priority of social economic conditions and 
survival) --- return to the Alevi identity 
ii) Aleviness--- urban migration or coming to cities for study (high school/ university) --- 
denial of the Aleviness --- involvement in Marxist class struggle/atheism --- return to 
Alevi identity in terms of activism (return of the identity politics/political language) 
iii) Professional life --- social democratic, secular or Marxist life style --- joining to 
Bektaşi circle 
iv) Aleviness --- professional life/social democratic, secular or Marxist life style --- 
joining to a Bektaşi circle 
v) Aleviness --- migration to Europe --- priority of social economic needs --- social 
economic prosperity --- return of identity needs and rediscovery of Aleviness  
vi) Aleviness---Sunni education – positive encounter with the ―other‖—interaction and 
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reciprocal influence of identities 
vii) Aleviness --- ignorance or denial of identity --- interest in Alevi culture and rituals  
viii) Aleviness --- Ignorance and denial of identity --- no significance of Aleviness in 
lifestyle  
ix) Aleviness --- modern secular education and life style --- denial of Aleviness because it 
is considered to be ―backward‖ 
x) Aleviness --- period of denial and unawareness --- recognition of the Aleviness in 
contentious encounters at school, military service, at work or personal relations- neither 
proud nor apologetic about being Alevi yet disturbed because of marginalization 
xi) Aleviness --- migration to city --- continuation of traditional Alevi rituals and 
practices 
8.2.2. Markers of Competing Discourse Positions 
The discourse positions that are outlined in this chapter emerged while investigating 
the following questions and concerns related to Alevi contemporary identity: 
 The way the individual and the social identity/―US‖ have been defined  
 How the ―Other‖ or ―THEM‖ definition is made  
 Debate on the essence and requirements of being an Alevi (sources of identity)  
 Role or position of Islam, Marxism and Secular values in their self definition 
 The ways in which the boundaries of the Alevi identity have been defined and 
expressed in changing circumstances  
 Selection of heroes and villains in their collective imagination 
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 Institutional representatives or public voices of the discourse 
 Problems (personal or collective) of being Alevi in the contemporary context  
 Understanding of  the origins and the critical episodes in Alevi history 
 What should the Alevi do?  
Besides the markers that are mentioned above there are significant unresolved 
internal controversies that cause the diversification of Alevi identity. A significant amount 
of energy and attention has been spent on the controversies that are mentioned below. 
Debate on leadership of the community: who should be the leaders and who 
should represent Alevi collectivist, dedes, Bektaşi babas, association representatives, 
intellectuals or others. 
How to deal with “Others”: ―Others‖ includes the Turkish state and the various 
Sunni understandings in Turkey. Should we reconcile with the Turkish state or is it 
essential to the Alevi community to continue the social and political struggle against 
unjust practices? 
Historical roots and the cultural resources of Alevi tradition. There are 
irreconcilable arguments on the debate about the essence of Alevilik. These arguments 
are mainly related to the different social and political projects and visions for the future of 
the Alevi community, therefore some of the arguments and historical analyses are highly 
anachronistic. 
What should be the role of Islam in defining Alevi identity? While some groups 
see Islam‘s role as marginal, others present Islam as the essence of Alevilik, or that 
Alevilik is the authentic essence of Islam. 
500 
 
8.3. İstanbul Discourse 
―Alevilik is the essence of Islam, which has not been distorted by the Umayyad 
understanding and tradition.‖ 
The Istanbul discourse constructs an ethno-sectarian identity, by defining Alevilik 
as the Turkish interpretation of Islam. This version of Alevilik thinks that their 
understanding of Islam is more ―Islamic‖ and ―authentic‖ than the Sunni version of 
Islam. There is an attribution of double authenticity and legitimacy in the Istanbul 
discourse in terms of the origins of Alevi thought. First, because it comes directly from 
the practices of ehl-i beyt. Ehl-i beyt is considered to be the second important source of 
Islam for Alevis, behind the Quran. Secondly, it is also presented as a tradition of belief 
that is blended with the pastoral Turkic tribes‘ simple, pure and ―unpoliticized,‖ or 
―unpolluted‖ understanding of Islam.  
The Essence of Islam 
[ A. Y. K.].: The Alevi creed is not a sect [Madh'hab]. That‘s what we tell 
everybody. The Alevi creed is the essence of Islam. The Alevi creed is way of 
understanding Islam in view of its own [values]. In other words, as a Chinese 
person you would interpret Islam in a different way. A [member] of the Shafi‘i 
[Madh'hab] interprets Islam differently. The Alevi creed is a belief system which 
interprets Islam in view of its own [values], in the way that it understands the 
Kuran, the Prophet Mohammed, Hazrat Ali, and the twelve Imams. It is not a 
culture. Culture is a different thing all together. 
The main problem for the Istanbul discourse is the homogeneous Sunni 
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understanding of Islam in Turkey that marginalize Alevis, their cultural practices, rituals 
and authentic lifestyle. 
Turkey needs to make a choice whether to keep insisting on the homogeneous 
―Sunni‖ definition of Islam or to recognize and embrace other versions as equal 
partners in the making of modern Turkish national identity. 
They consider the Diyanet to be the culprit of this marginalization. The motive for the 
marginalization according to Istanbul discourse is the unwillingness of the established 
religious orthodoxies to give equal share in the distribution of material resources and 
social and political influence. So the marginalization is not just about the different 
religious understandings, but also about the distribution of economic and political 
resources. The Istanbul discourse is also proud that their ―more authentic‖ understanding 
of Islam is at the same time more accommodative to modern, secular values and life 
style. 
The Alevi revival in the Istanbul discourse is regarded as a return to the authentic 
culture, practices and rituals of ―Turkish Islam.‖ According to the Istanbul discourse, the 
Turk‘s understanding of Islam had been Sunnified, politicized and contaminated during 
the Seljukid, Ottoman times, the multi party period of Republican Turkey, starting from 
the 1950s, and after the 1980 military coup. The politization of both the Alevi creed and 
Sunni Islam is severely criticized by Alevi groups. The image of Muawiya again returns 
as a way of condemning the politization of Alevilik as well. 
The Politicization of the Alevi Creed, against Politics 
[A.R.U.]: The ones who insulted the Alevi creed in the gravest way were those 
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who used the Alevi creed for their own political agendas. They are serving their 
own purposes. They secure contributions to their own machinations, to their own 
goals. As a result, they are Alevilik for their political inclinations. If you are going 
to become involved in politics in this country, I don‘t know the numbers, [but] 
there are about fifty [political] parties. They set them up, we respect them [for 
that]. But [as for] the Alevi creed, doing politics using Pir Sultan Abdal or Hacı 
Bektaş Veli, that cannot be done. Because Hacı Bektaş Veli is the [champion] of a 
struggle, the [champion] of a faith. He is not the [champion] of a [certain form of] 
politics. Politics and faith cannot go together. Muawiya cannot be side by side 
with Ali. One is a political [figure], the other a man of faith. The tainting of faith 
cannot be accepted. But politics are tainted from the beginning till the end. 
The Istanbul discourse defines Alevilik as the Turkish 
interpretation/understanding of Islam. It is claimed that the Alevilik is the essence, and 
the better interpretation, of Islam as opposed to Arabic and Persian interpretations. 
―Umayyad family introduced political controversies to the religion and they 
corrupted prophet‘s path and fought against prophet‘s family (ehl-i beyt).‖ Sunni 
version of Islam is Arabic and Umayyad understanding of Islam; Shiite version of 
Islam is Persian understanding of Islam. Alevi Islam, which is Turkish 
understanding of Islam, is definitely a way, which fits better to Turkish society 
therefore it should be emphasized in Turkish society.‖ Alevilik is not only the 
version or understanding that fits better to Turkish society but also the best 
interpretation of Islam, which is not corrupted with political debates or 
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controversies. 
It is still an accommodative understanding with Islam, because this discourse 
defines itself as opposed to other interpretations of Islam, not in contradiction with the 
principles of Islam itself. There is a strong emphasis on common Islamic values love for 
the ehl-i beyt (Prophet's family/lineage). They try to define themselves within the domain 
of Turkish-Islamic culture; they do not wish to keep a loose or ambiguous self-definition 
that can create contradiction and confusion. It also recently has some patriotic blend 
which praises locality and Turkishness. This is a paradoxical situation because on one 
hand, they emphasize the universal value and validity of the Alevi belief system and its 
potential as a liberation ideology that can contribute to the peace and prosperity of all 
humanity, while on the other hand they praise the authenticity and locality of the Alevilik 
as a safer version of Islam for the secularist Tukish regime. 
Alevilik is being portrayed as a ―cultural and individual Islam,‖ not ―politicized 
Islam‖ which better serves the secularist regime‘s need for a moderate religion. Alevilik 
is presented as a form of Anatolian folk Islam, Anatolian people‘s grassroots level 
interpretation of Islam, as opposed to Ottoman or Turkish state‘s top-down imposed 
version of Islam. It is presented as a safer understanding of Islam for the regime because 
it does not have any political claims in the public realm. Alevis have certain social and 
political claims for their cause but these claims are not seen as implicit attempts to 
change the secular characteristics of the ―Turkish Political Regime.‖ Within this spectrum 
of universalist and local culturalist claims, the Istanbul discourse has more of a blend of 
local cultural emphasis as opposed to the Ankara Discourse, which accentuates the 
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importance of Alevilik as a universalist liberation theology that can help all the oppressed 
people on earth. 
The Istanbul discourse emphasizes the importance of ritual practices and 
traditional sources of Alevi identity. As far as public political demands are concerned, 
they want the legal obstacles against traditional Alevi institutions and practices to be 
removed. 
―Alevi institutions, rituals and practices are essential we have to revive those 
rituals and practices and Cemevis are the right places to revive these practices. We 
have to return to the authentic sources and the rituals practices of Alevilik within 
the urban context. If some of the legal and political obstacles have been overcome 
we will better get integrated into Turkish society.‖ 
Table 8.1.: Main Features of Istanbul Discouse 
Table 8.1.: Main Features of Istanbul 
Discourse 
 
 
Definitions of ―US‖/ ―Ingroup‖   Better understanding of Islam, 
 Essence of Islam, 
 Turkish version of Islam 
 Authentic, modern and more progressive 
Islam 
Definitions of ―THEM‖ / ―Out 
group‖  
 Sunni, Religious orthodoxy,  
 Umayyad Islam,  
 Wahhabism,  
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 Islamic fundamentalism 
 Retrograde people 
 
The conditions of being an Alevi 
(sources of identity) 
Moral principles such as being modest, having 
control over ―hands, tongue and belly‖ (eline, 
beline diline sahip olmak‖ 
Role of  
 Islam, 
 Marxism & 
 Secular, Humanist values 
 in their self definition 
 We are better and more authentic 
Muslims than Sunnis.  
 Sunni Islam represents oppressive side of 
religious orthodoxy 
 Conservative Sunnis (Şeriatçı) 
misrepresent Islam 
 Marxism was a mistake deviation from 
Alevi values, it was a disaster. 
 We pursue social democratic egalitarian 
worldview 
 Secularism is our common ground with 
Sunnis social and political order should 
be secular 
Boundary maintenance in new 
context 
 Traditional institutions of Alevi culture is 
crucial maintenance of our identity 
Heroes, & frequently mentioned in 
the narratives 
 Hazrat Ali, Ehl-i Beyt, Hüseyin, Imam 
Cafer Sadık, Shah Ismail, Atatürk, Hacı 
Bektaş Veli 
Institutional representatives or  Traditional institutions cemevis, dedes, 
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public voices  dergahs, foundations 
Problems of being Alevis   Recognition by state 
 Legal status of cemevis 
 Removing of the mandatory religious 
courses 
 Equal share from the budget for our 
religious activities 
 Stereotypes, discrimination and biases of 
uneducated Sunnis 
What should the Alevis do?   Protect Alevi identity culture,  
 Consolidate the traditional institutions, 
 Educate our people about our culture, 
rituals and identity  
 Cooperate with the other progressive 
groups in Turkey against extremist 
Sunnis 
 
Social and political struggle and dialectic expressions are not essential features of 
Alevilik. They are, however, instrumental to reach the goals of better treatment and 
recognition within Turkish society. They always try to keep an open space for dialogue 
with the other groups and the people and institutions that represent the official state point 
of view. Some Alevi groups have criticized the Istanbul discourse for endorsing Turkish 
Islamic synthesis, ―Türk İslam Sentezci,‖ which implies a nationalist understanding of 
Alevi culture and identity. The memory of extreme nationalism has had a very negative 
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impact on the Alevi community, especially because of the events of the 1970s, which is 
why nationalist elements of the discourses have been criticized severely. Being in alliance 
with the nationalists and ―Türk İslam Sentezciler,‖ and trying to move from the periphery 
to the center represents a deviation from the left wing position of Alevis in the social 
struggle. This criticism/accusation of the Ankara discourse acknowledges that being in 
the left and taking part in the social struggle is an essential feature of Alevilik. This is an 
important area of disagreement between the Istanbul and Ankara discourses. 
8.3.1. Narratives of Victimization: Remembering the Umayyad, Seljukid and 
Ottoman legacies 
Discourses on victimhood and humiliation are an important element of the 
Istanbul discourse where the major divide within Sunni Islam is based on systematic 
violence, starting from the oppression and massacre of Ahl-al Bayt by the ―Umayyad 
Dynasty.‖ The generic narrative of marginalization below represents the overall 
sentiments related to discrimination in the İstanbul discourse. 
―For centuries ‗we the Alevis‘ have been marginalized, avoided and degraded by 
the central political authorities we have been governed by. Ruling elites had 
always considered us as a threat to their authorities or we have been treated as if 
we are potential allies of their foreign enemies. We have always been at the 
peripheries of the societies we have lived in and we have been treated as second-
class people. We never had an opportunity to express our identity views and 
political interests openly. We always had to hide ourselves or to live in isolated 
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spaces to escape from persecutions of political authorities. There is continuity in 
Seljukid, Ottoman times in terms of oppressions and discriminatory practices. 
Modern Turkish Republic should be more accommodative to differences. We are 
loyal citizens of the Turkish Republic; we don‘t want to escape anymore‖. 
The feeling of constant threat, marginalization and being seen as a threat is 
creating solid boundaries around Alevi community. These boundaries had given a feeling 
of security during normal times but evolved into a persistent threat when the Alevi 
identity became politicized or came to be perceived as politicized by ―others.‖ 
8.3.2. Period of Hope and Disappointment 
The Istanbul discourses‘ interpretation of early Republican history (1923-1950) is 
less critical than those of the Ankara and Bektaşi discourses. During the early years of the 
Turkish Republic our situation had been slightly better off and Bektaşi fathers had 
supported Atatürk and the new Republic. The end of the Ottoman Era caused a period of 
optimism and hope for the Alevi community. Alevis and Bektaşis did not object to the 
policy that banned tekke and zaviyes (shrines) because of their commitment to the secular 
democratic values of the Republic, though the Bektaşi Ocaks (shrines) were also closed 
according to the new law. This optimism had turned into disappointment after the single 
party period in 1950s. According to these narratives, the early death of the ―great leader 
and Commander Mustafa Kemal Atatürk‖ caused a digression from the commitment to 
the principles of the republic. 
During the multi party period, which started in 1950, right wing politicians started 
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to use populist religious discourses to attract popular support. This process helped the 
fostering of ultra-nationalist pan-Turkist ideology and extremist orthodox version of 
Islam that was not sympathetic to secular-Western values or to the Alevi community. The 
process of the revival of the orthodox Sunni version of Islam, with the help of populist 
politicians, created a tension among Alevi citizens, and the Alevi community formed a 
natural alliance with the leftist parties as a defensive response. 
The massive involvement of Alevi citizens, especially the Alevi youth, in the 
leftist struggle of the 1970s is seen as a disastrous and unfortunate deviation, according to 
the Istanbul discourse. 
[R. Ç.]: Involvement in the Marxist and Left-wing struggle was the worst thing 
that happened to Alevis after Yavuz‘s massacres in 16th century. In this case we 
almost committed a suicide. Fortunately we survived the period but it left a deep 
damage and destruction. Our dedes were insulted by our youth and some of our 
children became atheists or materialists and they started to fight with our 
traditional values. They have seen traditional Alevi values and institutions as 
obstacles to Alevi enlightenment. 
Although the overall political language of the Istanbul discourse is close to the 
secular social democratic understanding, they are opinionated against the extreme left 
ideologies because of the negative memories of the pre 1980 situation. 
Mobilizing and focusing our energy within the leftist political struggle starting 
from early 1970s had an incredibly negative influence on the Alevi community. 
We have to get rid of the impacts of the Marxist influences and should return to 
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the original sources and references of the Alevi belief system. The process of 
Alevi revival that started in late 1980s should also be seen as an important 
opportunity to educate our community. We need to deal with the remnants of 
Marxist ideology that corrupted our belief system and cultural practices. We have 
to direct our energy to the Alevi cause and for being recognized with our 
distinctive identity and group rights. 
AK: Our youngster who studying at universities in those days, when they went to 
the dedes after they got back, they would humiliate the dedes, they would address 
the dedes, and say what is it you are doing, what business do you have to deal 
with religion, with faith, with this or that, they would say stuff like socialism is 
going to save us. Now while doing this right, while saying the truth in a wrong 
fashion, with wrong methods, it is better to say that that era was completely` topsy 
turvy. 
In Turkey Alevis are perceived as the ―natural allies of the secularist/Kemalist 
regime,‖ this general understanding and perception is disturbing for Istanbul discourse. 
This position locates Alevis against other more conservative Sunnis and at the same it 
does not reflect the reality. Alevis have their own struggle and social and political claims. 
Generic Narrative: 
Our alliance with the leftist parties and our sympathy to the republican elite was 
not helpful to move Alevi community to the political center. Alevi community has 
been considered as the ―insurance of secularist values‖ and natural ally against 
Islamcists/ şeriatçı (defenders of Islamic regime), these descriptions accusations 
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disturb us.  
We don‘t want to be framed against any other groups in Turkey we are rather 
struggling for our own cause and democratization of Turkey. We support 
secularism and republican values but we are not the insurance of the Republic and 
laicism (Cumhuriyet ve laikliğin sigortası). Our identity is still being denied at the 
official state practices and by the majority Sunni population. We don‘t have any 
problem with the other social groups and Sunni citizens unless they deny our 
rights. We want Alevi identity to be considered as the central and constitutive 
element of Turkish culture. Our struggle is at the political level; we want state to 
recognize our rights other than that we should not get into a direct social struggle 
with any other group in Turkey. 
8.3.3. From periphery to center 
One of the significant characteristics of the Istanbul discourse is that there is a 
clear willingness to engage with the political center and to end the ―centuries old 
peripherialization.‖ There is a belief that further marginalization and maintenance of the 
distanced position by the state and other groups will not provide any benefits for the 
future generation of Alevis. They will consider a process of reconciliation with the 
Turkish state and conservative Sunni circle, if these actors are ready to change some of 
their biases against the Alevi community. 
We want to be melted at the center with the same rights that all the other Turkish 
citizens enjoy. Our interests are parallel with the interests of Turkey and other 
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Turkish citizens; democratization rule of law, social justice and equal treatment 
will resolve our problems. We have gained nothing by being marginalized socially 
and politically. 
EU integration reforms and liberalization policies are seen as the catalyst of social change 
and reconciliation. 
The Identity politics of the Istanbul discourse are integrative. It is argued that they 
want to be equal partners, with their rights related to their beliefs. They regard democratic 
reforms that will grant rights to the Alevi community as an instrument that will integrate 
them better into Turkish society as equal partners. Differences within the political sphere 
are conceived as fundamental according to the political ontologies of the Ankara and 
Diaspora discourses. They argue that cultural and religious commonalities with ―non-
Alevis‖ do not provide meaningful spheres for pursuing common political and social 
projects. Instead, political and social differences provide instrumental space for the 
continuation of Alevi identity politics. The rights granted will help to continue the 
separateness and uniqueness of the Alevi community. Assimilation and integration are 
seen as serious threats in all five discourses, but since protecting the separate identity is 
the main emphasis of the Ankara, ―fear of assimilation‖ is emphasized as a more central 
concern.  
-Cultural, religious and social dimensions of the Alevi tradition have been emphasized, 
rather than the political dimension in Istanbul discourse. 
-More accommodative language has been pursued vis-à-vis the ―secularized Sunnis.‖ 
-Satisfies the need for social identity and belonging, also the need for religious practices. 
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-Istanbul discourse recognizes the significance of the loyalty to the Turkish state and 
Turkish society in order to keep its social legitimacy and accountability. 
-There is a general distanced attitude to foreigners, especially European politicians and 
academicians, who are involved in the affairs of Alevi community. We can often hear 
statements like ―we love our nation, Turkey is ours and we are loyal citizens who have 
never been involved in separatist activities.‖ They sometimes contradict with the Ankara 
discourse and diasporic Alevis on this issue. Some of the leaders of the diasporic Alevis 
are seen in alliance with some European secret services that try to create internal tensions 
in Turkey. 
-They also have a reactionary attitude towards orthodox Sunni theologians and politicians 
who comment on Alevi affairs; they interpret any such event either as part of an 
assimilation campaign or as a part of a secret agenda to divide Alevis. 
-Their understanding of ―Turkish Islam,‖ which is local and unorthodox, is at the essence 
of their self-definition. This understanding of ―Turkish Islam‖ is supported only by non-
Alevis secularist people who are against orthodox Islamic practices in Turkey. 
-Small and medium level businessman, working class including the youth, old people are 
more attracted by this discourse. 
-One of the most important features of this discourse is that it communicates better with 
urban working class Alevis and the educated Alevis that appreciate the ritual and cultural 
aspects of their tradition. Besides their traditional legitimacy dedes know the oral culture, 
deyişs and the feelings of the Alevi community, which is why they communicate better 
with ordinary people. Marxist and political discourse is like a foreign language to 
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ordinary Alevi citizens, therefore they are not attracted by this discourse. The social, 
economic and political struggles, given with religious terminology and narratives, have 
more impact and resonance with people. Narratives such as the Karbala Disaster, the 
Martyrdom of Hüseyin, the Council of the Forties, the atrocities of the Ottoman era and 
the heroic genre of narratives are more popular in the Istanbul Discourse. 
The institutionalization of the Istanbul Alevilik is shaped along the dergahs and 
cemevis. People visit every week to participate in religious ceremonies (ayin-i cem). 
Hundreds of thousands of people participate in these ceremonies on Thursday nights and 
Sundays, especially in the month of Muharrem when the prophet‘s grandson Hüseyin was 
martyred in Karbala. 
Cemevi is a space for social, cultural and religious practices and also a space for 
the formation and expression of ―authentic‖ Alevi identity. ―Worship and prayers are 
performed regularly in cemevis but it is also temporally the most effective instrument for 
the social struggle for recognition.‖ Cemevis are also helpful for the Alevi community to 
deal with the problems of urbanization. By providing a space that will keep ties with the 
rural roots, cemevis provide a feeling of belonging and community and of not getting lost 
and assimilated within the modern urban context. For centuries Alevis have lived in 
small, isolated communities in the rural context, and urbanization has brought a feeling of 
social insecurity. Besides satisfying the identity and religious needs of the Alevis in the 
urban context, cemevis and communities around the cemevis satisfy the need for 
belonging and community. 
Dedes are the leaders, social and religious authorities and they have legitimacy 
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because of their spiritual and social leadership. Dedes are also being trained to perform 
some of the basic religious needs of the Alevi community, such as funeral services and 
sacrifice (kurban) etc. 
At the level of political and social activism the Ankara voice is heard more, but 
the Istanbul voice is more dominant at the popular level and has more potential in terms 
of social mobilization. The ideal institution is the CEM Foundation, whose headquarter is 
in Istanbul but the historical dergahs and cemevis all over Istanbul are considered under 
this. According to Istanbul discourse,the―other‖ of Alevilik are not Sunnis in general but, 
ultra orthodox Sunnis (şeriatçı), Wahhabis, Islamists, ―derin devlet‖ (deep or secret state, 
some paralegal groups within the civil and the military bureaucracy). 
8.4. Ankara Discourse 
―Resistance to injustice, social and economic inequality, and marginalization have always 
been the fundamental feature of Alevilik. We have a special value and mission and this 
mission has always been thwarted by autocratic orders and leaders.‖ 
For the Ankara discourse, it is not relevant to concentrate on the discussion of 
whether Alevis are within or outside the definition of Islam, or whether Alevilik is a 
better or different interpretation of Islam than Sunni Islam. Their reference points are the 
social, political and economic orientations of Alevis, which are seen as being 
fundamentally different than the Sunnis, or other groups in Turkey. There is the 
perception that the contemporary Alevi identity movement is a social and political 
movement that is seeking certain ―rights and equal treatment which has been violated for 
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centuries.‖ There is an overall belief that the relationships of Alevis to the Turkish state 
and the rest of Turkish society are based on a secular, democratic, egalitarian value 
system and law. 
The Ankara discourse constructs a politicized identity through dialectic political 
language. The relationship between the Alevi community and the other social and 
political groups in Turkey has been sustained via constant emphasis on the differences. In 
many instances these differences have been essentialized through the use of conflictual 
storylines about all aspects of the boundary making procedures. Alevilik have been 
characterized as having a different world view ―Ayrı bir dünya görüşü.‖ This is an 
abstract and vague self-definition that has practical references to an ideological notion of 
Alevilik as opposed to ethnic, religious or sectarian notions. This understanding has been 
criticized in the Istanbul discourse as being a reductionist use of ―Alevilik‖ for political 
purposes that is isolated from its cultural and historical context and background. 
 Alevilik is defined as a world-view with its own culture, belief system, rituals, 
political rights and different historical experiences. There is even a perspective among the 
Ankara discourse that defines Alevilik as a different religion. 
[F.G.]: I think that the Alevilik is peculiar to Anatolia. It has no connection with 
Islam. There are a number of religious motifs, cults from Islam, such as Karbala 
to the belief in Hazrat Ali, present. But next to these we have also been influenced 
by other beliefs, but of course the largest influence comes from Islam. We have to 
regard this as natural. We have lived [side by side] for thousands of years in the 
same geography, the beliefs of our neighbors was Islam and [particularly] 
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Sunnism. As a result, it is not possible not to have been under the influence, or to 
have taken over certain aspects. Within our Federation, our stance regarding the 
Alevi creed primarily relies on this. 
The view that defines Alevilik as a separate religion is marginalized both within the 
Ankara discourse as well as within the broader Alevi discourse. The distanced political 
position against the political center and the tradition of resistance is seen as an essential 
feature of the Alevi identity according to Ankara discourse. 
[K.G.]: ―Resistance to state/political authorities that try to marginalize and 
oppress Alevis with religious and political arguments and struggling for social 
justice when the political systems deny us is an essential feature of Alevi identity. 
We were always on the side of social and political justice against the corrupt 
political authorities that used religion as a pretext to suppress us, which is what 
made Alevi identity and community special. 
The storylines that consider the Kızılbaş uprisings during the Ottoman times and the 
messianic revolts during the Seljukid era related to the social and economic discontents 
of the Anatolian people are emphasized in the Ankara discourse. In a sense they believe 
in the Historical Materialist way of interpreting Alevi history. The paradoxical situation is 
that even through there are limited references to the religious dimensions of Alevilik, in 
the Ankara discourse some people argue that Ali and ehl-i beyt has been oppressed and 
many of the family members have been massacred because they were resisting the unjust 
rule of the Umayyad order that tried to corrupt the teachings of the prophet Mohammed. 
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8.4.1. The Rise of the Ankara Discourse 
The Alevi dernek (association) and vakıfs (foundation) were initially established 
in the late 1980s. There were very few associations that were founded mainly for the 
Alevi cause until the early 1990s. Many Alevi citizens in the urban context have been 
organized around the village or hometown associations that were rapidly established with 
a flow of migration to the cities after the 1960s. These associations tried to sustain the 
solidarity of people from the same villages or towns, and their sense of belonging in the 
cities. But they did not have a mission to become politicized along the self definition of 
―Aleviness.‖ These hometown associations later were seen as an obstacle to the unity of 
Alevi identity politics after the rapid establishment of Alevi associations and foundations. 
Some people still tried to sustain their local belongingness and within the broader Alevi 
identity politics, city and town loyalties started to compete with each other. 
Another significant obstacle for the relatively late institutionalization of Alevi 
associations and foundations was that it was illegal to found associations with the name 
of a sect, ethnic or religious groups until the early 1990s. After a tiring legal battle, the 
Alevis managed to succeed in their struggle to open associations with the Alevi name 
(deb). The 1993 Sivas Events and 1995 Gazi Riots accelerated the institutionalization of 
these associations and foundations. The process of rapid institutionalization after the 
Sivas Events of 1993 has been very reactionary and defensive in nature. The activists of 
Alevi background, who experienced the left wing struggle, were in ideological limbo 
with the collapse of the Communist bloc. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the 
end of the ideological confrontation, these groups of activists were in search of a new 
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political identity. 
From the Revolution to a Struggle for Rights  
[ A. B.]: I was a revolutionary socialist kind of man before September 12, 1980 
[military coup]. I am still like that. I am a person who has accepted and come to 
terms with the struggle I‘ve been through in those years. When talking about the 
revolutionary movement, when certain demands on a societal level were refused 
then such demands as human rights, democracy, equality, justice become society‘s 
[main] concern. Not just my own personal [concern]. As a person who grew up in 
a political frame [of mind] in the Alevi community, whereas I am someone who 
was brought up on Alevi values. I have seen the oppressed state, the ostracized 
nature, the lack of rights, the not being taken seriously [of the Alevi community]. 
In the framework of the concept of Alevi, which had come from abroad, 
organizations started to spring up. 
Attacks against the Alevi community recalled their ―Aleviness.‖ These activists 
diverted their energy and practical experiences into the Alevi cause. The problem related 
to this rapid transformation is that activists did not have a chance to go through a process 
of comprehensive self-criticism because of such an unexpected revival. Rather than 
redefining their identity and trying to understand the authentic sources and practices of 
the Alevi creed, they tried to redefine Alevilik in such a way that would co-exist with 
their previous identities and political attachments. These activists created a new political 
theology which was a blend of the theoretical resources of the dialectical Marxism, 
historical and political sources of the Anatolian revolts, and the practical instrument of 
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the identity politics and the social movement approaches. This new idea was also backed 
and financially and ideological supported by the diaspora Alevis. 
Table 8.2: Main Features of Ankara Discourse 
Table 8.2: Main Features of 
Ankara Discourse 
 
Definitions of ―US‖/―Ingroup‖   Periphery, victim, minority, oppressed, 
heterodox, marginalized, exploited, 
syncretic religion 
Definitions of ―THEM‖ / ―Out 
group‖  
 Oppressors, political center, state, ulema, 
religious orthodoxy, privileged groups  
The conditions of being an Alevi 
(sources of identity) 
 Marginalized Turcoman and 
Kurdish/Zaza groups of Anatolia with 
heterodox beliefs, 
  resistance to political, social, religious 
and economic orthodoxies 
Role of in self definition 
Islam, 
Marxism & 
Secular, Humanist values 
  
 Islam is one of the many sources of Alevi 
identity it is not the common ground for 
us with the other groups.  
 There might have been Alevilik without 
Islam 
 Our struggle predates Marxism, there is 
an overlap in the objectives of Marxism 
and Alevilik that‘s why we were attracted 
to it 
 Secular democratic values can be the only 
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common ground with the Sunnis 
 One can be Alevi without being a Muslim 
because Alevilik is more of an attitude 
philosophy 
 
Boundary maintenance in new 
context 
 We have to maintain our opposition to 
religious and ideological orthodoxies and 
oppressive structures  
 Assimilation is the major threat and it can 
only be prevented by maintaining the 
struggle against orthodoxies 
Heroes, & frequently mentioned in 
the narratives 
 PSA, 7 poems, Marx, Anatolian 
Heterodox dervishes and social 
revolutionaries‖, HBV, Shah Ismail 
Institutional representatives or 
public voices  
 Civil society organizations, associations, 
foundations, publication houses, TV 
stations and all other instruments of 
social movements 
Problems of being Alevis   Discrimination, marginalization, 
assimilation, not being recognized by the 
state, equal share in official position, 
equal share from budget 
What should the Alevis do?   We have to maintain the struggle in 
different arenas until our differences are 
appreciated and our difference we will 
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have equal status  
 Democratic struggle for rights is the right 
path 
 Turkish state and Sunni citizens should 
also acknowledge the pains we have gone 
through 
 We should use legal instruments such as 
Turkish courts, ECHR, media and other 
instruments to publicize our cause. 
 
 
As the fear of direct violence is diminishing, the process of self-criticism and 
inner debate over a different understanding of Alevilik is coming to the forefront of the 
Alevi political and social agenda. Struggles and debates with the ―out-groups‖ helped the  
fostering of the Ankara discourse but confrontations with the other Alevi groups and 
discourses weakened their position and legitimacy within Alevi community especially at 
the grassroots level. Their interpretation of the Alevi sources and theology is influenced 
from dialectic Marxist discourses. It is common to encounter people from the political 
and intellectual elite that define Alevilik as outside the domain of Islam or Alevilik 
without ―Ali‖. 
[A.K.]: God of Communists and the God of Alevis are same 
During mid 1980s I was interested in Alevi music, theater and semahs. We were 
performing plays about the lives of Pir Sultan Abdal, Şeyh Bedrettin, Hacı Bektaş 
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Veli and other important figures of the Alevi history. Together with 4-5 friends we 
were travelling villages and different towns and performing those songs, semahs 
and rituals. In deyişs there were frequent recitations of Allah (God), Mohammed 
and I was feeling unfomfortable to recite those. I knew that the Allah definition in 
the Alevi tradition was different than the Allah definition in Sunni tradition but I 
was still feeling uncomfortable because I was a communist then. Even the esoteric 
notion of Allah was making me feel uncomfortable. When I learned that the Allah 
in Alevi tradition equals to insan (human), I was relieved. God of Communists 
and God of Alevis are the same as we both call humans as Allah. Many Alevis 
people do not recognize and accept this but Communism and Alevilik has 
fundamental similarities. 
Political arguments and language, and legal instruments are dominant in their 
mode of interaction with the state and other official institutions. The Ankara discourse is 
also more reactionary towards the majority Sunni population. There is a negative attitude 
towards the majority Sunni population, because they are perceived to have hostile 
feelings against Alevis. They have the perception of being a minority within Turkish 
society and this affects their position and general tone in the legal and political struggle. 
Some of the legal concepts they have been using in their appeal to the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) are related to the minority rights frame. 
Attorneys and writers who were previously active in the leftist-Marxist struggle 
are able to practice the language of political and legal struggle more skillfully, therefore 
they have activated their comparative advantage for a new cause within the changing 
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political context. The language of previous activism has been translated into the new 
Alevi cause in different forms. It may be a unique case but the quotation below provides a 
context for understanding the process of incorporation of Alevi creed with the other 
identity claims. 
Identity, Sub-Identity 
[A.K.]: I do not feel any discomfort in saying that I am an Alevi, but I also have 
an upper-identity. I do not leave my upper-identity behind, just to care about my 
sub-identity. My upper-identity is communist. It doesn‘t mean a thing for a 
communist person to deal with his sub-identity, to appropriate his sub-identity in 
such a way that it were to assume primary importance. But, it is the duty of a 
communist to be respectful to sub-identities, to understand sub-identities, to be 
concerned about the problems sub-identities face. In other words, everything 
interests a communist, from the concept of nationality, the concept of faith, as 
well as societal issues, women‘s questions, till the students‘ movement. 
Well, I have characteristics which stem from the Alevi tradition, from my parental 
lineage. If I weren‘t an Alevi, I would still approach these issues in the same way, 
with the same amount of sensitivity, it would be necessary to approach these 
issues in the same manner 
The language of the ideological struggle is lacking in describing the religious and 
traditional dimensions of Alevi identity. The Alevi identity is primarily an ethno-
religious/ethno-cultural identity, whereas the materialist/atheist assumptions of the 
Marxist class struggle have contradicted the fundamental assumptions of the Alevi belief 
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system. To many ordinary Alevi citizens that had not been actively involved in the 
ideological struggles of the 60s and 70s, the Ankara discourse sounded like a foreign 
language. In addition, efforts to write an Alevi history, tradition and identity according to 
the assumptions of this new discourse are underway. 
8.4.2. Alevilik as Social and Political Activism 
The social and political activism dimension of Alevilik has been accentuated in 
comparison to the belief dimension. Alevi heroes such as Hacı Bektaş Veli, Pir Sultan 
Abdal, Şeyh Bedrettin, 7 Alevi poets have been presented as the champions of this 
activism in the Ankara discourse. There are social references to the ethical teachings of 
these important figures, but the Islamic dimension and teachings have been disregarded. 
―Sunni Islam has been interpreted either as a submissive tradition or as the ideology of 
the political power, in either cases political and social stance of the Sunni Islam 
contradicted to Alevi worldview.[M.İ.]‖ The sources of this branch of ethics have been 
attributed to a transcendental, humanist value system, which is associated with the pre-
Islamic Anatolian/Turkish originated values. It is common to hear, ―Islam is just a flavor 
in this transcendental blend of values in Alevi worldview. Alevilik might have existed 
even if the Turcoman tribes were not introduced to Islam.‖ There is also a widely shared 
notion within the Ankara discourse which assumes that Islam is not a natural tendency of 
nomadic Turks (Turcomans), and that Turcomans were forced to convert to Islam by 
Arabs in between the 9
th
 and 13
th
 centuries. Their way of dealing with Islam is by 
presenting it as deviation and imposition, which has not been internalized by Turcomans. 
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The narrative of early Republican history differs from the Istanbul and Bektaşi 
discourses. For the Ankara discourse, the disruption of promising relations started earlier 
than the initiation of the multi-party regime. They also agree that the Kemalist regime 
was revolutionary in the early years of the Turkish Republic in terms of transforming 
Turkey into a modern, secular, nation-state. These revolutionary policies have been 
supported by Alevi-Bektaşi groups. However, they believe that the disruption started even 
during Atatürk‘s presidency. ―When the regime started to consolidate its power it turned 
into an oppressive structure imposing its own understanding of a homogeneous Turkish 
nation.‖ [E.K.] 
Starting from late 1930‘s especially ethnic Kurdish/Zaza Alevis living in the 
Dersim region have been alienated from the Kemalist regime, because of the 
fascistic tendencies of CHP (Republican People‘s Party).  Especially Dersim 
Events of 1937 have accelerated alienation of Kurdish/Zaza Alevis from the 
regime.  
The Ankara discourse is also critical with regard to the common myth which assumes that 
Alevis have always had a good relationship with the Kemalist regime, and that the Alevi 
community is the guarantor/insurance of the regime's secularist principles. 
As opposed to the four other discourses, the Ankara discourse is critical of 
Atatürk
125 
and some of the principles of the republican regime. The subject of Atatürk is 
an important taboo: he is like a messianic figure in İstanbul, Bektaşi, ethnic and post-
Alevi genres. He is also highly regarded by ordinary Alevis, since he is considered to be 
                                                 
125  Further info about the role of Atatürk in Alevi cosmology. 
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an important hero in Alevi culture. The Ankara discourse is more pragmatic in its 
evaluation of Ataturk. The Istanbul discourse and ethnic Alevis tend to blame the right 
wing politicians for the problems of the regime, whereas the Ankara discourse makes 
more foundational criticism of the republican regime. 
Banning of the Bektaşi Lodges was a disappointment to Alevis  
[A.Yl.]: In the Ottoman period [Alevis] were pushed into the position of the other, 
and the appearance of the republic in the 1920s as a development against the 
Ottomans, expressing itself as such, for example, Atatürk‘s sayings which 
characterize the Ottomans as a gang of traitors, which rejected the Ottomans, 
became a common point on which they were able to find each other as opponents 
of the Ottomans. You know that, when Atatürk came to Ankara on 24 December 
1919, he [also] visited [its] Bektaşi convent. And there he asks the dede Salih 
Niyazi and Cemalettin Çelebi to support his movement. And they say that they 
will support him with all of their powers, that they will be by his side with all of 
their powers. Cemalettin Çelebi, who was one of the foremost personalities 
among the Alevis [in those days], became the assistant chairman of parliament in 
1920. Quite a few notable members of the Alevi [community] became 
representatives [in parliament]. 
T.K.: Was a compromise reached? 
A.Y.: In a way yes. We can say compromise. Well, I can say this, in 1919, when 
Mustafa Kemal, Salih Niyazi and Cemalettin Çelebi were sitting down for an 
evening meal in the Hacı Bektaş convent they had a discussion. And there they 
528 
 
drink, they have rakı. They say we are lifting our drinking glasses for a bright 
future. Atatürk‘s aide-de-camp has written this down. He was in Atatürk retinue, 
he wrote down [these things] like a kind of War of Liberation diary. Well, they 
had their evening meal together and [also] drank [together]. What was the date? 
24 December 1919. After that the law regarding convents and zaviyahs is released 
in December 1925. Law #. 677. I am asking you this, a simple question. How 
much is a cup of coffee worth in Turkey? 40 years. And how many years are a 
double shot of rakı worth? Six years, right? In other words, six years later the 
doors of that convent are closed. In spite of that, Alevis still do not see any 
problems with the republic. In fact, at the time, one of the notable members of the 
Bektaşi [order], I don‘t remember his name now, a baba who wrote for the Yeni 
Gün newspaper [indicated that] all the wishes of the Bektaşi community were 
being realized by the republic. In this way, there was no reason left to keep our 
convents open, [as] the republican project appropriated [these aims]. 
The voice of Zaza (Dimilî)/Kurdish Alevis are represented more in the Ankara 
discourse. Zaza/Kurdish Alevis suffered a double stigma by the official regime. Being 
both as Kurd and Alevi, they felt a double marginalization. The other reason is that the 
revolutionary leftist struggle of the 1970-80s was against the regime, which was 
considered to have been ruled by Fascists, with the popular support of right wing 
Kemalists and  the external mandate of the ―Imperialist USA‖ that tried to contain the 
communist threat. The regime which emerged as a resistance movement against 
imperialism has been accused of corruption because of its cooperation with 
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―imperialists.‖ 
“Alevilik predates Marxism in the struggle for social justice” 
―The leftist struggle, which started in the early 1960s was also part of our 
continuing struggle for social justice; therefore there is a consistency in our 
position. Being in the Marxist camp in the post 1960 political struggle was not a 
mistake it was the right position, but we have to be self critical about what we 
have done to our Dedes and traditional Alevi institutions. We lately have 
recognized that we were unaware of the significance of the Alevi struggle for 
social justice and democracy, which was older and more comprehensive than the 
Marxist class struggle.‖ 
The influences of dialectic Marxism and dialectic discourses about the self and 
other are very dominant in Ankara discourse. There seems a very limited space for a 
dialogic encounter when you talk to an Alevi that prefers the language of the Ankara 
discourse. 
The aim of the Ankara discourse is also to be recognized as different by the 
political authorities and other segments of the Turkish society. They also want their 
differences to be appreciated by the other people in Turkey. The Ankara discourse is 
almost paranoid about the fear of assimilation. They believe that if they stop the struggle, 
their authenticity and differences will disappear and they will be assimilated into the 
majority Sunni-Turkish population. The use of ―Human Rights discourse‖ is instrumental 
in the overall Alevi struggle for recognition. The Ankara discourse is particularly 
instrumental for their identity politics.  
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[Generic Statement] 
―We want to be recognized as equal citizens by the state institutions and Sunni 
citizens with our separate identity and with all our group rights. If we stop the 
struggle we may lose our identity and may be assimilated into Sunni identity. We 
should ask for an Alevi quota in official bureaucratic circles as well. Because our 
identity and rights have been denied for centuries, in order to be fully integrated 
into state and society we want positive discrimination‖. 
The Istanbul and ethnic discourses are in agreement with the Ankara discourse about the 
issue of positive discrimination. They are not as sympathetic to and supportive of the 
human rights debates of the conservative Sunni citizens. 
[K.G;A.Yl.;A.Ky.]―We will struggle for our rights until Turkish state 
acknowledges our identity and group rights. In case our legal and political rights 
have been denied, we may sue the bureaucratic institutions of the Turkish state to 
European Court of Human Rights. These are different instruments of our struggle 
for recognition. Our associations and institutions are crucial channels for our fight 
for rights, therefore our political and legal struggle should be organized and 
continued along these associations rather than cemevis and traditional Alevi 
institutions‖. 
8.4.3. Ambiguity of the Boundaries: Obstacle or Asset? 
The question of what is the most ideal way to define the boundaries of the Alevi 
community creates a serious debate among competing narrative genres. The Istanbul and 
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post-Alevi discourses don‘t want to construct impermeable boundaries between the Alevi 
community and rest of Turkish society. Instead, they want to keep flexible boundaries 
that would reconcile the Alevi community with the political center and end the 
marginalization. While taking into consideration distinctive historical experiences and 
political interests, the Ankara discourse wants to keep exclusive and ambiguous 
boundaries that would empower social and political activists as the alchemists of the 
boundary making and protection process. The Ankara discourse is very reactionary to any 
other non-Alevi groups that comment on the boundaries of the Alevi community. They 
even accuse the agents of the post-Alevi discourse as being assimilated, or traitors (Hızır 
Paşas). They very loudly claim, ―Nobody can define Alevilik other than Alevis 
themselves. Especially Diyanet and Sunni theologians, politicians have always tried to 
assimilate Alevi community to Sunni Islam they should better keep their hands off 
Alevilik.‖ Ambiguities of the boundaries and the definition of the Alevilik give them an 
opportunity to speak and write on the subject. They don‘t want this powerful instrument 
to be taken from their hands. 
8.4.4. Instrumentalization of the tradition 
Cemevi for Ankara discourse has been instrumentally defined as a cultural and 
political space for the aggregation and expression of economic and political interests. 
There is a tendency to see Cemevis as functional spaces and a distinctive cultural feature 
that helps to shape the Alevi identity. They argue that cemevis should not turn into just a 
space for worshiping. Ironically though, most people in this group do not participate in 
532 
 
the regular activities of the Cemevis. Some of them are even ignorant about the rituals 
that are being performed at Cemevis. Now the attitude towards traditional Alevi 
institutions has been transformed into a more positive one. There is still a feeling which 
says, ―we should not insist on some of the rituals and practices such as musahiplik that 
may seem archaic within the modern urban context‖. [İ.M.] 
―Religious rituals and other traditional ceremonies and institutions are not as 
central within the modern urban context. We can be organized along different lines with 
more modern institutions and integrate Dedes and traditional Alevi institutions to this 
new form of organization‖. They believe that associations and foundations should have 
the decisive leadership role in Alevi organization and institutionalizations because of their 
experiences with the legal and political struggle. They argue that the modern form of 
organization may better fit the political struggle. 
In terms of expressing their loyalty to the Turkish state they have a critical 
position. The Istanbul discourse presents their identity struggle as a broader and more 
comprehensive cause of the democratization and secularization of Turkish society 
(Massicard, 2007). They do not want to present their requests as specific requests. The 
Ankara discourse does not consider it a necessary step to present their requests within a 
broader frame that would contribute to the integrity and strength of the Turkish state and 
society. The Ankara discourse focuses more on the interests of their group and they do 
not see formulating such interests within a broader frame. 
[A.K.]: Every group struggle for their own rights, why should not we ask for 
ourselves rights as well. We don‘t need to prove anything about our loyalty, we 
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pay our taxes and we do our military service, therefore state should better take our 
requests more seriously like other citizens. We believe that the Turkish State 
establishment is not fulfilling its responsibilities to Alevi community. 
The legal battles or the struggles sometimes create tension between themselves and the 
state but they believe these tensions are part of the collective bargaining process. 
The Ankara discourse is more popular among emerging non-traditional Alevi 
elites, lawyers, politicians and more educated professional people who are more 
integrated with urban life, and Kurdish/Zaza Alevis. Unlike the dergahs and cemevis in 
Istanbul, these associations and foundations do not attract ordinary citizens who have no 
political agenda. They have difficulty communicating their politically oriented language 
to ordinary people. The Ankara discourse and associations were more active and popular 
in the late 1990s but have been losing ground against the Istanbul discourse and 
traditional Alevi institutions. 
They argue that this discourse is represented in 85-90% of Alevi organizations 
and associations. In terms of the number of the associations and institutions this estimate 
may be correct, but in terms of the popularity of these organizations among Alevis they 
are not as popular as cemevis and dergahs. 
90% Organization vs 90% Population 
[A.K.]: In am not saying this in connection with a person. But I am talking about 
institutions referred to as Alevi institutions. I am talking about institutions set up 
in the context of Alevi organizations. Outside of these are 10%. As a result, the 
Alevi-Bektaşi Federation represents 90% of the Alevis‘ organisational framework 
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in Turkey. But if we are going to evaluate a person who is a member of a cemevi, 
in the framework of an Alevi organization, if we are talking about the organized 
structure of the Alevis, if we are talking about their structure, 90% of that is 
represented by the Federation.  
  The Ankara discourse: 
 - Produces a strong political identity and consciousness, formulating interests 
through political and confrontational language. Religion, that is, Islam. Is considered to 
be just one of the many sources of Alevi identity. 
-Satisfies the need for political and social identity. Debates over cemevi, the status 
of mandatory religious courses and the Diyanet are rather instrumental. 
-Their social and political claims are very similar to the Istanbul discourse, but the 
way these requests have been expressed is completely different. One of the most 
significant differences regarding the Ankara discourse is that Alevilik has not been 
formulated as the better version and interpretation of Islam. Rather, they claim that 
Alevilik is a unique and different entity, primarily the extension of Anatolian Humanism. 
They want to be recognized as a group and given their group rights. They have more 
connections with social democrats and extreme-left marginal parties. 
-The ―other‖ of Alevilik (according to this discourse: Sunnis, nationalists, 
Islamists and supporters of right wing ideologies, ―derin devlet‖ secret state, some 
paralegal groups within the civil and the military bureaucracy). 
 The Alevi Bektaşi Federation (ABF) and the many other institutions under the 
umbrella of the Federation are considered to be the institutional representative of the 
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Ankara discourse. The discourse, however, not limited to the ABF and there is also a 
wide variety of voices within the ABF that may be closer to the other four categories of 
discourses. 
[ H. Ş.]: The Ali of the Alevi creed is not completely [commensurate] with the Ali 
of the Four [Rightly Guided] Caliphs, in my opinion. There is also an Ali in 
Anatolia. This Ali can be Khidhir, if need be; can be Atatürk, if need be; can the 
Ali of the Four [Rightly Guided] Caliphs, if need be. This Ali is an Ali who stands 
up against injustice, who protects the innocent. I think that the Alevi creeds 
contains such a philosophy. I see this as a philosophy which does not infringe 
upon anyone‘s rights, which says ―it is not mine‖ to that which is not mine, which 
see all mankind as one, be they Jews, Armenian, Circassian, Orthodox, [or] 
Catholic. 
8.5. Bektaşi Discourse 
―Bektaşilik is a spiritual journey which transcends ethnic and racial differences. 
Anyone committed to become a more mature human being is welcome to our circle.‖  
 
The Bektaşi creed: Our job is to produce “İnsan-ı Kâmil” (mature human beings) 
[Ş.K.]: The side of the Bektaşi creed which supersedes all other kinds of mystical 
tariqahs is this: the other [tariqahs] all distance man from society, [as] all Islamic 
tariqahs‘ goal is to become the perfect man [insan-ı kâmil, who is the Prophet, 
therefore the goal is to approximate Mohammed‘s stature and essence]. It is to 
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liberate man from his physical desires, to prevent that he becomes a slave to his 
inclinations. But the Bektaşi [order] does this without plucking man away from 
life. And another characteristic of the other tariqahs is that within a tariqah 
organization a mürid [disciple] becomes the slave of the mürşid [guide, master]. 
By means of psychological methods, Western orders do this as well through 
psychological methods. Here, man‘s bad desires are purified by means of methods 
of persuasion. The animalistic side of man is here tamed. 
The Bektaşi discourse presents its perspective and worldview predominantly as an 
intra-psychic journey that tries to transform the human being rather than changing the 
social and political order. They believe that real change should be both inside and 
between human beings. People who experience this transformation will be able to make 
more drastic positive changes in their social environments as well. They will be able to 
convince other people by their spiritual maturity and personal integrity. Their 
methodology for change is intra-psychic and inter-personal; however there is a necessity 
for a moral guide and certain ethical principles in this journey. 
[Ş.K.]: The always ask me, would you tell us an episode to describe the 
[workings of] Bektaşi order. I always tell this. The sultan went to visit a Bektaşi 
order. It was probably [Sultan] Abdülmecid [1839-61]. Sultan Mahmud had not 
yet closed down the Bektaşi order. Mahmud II [1808-39]. He was the son of 
Abdülmecid. Because his mother was a Bektaşi, he allowed Bektaşi convents to 
[operate] freely. He came to inspect one of these Bektaşi convents. He had his 
friends with him. The Baba welcomed them immediately, [addressing him as] my 
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Sultan. He saw there was fruit in the convent‘s garden. Are there pears available, 
there are my Sultan. So, let‘s have some pears so we can them, but of course, as 
you command, but do you want Allah‘s pear or the pear of his creature? The Baba 
asked him. The Sultan replies but of course I want Allah‘s pear. The Baba turns to 
his dervishes and tells them to go out and get a wild pear from an uncultivated 
pear tree. Something terrible happens. When you eat it, it gets stuck in your 
throat, you cannot swallow it nor can you spit it out. They offered it to the Sultan 
and Sultan gets angry. You wanted Allah‘s pear, if you would have preferred his 
creature‘s pear this wouldn‘t have happened. So, his creature‘s pear is brought. He 
turns to his dervishes and tells them to bring a pear that they have cultivated 
[inoculated]. This pear is wonderful. My Sultan, did you see this pear? You 
wanted it like this, but I wanted to convey a message to you. What was this 
message? Your blessed father closed down our convents. Whereas what we do is 
just like the pears from the wild tree, Allah created it in its raw form and we 
cultivate it. We take man and bring him to maturity. Just like the pear. We 
cultivate her. We get rid of all of its bad characteristics. 
It is a journey which is guided by the Bektaşi baba to reach spiritual maturity. It is 
open to anyone from any cultural and religious backgrounds who are interested, but there 
are special rites of initiation and certain practices and requirements after being part of 
Bektaşi order. Bektaşis often say that ―Our mission is not to preach social and political 
struggles though we have a stake in these issues in Turkey and other places. We have a 
universal message and we try to teach a moral order that can make all of humanity happy, 
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peaceful and wealthy.‖ There is a strong belief in Bektaşi discourse that their message 
embraces entire world of humanity. 
A detailed account of Betaşi history is presented in Chapter 2 and there are many 
studies specifically related to the subject. I will highlight the features of the Bektaşi social 
discourses and its influence in the formation of Alevi identity. The definition and rituals 
of the Bektaşi order is highly organized and there are written historical sources related to 
the subject. Here, I am trying to understand how the narratives and discourse of the 
Bektaşi actors affect the overall discourses on Alevi identity. It is often more difficult to 
gather information about the social and political discourses of Bektaşis because they do 
not want to talk about these subjects and they do not want to reveal their identities. 
Bektaşilik is the name of a religious order, which has been established based on 
Hacı Bektaş Veli. Both Alevilik and Bektaşilik refer to the phenomenon of ―Turkish folk 
Islam,‖ therefore they are used interchangeably. Alevilik and Bektaşilik are in unity with 
each other despite differences, which are not fundamental in regards to their faith and 
moral principles (Yaman, & Erdemir, 2006, p. 17). It was believed that historically one of 
the main differences between those two groups are in their forms of social organization. 
While Alevis traditionally lived in a rural context, Bektaşis have traditionally lived in 
urban contexts. Alevi, or Kızılbaş, have been described as rural or village Bektaşism. 
Today, with the migration into cities, this difference has started to lose its meaning. There 
is an increasing level of interest regarding Bektaşilik among both Alevi and Sunni in the 
urban context. 
A significant difference between Alevilik and Bektaşilik in terms of group 
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membership is that the ethnic line of division is not prevalent in the Bektaşi ethos. 
Membership in the Bektaşi order is voluntary and has special procedures. Being part of 
the Bektaşi order is open to anyone that fulfills the moral requirements and that are 
accepted by the members of the order even if they are not born from Alevi parents. Many 
of these principles are equally espoused by conservative Alevis even though they may not 
be part of Bektaşi order. 
Today, participation in the Bektaşi order is more at the educated/elite level. In the 
social context they prefer not to express their identity openly because of the moral codes 
of the order. Bektaşis are organized along tariqa (religious brotherhood) lines. 
Table 8.3: Main Features of Bektaşi Discourse 
Table 8.3: Main Features of Bektaşi 
Discourse 
 
 
Definitions of ―US‖/―Ingroup‖  Esoteric sufi order within Islam 
Definitions of ―THEM‖/ 
―Outgroup‖  
 Open to all whoever wants to commit to 
the journey to spiritual maturity. 
 This is more of an intra-personal journey 
with the guidance of Bektaşi father  
 Bektaşi social and historical background 
is predominantly Turkic and Balkanic 
The conditions of being an Alevi 
(sources of identity) 
 Commitment to the moral principles of 
the order is necessary 
 Certain rites of initiation are necessary, 
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exclusive in that sense.  
 Those who do not conform to the rules 
may be excluded or excommunicated 
Role of in self definition 
Islam, 
Marxism & 
Secular, Humanist values 
  
 Accepting the principles of Islam is 
necessary but not sufficient for being 
Bektaşi. Bektaşis have their own 
principles as well 
 We have nothing to do with Marxism, or 
other political ideologies 
 In terms of social and political views we 
are close to secular, humanist values. 
Bektaşi order is like Anatolian Humanism 
Boundary maintenance in new 
context 
 Because of the illegality of the dergah 
and Bektaşi lodges the relationships are 
maintained informally.  
 Boundaries are clear and inclusion and 
exclusion is voluntary 
Heroes, & villains frequently 
mentioned in the narratives 
 Hazrat Ali, Atatürk, HBV, Bektaşi fathers 
(baba) 
Institutional representatives or 
public voices  
 Bektaşi order, Hacı Bektaş Dergah, other 
dergahs 
Problems of being Alevis   Religious orders are illegal according 
republican laws  
 We maintain the community underground 
 Lack of education system of order 
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Ignorance 
 Politization of Alevilik 
What should the Alevis do?   Don‘t have any particular political claims 
 Educating people about our values 
 Traditional Bektaşi institutions may be 
revived  
 
 
There is a distanced attitude against ―şeriatçı‖ ultra orthodox Sunni understanding 
which sees Bektaşilik as a form of deviant schism. Orthodox Sunnis have been accused 
of emphasizing the formal ritual dimensions of Islam rather than its essence. The 
Boundaries of Bektaşi group identity are moral-religious with more of a transcendental 
vision rather than an ethnic one. Alevis with Alevi family roots sometimes approach 
Bektaşis with skepticism but this does not create much of a social tension between them. 
Bektaşis with Bektaşi/Alevi descendents are still perceived ―more Alevi/Bektaşi‖ by 
many. Some people from the Alevi elite, sometimes resent the Bektaşi babas‘ speaking on 
their behalf. 
Prayers 
[A.H.]: There is of course. We have differences from the Alevis. They fast for 
twelve, we for ten days. It is different. I mean I am not saying it as such, that we 
think that fasting is not a command of Allah. We do not repudiate fasting. The one 
who repudiates the fast, the one who repudiates proscribed prayers is not a 
Muslim. But we do not fast, nor do we pray [in the proscribed manner, salah or 
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namaz]. We look at fasting and praying in a way that is different from the Sunnis. 
Did I make myself clear? We interpret the proscribed prayers in a different 
fashion.  
T.K.: The form can be different in other words? 
Ş.K.: I am telling you these things so as not to give you wrong information, in the 
Kuran the word namaz is not mentioned. The word salah is mentioned. Sunni 
Muslims translate this word as namaz into Turkish. We, on the other hand, feel 
God in our own heart. Servicing humanity. Loving mankind. We say that 
approaching mankind and approaching everything with love is salah. It is not that 
we repudiate the proscribed prayers [salah or namaz]. It is a command of Allah. 
Everyone claiming to be a Muslim has to accept the proscribed prayers. The same 
goes for fasting. But we think that you break your fast when you lie. When you 
commit adultery, you break your fast. 
The social and political views of Bektaşis in the contemporary Turkish context is 
secular and democratic, but they don‘t have negative attitudes against Sunni Islam other 
than the conservative Sunnis that are biased against them. The Bektaşi discourse seems in 
keeping with the fundamental principles of the Turkish Republic. Bektaşis don‘t mobilize 
resources and struggle for any particular political and social objectives; neither have they 
had a macro scale social agenda for a specific group of people. They prefer not to turn 
into a faith-based interest group or a social movement in Turkish politics. This is a 
paradoxical situation because on one hand, this position gives them a more global 
perspective that is appreciated and sympathized with by out-groups; on the other hand, 
543 
 
the Bektaşi discourse is not considered to be an influential voice within the overall Alevi 
identity politics. Bektaşi discourse seems more meaningful within the Turkish social and 
political context when it is considered together with the other alternative discourses. The 
Bektaşi discourse also completes the religious and spiritual dimensions of the overall 
Alevi-Bektaşi discourse and grounds Alevilik-Bektaşism strongly within the Turkish and 
Islamic cultures. 
The constructive and integrative cultural dimensions of the Bektaşi discourse that 
is embedded within the moral ground of the Turkish-Islamic culture makes it easier for 
the Alevi-Bektaşi community to manage their relationsips with other groups in Turkey. 
Within the overall Alevi-Bektaşi identity politics, the Bektaşi discourse and culture may 
sound like a weak voice when it is compared to the Ankara, Istanbul and ethnic 
discourses, but this voice is heard and taken seriously by the members of the out-groups 
that try to build positive relations with Alevi-Bektaşi groups in Turkey. 
Bektaşi sources are very influential for shaping the religious/spiritual dimension 
of Alevilik. Alevilik has very rich oral sources, literature and especially rituals, but almost 
all the written sources of the Alevi belief system are Bektaşi originated. Sunni 
theologians, conservative politicians and communities emphasize Bektaşi sources when 
they are commenting on Alevilik. The Ankara discourse are disturbed by this selective 
attitude. They say ―they just want to talk to the voice they want to hear; this is also part of 
their policy of the misrecognition of our identity and community. ―We don‘t want Sunnis 
to divide us or use some groups among us for their purposes of discrimination.‖ The 
critical comment below partially represents the sentiments of the ―Ankara elite‖ with 
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regard to the Bektaşi discourse. Although there is an appreciation, they also consider the 
Bektaşi order in the current environment to be an exclusive/elite club. 
[A. Yl.].: This is why. Traditionally, the Bektaşi order was like a single party. In 
other words, confined to narrow surroundings. That type of Bektaşi order is 
barren, led by unmarried Babas, a kind of Bektaşi order that was very narrowly 
defined. In other words, not denying the validity of other ways, but in the end 
very narrowly defined. Those who operated under the name of Bektaşi order are 
the [leaders we call] Çelebi. Isn‘t that the case? And it is not possible to mention 
any kind of difference between the branch of the Çelebis and the Alevi creed in 
terms of faith. I mean that Alevi is the name used in the frame of the Bektaşi 
federation so that nobody would be left out. The Bektaşi have stayed as a narrow 
circle of friends. It is a circle consisting of maybe a thousand people. 
 Bektaşis also have their own historical problems starting from the early 19th 
century Ottoman era. Hacı Bektaş Veli, founder of the Bektaşi order (year of death 1271) 
was the Pir (spritual leader) of Janissaries and Bektaşi fathers constantly accompanied 
Janissary troops in battles. The Janissary corps, which may be considered to be one of the 
most disciplined and effective administrative and military bodies in history, has been 
guided spiritually and socially by the Bektaşi order for centuries. The decline of the 
Bektaşi order and banning of the Bektaşi lodges was a traumatic event for many Bektaşis. 
The Bektaşi order was prohibited with a decision tmade on July 8, 1826, together with 
the abolition of the Janissary corps. This was a turning point for the Bektaşi order. Once 
having been one of the strongest sufi and social movements, Bekaşis had found a way of 
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existing among ranks of other religious orders such as Melamism, Halvetism and 
Rifaism. Pressures were relaxed during the era of Sultan Abdul-Mejid (1839-1861) and 
especially after the institution of the Second Constitutional Period (1908). 
During the first and second TBMM (Turkish Grand National Assembly), Bektaşi 
Çelebis openly supported Mustafa Kemal. With the article #677, religious centers (and 
schools connected to them) and shrines were closed and the usage of titles such as seyid 
or sheih was also banned. The secular reforms during the early republican era were 
supported by Alevi-Bektaşis but the abolition of the tekke and zaviyes (religious centers 
and shrines) had negative outcome for the Bektaşi order. Some Bektaşis interpreted this 
move as a betrayal whereas some Alevi-Bektaşis argued that the order was already 
corrupted by the time it was banned. 
[E.K.]: ―Bektaşi shrines had already been corrupted because they were given to 
the Nakshibendi order, those regulations were necessary in the early years of the 
new Turkish Republic in order to control extremist religious activism. That‘s why 
Alevi-Bektaşis did not object this policy‖. 
It is for sure that abolition of the Bektaşi shrines had caused disappointment in the 
Alevi-Bektaşi community. Most Alevi-Bektaşis are still supportive of Atatürk‘s secularist 
reforms. The Bektaşi discourse also somehow legitimizes some of Atatürk‘s policies even 
though they contradict with their group interests. The blame for the abolition of the 
Bektaşi order is often directed to Ottoman Sultan Mahmut II and the corruption of the 
Janissary Corps. 
―Bektaşi shrines were ruled by Nakshis so, what Atatürk had done did not affect 
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Alevi-Bektaşi community as much as it affected other tarikas. Establishment of 
the secular system was an important assurance for the protection of Alevi-Bektaşi 
community.‖ 
According to Bektaşi discourse, Bektaşilik is the essence of Turkish and Balkan 
Islam, and it has been presented as a more peaceful and accommodative tradition. 
Diyanet‘s understanding of Islam negates Bektaşi teachings and emphasizes the particular 
formal perspective of Sunni Islam. They therefore consider the Diyanet to be a sectarian 
institution in its policies. Bektaşis expect the Turkish state to pursue a more neutral 
position towards Bektaşis and protect their rights both in Turkey and in the Balkans. The 
Bektaşi discourse does not have much political value within the overall revival process. 
[A.A.]: Today, especially in the Balkans, Bektaşi tradition and shrines are being 
threatened by Saudi financed ultra-Orthodox Wahhabis. They are ruining tolerant 
Bektaşi tradition. Unfortunately no one in Turkey acts to prevent this cultural 
meltdown. 
Islam is central to Bektaşi identity and self-definition, although it is not expressed 
too much in the social domain. The most distinctive feature of the Bektaşi discourse is 
that it emphasizes the Batıni (esoteric) dimension of Islam rather than Zahiri (open/up-
front) dimension, which is associated with sharia and other religious rituals. There are 
four doors and forty stations to reach Hakikat, according to the Bektaşi path. Sharia, 
which is the first door to reach hakikat , has not been completely denied, but 
―conservative Sunnis‖ have been accused of just focusing on sharia and missing the 
essence of the hakikat (truth). 
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[H. M.]: He said if a man possesses those twelve characteristics then he is a 
perfect man who sees God with the eyes of his heart. A man has to first of all be 
able to master his hand, body, tongue. He should be able to control his spouse, his 
job, his food. His disposition should be open [and] generous, his table [should be] 
welcoming. He said that he should be able to hold a secret, to hide a shameful 
[thing], to control his anger when his passion flares. Now, that is the first 
condition of the Alevi creed. Another condition of the Alevi creed, a second credo 
exists and that is four gates and forty stations. Shariah, Tariqah, Maarifah, 
Haqiqat. Hacı Bektaş Veli compared the Shariah to a ship. Like Noah‘s ship, he 
said. Tariqah is a sea, Maarifah is diving into the sea and Haqiqah is diving into 
the sea to get hold of the pearl of truth [wisdom]. The Shariah belongs to your 
worship. In other words, it is those who pray to Allah. The Tariqah belongs to the 
pious ones, those who pray in fear and doubt. Maarifah, then, belongs those who 
have achieved knowledge (of Allah). Finally, Haqiqah belongs to the lovers (of 
Allah). He said to enter this building, this building is the Shariah. He [also] said 
that Tariqah is the front door, and admonished against entering through the 
backdoor. Enter via the front door. Don‘t enter without obtaining the landlord‘s 
blessings [though]. That‘s what it says in the Kuran. 
Although there is a strong sense of community, in-group/out-group boundaries in Bektaşi 
order they do not define their identity in an antagonistic way with other groups. The 
Bektaşi identity can also easily coexist with other identities that do not have moral 
assumptions contradictory to the Bektaşi path. They are not in confrontation with any of 
548 
 
the other groups, and are trying to be more accommodative. 
 Confrontational political language contradicts with the inclusive teachings of the 
Bektaşilik, therefore they try to refrain from getting into political controversies. Unlike 
the Istanbul discoursehe , which is represented in Cemevis and dergah (shrines), or 
Ankara discourse, which is represented in associations and foundations, the Bektaşi 
discourse does not have any formal channels that will enable direct access to the Alevi 
population. Many of the moral principles and values that are mentioned by Alevi citizens 
originate from Bektaşi sources. The answer to the question, ―what should we with 
Alevi/Bektaşi identity?‖ is vague according to the Bektaşi discourse. ―We do not have a 
particular objective to expand and get a more influential social institution, but people may 
become better and more mature individuals by joining Bektaşi circles,‖ is the dominant 
framing of this question. The Bektaşis feel the responsibility to educate both Alevi and 
Sunni citizens in Turkey. The ritual system of Alevilik could have been much weaker and 
it might be seen as less sympathetic to ―outsiders‖ without Bektaşi teachings. The Bektaşi 
discourse provides a strong connection between the Alevi-Bektaşi worldview, both to 
Turkish culture and identity, and to universal values. Because of its cultural and 
intellectual significance, the Bektaşi discourse will always be an essential element of 
Alevi identity. Besides its cultural sources and significance, the Bektaşi discourse is the 
only perspective among the five discourses that is appealing to the ―non Alevi (in terms 
of family background)‖ urban population. Other discourses sound more like ethnic 
identities to many Sunnis. 
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8.6. Ethnic Alevi Discourse 
[ A.O.]: I am from Erzincan many people around this area are either from 
Erzincan or Malatya. My parents are Alevi, so I am. In fact many people that 
come to this coffeehouse are also Alevis. We are neither better nor worse than 
Sunnis just because we have been born from Alevi families. It was not my choice 
to be born from Alevi parents. Sunnis also do not choose to be Sunni they are 
born from Sunni families. Many Alevis and Sunnis today have modern secular life 
styles. Sectarian and religious attachments and affilliations are loosing their 
significance. I personally live a secular life and I don‘t go to cemevis except for 
weddings or funerals‖. 
Alevi identity in this case is taken for granted; people neither spare an effort to 
posses this identity nor specifically try to protect it. It is like a loose kinship or primordial 
tie. Cultural repertoire and information are secondary to the kinship ties. Being Alevi or 
Sunni does not specifically convey positive/negative value, or make someone better or 
worse according to the ethnic discourse. The ideal way to make value judgments or 
positive and negative value attributions should be based on the individual‘s personal 
characteristics rather than their family lineage or ethnic background. In general, it is a 
more individualistic discourse on Alevi identity. Mandatory collective attachments and 
kinship based affiliations provide collective self esteem but they may turn into personal 
and collective burdens in certain contexts. 
[ V.K.]: I am first and foremost and academic, I am social democrat, humanist and 
I am at the same time a feminist person. Besides these features of myself 
550 
 
definition, I was born from an Alevi family. I have certain moral and historical 
responsibilities with regard to all these affiliations. None of those affiliations are 
prior to the others. 
[ B.İ.]: ―I am not apologetic about my Alevi identity but sometimes certain 
stigmas are imposed upon me and I am reminded of my identity negatively.‖ 
Ethnic discourse is the voice of quite majority within the broader spectrum of 
Alevi identity. A voice which has reams, expectations and objectives similar to the 
majority of Alevi and Sunni populations of Turkey, yet is not been represented by any 
particular institution or association. Alevi associations and activists claim to represent and 
seek rights for the ―ethnic Alevis,‖ whom I believe constitute the majority within the 
gamut of discourses on Alevi identity. Their expectations are better education, better jobs, 
wealthier life and respect for their identity and dignity. They want the removal of the 
obstacles and informal discriminatory practices that are caused by being Alevi. They do 
not want the continuation of the challenges that have previously been experienced by 
their families. 
Their horizontal social, political and cultural ties are stronger than the vertical 
affiliations with regard to their Alevi identity. In other words, they have more in 
common/commonalities with their co-workers, their colleagues, their classmates or 
neighbors than the Alevis that belong to a different socio-economic class or status. 
Another interesting experience was my encounter with a young Alevi, who was from a 
dede lineage. Elder members of his family, his father and his uncle were prominent 
figures among the Alevi community in Malatya. His name is a very traditional Alevi one, 
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―A. M.‖ After chatting about his life and family, I wanted to learn about his 
understanding of Alevilik, but his response to my question was intriguing. He said ―I 
really don‘t know much about Alevilik, my family also had not taught me about that, I 
was not interested to learn about the rituals as well. Can you tell me about what you 
know, you seem knowledgeable on Alevilik brother (abi).‖ It was an interesting response 
because he belongs to a family lineage that has traditionally played a leadership role 
within the Alevi community and he was himself eligible to perform this role later in his 
life. 
Table 8.4: Main Features of Ethnic Discourse 
Table 8.4: Main Features of Ethnic 
Discourse 
 
 
Definitions of ―US‖/ ―Ingroup‖   Born from an Alevi family 
Definitions of ―THEM‖ / ―Out 
group‖  
 Sunni 
 Ignorant religious conservatives (bigots) 
The conditions of being an Alevi 
(sources of identity) 
 It is like an ethnic identity it is not 
people‘s choice to be Alevi and Sunni.  
Role of in self definition 
Islam, 
Marxism & 
Secular, Humanist values 
  
 Religion is not the central in modern 
peoples‘ lives anymore like many other 
Sunnis we are secularized  
 We are just like the other secular Sunnis. 
 In terms of political orientation closer to 
social democracy 
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 Revolutionary class struggle had left a 
negative legacy for many Alevi families, 
we should avoid destructive proxy 
struggles 
 Values of enlightenment and modernity 
are embracing and consistent with Alevi 
moral system 
 
Boundary maintenance in new 
context 
 Against boundaries, boundaries are 
imposed upon us we are not happy about 
boundaries that discriminate against us in 
many aspects of our lives and sometimes 
humiliate us 
 Limits of our culture are limits of our 
identity, Alevis and Sunnis have a lot in 
common. 
Heroes, & frequently mentioned in 
the narratives 
 Atatürk, HBV, Singers, and poets  
Institutional representatives or 
public voices  
 Traditional institutions cemevis, Alevi 
TVs, radios, musicians, festivals, 
ceremonies 
Problems of being Alevis   People‘s ignorance 
 Continuation of the stereotypes, slanders 
and discriminatory discourses in daily  
 Discrimination in marriage and job 
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market 
 
What should the Alevis do?   Work for secular, democratic egalitarian 
Turkey in which Alevi-Sunni split and 
discrimination ends 
 Collaborate with other ―democratic 
people‖ for a prosperous and progressive 
Turkey 
 
The ethnic discourse does not pursue any specific social or political goals based 
on Alevi identity. They rather support the vision of the social democratic parties, and 
secular, democratic social and political leaders and organizations. The worldview of the 
ethnic discourse overlaps with the secular, social democratic understanding in Turkey. 
From the point of view of the Ankara and Istanbul discourses the ethnic discourse is 
prone to assimilation since their identities are not as ―solid‖ or ―salient.‖ They do not 
regularly attend the activities at cemevi or other traditional Alevi institutions nor are they 
active within the Alevi civil society organizations or associations. On the other hand they 
are proud of Alevi culture, music, rituals and dance. 
Alevilik, according to the ethnic discourse, is an ethnic marker. The limits of the 
Alevi identity are experienced when people try to get married. Social and cultural 
boundaries are activated, especially in those situations where a background check is 
required for employment, marriage to a non-Alevi, and during the military service or in 
schools and dorms where they have to socialize with people of different backgrounds. 
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Many Alevis in some way experience such difficulties that leave deep psychological 
wounds.  
[B.Ö.]: I got engaged in my early 20s. My fiancé was from a Sunni family, he was 
not a believer but an atheist. His family was secular and religion was never a 
significant thing in their family. His atheism was not a big deal for me as it was 
for it that we were not having any debates regarding religious differences. He was 
also respectful towards my Alevi culture and its rituals; we had been to cemevi 
together a couple of times. When we got into a debate on how to raise our kids, I 
told him that I would like to raise my kids according to Alevi culture since he was 
not a believer. At first he did not object to the idea, but I don‘t know why he then 
started to question the idea. He started to say if we have kids we can send them to 
both cami (mosque) and cemevi (assembly house). It is probably because of 
family or peer pressure. I strongly objected to this new idea. We somehow could 
not maintain the relationship afterwards. Even with the secular Sunnis you 
experience these problems. 
Similar problems and discriminatory practices are experienced by people who are 
closer to the other categories of discourses. In the case of the ethnic discourse, the 
identity has primarily been activated, or the salience of identity increases when it is faced 
with these kinds of challenges. The month of Ramadan is also an important period for 
Alevis. It is a festive time, and many Sunnis are either fasting or not eating in public. 
Since Alevis do no fast during the month of Ramadan, they feel the tension of being 
stigmatized in their social environments or they feel it necessary to explain the difference 
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in their belief system. In these situations, saying ―actually I am a secular Alevi‖ does not 
help to remove the psychocultural barriers. 
[S. K.]: In terms of my religious identity I am Muslim but like many other Sunnis 
I have a secular life style. I happened to be born from an Alevi family, but 
Alevilik was not a subject of talk or discussion in my family circles. I don‘t know 
much about Alevilik and my family had not taught us about Alevilik, whether on 
purpose or not I don‘t know. I remember my mother was fasting on the month of 
Muharrem. We were definitely not practicing the rituals of Sunnis as well like 
praying 5 times a day or fasting in the month of Ramadan. My family never talks 
about whether they had been discriminated but I could feel why they try to keep 
silent. They did not want us to be discriminated or stigmatized at school in our 
work environments; maybe that‘s why they preferred to keep quiet about our 
Alevi identity.‖ 
The emotional components elaborated on in the previous chapter, such as the psychology 
of victimhood, and versions of fears and humiliation, are occasionally experienced by the 
people who pursue the ethnic discourse. 
Weddings and funerals are important occasions for the activation of collective 
attachments. The young generation of Alevis has been exposed to Alevi culture and 
tradition through bağlama courses and semah classes in cemevis or Alevi culture 
associations. These places were important venues for me to get in touch with and talk to 
young Alevis. There are also other venues called ―türkü cafes‖ or ―türkü bars‖ which are 
frequented by a generation of young Alevis. Alcohol is served in ―türkü bars‖ with live 
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music, and these places are at the same time sites for socialization. The ―türkü bars‖ are 
not exclusive to Alevi youth. Many other people also go to these places but they are 
popular among Alevi youth and the musicians are mostly Alevis. I had a chance to talk to 
a couple of people who were playing saz (lute) and other instruments and singing in türkü 
bars. In contrast, conservative Alevis are very critical of the ―türkü bars‖ for corrupting 
and depoliticizing Alevi youth. Especially within the Istanbul discourse, there are 
criticisms with regard to ―türkü bars.‖ They criticized the singing of the Alevi/Bektaşi 
hymns and folk songs in bars or in environments where men and women dance. A couple 
of people even claimed that these ―türkü bars‖ are established and supported by the 
Turkish state to degenerate, assimilate and depoliticize Alevi youth. There is no evidence 
to support these arguments but it is obvious that many more traditional Alevis are 
concerned about the social impact of ―türkü bars‖ and ―türkü cafes.‖ The ―türkü bars‖ 
may have a controversial impact on the Alevi youth, but they definitely contribute 
positively to their socialization and social interactions. 
Atatürk is the ultimate hero and the uniting figure for Turkish people, according to 
many of the ethnic Alevis. There is a general belief among the ethnic discourse that 
Atatürk, and principles of the Turkish Republic that were established during his 
leadership, represent the ethos and the soul of the Turkish nation, therefore whoever 
targets and criticizes Atatürk also targets Alevis as well. The establishment of the modern, 
secular Turkish Republic in 1923 is therefore the fundamental turning point in the 
historical consciousness of the ethnic Alevi discourse. Unlike their families, who are 
mostly first generation urban immigrants, they are not aware of the rich Alevi oral 
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culture, especially the oral narrative about Ali, Hüseyin, the 12 imams, Shah Ismail, or 
themes related to the lives and legacies of Ali and the Prophet Mohammed. In general the 
Islamic references are not common themes in the ethnic discourse. 
Extreme right ideologues and religious bigots among both Alevis and Sunnis who 
have prejudices against each other are the ―others,‖ according to the ethnic discourse. 
Equal citizenship, a democratic secular Turkey, and rule of law are the ideal situations 
that can keep people together in Turkey, according to the ethnic discourse. Ignorance and 
malice are the two major enemies of both Sunnis and especially Alevis. Reaching these 
ideals at the governmental level is a relatively easy task in comparison to dealing with the 
cultural stereotypes and popular biases against Alevis that have been formed within such 
a long history. There is however an optimistic vision and outlook in the ethnic discourse 
which illustrates that the problems between Alevis and Sunnis and historical animosities 
may be tackled with better education and mutual understanding. They believe that the 
majority of Sunnis also think similarly to them. 
[C.T & B.İ.]: I think our generation of Alevis and Sunnis can overcome this cycle 
of biases, prejudices and misunderstandings with better education and better 
communication. The ignorant and malignant people from both sides are the main 
reasons for the continuation of these stereotypes and miscommunication. 
Priorities of our generation are different; I guess nobody wants social 
confrontation and sectarian violence anymore. 
The historical consciousness in the ethnic discourse is not deeply rooted as is the 
cases with the İstanbul, Ankara and Bektaşi discourses. The ―Alevi history they know and 
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refer to in their narratives‖ start with the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Their 
symbolic and normative repertoires are composed fundamentally of more contemporary 
references. There are certain negative value judgments with regard to Ottoman legacy and 
early Islamic history, but the majority of heroes and villains in the ethnic figures are 
contemporary, such as Alevi singers, artists or dedes. In comparison to other categories of 
discourses that define the problems of Alevis in a comprehensive and deep rooted way, 
their problem definitions are about the daily practices of discrimination and prejudices. 
The ethnic discourse is not mentioned in the lists of taxonomies that are based primarily 
on ideological and political categories, however, it is this category which represents the 
emotions and social and cultural visions of the fastest growing segment of the Alevi 
community in urban contexts. The ethnic discourse does not have any specific agenda for 
social and political activism on behalf of Alevi identity except, the abandonment of 
discriminatory practices. The Istanbul and Ankara discourses compete over their claims 
to represent the rights and expectations of the ethnic Alevis. 
8.7. Post-Alevi Discourse 
[ L.K. ]: ―We are different branches of the same tree,‖ differences between us are minor 
in comparison to common sources and shared historical experiences. 
This genre of discourse has been defined as post-Alevi because the voices under 
this category do not develop a positive identity and self esteem based on the critique or 
negation of Sunni identity. In other words, the Alevi definition is not formulated as 
opposed to the established ―orthodox‖ Sunni understanding. The differences between the 
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Sunni and Alevi folks of Anatolia are minor, what is more important is the common 
Islamic background, and the centuries' long experience of coexistence. This 
understanding of Alevilik coincides with the Alevi definition offered by the Institution of 
Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), which is considered in other Alevi 
discourses to be the fundamental institution of the Hanefi sect of Sunni Islam in Turkey. 
This is the main reason why Alevis in the other discourse categories are reactionary 
against the emerging post-Alevi discourse. As is the case with the ethnic discourse, the 
proponents of the post-Alevi discourse perceive their Alevi identity to be an ethnic 
identity. 
The Alevi creed is an ethnic identity 
[ D. K.]: It is as if the Alevi creed is an ethnic identity. Because it is being 
perceived as an ethnic identity, my [social] circle, [even] my own family circle 
sees me as an Alevi, but as a brainwashed Alevi, or [otherwise put] as an Alevi 
adherent of [Necmettin] Erbakan [prominent conservative Sunni politician]. Even 
if you were a Christian, they would call you a Christian Alevi. In other words, it is 
being perceived as an ethnic identity. For that reason, I have [what we could call] 
an Alevi awareness. I mean, I know that I was an Alevi, but kept it hidden, [I] 
didn‘t tell anybody in Sunni circles. 
The post-Alevi discourse criticizes the general conception among Alevis which 
produces and fosters negative attitudes against Sunnis. There is an overall criticism about 
some of the companions of the Prophet (sahaba) and the Ottoman legacy, but the post-
Alevi discourse believes that the idea of the total denial of these historical and cultural 
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resources is not a necessity for Alevi self definition. This is the most distinctive feature of 
post-Alevi discourse in comparison to the other versions. There is a belief that the 
unnecessary tension between the Alevi political activists and the Sunni population is an 
unproductive way of engaging with each other. Polarizing figures and voices in both 
Alevi and Sunni communities distorts the relationship between Alevis and Sunnis. Islam 
and the Anatolian culture are perceived to be the common values and ethos of almost all 
the people living in Turkey. 
Table 8.5.: Features of Post Alevi Discourse 
Table 8.5.: Features of Post Alevi 
Discourse 
 
 
Definitions of ―US‖/ ―Ingroup‖   Alevilik is predominantly a belief system.  
 It is sufi sect within Islam, which has 
influences from Bektaşi teachings and 
some others as well. 
 
 Definitions of  ―THEM‖ / ―Out 
group‖  
 Ignorant Sunni bigots and people (Alevi) 
who try to politicize Alevi identity 
 
The conditions of being an Alevi 
(sources of identity) 
 We have the same Islamic roots with 
Sunnis, esoteric teachings and rituals 
differentiate Alevi.  
Role of in self definition  Islam is central for our self definition, 
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Islam, 
Marxism & 
Secular, Humanist values 
  
one should first acknowledge Islamic 
identity to become Alevi 
 We embrace secular, humanist, modern 
values, democracy, those values do not 
contradict with Islam and Alevi 
teachings. 
 Marxism and atheism were anomalies for 
Alevi teachings 
Boundary maintenance in new 
context 
 We have our own culture, rituals, 
practices and traditional institutions that 
needs to be maintained.  
 Whether we like it or not Alevi identity 
still passes from family. We have to be 
more accommodative to avoid 
discrimination 
Heroes, & frequently mentioned in 
the narratives 
 Prophet Mohammed, Hazrat Ali, Ahl-al 
Bayt, Hussein, Iman Cafer Sadık, Shah 
Ismail, Atatürk, HBV, et al 
Institutional representatives or 
public voices  
 Traditional institutions cemevis, dedes, 
dergahs, foundations 
Problems of being Alevis   There is a cacophony and confusion with 
Alevis which is used by some bad 
intentioned Sunnis 
 Discrimination of Alevis in daily 
practices and job market 
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 Lack of enough written sources on Alevi 
teachings  
What should the Alevis do?   Deal with historical misunderstandings 
 Educate themselves and Sunnis about 
Alevi tradition and value system 
 
 
Anatolian values, the experience of centuries-long coexistence, and the teachings 
of Central Asian and Anatolian dervishes such as Hoca Ahmet Yesevi, Yunus Emre, Hacı 
Bektaş Veli and Rumi are considered common ground for Alevis and Sunnis. Other 
discourses do not prefer to emphasize commonalities with the Sunnis. Instead, they 
highlight the differences in their interpretation of Islam for the purposes of maintaining 
the boundaries of their identity. In this sense, the post-Alevi discourse is also considered 
to be the more preferable perspective by majority Sunnis. 
[ D. G.]: The basic sources of the Alevi creed are the basic sources of [the religion 
of] Islam. The Kuran. Isn‘t that right? There can be no Islam without the Kuran. 
In the sense that, here people are not being radicalized, not being pushed [in the 
direction of] fundamentalism, but by means of communicating the beauty of 
Islam. What did Hacı Bektaş Veli have to say about this, what did Hazrat Ali have 
to say about this, what did the Twelve Imams, what did Pir Sultan Abdal, what did 
Shah Hataî, have to say about this? What did Yunus say about this? And then, 
what do the people who do not belong to us have to say about this? And the most 
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important [thing] is the necessity to be respectful to all people, irrespective of 
their ideas of faith. Because everybody worships Allah as he sees fit. After they 
have worshiped they can blunder. However they do it, it‘s alright, as long as there 
is sincerity. We would like to communicate these views to the young. 
Conservative Sunnis‘ predilection to engage with post-Alevi discourse or their 
tendency to present the Alevi definition solely as the ―post-Alevi definition‖ disturbs the 
people who prefer the other categories of discourses. The other discourse categories are 
challenged by Sunni comments such as ―If Alevilik means to love Hazrat Ali, Ahl-al Bayt 
or Hacı Bektaş Veli, I am as Alevi as Alevi as you are.‖ The implication of this statement 
is that ―if the Alevi vision is like the way it is presented in the post-Alevi discourse we 
also mostly agree on this vision.‖ Many people that adopt other discourse categories 
consider the post-Alevi discourse to be an assimilated category because they do not make 
any specific social and political claims on behalf of their Alevi identity. In terms of values 
and collective ethos their arguments are closer to the Bektaşi discourse 
[K.S.]: The love of ehl-i beyt, Hazrat Ali, and 12 imams are the essence of 
Alevilik. Hacı Bektaş Veli‘s order in Anatolia helped the spread of Islam among 
Turcoman tribes. Our Allah, our prophet and our holy book is same, in terms of 
beliefs we are almost same but some of the ritual practices in Alevilik is 
different.‖ 
The vision of the post-Alevi discourse is more acceptable to conservative Sunnis 
and the Diyanet in comparison to the previous four discourse categories because the 
categorical and axiological agreement does not imply any social, political and economic 
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responsibilities for them. The people who resort to the language of the post-Alevi 
discourse in most cases have the experience of living, working and becoming educated 
together with Sunnis over a long period. These experiences might have some negative 
dimensions but in general they have positive memories related to their experiences.  
They believe that Hazrat Ali and Ehl-i beyt were going to mosque and observing 
the ―five pillars of Islam‖ just like the Prophet Mohammed and the observant Sunnis.  
―Some Alevis do not want to acknowledge this historical fact. They cannot deny 
praying five times a day and fasting just because observant Sunnis do these. These 
are written in the Quran and many other sources of Islam. There cannot be a 
negative-theology based on denial of the other beliefs‖. 
[G. C.]: ―Hz Ali was the follower of the Prophet with all aspects that‘s why he 
deserved to be the first caliph. I believe that Hz. Ali‘s right to caliphate had been 
violated by Abu Bakr, Omar and Uthman, Muawiya, however making the hatred 
against the other caliphs as the essence of Alevilik is not a meaningful approach 
today. Hatred against the other caliphs helps to continuation of animosities 
between Alevi and Sunni populations. Some Alevi activists try to impose their 
personal views of sahabah. 
The heroes and villains within the Istanbul discourse are almost the same as the other 
discourse categories, but the positioning of these heroes and villains is very different, 
more resembling the Sunni understanding of these characters. There is also an 
understanding in the post-Alevi discourse which assumes that Hacı Bektaş Veli was loved 
and respected by the Sunni population of Turkey as well, whereas in other discourse 
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categories Hacı Bektaş Veli was interpreted in a specific way. 
―Haci Bektas Veli was an Anatolian sufi leader. He has some social activism 
dimension in his life practice but this dimension should not shadow his religious 
leadership and moral teachings. We have to focus on Alevi classics and basic texts 
to guide our society, the journalistic texts have been written for social and 
political purposes. We have turn to authentic written sources of Alevi-Bektaşi 
teachings that is not distorted by politicians and activists.‖ 
[G.C.]: I had a problem with my family when I told them that ―I don‘t believe that 
the other caliphs are necessarily bad people‖. My family believes that I am 
converted to Sunnism. I personally don‘t understand why I am supposed to hate 
them, it sounds like a blood feud to me. It does not make sense to new generation 
of Alevis as well. 
They are uncomfortable with being considered assimilated Alevis or ―sunnified Alevis 
(sunnilesmis Aleviler)‖ by other Alevis. There is discontent among the proponents of the 
post-Alevi discourse because of the ignorance of both the Alevis‘and Sunnis‘ about the 
―authentic Alevi tradition.‖ Some post-Alevis also condemn the Ankara discourse for 
being ―atheists‖. They argue that these people try to ―learn‖ Islam from the books of 
atheist authors in order to legitimize their social and political positions rather than 
learning Islam sincerely. The position of the post-Alevi discourse is open to criticism 
from both ―orthodox Alevis,‖ (the people who base their self definition on the total 
differentiation with the category of ―other‖), as well as Sunnis that are biased against 
Alevis. This is a dilemma for the people that position themselves under the post-Alevi 
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discourse; they are excluded by the extremist people in both the Alevi and Sunni 
communities. 
[L. D.]: At that time I was a village teacher in Yozgat. Yozgat is a place where the 
Grey Wolves [ülkücü, right-wing extremist nationalists] are in a majority, and at 
the time there was a lot of struggle between right and left-wing factions. It was an 
Alevi village, but there was [nevertheless] a young man there who could fulfill the 
role of prayer leader [imam]. He had actually abandoned the Imam-Hatip high 
school, his name was Haydar. He also went to Friday prayers. This Alevi youth 
attended an Imam-Hatip high school, but after he finished secondary school he 
abandoned school. Because Haydar possessed a pretty voice, he would recite the 
Mevlid [a poem recounting the birth of the Prophet] in the mortuary. One time, 
during his recital, somebody said that Haydar was an Alevi and he was chased 
away from the service. The kid was very upset about that, he immediately 
returned to his village and discontinued his studies at the Imam-Hatip high school. 
It was sad because he was at least as observant of his religion as his Sunni peers. 
 Alevi citizens did not send their children to Imam Hatip schools and Faculties of 
Theology. There are some who graduated from here. Two problems were seen 
there. Fists: a child is sent [to such a school], when he experiences the kind of 
things I experienced he just drops out, I persisted. Secondly, he graduates, and he 
simply turns away from his own community. I can understand concerns of their 
families but we also have to deal with the problem of ignorance  
 There are some Alevis in this category who observe the religious practices similar 
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to Sunnis, such as praying five times a day and reciting the Quran. There is also a group 
of Alevis who were against the recognition of cemevis as the religious places, believing 
that it may lead to the institutionalization of Alevilik as a separate religion. They 
recognized the cemevis as part of the Alevi culture and mystic tradition. Post-Alevi 
discourse also states concerns related to religious education in Turkey. They believe that 
because of the institutional ruptures, the new generation of Alevis are misguided, dedes 
cannot find satisfactory answers to their concerns, and they also don‘t trust the Diyanet 
because of the historical mistrust. In this context, the post-Alevi discourse has access to 
the knowledge of both Sunni and Alevi teachings but they do not have social and 
institutional legitimacy within the Alevi community because they don‘t agree on the 
social and political objectives of Alevi activists. Within this delicate balance of 
social/political and belief oriented priorities, the post-Alevi discourse has a difficult 
position. The post-Alevi discourse is not seen to be hegemonic within the Alevi 
movement, but there is a potential to influence and mitigate the confrontational language 
of other discourses. 
8.8. Conclusion 
The complexity of the discourses and the intra-group competition is part of the 
Alevi social reality. The purpose and priority of this study is not to classify the Alevi 
narrative genres or discourses, it is rather to grasp the complex dynamics of identity and 
the boundary negotiation process. It is my conclusion that it is impossible to present a 
single storyline related to the issues of the marginalization, victimization and politization 
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of social identity in the Alevi case. These ideal typical discourse categories analytically 
present the complexity of the phenomena. I also believe that this kind of analysis is the 
essential premise of any conflict resolution, especially the reconciliation process for the 
contemporary reflections of a discontent that has deep, historical and emotional roots. 
The fragmentation of Alevi identity over the contending discourses makes 
addressing the concerns and requests of Alevis more difficult for the policy makers. 
Whether the officials or the Diyanet recognize it or not, there are Alevi with different 
requests, priorities, and self- and other- definitions. In order to deal with these identity 
based conflicts and contentions in a realistic sense, this diversity should be taken into 
consideration. In the conclusion chapter some of the possible options to address the 
identity and recognition needs of the Alevis will be discussed. 
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Chapter 9 
Structures, Values and Emotions: Paths to Reconciliation 
 
The ―Alevi Issue‖ is one of Turkey‘s most complicated and most commonly 
misunderstood problems. The ―Alevi revival‖ has allowed for means of direct expression 
for Alevi discontents through certain institutional channels. In various social and political 
contexts debates on the issue have often been reduced to the limited list of Alevi identity-
based claims. This research has emphasized the symbolic and discursive dimensions of 
―identity revival,‖ or ―identity (re)construction.‖ The historical, axiological, emotional 
and interest related aspects of the intricate issue of the Alevi identity struggle are 
formulated in narrative forms or through certain discursive mechanisms. The personal 
and collective narratives constitute the main data set of this research. Findings of this 
research highlight the crucial importance of collective emotions such as fear, humiliation, 
shame and victimhood, as well as collective axiology and contending value systems in 
identity based conflicts. 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the findings of this research and to 
discuss obstacles that prevent Alevi-Sunni reconciliation. The legal, political, social and 
psychocultural mechanisms which address the Alevi identity based claims are also 
discussed here. The theoretical perspective of this study is social constructionist and the 
discursive approaches to both analysis and resolution are emphasized. It is equally 
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important to address the legal, political and social aspects of the problems, in order to 
transform the conflict generating structures. Finally, the implications of the findings for 
the CR field are elaborated.  
This study explores the nature and processes of Alevi identity negotiation or 
―construction‖ within the post-1980 social and political context of Turkey. Consistent 
with the social constructionist epistemology it is assumed in this study that identities, 
including the Alevi identity, are products of discourses and linguistic practices. The 
social, political, emotional and normative aspects of identity construction and negotiation 
processes are explored via collective and ―personal‖ stories. The meaning of identity 
construction is not abstract and ephemeral; it is meaningful within a specific context and 
within a process of social and cultural interaction (Slocum-Bradley, 2008, p. 5). As it is 
summarized by Tilly (2002), political identities are relational, collective and stories play 
significant role in shaping of the boundaries of identities. The ongoing identity 
construction and negotiation process, particularly in urban contexts, is very dynamic 
where there are a multiplicity of social forces and emerging forms of relationships.  
Life story narratives are also made within a particular social and cultural milieu 
with the available symbolic, discursive and narrative repertoires. Nikki Slocum-Bradley‘s 
operational definition of identity was helpful for the practical examination of Alevi 
identity. According to Slocum-Bradley:  
‗Identities‘ are meanings – labels, categories, symbols, and so forth – applied to 
persons or other narrated actors in specific contexts. (Slocum-Bradley, 2008, p. 5) 
Meanings of identities, boundaries of communities, historical and political experiences, 
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and conflicts as well as peace and harmony are studied as dynamic and contextual 
phenomena in this research. A brief survey of the identity debate in the CR discipline is 
presented in chapter four. It is argued here that the analyses of collective emotions and 
collective axiologies should be focal in the study of ethnic and sectarian identities.  
 Many such labels, categories, symbolic references and moral positions have been 
assigned to Alevi identity by the ―others.‖ One of the priorities of Alevi identity 
negotiation is to challenge all these misinformed or malignant positions and to assign 
their own versions of moral categories and positions. The Alevi concept has been the 
bundle category of ―other,‖ and different people in Turkey have positioned the Alevi 
according to their own vision and self definition. They have been constructed as ―rebels,‖ 
―heretics,‖ ―perverts,‖ ―Kızılbaş,‖ ―Râfızî,‖ ―communists,‖ ―people of low moral values 
and qualities,‖ ―enemies of the state‖ ―antidotes to Islamists,‖ ―patriots,‖ ―potential 
traitors,‖ ―people with weak loyalties to Turkish State,‖ ―guardians of the secular 
republic,‖ ―pure Turks,‖ ―victims‖ and ―Anatolian socialists‖ by their interlocutors. 
Certain normative judgments, rights and duty assignments are also associated with those 
categories and labels. Alevis have been constructing other identity categories and labels 
such as ―humanists,‖ ―true Muslims,‖ ―enlightened Muslims,‖ ―actors against unjust 
practices,‖ ―brave people,‖ ―defenders of democracy and human rights,‖ ―progressive 
Turks,‖ ―anti-imperialists,‖ ―pure Turks,‖ ―victims,‖ ―patriots,‖ and ―people of peace.‖ 
Different collective rights and duties are entitled to these alternative positions. 
Boundary making, which is discussed in chapter 6, is the most important and at 
the same time the most controversial aspect of the identity construction process. The 
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interactive and reflexive process of boundary negotiation shaped the controversial 
category or categories of the ―Sunni other.‖ The possibility of direct inter-communal 
violence has been marginalized, but linguistic and discursive practices are still at play 
reproducing discrimination, marginalization, stigmatization, humiliation and 
stereotyping, which constitute the major identity based discontents of Alevis. With the 
similar logic, Alevi narratives have constructed a controversial and biased image of Sunni 
identity and worldview. Building a category of ―other‖ in the form of a mirror image of 
―self‖ is an inevitable byproduct of the boundary making process. 
Although the boundaries between the Alevi and Sunni identities are 
predominantly psychocultural and normative, Alevi social discontents have often been 
substantiated and expressed through policy relevant claims and requests. Addressing 
those claims is perceived as the gradual recognition of the boundaries of the ―us‖ by the 
―other.‖ Therefore, the Alevi identity based claims are not just related to the actual 
contents of those claims. The Alevi identity struggle is about the recognition of 
―collective psychological wounds,‖ ―psychocultural dramas‖ and the ―axiological 
differences‖ of Alevis. Addressing the legal, political and resource allocation related 
claims will be necessary but not sufficient to transform the dialectic and irreconcilable 
visions of ―Alevi-Sunni‖ and ―Alevi-state‖ relations. These dialectic visions and 
imagination can only be transformed by co-creating new collective meanings and new 
and more convincing collective narratives.  
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9.1. General Overview and the Summary of the Field Research 
It is a problem that crosscuts left/right and secular/pro-Islamist (Çarkoğlu, 2006) 
and center/ periphery (Ateş, 2006) cleavages in Turkish politics. It is the contradiction of 
alternative but non-communicating life styles. It is much more complicated than other 
identity based problems in Turkey because a multiplicity of lifestyles are embedded 
within each category. More importantly, there is an overall disagreement about the 
answer to the question: ―What should we do with the Alevi identity?‖ Resistance to the 
political center and religious orthodoxy have historically become essential pillars of 
Alevi identity and many people among the Alevi social and political elite are unwilling to 
give up this feature of Alevi identity.  
The main features of the ongoing and unsettled Alevi collective identity 
negotiation process can be outlined as follows: 
Global trends and changing social and political landscape in Turkey have direct impacts 
on the language of Alevi identity politics 
The global/transnational social and political trends and the changing political 
landscape in Turkey have been affecting the nature of the Alevi identity struggle. New 
concepts and methods of political and social activism have been introduced to the lexicon 
of Alevi activism parallel to the transnational trends of social activism. The collapse of 
the Soviet Block and the end of ideological confrontation, as well as the rise of ethnic, 
religious, sectarian and identity based conflicts have influenced the political language of 
Alevi activists. In addition to these global political trends that have also had an impact on 
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Turkey, Turkey‘s EU integration process, pro-Islamist and ethnic Kurdish movements 
that began a decade prior to the Alevi revival, have also affected the Alevi identity 
movement. In addition to the EU integration process, the previous trends of ethnic and 
religious oriented identity movements in Turkey have also led to discontents among the 
Alevi community. The trends of urbanization and modernization have likely affected the 
rural Alevi community more than the other groups in Turkey. These local and 
transnational trends have at the same time led to deep confusions and splits within Alevi 
communities. The Alevi social imagination and narrative repertoire have been 
transformed due to these local political and social developments.  
Alevi communities in Turkey represent the diverse nature of the entire Turkish society. 
They are not isolated homogeneous communities that have consensus on cultural, social 
and political matters. They are becoming socially, economically and politically more 
diverse.  
As elaborated in a detail in chapter 8, even within a particular family it is possible 
to encounter contradictory understandings of Alevilik. The Alevi community is not a 
homogeneous, monolithic, highly integrated entity as perceived by some outsiders who 
are not familiar with Alevis. Educational background, income level, social interactions 
with the Sunni ―other‖ and even the differences in the background of one‘s hometown 
can be the sources of diversification. Social, economic and political diversity is becoming 
more common through the processes of rapid modernization and urbanization. This 
diversity is also represented in public discourses as well as personal life story narratives. 
Many Alevis expect ―non-Alevis‖ or ―others‖ to recognize them and their differences, 
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rather than using these differences as a pretext to deny their identity based claims. The 
diversity of social and political orientations of Alevis also allows different groups among 
the Alevi community to build relationships and communication channels within many 
different segments of the Turkish society. 
As the communication, interaction and Sunni population‟s knowledge on and 
acquaintance with the Alevi community increases, stereotypes and discriminatory 
discourses about Alevis lessen. 
For centuries Alevi and Sunni villages have lived with a limited interaction in 
rural contexts. Alevi/Kızılbaş villages were predominantly in the more secluded areas of 
Anatolia in comparison to Sunni villages. Within the rural context in particular there have 
been limited contacts as well as rare conflicts between Alevis and Sunni communities. 
Alevis have traditionally lived in solitary places in rural Anatolia due to fear of 
persecution. The pattern of isolated and secluded life style to a certain extent continued in 
the urban context as well. In the early stages of the urban experience Alevis were 
concentrated in certain areas and neighborhoods, predominantly ―gecekondu‖ 
neighborhoods. Stereotypes and biased discourses on Alevis continued in the urban 
contexts as well, due to limited inter-communal interactions. 
As a result of upward social and economic mobilization, second generation Alevis 
preferred to move out of their traditional neighborhoods. Increased social mobility and 
improvements in communication and the media have also enhanced the communicative 
interactions between Alevi and Sunni citizens. Direct communication and interpersonal 
interactions between the Alevi and Sunni citizens contribute to the gradual fading of 
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many prejudices and insults. This is a promising sign for the future of Alevi-Sunni inter-
communal relations. 
The process of increased interaction and communication, and modernization and 
urbanization also lead to the evaporation of the boundaries between Alevi and Sunni 
identities  
Paradoxically, these interactions also facilitate the vanishing of the boundaries 
between Alevis and Sunni identities, which is a matter of concern for the elder generation 
of Alevis, who suffered from most from these discriminatory practices. The boundaries 
have been solidified because of the political confrontations and ideological polarization, 
but these clear cut boundaries have been fading away in the modern urban context. The 
political activism and identity based claims are no more the priority among the new 
generation of Alevis, which may also be considered a sign of normalization. The quiet 
voice of the ―ethnic Alevi discourse‖ is becoming the predominant discourse. In the urban 
context, the boundaries of Alevi identity and various forms of its ―others‖ have been 
constructed over political and social confrontations during the 1970s, rather than through 
different rituals, cultures and practices. 
Although the wide majority of Alevis support the Alevi identity politics, they do 
not prefer to be the activists of ―Alevi identity politics.‖ It is still difficult to cross the 
boundaries of identities with regard to the issues of marriage and certain areas of 
employment. It is at the same time difficult to maintain the boundaries of a ―minority 
identity‖ in a context where the social setting is not suitable for maintenance of the 
traditional relationships and also the practice of cultural rituals. Some of the anxieties and 
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fears are related to the ambiguities of the boundaries of Alevi identity in a changing 
social context. Within this atmosphere of insecurity and ambiguity for Alevis, Alevi 
public discourses have a reactionary tone. The controversial narratives and conflicting 
discourses are overrepresented within the lexicon of the Alevi identity struggle. However, 
this is mainly due to the tendency to build new boundaries to consolidate an ―in group.‖  
There are significant unresolved controversies within the Alevi community which are 
crucial for the reshaping of Alevi identity.  
A considerable amount of energy and attention have been allocated to clarify those 
controversies. Publications on Alevilik and the rapid spread of Alevi TV and radio 
stations are also part of this broader negotiation process. So far, no consensus has been 
reached over the following debates: 
 Debate on leadership of the community. Who (which institutions or which group 
of people) should legitimately represent Alevis? What roles should dedes, Hacı 
Bektaş Postnişin, association leaders, representatives of foundations and 
intellectuals play? Is it possible to coordinate the activities and the roles of all 
these actors? 
 Confusion about how to approach the “others.” The category of ―others‖ includes 
the ―Turkish State‖ and the various Sunni orientations in Turkey. Should we 
reconcile with the political center to end our marginalized situation? Is it an 
essential feature of the Alevi community to continue a social and political struggle 
against unjust practices? To what extent does the Alevi identity based claims and 
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worldview overlap with the worldviews of the secular & left wing ―Sunnis‖ in 
Turkey? 
 Debate about the ―historical roots‖ and the ―cultural sources‖ of Alevi tradition. 
There are irreconcilable arguments over the debate about the essence of Alevilik 
which are elaborated in a detail in chapters 6 and 8. These debates are mostly 
related to the different social and political projects and visions for the future of 
Alevi community. These debates may not make much sense with a scientific gaze 
but they are considered crucial to the unsettled debate on the ―essence of Alevi 
identity.‖ 
 Debate over the role and significance of Islam, which is also labeled Sunnism by a 
small group of Alevis in the characterization of Alevi identity. While some groups 
see Islam‘s role as marginal in Alevi self definition, some others present Islam as 
the essence of Alevilik or Alevilik as essence of Islam. 
Alevis unite and mobilize against external challenges and threats. Fear and humiliation 
narratives constitute an important bulk of Alevi collective narratives. 
Although there are significant internal variations in different understandings of 
Alevilik, when there is a common threat perception or when they are challenged from 
outsiders they can easily become mobilized against these challenges. Overall, Alevi 
identity is perceived as a ―threatened identity‖ and any interference from ―outsiders‖ is 
approached with some skepticism. Alevi writers, activists and opinion makers are critical 
of Sunni theologians‘ studies on Alevilik. They are also very reactionary to conservative 
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Sunni politicians‘ interest in Alevi politics. As an unintended consequence of living as a 
―minority group,‖ in Anatolia, Alevis have developed effective defensive traits. Features 
of threatened identities such as feelings of fear, anxiety and insecurity are predominant 
themes in the Alevi personal and collective narratives. Heroic and tragic narratives are 
equally important components of Alevi narrative repertoires and these narratives are 
frequently voiced publicly, but threat perceptions are relatively more difficult for non-
Alevis‘ comprehension.  Sharing similar anxieties, experiences of humiliation, threat 
perceptions and fears, many Alevis feel more secure together with their fellow Alevis. 
The general notion that ―there is no one to save ‗us‘ other than ourselves‖ keeps the 
solidarity and sense of belonging among Alevis. The defensive instincts of the Alevi 
community have been tested several times in the last two decades resulting in some 
verbal and physical attacks. Even though on an ad hoc basis many segments of the Alevi 
community have managed to unite and resist against those potential threats. 
Leadership cadres of many Alevi associations have been involved in the left wing 
political and social activism in the pre-1980 era. The political language of non-
traditional leaders also affected and shaped the language of Alevi identity politics to a 
certain extent. 
Marxist political discourses influence the public representation of Alevi identity 
politics. Marxist narratives and the dialectic Marxist interpretation of some historical 
events have been included in the Alevi public discourses. Some traditional Alevi leaders 
(dedes) as well as the Sunni religious authorities and politicians react to this particular 
way of interpreting Alevi history and rituals, accusing the leadership cadres of the Alevi 
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associations of being ―Marxist‖ or ―Atheist.‖ Marxist interpretations of Alevi history and 
―identity struggle‖ have become inevitable components of Alevi cultural and political 
repertoires. It is therefore impossible to completely sort out these elements from Alevi 
cultural and political repertoires. The previous experiences of the Alevi community 
leaders in the ideological struggle have also contributed to the effectiveness and the 
success of Alevi associations. At the grassroots level, Alevi citizens are increasingly 
interested in the cultural practices, rituals, belief system and religious teachings of the 
Alevi ―cultural system‖ or ―worldview.‖ The gap between the leadership narratives and 
grassroots narratives is gradually narrowing down in favor of traditional elements and 
teachings, rather than the Marxist teachings. The process of tacit negotiation is far from 
being settled yet.  
Alevi identity struggle is presented as a struggle which is for the interest of all humanity, 
particularly for the advancement of Turkish society. Alevi narratives emphasize that the 
“local Alevi ethos” transcends its spatio-temporal boundaries. The transcendental 
presentation of Alevi ethos is a consequence of a search for a broader legitimacy. 
There is a common belief among the Alevi citizens which assumes that the Alevi 
belief system and principles have a value and validity beyond particular space and time. 
Significant Alevi historical figures such as Ali, Hacı Bektaş Veli, Pir Sultan Abdal are 
paralleled to Kant, Karl Marx, enlightenment philosophers and human rights activists. 
Even in the narratives of ordinary Alevi these references can easily be recognized. Most 
Alevis sincerely believe that Alevi worldview, ―noble values‖ and teachings, if 
understood and practiced, will likely bring peace and social and economic justice to the 
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entirety of humanity. ―Alevi martyrs‖ and ―victims‖ have been considered martyrs in the 
―century‘s old battle of good and evil.‖ These presentations help to explain and justify the 
victimhood and suffering of Kızılbaş/Alevi communities. The interests and identity based 
claims of the Alevi communities are perceived beyond the frames of particularistic group 
interests. 
For the wide majority of the Alevis, their shared Islamic values and common ground with 
the Sunni citizens is not as relevant as the secular value, which emerged predominantly 
after Atatürk‟s reforms. For Alevis, commitment to secularist principles rather than an 
emphases on religious references increase the legitimacy of “Turkish Regime.” 
 Alevis wish to build their future with the Sunni citizens based on equal citizenship 
rights and secular democratic values. Modern secular values, democratic political culture 
and rule of law based on equality constitute the axiological basis of the ideal ―happily 
ever after narratives‖ for Alevis. Emphasis on the common Islamic values by right wing 
nationalist and pro-Islamist politicians and intellectuals disturb many Alevis. Instead, 
Alevis want their specific way of understanding and practicing Islam to be recognized 
and appreciated by ―others‖ or ―non-Alevis.‖ Religious common ground is considered to 
be a significant integrating factor for addressing the Kurdish ethno-nationalism; it may be 
counterproductive in the Alevi case. The axiological gap may gradually be bridged 
through the democratic process of deliberation rather than through emphasizing 
sacred/spiritual themes. Regardless of their contents, the religiously oriented discourses 
of Sunnis sound like assimilation attempts to Alevi leaders.  Secular values and the 
institutions that are seen as the defenders of secularism are considered to be the 
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guarantors for the future of Alevi identity.  
Many Alevis have emotional stories and experiences that have transformative value for 
re-conceptualization of their “Aleviness.” Personal stories are associated with the 
broader narratives of historical victimhood and are articulated as the latest scene of the 
perpetual processes of victimization and marginalization. 
These stories and personal experiences play significant roles in shaping their 
feelings about their Alevi identity. In particular, discriminatory and traumatic experiences 
generate irrecoverable emotional gaps with the categories of ―other.‖ When these 
personal experiences are associated with the narratives of collective victimhood they 
generate feelings of perpetual victimization and humiliation. While trying to address the 
structural sources of the problems and dealing with the collective emotions, it is equally 
important to hear and reconcile the stories of emotionally distressed individuals.  
Violent confrontations both at the inter-communal level (Alevi-Sunni) and state- 
community level (between Alevis and the Turkish State) were avoided in Alevi identity 
struggle. Mainly because: 
-Alevis do not have any specific sovereignty claims over a particular territory 
-Alevi activists are mainly urban dwellers and they developed crosscutting and 
overlapping social ties with other actors. They became activists and militants in other 
struggles. 
-Alevi/ Bektaşi teachings and value system are peaceful and conciliatory by 
nature 
-Alevi are very successful in getting organized at the civil society level. They 
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effectively utilized democratic channels to express their unrest.  
-Historically there are not many records of inter-communal violence between 
Alevis and Sunni, in Alevi public memory. Ideological oriented violent confrontations of 
1970s are often considered as exceptional events that were instigated by ―foreign 
enemies‖ that were planning to weaken and divide Turkey. 
-There are common cultural/ normative resources (secularism, Islam, common 
homeland and Turkish culture) and collective narratives (shared heroes, shared villains, 
shared glories and traumas) that prevented dehumanization. Notions of shared homeland, 
shared language and shared culture were strong deterrents of violent confrontations. 
9.2. Understanding and Reframing the Problems 
 Ordinary Sunni Turkish citizens‘ knowledge on the Alevi issue is often limited to 
the publicly voiced claims of Alevis. Emotional and axiological backgrounds of these 
claims can only be comprehended with reference to the discursive contexts in which they 
are formulated. The storylines and speech acts with which these claims are voiced reveal 
more about their intentions, which is why the meanings of these claims are explored 
within a symbolic and narrative context. 
9.2.1. What Do Alevis Ask For? 
The motto of the November 9 2008 Alevi meeting was ―equal citizenship rights 
under the law‖ (eşit yurttaşlık hakları). ―Democracy and the principle of laicism are the 
guarantees for the maintenance of Alevi identity. Therefore they should be defended.‖ 
Democracy, secularism and human rights discourse are not the only available framework 
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formulating Alevi identity based claims. Some associations formulated them as religious 
rights. There may be some variations in the demands of different Alevi associations and 
institutions. For example, ABF is against Diyanet, various religious courses, and salaries 
for Alevi dedes, whereas the CEM Foundation and the Ehl-i Beyt Foundation want a 
special directorate for Alevis or representation of Alevis within Diyanet. The ABF wants 
a ―Turkish State,‖ as a requirement of principle of secularism/laicite, to refrain from 
many activities and services related to religion. The CEM Foundation and Ehl-i Beyt 
Foundation demand the equal delivery of public services to all citizens regardless of 
ethnicity, sect, religion, rank and age. They also approach the plan of salary payment to 
dedes positively. There is an overall consensus about the abandoning of the 
discriminatory practices against Alevi citizens and equal representation of Alevi culture 
and lifestyle in the public media outlets.  
The list below covers more or less all the Alevi demands that are mentioned in 
different contexts. 
1. Legalization of the status of cemevis as places of worship (ibadethane). 
2. Abolishment of compulsory religious courses. 
3. Abandonment of the policy of building mosques in Alevi villages. 
4. Abolishment of the Administration of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri 
Başkanlığı) or allocation of a budget to Cemevis. 
5. Allocation of a state budget for cemevis and salary for Alevi Dedes. 
6. Removal of the religious sign from the national ID cards. 
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7. Broadcasting of programs on Alevi culture and rituals at official TV and radio 
broadcasting company TRT (Turkish Radio and TV). 
8. Positive discrimination for Alevi citizens in bureaucratic jobs. 
9. Transforming the ―Madımak Hotel‖ into a museum for the memory of 37 people 
that died in the Sivas Events of July 2 1993. 
10. Recommendation of saz (lute) as a musical instrument in secondary school 
curriculum. 
11. Handing over the administration and control of the historical Bektaşi Dergah‘s 
(shrines) including Hacı Bektaş Dergah, Şahkulu Dergah to Alevi-Bektaşi 
foundations and associations. 
12. Free water, electricity and building sites to cemevis. 
9.2.2. What Do Alevis Actually Mean? 
The purposes of the Alevi identity struggle are definitely beyond the list that is 
indicated above. The overall objectives of the Alevi identity struggle fall under four 
major categories: 
i) maintenance of the Alevi identity in modern, urban social contexts 
(boundary maintenance & reproduction); 
ii) recognition of Alevi identity as an equal and legitimate element of Turkish 
society; 
iii)  allocation of material resources for the Alevi identity based institutions; 
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iv) acknowledgement of the historical traumas and the victimhood of Alevis 
and certain guarantees that would prevent possible recurrence of 
traumatic experiences. 
The common claim of the diverse groups within the Alevi community is the quest 
for the public recognition of Alevi identity and institutions, and the acknowledgement of 
grievances by the Turkish state and the majority Sunni population in Turkey. The 
resource allocation related claims are also a reaction against the social and economic 
marginalization of Alevis. Recognition has legal, political, and social dimensions and 
many of the identity based claims fall under the category of recognition. 
Some particular needs can fall under more than one category, for example the 
establishment of the Alevi religious institutions such as cemevis, which serves the 
maintenance of Alevi identity or for ―survival,‖ or obtaining the legal status for cemevis 
as a place of worship (ibadethane), which is at the same time a step towards the legal 
recognition of Alevi identity. The request for the payment of salary to dedes is both a 
form of resource allocation and a form of recognition of the traditional Alevi elite. 
Commitment to the secularist principles against the pro-Islamist tendencies is considered 
a necessity for the prevention of the assimilation of the new generation of Alevi youth 
into ―Sunni identity.‖ 
Recognition and acknowledgment have two main components: first and foremost 
the acknowledgment of the past crimes, assaults and unjust practices against the Alevis 
by the Turkish state and Sunnis (especially extreme right and Islamicist groups); 
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secondly, the legal and political steps that would fulfill demands related to the group 
rights of the Alevi community. But there is no overall consensus on how to be recognized 
except for the requests such as religious places, a budget for the community, and the 
abolition of compulsory religion courses. 
 In general, the implications of these claims within the particular context can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Recognition of cultural, religious, social and political rights of Alevis as equal 
citizens. 
2. Endorsement of a more pluralistic narrative of ―Turkish history‖ and ―Islamic 
history‖ in the Turkish national education system and in the popular media.  
3. Public apology or statements from some influential politicians and opinion 
makers that would clearly indicate regret for some of the historical events in 
which the ancestors of the Alevis have been victimized (remembering the violent 
episodes of Maraş, Sivas, Çorum, Malatya and the more recent Sivas Events of 
1993).  
4. Clear commitment of the governments to secular, democratic pillars of the 
Turkish Republic and Atatürk‘s principles. 
5. Certain official restrictions on Islamic social and political activism in the ―public 
sphere.‖ Regulating the ―anti-secular‖ activities of Islamist and ultra-nationalist 
groups.  
6. Equal opportunity for Alevi citizens in the job market, especially for the high 
level civilian and military positions in the bureaucracy. 
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7. Improvement in the economic conditions of the Alevi dedes.  
8. Ending marginalization and discrimination of Alevi citizens such as certain insults 
and stereotypes in daily social interactions, especially at schools, workplaces and 
during the mandatory military service. 
9. Raising the consciousness of Sunni citizens about the sensitivities of Alevi 
citizens with regard to cultural stigmas regarding Alevi identity. 
10. Maintenance of Alevi identity among the new generation of young urban Alevis 
(preventing assimilation). 
9.3. What are the Obstacles for a Broader Reconciliation? 
9.3.1. Legal Obstacles 
There are three major legal obstacles that prevent the fulfillment of Alevi identity 
based claims: i) the situation of the legal status of cemevis as places of worship; ii) the 
status and contents of the compulsory religious courses; iii) restructuring the legal status 
and the services of Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı. 
The demands related to the cemevis include the legalization of the cemevis as 
places of worship (ibadethane). Alevi associations also want cemevis to benefit from all 
the privileges that the mosques benefit from, including free electricity, free water and the 
allocation of free building sites. The status of the cemevis is the most important item in 
the Alevi struggle for recognition. Different Alevi associations, foundations and civil 
society institutions have different expectations from the cemevi debate. Some 
associations consider the debate over the legal status of cemevis to be an opportunity to 
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allow ―Alevilik‖ recognition as a separate religion or a separate belief system. On the 
other hand, some other institutions want to benefit from the privileges of places of 
worship. 
―The law # 677‖126 bans the places of worship other than mosques, such as 
shrines, dervish lodges and gathering places of sects and tarikats. The law # 677 is 
considered an important element of Atatürk‘s reforms. It is a highly risky subject for the 
governing AKP to amend the Law # 677. The AKP may end up faced with a closing case 
in the constitutional court on the basis of trying to ―alter‖ the secular fundamentals of 
Turkish Republic. Besides changing the law # 677, Prime Minister Erdoğan has signaled 
to make some legal and institutional modifications in the status of cemevis along with the 
―Alevi engagement policy‖. Establishing a new ―Alevi Directorate‖ under the Prime 
Minister‘s office and funding and regulating the cemevis through this new institution may 
be an ideal solution. Alevi civil society institutions will resist the Diyanet or Ministry of 
Culture‘s control over cemevis.  
According to the 24
th
 article of the 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 
education and instruction in religion and ethics is compulsory: 
Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state 
supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall 
be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious 
                                                 
126 Commonly known as the ―Tekke, Zaviye ve Türbelerin kapatılmasına dair kanun‖ 
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education and instruction shall be subject to the individual‘s own desire, and in 
the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives
127
. 
All the Alevi citizens are against the current form and the contents of the compulsory 
religious courses. There are ECHR and court decisions against the compulsory religious 
courses, which are elaborated above. There are three major criticisms again the 
compulsory religious courses, and the majority of Alevi citizens object to the compulsory 
nature of the courses. Almost all the Alevis criticize the contents of the courses for being 
―biased‖ and ―discriminatory.‖ There is general conviction among Alevi citizens who 
believe that the religious courses teach Sunni beliefs and religious practices. A 
considerable number of Alevis are firmly against the existence of religious classes in a 
modern, secular state. It is difficult to legally accommodate all different demands related 
to religious education. Changing the compulsory character of religious courses 
necessitates a constitutional amendment, therefore the consent and the support of the 
opposition parties is also a requirement.  
In order to initiate the legal amendment there is a necessity for the support of the 
opposition parties in the parliament (CHP and MHP) as well. The AKP will not take such 
a risk unless the amendment is initiated with the consensus of the two opposition parties, 
which does not seem a possibility in the foreseeable future. The other option is to give 
status to culture centers and support accordingly, yet this will not satisfy some of the 
Alevi activists, especially those which benefit from the continuation of the struggle. 
                                                 
127 1982 Constitution of Republic of Turkey http://www.constitution.org/cons/turkey/turk_cons.htm, accessed in June 17, 2009. 
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The ABF wants the abolishment of the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı and the 
confiscation of all its property to the treasury. Another option is the establishment of the 
Alevi version of the Diyanet with a separate budget that would provide services to Alevi 
citizens. Some Alevis want the Diyanet to be financed outside the public budget. They 
argue that in a secular (laic) state, religious services should not be financed from the 
public budget. Others argue that Alevis deserve tax waivers since they do not benefit 
from the services of the Diyanet. Hostility towards the Diyanet is a shared theme among 
the diverse views in Alevi community but there is a disagreement about what needs to be 
done.  
Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı is one of the rooted institutions in Turkey, which was 
established in 1924 by Atatürk. The Diyanet is providing religious services, and at the 
same time regulating the majority of the religious activities in Turkey. There is strong 
support for the services of the Diyanet from the majority of Turkish society, and in that 
sense no democratically elected government in Turkey can risk abolishing the Diyanet. 
Abolishing the Diyanet may gradually lead to the strengthening of the religious 
communities and faith based organizations in Turkey.  Incorporating Alevis into Diyanet 
is also not a practical approach, because for a long time the Diyanet has been perceived 
as a common enemy by many Alevi groups. It is difficult to change this perception in the 
short run. Establishing a separate publicly funded institution to provide cultural and 
religious services for Alevi citizens and educating the Diyanet staff about Alevi culture 
and traditions is a more viable option.  
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9.3.2. Political Obstacles 
The ―other‖ of Alevi identity in Turkey has traditionally been the combination of 
―conservative Sunni,‖ ―right wing nationalist‖ and ―pro-Islamist‖ identities. These 
identity definitions in the political sphere constitute the support bases of the two major 
right-wing parties of the Turkish parliament: the AKP and the MHP (National Action 
Party). Alevi identity based claims can ―legitimately‖ be addressed in the political sphere 
by incorporating the AKP and the MHP to the resolution process. Both political parties 
have made certain public statements about their willingness to engage with the Alevi 
community and to address the Alevi identity based claims. There is therefore a suitable 
ground for dealing with some of the legal obstacles.  
Even if the AKP leads the process which will enable legal amendments 
concerning Alevi identity based claims in the TBMM, it is most probable they will not 
get the political support of the Alevi citizens in the foreseeable future. There is also a 
possibility that the AKP may alienate their conservative Sunni constituents as a 
consequence of such a political move. These are some political limitations of the 
governing AKP with regard to dealing with Alevi issue. Prime Minister Erdoğan can play 
a significant role in explaining such legal amendments to his party‘s constituents.  
Since the early 1960s, the CHP (Republican People‘s Party) and the other left 
wing parties have been enjoying the loyal support of the Alevi citizens. The polarization 
of Alevi-Sunni and secularist –Islamist tensions helps the consolidation of Alevi support 
to the CHP. The process of a broader social and political reconciliation may thus disturb 
the CHP since it may mean a change in the status quo, unless the CHP comes up with an 
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alternative plan. Some of the activists of Alevi identity politics as well as the factions, 
which benefit from the maintenance of Alevi-Sunni and Secularist-Islamist/ conservative 
Sunni polarizations in Turkey, are also unhappy about the new engagement policy. Legal 
and constitutional amendments may also be a risky move for the AKP administration, 
because the opposition parties in the parliament may likely take the amendments to the 
Anayasa Mahkemesi (Constitutional Court) to prevent them from becoming law. 
Addressing the Alevi claims is not just a matter of political pragmatism for the 
governing AKP administration; it is rather a historical opportunity to mitigate centuries 
old tension. It is at the same time a requirement to ensure equal rights to all Turkish 
citizens. Those steps may be necessary but not sufficient to deal with the deep rooted 
marginalization and discrimination feelings of Alevis. 
9.3.3. Social and Normative Obstacles 
Popular discourses of politicians usually emphasize the ―experience of Alevi-
Sunni coexistence in Anatolia‖ or ―experience of coexistence.‖ In contradiction to the 
popular belief, the Alevis and Sunnis mostly lived in isolated places in rural contexts. 
Alevi and Sunni citizens have a very limited experience of coexistence at the grassroots 
level, and both communities position each other in a dialectic fashion. These biases and 
stereotypes can be overcome in the long run by improving the social spaces that would 
enable inter-communal communication and interaction. 
At the social level as well there are certain barriers between Alevi and Sunni 
citizens. For example a recent opinion survey, which was conducted by the A&G 
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Research Company, asked questions about Turkish people‘s preferences on marriage. 
Half of the participants (50.1 %) gave a negative response to the question: ―Do you 
consider marrying someone from another sect (fe. Alevi, Sunni) as normal?‖ Only 29.8% 
of the participants responded affirmatively, whereas 20.1% had partially agreed
128
. The 
social and cultural boundaries between Alevi and Sunni identities are strong despite the 
general trend of modernization and secularization. 
9.3.4. Psychocultural Obstacles 
The most challenging set of obstacles for the reconciliation of Alevi-Sunni 
contention in Turkey are the psychocultural and emotional obstacles. There are no legal 
or political mechanisms to deal with the intense emotional dimensions of threatened 
identities. Shared collective traumas and the feelings of perpetual victimhood and 
marginalization are the most common collective emotions of Alevis that have been 
maintained for centuries. Remembrance and mourning for the Karbala Massacre is an 
important component of the Alevi ritual cem. Commemoration of Hacı Bektaş Veli, 
founder of the Bektaşi order, Pîr Sultan Abdal, and the recent Alevi traumas of the ―Sivas 
Events‖ of 1993, as well as the remembrance of other painful experiences such as the 
Maraş Events of 1978, play important roles in the maintenance of Alevi identity. In 
addition to these historical references the ongoing practices of denial and cultural insults 
in the daily lives of many Alevis are a source of humiliation. These prejudices and 
humiliating experiences have become important turning points in the lives of many Alevi 
                                                 
128   
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Guncel/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=1105210&Kategori=guncel&b=Ha%20baska%20dindensin%20ha%20baska%2
0mezhepten 
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citizens. 
Without understanding these emotional elements it is impossible to comprehend 
the social actions, narratives and emotional responses of the people in the Alevi identity 
movement. Fears related to the possibility of extermination, direct violence, and 
assimilation with other more sophisticated cultural and structural forms of violence are 
proximate possibilities for many Alevis. Although Alevi associations and community 
leaders seek certain legal protections and policy changes from the government, fears and 
traumatizing historical experiences cannot be addressed through legal and political 
measures. Even the conciliatory gestures of right wing, nationalist and pro-Islamist 
politicians are interpreted as assimilatory tricks by many Alevis.  
Educating Turkish society about the cultural and emotional sensitivities of the 
Alevi citizens is an essential step for this. Educational curriculum can be revised and 
popular media can be systematically informed about these sensitivities. Starting a 
comprehensive reconciliation process is a long term project but symbolic gestures are 
helpful in order to manifest certain cultural and psychological sensitivities. Prime 
Minister Erdoğan‘s embracing speeches in Alevi iftars and Culture Minister Ertuğrul 
Günay‘s apology to Alevi citizens for the past events of violence were important 
symbolic steps for the acknowledgment of Alevi collective traumas. At the grassroots 
level as well, similar steps need to be encouraged. 
9.4. A Practical Agenda for a Comprehensive Reconciliation 
 Louis Kriesberg defines reconciliation as the ―conciliatory ways members of 
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adversary entities come to regard each other after having engaged in intense and often 
destructive struggle‖ (Kriesberg, 1999, p. 106). The critical aspect of reconciliation is that 
in the process the parties give up or ―do not act on their feelings of hate, fear, and 
loathing or their desires for revenge or retribution‖ (Kriesberg, 1999, p. 106). 
Acknowledgement of previous hostilities, guilt, sufferings and the anticipation of a 
peaceful future are the preconditions for inter communal reconciliation. Conciliatory 
gestures and narrative interventions to the normative and emotional domains will not be 
effective and will not be perceived as convincing without adjustments at the legal and 
political fields. 
Legal and political reforms are crucial for overcoming structural inequalities and 
preventing the practices of marginalization. These reforms and structural adjustment 
policies are not alternatives to the processes of narrative reconciliation, they are rather 
crucial complementary steps. 
9.4.1. Legal and Political Reforms 
1. Developing a better relationship with the opposition parties in order to succeed in 
planned legal reforms. Integrating the political opposition to the resolution 
process will increase the legitimacy of legal amendment attempts. Former judges, 
high level bureaucrats and politicians can also play important roles in informing 
the general public about the legal aspects of the Alevi identity based claims. 
Presenting the case beyond the limits of party politics or immediate political 
concerns is a requirement for the success of the legal processes. 
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2. Revising the legal status of the compulsory religion courses is part of a broader 
reform of religious education policy. Providing multiple religious course options 
in schools or revising the contents and the curricula of religious courses can be 
another option. In any case the decision will be a subject of debate among Alevi 
associations and civil society institutions. 
3. Forming a commission in the TBMM (Turkish Grand National Assembly) to 
explore the possible options for the legal status of cemevis. A subcommittee on 
the constitution can explore the constitutional obstacles and alternative paths to 
deal with these obstacles. 
4. Re-structuring the ―Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı‖ so that it may provide the religious 
services equally to different sects. 
5. Opening of government funded Alevi research centers and institutes and 
providing government grants to research projects. 
6. Providing free electricity, water and some financial aid to the activities of 
cemevis.  
7. Certain forms of financial compensation to the Alevi dedes. The details of the 
project can be decided by Alevis themselves through participatory workshops, 
which are moderated by a mix of academics and public policy experts. 
8. Making the diaspora Alevis a part of the engagement policy in Turkey. Alevi 
associations in Europe had significant influences on the shaping of political 
discourses and the institutionalization of Alevi associations in Turkey. There is 
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still an ongoing interaction between European Alevi associations and Alevi 
associations in Turkey.  
9. The legal amendments can resonate to the constituency of governing AKP only if 
they are framed under a broader policy package of democratization and improving 
religious freedoms to in Turkey. 
10. The opposition parties, bureaucratic institutions (Diyanet, local governors) and 
civil society institutions (bar associations, human rights organizations, and 
religious organizations) should also be integrated into the process to broaden the 
constituents of the reconciliation process. 
9.4.2. Bridging the Normative and Communicative Gaps 
Biased popular images and malignant positioning of the ―other‖ have occasionally 
been exposed in the places of encounter such as schools, workplaces, military service and 
business life. These personal and collective experiences feed the emotional and 
psychocultural barriers and cause the general conviction that the gaps between two 
―communities‖ are impossible to be bridged. On the other hand, this research also 
concludes that the unbiased social interactions and domains of communication allow for 
the normalization of inter-communal interactions. For both Alevis and Sunnis who 
experienced an unbiased interaction with the ―other,‖ at least the notions of a 
homogeneous and diametrically opposing other have been crumbled. People have started 
to have positive narratives and positive interactions with the ―other.‖ 
The positions on ―self‖ and ―other‖ or ―us‖ and ―them‖ in the Alevi-Sunni and 
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Alevi-State cases have been shaped along the ―long durée.‖ There are no easy or short 
term mechanisms to change the images and collective narratives. The modes of inter-
communal interactions have historically been shaped and institutionalized along dialectic 
lines where the broader categories of sectarian, religious and ethnic ―other‖ have been 
systematically delegitimized. The Alevis or ―Kızılbaş‖ by historical name, have been the 
victims of ―discrimination‖ and marginalization.  
The problem of the dialectic vision of ―self‖ and ―other‖ constitutes the normative 
gap between Alevis and Sunnis at the communal level. A practical Conflict Resolution 
vision, which is conceptualized as ―Spheres of Dialogic Interaction‖ (SODI)129 is 
emphasize as a perspective that can bridge the axiological gap between two communities 
by creating shared discourses and frames of action. Experiences of peaceful coexistence 
are prevalent even within the most confrontational inter-communal contexts. During the 
ideological confrontation period of 1970s many Alevis and Sunnis worked together under 
the same organizations for the common cause of ―socialist revolution,‖ and they still 
work together in labor unions for workers‘ rights. Alevi and Sunni citizens live peacefully 
in mixed neighborhoods. There are numerous stories related to coexistence experiences 
and friendly relationships related to these activities. There are an increasing number of 
intermarriages between Alevis and Sunnis, where the families of the couples get to know 
each other better. 
There are historical experiences of successful coexistence that can be models for 
                                                 
129 The conceptual background of the notion of SODI have been discussed in an earlier study: Talha Köse, ―The Alliance of Civilizations: Possibilities of Conflict 
resolution at the Civiliational Level,‖ Insight Turkey, Vol. 11 (3), pp. 77-95, Summer 2009. This section includes the extended and revised version of the section 
related to SODI. 
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future dialogues. The Bektaşi order has a positive legacy with its contributions to the 
urban culture of Anatolia and the Balkans. A strong sense of homeland is an important 
element of Alevi identity and it is the common ground for all people living in Turkey. 
Anatolian culture and values have often been presented as the shared ethos of the people 
who are living in this homeland. Exploring further the narratives on a common homeland 
may provide additional resources to the repertoire of conciliatory narratives. However, in 
most cases these experiences have been maintained as isolated local instances or they are 
avoided completely. The purpose of SODI is to conceptualize these available dialogic 
spheres in order to turn them into broader models of inter-communal interaction and co-
existence. 
The idea of ―spheres of dialogic interaction‖ had been inspired from two main 
sources: the concept of ―zones of peace‖ and the dialogic philosophy of Martin Buber 
(Buber, 1958) and Mikhail Bakhtin (Bakhtin & Holquist,
 
1982). At the philosophical 
level there are some parallel conceptualizations that refer to the mutual legitimization and 
recognition of the category of other such as John Shotter‘s (1993b) notion of ―joint 
action,‖ Milhael Bakhtin‘s (1982) ―dialogic imagination,‖ Hans Georg Gadamer‘s (2004) 
―fusion of horizons,‖ Martin Buber‘s (1958) dialogic philosophy of ―I Thou,‖ Jürgen 
Habemas‘ (1996) ―communicative action‖ and ―discourse theory of democracy,‖ or 
imagination of a new ―language game‖ according to a Wittgensteinian understanding.  
The prominent Anatolian Dervishes and philosophers Hacı Bektaş Veli, Mevlana 
and Yunus Emre‘s, who are respected both by Alevis and Sunnis, offer teachings and 
practices on developing dialogic relationships among human beings, between human 
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beings and Allah, and between human beings and nature. The significant commonality of 
dialogic dialogue according to all these perspectives is their emphasis on the open-ended, 
dynamic and multi-voiced linguistic exchanges. All these perspectives try to highlight the 
possibility of open ended and unbiased interactions as opposed to the dialectic vision of 
―us‖ and ―them‖ or ―self‖ and ―other.‖ A similar perspective in narrative practice is 
elaborated by Sara Cobb (1994). According to Cobb (1994), narrative closure does not 
allow for the emergence of narratives and discursive processes that could be alternative to 
adversarial relationships.  Boundaries of groups and moral categorizations can be 
constructively re-negotiated and common understanding can be reached with open ended 
narratives and cognitive categories. 
These abstract and philosophical notions of dialogic thought had been more 
practically conceptualized in the method of ―dialogic teaching.‖ Therefore, features of 
dialogic teachings are highlighted rather than getting into a detailed theoretical 
discussion. ―Zones of peace are agreed peace "zones," where fighting should cease or 
where certain people would be immune from attack or from the other damaging effects of 
being at war
130‖.  
In a zone of peace, the idea is to create, either based on custom or agreement, 
accepted rules for establishing a zone where certain "things" are not permitted 
(compared to outside the zone) and other things are encouraged. The "things" can 
be material—such as arms, uniforms, and propaganda pamphlets, which might be 
                                                 
130 C. Mitchell and S. A. Nan, ―Local peace zones as institutionalized conflict,‖ Peace Review 9, no. 2 (1997): 159-162; S. Allen-Nan and C. Mitchell, ―Local 
Zones of Peace as a Form of Institutionalized Conflict: Some Introductory Thoughts,‖ The Construction of Sanctuary: Local Zones of Peace Amid Protracted 
Conflict. Virginia: George Mason University–Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (2004): 3-8 
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forbidden, or food, medicine and other humanitarian relief, which might be 
encouraged. Or (more usually) the "things" can be behavioral—such as violence, 
threatening behavior and preparing the next battle, which might be forbidden, or 
education, voter registration, and immunization and other medical treatment, 
which might be encouraged. (Mitchell, & Nan, 1997, p. 159) 
SODI tries to provide practical spheres that are immune from cultural confrontations. 
Dialogic teaching is usually practiced in primary education, where the dialogue 
between teacher and pupils and between pupils themselves is encouraged. ―Dialogic 
teaching is distinct from the question-answer and listen-tell routines of mainstream 
teaching, aiming to be more consistently searching, reciprocal and extended (Alexander, 
2006).‖ Five principles of the dialogic education, reciprocity, cumulation, cooperation 
and collectivity, supportiveness and purpose, are key for developing models for spheres 
of dialogic interaction. 
The pedagogy underpinning this approach to teaching places an emphasis on five 
principles: reciprocity, or the sharing of ideas between teacher and pupils; 
cumulation, or the careful building of arguments or lines of enquiry by linking 
the ideas of all those contributing to the dialogue; cooperation and collectivity, 
with pupils working together with the teacher or in groups; supportiveness, 
which encourages all to feel accepted and included; and purpose, in that the 
dialogue is intended to achieve specific educational goals
131
 
Being dialogic/reciprocal, goal oriented, reflexive, multi-layer and technologically 
                                                 
131―Dialogic teaching,‖ a dictionary of education ed. Susan Wallace, Oxford University Press 2009, Oxford Refence Online, accessed 18 June, 2009. 
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adaptive are the hallmarks of SODI. SODI are the practical activities and domains that 
will nurture the dialogic discursive practices. SODI are a step ahead of coexistence 
practice. In SODI there are common goals and modes of practical interaction and the 
products are co-produced by various actors. The contents of the goals are less important 
than the practical collective efforts and cooperative activities to reach those goals. 
Dialogic interactions among academics, religious leaders, youth groups, aid organizations 
and the experiences of dialogic interactions of particular cities or zones may be a model 
for other contexts. The process of dialogic-dialogue is the cumulation of activities at 
multiplicity of levels. 
In the contemporary context it is important to incorporate high tech media, 
including communication and media instruments, in the spheres of communicative 
interactions. Most Alevis as well as Sunnis are exposed to Alevi culture, life style and 
ritual practices via TV, radios and web based environments. As mentioned in the earlier 
chapters, media instruments played significant roles in the recent Alevi revival; they can 
also play significant roles for the legitimation of categories of ―other‖ for both Alevis and 
Sunnis. 
Consistent with the theoretical sources, the features of SODI are defined as: 
 They are action and common goal oriented. Main objective is to make diverse and 
contradictory identity positions to work on a joint set of goals. Assumption is that 
joint actions and shared projects teach and help to understand better than 
conversations. 
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 They are sustainable and dynamic/ flexible processes that can be adaptive to rapid 
social and political transformations. 
 They try to incorporate different segments of society including youth, women, 
political actors, grassroots level. 
 Intra-group dimension is also incorporated into the process. 
 They try to create reflexive learning environments. Rather than trying to 
superimpose a superficial common language or symbols, language and the 
common culture is expected to emerge during the dialogic encounters. 
 Technologically advanced media and new communication environments are used 
instrumentally. 
 Many of the practical tasks are delegated to local associations and community 
level organizations rather than governments and other political institutions. 
If we relate the notion of SODI to the positioning triangle, the objective of SODI is to 
generate a discursive environment conducive to embracing positions and mutually 
legitimizing speech acts. Accommodating the dialogic and open ended storylines among 
the repertoires of collective narratives is a practical choice for narrative reconciliation 
that will accompany the positions and speech acts. 
9.4.3. Practical SODI for Inter-communal Interactions 
1. Encouraging mixed communal activities and events between Alevi and Sunni 
citizens to get them to know each other better. Encouragement of project 
competition for such events and activities. 
605 
 
2. Encouraging Sunni citizens to visit cemevis in the month of Muharram and the 
Alevi citizens to go to mosques especially in the month of Ramadan. 
3. Organizing mixed music and culture festivals and encouraging participation in 
these activities. 
4. Weekly programs on Alevi culture, rituals and music in the official state TV TRT. 
5. Development of an interactive learning and information website by the MEB 
(Ministry of National Education) or the Diyanet about Alevi culture, history and 
rituals.  
6. Preparing and using instructional documentary movies and texts. 
7. Creating a media crisis response mechanism to prevent inter-communal tensions 
that can be caused by biased or misinformed comments and remarks in the media.  
8. Training the staff of the Diyanet about Alevi history, culture and rituals. 
9. Developing a monitoring mechanism to prevent discrimination and 
marginalization of people with different ethnic, cultural and religious 
backgrounds. 
9.4.4. Reconciling Emotions: How to Transform the Public Discourses 
1. Making some changes in the educational textbooks and revising sensitive parts 
that create biases against Alevi culture and Alevi citizens. 
2. Sensitivity training in bureaucratic jobs, military service and schools where the 
discriminations or insults against Alevis frequently take place. Especially the 
Diyanet staff, district governors, teachers should be trained. 
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3. With the same logic, training Alevi citizens about the sensitivities and the cultural 
values of Sunni citizens. 
4. Establishing a permanent advisory council from the Alevi community leaders and 
consulting the council in the matters concerning the Alevi community. 
5. Designing a memorial library or a culture center for the memory of citizens that 
were killed in the Sivas Events of July 2 1993. 
6. Creating Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to investigate the political 
and sectarian violence of 1970s (Sivas, Çorum, Malatya, Maraş). In addition to 
the Sivas Events of 1993, the period of ideological/sectarian violence during 
1970s have a traumatic legacy in Alevi public memories. Memory of those events 
feed the victimhood psychology among the new generation of Alevis as well. 
Mistrust against the state and the conservative Sunnis are also primarily a residue 
of political violence of 1970s. Investigations and public recording of these events 
may be a step towards settling some of the fears of Alevi citizens.  
9.5.  Insights for Discursive Interventions 
In this last section I discuss the broader implications of the findings of this research for 
other similar identity based contentions.  
1. Marginalizing the enduring mutual malignant positionings through certain speech 
acts, will help the legitimization of categories of ―other.‖ 
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Reaching a collective consensus among the opinion makers on the unacceptability of 
rebukes, accusations, stereotypes and insults will raise awareness about the disturbing 
public slanders.  
2. Emphasizing the shared collective narratives rather than the divisive or 
oppositional ones will balance the dialectic discourses of the entrepreneurs of identity 
politics. 
Narratives on the shared traumas and shared glories may be voiced, rather than the 
episodes that lead to inter-communal polarization and mutual allegations. Prime 
Minister Erdoğan‘s reference to the Karbala Event in saying ―Karbala is our shared 
mourning‖ was an important discursive intervention. Establishment of the ―Republic 
of Turkey‖ is a shared glory for all people in Turkey. 
3. Accentuating common duties and responsibilities for a shared better future 
(imaging coexistence) will strengthen the bonds between contending communities.  
There is an overall consensus among the Alevi and Sunni communities about the 
desirability of a more democratic political system which is respectful to human rights 
and liberties. There is also a consensus on the desirability of a scientifically advanced, 
culturally tolerant and economically developed system in Turkey. The general theme 
of common duties and responsibilities should be related to the shared understanding 
of a better future. 
4. Publicizing that the dialectic discourses of the contenders do not represent the 
mainstream ideas and feelings of Alevi and Sunni communities. 
Highlighting the fact that people, associations, leaders and communities that are 
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against the inter-communal reconciliation are marginal and becoming further 
marginalized as a consequence of inter-communal interactions and engagements. The 
ongoing engagement process will gradually increase proponents of the conciliatory 
discourses.   
5. Historicizing the foundational narratives of ―violence‖ and presenting those 
episodes as exceptional unfortunate events that were the by-products of specific 
political and economic confrontations will dispel the myths around those narratives.  
Assuming essential and irreconcilable animosities between Alevi and Sunni 
communities is a misinterpretation of past events. For example, the Shah Ismail- 
Yavuz Sultan Selim struggle was political in nature rather than religious and 
sectarian. Violent events of the 1970s were also predominantly because of the 
ideological confrontation. There are some legally unconfirmed claims, which argue 
that the Sivas Events and Gazi Riots were planned and executed by a marginal faction 
within the state apparatus that tried to provoke sectarian discontents. Further 
explorations on these episodes as historical events or processes may help the 
deconstruction of the mythic and metahistorical presentations of the activist 
discourses.  
6. Approaching the widespread social, economic and political practices of 
marginalization as a barrier to equal citizenship rights will create overarching 
sensitivity against the problem. Dealing with the problem of practical and discursive 
marginalization as a ―super ordinate goal.‖ 
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Different segments of Turkish society experience the problem of marginalization and 
discrimination in various aspects of their lives. Many people believe that the 
marginalizing discourses and practices are related to their specific identity positions. 
Marginalizing the practical and discursive instruments of marginalization can be the 
shared agenda or the ―super ordinate goal‖ for both Alevis and Sunnis. 
7. Complexifying the categories of ―other‖ will help toward the complexification of 
the simplistic and dialectically constructed narratives on ―other.‖ 
Understanding that there are competing discourses and certain unsettled debates 
within both Alevi and Sunni groups is the first step towards transforming the 
polarized discourses. There are a multiplicity of positions and contending discourses 
on the definition of ―other.‖ The assumption of a homogeneous and unified ―THEM‖ 
against the weak and fragmented ―US‖ is wrong. The other side of the coin is at least 
as complicated and as diverse as the ―in group.‖ There are plenty of people from both 
sides who are willing to engage into a genuine dialogue. There may be scores of 
different relationship forms among these alternative understandings.  
8. Amplifying and appreciating the conciliatory speeches and gestures of the Alevi 
and Sunni opinion makers may eventually make those conciliatory discourses a part 
of the mainstream discourses. 
Especially after the initiation of the ―Alevi engagement policy,‖ politicians, 
academics, religious figures, association leaders and traditional community leaders 
gave conciliatory speeches in the media and other public forums. Making the 
conciliatory voices, speeches and activities heard more in the public. 
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9. Narratives on the shared homeland and the values that are associated with the 
homeland are unifying factors. 
Strong sense of homeland is an important element of Alevi identity and it is the 
common ground for all people living in Turkey. Anatolian culture and values have 
often been presented as the shared ethos of the people who are living in this ―magical 
homeland.‖  Certain values such as hospitality, courage, humility, honesty, sense of 
justice and benevolence are associated with the Anatolian ethos. Both Alevi and 
Sunni citizens are proud of their shared homeland: ―Anatolia‖ is the shared homeland 
of Alevis, Sunnis, Turks, Kurds and many other ethnic groups. Anatolia is the cradle 
of civilizations and the home of philosophers, saints and dervishes.‖ Culture and 
values that are associated with the ―mythic homeland Anatolia‖ have special 
significance in Alevi public narratives. Exploring further into the narratives on 
common homeland may provide additional resources to the repertoire of conciliatory 
narratives. 
10. Praising of shared heroes by leaders and opinion makers of both communities will 
strengthen the crosscutting ties between them.  
Many people mentioned the names and the stories of the ―shared heroes‖ when they 
were asked about their common values with Sunnis of Turkey. The Prophet 
Mohammed, Hazrat Ali and his sons Hasan and Hussein; Anatolian dervishes Yunus 
Emre, Hacı Bektaş Veli, Mevlana; and Atatürk are the common heroes of Alevis and 
Sunnis. Narratives on these figures play significant roles in the identity formation 
processes of many people in Turkey. Highlighting the significant commonalities on 
611 
 
the love and respect for the same heroes may strengthen the crosscutting ties between 
two communities. 
11. Condemning the shared villains or common enemies through parallel narratives of 
two communities will reveal psychocultural common ground. 
Some figures of the early Islamic history such as Yezid, Haccac or the ruthless 
statesmen of Ottoman Era are abhorred by both Alevi and Sunnis. Many Alevis 
believe that those figures are respected by Sunni citizens. Those figures and their 
malignant deeds may be condemned in some public records and publications. 
12. Dialectic collective axiologies in identity based conflicts can be negotiated 
through sustained practical interactions (including the linguistic practice) rather than 
through abstract and phenomenological debates. Starting the debates from alternative 
value systems do not help to bridge the gaps between different identity groups. 
Creating to communication domains that would encourage forms of dialogic verbal 
and behavioral exchange like in the case of SODI may be a better approach to bridge 
dialectic collective value orientations. 
13. Practical and legal measures are not sufficient to transform the conflict generating 
narratives, discourses and affective sources. These policies may nonetheless make the 
conciliatory gestures and narratives publicly more convincing.  
14. Emotions and the personal and collective narratives on traumas, shame, 
humiliation, victimhood and fear are crucial for the trans-generational transmission of 
ethno-sectarian conflicts. They do not always generate conflict nonetheless those 
emotions should be incorporated to the inter-communal reconciliation processes. 
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15. Emotional narratives are reproduced according to the changing social, political 
and cultural context. However it is possible to reproduce them in a more 
accommodative and conciliatory forms.  
16. Complexity and the diversity of the in-group narratives and their influences to the 
relations with outgroups should be taken seriously. Adopting a particular storyline or 
a genre of identity discourse, in Alevi case one among the five genres, and building 
the reconciliation processes according to that particular position will be 
counterproductive and offensive to the people who pursue alternative discourses.  
Conclusion 
Identities, conflicts, fears, emotions, traumas, boundaries, meanings, memories, 
narratives on past, present and future, and the collective axiology are not fixed constructs. 
They are rather open ended and imagined constructs that are meaningful within particular 
contexts. They can be ―re-imagined,‖ ―re-constructed,‖ ―re-negotiated‖ or ―re-narrated‖ 
in less conflictual or less controversial ways. This study can be considered a narrative 
intervention in the issue of Alevi-Sunni and Alevi-State relationships. The complexities 
of the Alevi narratives, barriers to more positive inter-communal relations, as well as the 
possible areas for reconciliation are explored comprehensively in this study. There is no 
easy or unilinear path to address the bulk of problems that have been accumulated for 
many years, but as it is indicated above there are plentiful available steps that can help 
toward the mitigation of these problems.  
The specific focus of this study is the meaning systems, emotions and narratives 
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of Alevis. Exploring the Alevi Issue within the official Discourses or Sunni public 
discourses will complement this research. 
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APPENDIX 1: List of Informants 
 
 
 
 
NAME Meeting Date Occupation Meeting 
City 
L. D. March 4 2006 Teacher     İstanbul 
A. Y. March 6 2006 Academic İstanbul 
A. Ky. March 9 2006 Retired teacher/ Researcher-
writer 
İstanbul 
A. A. March 15- April 5 Researcher-writer/ Journalist İstanbul 
B. Ö. March 15-2006 Public Relations employee İstanbul 
A. Y. K. March 16 2006 Retired bank manager İstanbul 
A. A. A. March 20 2006 Poet- owner of a publishing 
house 
İstanbul 
L. K. March 21 2006 Researcher-writer/ Retired small 
business owner 
İstanbul 
E. K. March 28 2006 Researcher-writer/ Editor of 
monthly Alevi journal 
İstanbul 
C. A. April 5 2006 Dede/ President of a hemşehri 
association 
İstanbul 
E. D. March 21 2006 Worker İstanbul 
V. K. March 30 2006 Research Assistant- Doctoral 
student 
İstanbul 
K. A. March 27 2006 Businessman İstanbul 
G. C. March 29 2006 MA student/ TA İstanbul 
H. T. March 28 2006 Vice president of the European 
Alevi Associations Federation 
İstanbul 
A. O. April 1 2006 Accountant İstanbul 
B. Ü. April 2 2006 Owns an internet cafe İstanbul 
H. A.  
 
Housewife İstanbul 
A. K. April 6 2006 Owner of monthly Alevi Journal  İstanbul 
M. T. April 11 2006 Owner of coffee house İstanbul 
A. C. April 13 2006 Security guard İstanbul 
B. İ. July 16 2006 Student at school of music/ 
conservatory 
İstanbul 
S. Y. July 16 2006 Teaches Bağlama / musician İstanbul 
A. H. July 17 2006 Retired İstanbul 
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E. E. July 17 2006 Businessman İstanbul 
C. Ş. July 18 2006 Publisher/ Researcher-writer İstanbul 
C. K. July 19 2006 Employee of an Alevi 
Foundation 
Ankara 
A. B. July19 2006 Culture and Art director of 
HBVAKV 
Ankara 
A. Ya July 20 2006 Asssociate Professor of 
Communication  
Ankara 
Ş. K. July 21 2006 Editor/Publisher/ Retired 
Lawyer 
Ankara 
K. G. July 22 2006 Lawyer Ankara 
F. G. July 24 2006 Lawyer Ankara 
E. G. July 25 2006 President of HBVAKV  Ankara 
T. Ö. July 25 2006 Secretary General of HBVAKV  Ankara 
R. Ç. July 26 2006 Researcher-Writer/Novelist/ MP Ankara 
A. Yl. July 26 2006 Lawyer/ Researcher-writer Ankara 
A. E. July 27 2006 President of (HBVTKV) Ankara 
K. A. July 28 2006 Former MP/ Lawyer Ankara 
İ. P. July 31 2006 Journalist/ President of an Alevi 
radio 
İstanbul 
Ü. Ö. August1 2006 Publisher/ Researcher-writer Ankara 
M. D. August 2 2006 Accountant Ankara 
S. Ş. August 2 2006 Retired worker Ankara 
İ. M. August 7 2006 Lawyer/ Businessman Ankara 
H. Ş. August 9 2006 Anthropologist Malatya 
H. M. August 4 2006 President of (MHBVTKV) Malatya 
Ö. S. August 5 2006 Administrative assistant at the 
CEM Vakfı Malatya Branch 
Malatya 
A.M.Ç  Student Malatya 
H. A.  Farmer Malatya 
M. G. August 6 2006 Retired Malatya 
A. B. August 11 2006 Owner of a café and bar/lounge Ankara 
M. E. August 19 2006 President of Karacaahmet Cem 
Kültür Evi 
İstanbul 
A. S. August 21 2006 Practicing Dede at Yeni Bosna 
Cemevi 
İstanbul 
T. S. August 23 2006 Human Resources Director İstanbul 
G. Ö. November 11 2006 Employee of Ministry of 
Culture 
Ankara 
A. Kn. October 04 2006 Vice president of ABF Ankara 
D. B. October 09 2006 Retired businessman/ President 
of Alevi Foundations 
Association 
İstanbul 
A. R. G. October 13 2006 MP Ankara 
M. Ç. November 06 2006 Vice President of an Alevi İstanbul 
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Foundation 
M. İ. November 07 2006 Journalist/ President of an Alevi 
radio 
İstanbul 
R. Z. November 17 2006 Journalist/Researcher-writer İstanbul 
A. R. U. November 06 2006 Practicing Dede  İstanbul 
F. A. November 19 2006 President of Ehl-i Beyt 
Foundation 
İstanbul 
D. G. November 06 2006 Academic/ Researcher-writer İstanbul 
P. E. November 11 2006 Anthropologist Ankara 
A. A. K. November 19 2006 Political advisor Ankara 
O. E. January 7 2007 Associate Professor of 
Education/ Theology 
Ankara 
K. S. January 16 2007 Retired worker İstanbul 
D. K. December 7 2006 Doctoral student İstanbul 
S. D. January 24 2007 Businessman Ankara 
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APPENDIX 2: Contemporary Alevi Institutions
132
 
 
Dergahs: Dergah‘s are traditionally defined as the shrines of Sufi saints and their 
followers. There are historical Dergahs of the Bektaşi order all over Anatolia and the 
Balkans. These Dergah‘s were banned with the republican law # 677133 of 1925, but some 
of them function as culture centers or museums with special permission. HBV Dergah, 
Abdal Musa Dergah, Karacaahmet Sultan Dergah, Şahkulu Sultan Dergah are some of 
the most well-known Alevi-Bektaşi Dergahs. 
Cemevis: Buildings constructed to hold traditional cem ceremonies of Alevis. 
cemevis are increasingly becoming more popular and their number is rapidly increasing 
with the Alevi revival, mainly due to urbanization. In the rural contexts cem ceremonies 
were held in the largest available room of the village. Yeni Bosna cemevi, Okmeyanı 
Cemevi, and Gazi Cemevi are just few of the cemevis. Cemevis which still do not have 
legal status as religious places. Having a legal status as a religious center is one of the 
major claims of the Alevi identity struggle. Besides their function as a belief center, they 
are social gathering places for weddings, funerals and other important social events. 
Derneks (Associations): Civil society organizations that are founded in order to 
publicize and raise consciousness about the Alevi cause, and Alevi social, political and 
cultural claims. The establishment of Alevi associations started in the 1960s with the 
HBTTD and the HBKKYD, but their number boomed after the Sivas Events and Gazi 
Riots. The HBV and the PSAKD are associations with many branches all over Turkey. 
There are also Alevi-Bektaşi association branches in Europe, especially in Germany, 
France, Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, England and the like. 
Federations: Some of these associations formed federations, such as the AABF 
(Alevi Bektaşi Federation of Europe), the AABF (Federation of Alevi Associations in 
Turkey), the ABF (Alevi Bektaşi Federation), and the ABVF (Alevi Bektaşi Foundations 
Federation). 
Confederations: The AABK (European Alevi Associations Confederation) 
Foundations: Foundations and charitable trusts. They are more difficult to 
establish and subject to a different legal status. The CEM Vakfı (Republican Education 
and Culture Foundation), the HBVAKV (Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Culture Foundation), 
and many others. 
Researcher-writers: A group of writers who are writing semi-academic and 
popular books about Alevi culture, history and politics. The publications written by 
researcher-writers played an important role in the early periods of the Alevi revival. Some 
of the researcher-writers became important opinion makers within the Alevi community. 
                                                 
132 This section is a short annotated summary (Kaleli, 2000; Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2001; Yaman, 2000; 2007; Massicard, 2007; Üzüm, 1997; 1999; Vorhoff, 1998b; 
Gümüş, 2004; Şener, & İlknur, 1995). 
133 Republican law # 677 is explained in chapter 9. 
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They are still read by many
134
. 
Media Institutions: Popular media channels such as TV(Su TV, Cem TV, Yol TV, 
Dem TV, Düzgün TV), and radio stations (Cem Radyo, Radyo Barış, Alevilerin Sesi, and 
other), blogs & web sites, monthly/quarterly journals, newspapers. Audio/visual media is 
increasingly becoming more popular among Alevi citizens, where they have had a chance 
to watch traditional Alevi rituals, values and music. Alevi journals
135
 played important 
roles in the 1990s for the emergence of the new Alevi literature and many of the current 
researcher-writers gained experienced in these institutions. However, many of them could 
not continue because of financial reasons, lack of interest and differences of opinions 
among the writers. 
Business and Labor Associations
136
: Business associations of Alevi 
businessmen: The CUSİAD (Republican Industrialists and Businessmen Association), 
and the DEMSIAD (Democrat Industrialists and Businessmen Association) were other 
platforms for Alevi businessmen as interest groups that are also contributing to the Alevi 
cause. There is also a tradition of labor union activism among working class Alevis. Since 
the 1960s, many Alevis have gained social and political experience in these institutions.  
There has not been an Alevi trade union, but Alevis have taken important positions in 
trade unions such as the KESK, the DİSK, the KAMUSEN and others. 
Artists: Within the traditional Turkish folk music genre, Alevi musical forms such 
as deyiş, türkü and nefes‟ have an important place. Alevi folk poets (ozan), have 
traditionally performed certain leadership roles as opinion makers. As public figures, 
Alevi singers also shape Alevi public opinion and contribute to the identity struggle. An 
increasing number of Alevi youth are currently participating in semah courses that are 
provided by cemevis and musical instrument saz (lute) courses. These courses are both 
social gathering places for Alevi youth, and at the same time, help maintain and continue 
Alevi tradition. Young Alevis are more interested in the ritual and social struggle 
dimensions of Alevilik than in beliefs and teachings. During my field research I had a 
chance to get in touch with Alevi youth that were regular participants of semah and saz 
courses. Those activities create a sense of community and belonging among the new 
generation of particularly working class Alevis. 
                                                 
134 For detailed record of publications of researcher-writer in 1990‘s, Karin Vorhoff‘s (1998) 
135  Yaman (2000), and Vorhoff 1998 list all the Alevi periodicals since 1960‘s: Cem, Gerçekler, Hünkâr, Karahöyük, Nefes, Pir Sultan Abdal, Serçeşme, Kavga 
(Kervan), Gönüllerin Sesi, Genç Erenler, Zülfikar, Canların Sesi, Alevi Halk Gerçeği, Mürşid, Gazi Üniversitesi Hacı Bektaş Veli Araştırma Dergisi, Kerbela, 
Birgeçit,Gönül Verenler, Can Cana,Pir, Yurtta Birlik, Hacı Bektaş Veli, Munzur, Fidan, Aşura, Hu Dost, Ehl-i Beyt Dünyası, EhlibeytŞahkulunun Sesi, Gerçek İlim, 
Ware, Berhem, Aşura, Rehber, Velayet. Among these titles some were very short lived; those in bold played an important role in the Alevi revival of post 1990.  
136 This section is based on Ali Yaman (2000)‘s compilation. 
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APPENDIX 3: Chronology of Alevi Opening 
 
 April 17 2006, 5th District Administrative Court of İstanbul corroborated Ali 
Kenanoğlu, who objected to contents of the compulsory religious courses that 
were being taught his son at primary school.  
Kenanoğlu‘s son Mustafa Berkay was a 4th grade student at the Üsküdar 
Rasathane Primary School. Kenanoğlu argued that the contents of the compulsory 
religious courses contradict with Alevi beliefs and worldview and he wanted his 
son to be exempted from religious classes. National Education Directorate of 
İstanbul did not respond to Kenanoğlu‘s written request which officially means 
the refusal of the request. Kenanoğlu had brought the complaint to the court. In 
the interim period Kenanoğlu‘s son was exempted from the religious classes with 
the decision of the court. The court decreed a decision confirming Kenanoğlu‘s 
request on the basis of Turkish Constitution and European Human Rights 
Convention.  
 October 9 2007, ECHR (European Court of Human Rights) decides that the 
compulsory religious courses violate the freedom of religion and the rights of 
education137. 
(Akşam; Milliyet; Radikal, October 10)138. 
 January 2007, Diyanet starts to publish the texts of Alevi Classics. First three 
books are published on January 2007. The overall project includes the transcribed 
publications of the books such as 'Ilm-i Cavidan', 'Kitab-ı Cabbar Kulu', 'Dar 
Kitabı', 'Muhammed Hanefi Cenknâmesi', 'Dastân-ı Ibrahim Edhem', 'Malik bin 
Eşter Cenknamesi', 'Fütüvvetnâme-i Imam Cafer-i Sadık', 'Maktel-i Hüseyin', 
'Makalat' ve 'Şerh-i Besmele'139. The academic director of the Project is Assoc. 
Prof Osman Eğri, who himself is also an Alevi. These attempts are interpreted as 
―assimilation efforts of the Diyanet‖ by some Alevi activists140 (Sabah, Radikal, 
Milliyet January 2007). 
 July 16 2008, Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Eriklibaba Cemevi after the 
Kazlıçeşme meeting for the July 22 general elections141. 
Although the visit did not create any excitement in the Alevi community, this was 
Erdoğan‘s first visit to a cemevi as the Prime Minister.  
                                                 
137 For the details of the case and decision with legal justification http://www.ius-
software.si/EUII/EUCHR/dokumenti/2007/10/CASE_OF_HASAN_AND_EYLEM_ZENGIN_v._TURKEY_09_10_2007.html 
138 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33075 
139 http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/03/12/gnd91.html 
140 http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=209122 
141 http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/07/17/haber,E95294207CD64B78AEE72D51FE266277.html 
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 July 22 2007, General Elections, 
Governing AKP got the 46.58% of the votes and won 341 seats in the parliament 
(out of 550 seats). AKP increased its votes 12%, whereas the total number of 
AKP seats decreased from 365 to 341 in comparison to November 3 2002 
elections142.  Three Alevi MP‘s: Reha Çamuroğlu, İbrahim Yiğit and Hüseyin 
Tuğcu are elected from AKP. İstanbul deputy Çamuroğlu also became the advisor 
of Prime Minister Erdoğan and he is also the mentor of the new ―Alevi 
engagement policy‖.  
 November 2007, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signaled the change in 
his party‘s Alevi policy and mentioned some elements of the Alevi Engagement 
Policy (Alevi Açılımı). 
New Alevi Directorate that will either be under the Prime Ministry or State 
Ministry was a part of the plan. The new administration will have a 3 thousand 
staff and 2-3 million TL budget143 will be allocated to this new administration. 
Erdoğan also mentioned that the legal situation of cemevis may be reconsidered. 
 December 10 2007, Prime Minister Erdoğan called and talked to BK, whose 
daughter student ZK was mistreated and humiliated by her literature teacher 
because of being an Alevi. 
Erdoğan ordered Mayor of Esenler district to visit the family of the student144 
(Milliyet, Radikal, Sabah). The teacher was also given certain disciplinary 
punishments. Turkish Grand National Assembly‘s (TGNA/TBMM) Human 
Rights Commission investigated the event145. 
 December 14 2007, AKP‘s new Alevi is criticized with newspaper ad by a group 
of intellectuals, singers, artists and Alevi activists.  
In addition to stating its expectations and frustrations about Alevi claims, the 
group also emphasized its concerns about the ―anti-secular practices‖ of AKP 
administration146 (Hurriyet 14 Aralık 2007).  
 January 11 2008, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attended the iftar 
(fast-breaking) dinner of Muharrem together with his 9 cabinet ministers, 50 MPs 
and many high level bureaucrats including the head of the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs Prof Ali Bardakoğlu (All the newspapers at Daily press ).  
The event was organized by the Abdal Musa Foundation in Bilkent Hotel Ankara. 
The event led to repercussions and divisions within the Alevi community. The 
groups, which had not participated and protested the meeting declared the Alevis 
that joined the meeting as indigents. It was symbolically a very significant event. 
Prime Minister Erdoğan gave an influential speech. 
―I came here to share all our mourning, not just your mourning. This is together 
our mourning. 
                                                 
142 http://www.belgenet.net/ 
143 http://www.haberx.com/Haberler/Ocak-2008/AKPNIN-ALEVI-ACILIMI-NETLESMEYE-BASLIYOR-GENEL-MUDURLUK-YOLDA-388299.aspx 
144 http://www.medyafaresi.com/haber/9361/guncel-medyafaresi-alkisliyor-bravo-tayyip-bey-basbakan-dayak-yiyen-alevi-ogrenciyi-de-aramis.html 
145http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetay&ArticleID=833880&Date=16.06.2009&CategoryID=98 
146 For the fulltext of the ad http://www.alevileriz.biz/archive/index.php/t-38068.html 
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We have been drinking from the same spring, we have been turning to same qibla, 
we should not put the blames of the history on to each other 
Our path, our guides and our destinations are same147‖ 
The statements above are some of the lines from Erdoğan‘s speech. 
 June 13 2008, Prime Minister Erdoğan‘s advisor and the mentor of the ―Alevi 
engagement policy‖ (Alevi açılımı) Reha Çamuroğlu resigns from his position as 
the advisor of PM Erdoğan. Çamuroğlu resigned because of his disappointments 
related to the government‘s performance in the ―Alevi engagement policy‖. 
―Çamuroğlu said, ―We are worried that some of the bureaucrats who are in 
the field of religious affairs and services have developed definite attitudes 
in a political discussion carried on rather hurriedly and sensationally. (…) 
However, the two incidents that occurred last week have finally forced us 
to opt for decisive messages and attitudes….‖  
According to the newspaper ―Sabah,‖ three incidents paved the way to the 
resignation:  
The words of Mustafa Çağrıcı, the mufti of Istanbul, that ―From the 
perspective of Islam, it does not seem possible to see Cemevis, Alevi place 
of worship, equivalent to mosques and to let them function as places of 
worship.‖  
The argument between the Minister of Interior, Beşir Atalay, and Elazığ 
Deputy, Fevzi İşbaşaran, during the AKP camp at Kızılcahamam about 
the Alevi girls in YİBO dormitories at the district of Karakoçan in the 
province of Elazığ in eastern Turkey, who could not get any service. The 
words expressed by Cemil Çiçek that ―In the mosque, one performs the 
‗namaz‘ and in the Cem House, one performs the ‗semah‘. Alevis are 
Sunni, Sunnis are Alevis
148.‖  
 May 24 2008, İSKİ (İstanbul Water and Sever Administration) did not charge any 
fee for the water bill of Sultanbeyli Cemevi. The status of the building of the 
Sultanbeyli Cemevi has been a constant source of tension between the local Alevi 
community and the municipality. The building did not have a construction license 
and permission, and it was built on a water basin. ISKI decided to demolish the 
building but the local Alevi community resisted the decision and protected the 
building with barricades149. And this controversy created a tension between 
Municipality of İstanbul and the Alevi community150. In May 2008 ISKI 
                                                 
147 For the http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=244199 
148 http://bianet.org/english/english/107657-prime-ministers-consultant-for-alevi-affairs-resigns 
149 Journalist Oral Çalışlar interviewed with the leading people of the PSAKD (Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği) to which the Sultanbeyli Cemevi was linked. For 
the stories of  http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetay&ArticleID=909124&Date=20.11.2008&CategoryID=104 
150http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetay&ArticleID=879312&Date=16.06.2009&CategoryID=97, 
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recognized the Sultanbeyli Cemevi as a place of worship151, which is considered a 
major victory for the managers of the PSAKD. 
 May 29 2008, Members of the elite judicial institutions visited the Hacı Bektaş‘s 
tomb and shrine. Members of the Supreme court of appeals (yargıtay), council of 
state (danıştay), high council of elections (yüksek seçim kurulu) also watched a 
semah performance152. 
 August 17 2008, President Abdullah Gül and Minister of Culture and Tourism 
Ertuğrul Günay participated to the 45th Hacı Bektaş Veli Commemoration 
ceremonies in Nevşehir. Even though Gül was protested by a small group of 
people outside of the stage the visit can be considered a successful gesture. For 
example, journalist Ekrem Dumanlı defined the impressions of Gül‘s visit as the 
meeting of state and nations: ―After stepping off the stage, the president made 
another gesture by mingling with the people. Photos published on the front pages 
of almost all papers showed President Gül among Alevis. Those who have seen 
these photos would comfortably say that this was a meeting of the state and the 
nation.‖153 While some media emphasized the protests against Gül and Günay.154 
In any case the president‘s Hacı Bektaş visit had a significant positive impact on 
the Alevi community. 
 November 9 2008, ―Grand Alevi Rally‖ ended with a meeting in the Tandoğan 
Square of Ankara.  For the first time in near past Alevis had a meeting to voice 
their identity based claims. The motto of the rally was: ―Equal citizenship rights 
against discrimination.‖ Political parties CHP, ÖDP and DTP also supported the 
meeting. 
―Grand Alevi Rally‖ in Ankara, in the media the total number of the participants 
ranged from 20 to 200 thousand people. Participants were mainly from the ABF 
(Alevi Bektaşi Federation), who had a more political orientation than a religious 
orientation. They also gave a clear message of indicating their unhappiness over 
the government‘s ―Alevi policy‖ (Alevi açılımı). President of the CEM 
Foundation İzzetin Doğan, underlined that Muslim identity is an essential 
component of Alevi identity and the ―people participating in the rally were 
Marxists who were cooperating with the pro-Kurdish movement and don‘t know 
anything about Alevi beliefs.‖ (Daily Press November 8, 9 10) 
 December 12 2008, Minister of Culture Ertuğrul Günay apologized to the Alevi 
citizens as the representative of state for the past victimhood that the ancestors of 
Alevis had experienced.155 Günay said that ―Alevis had experienced many painful 
____________ 
http://www.psakd.org/basin_sultanbeyli_cemevi_mahkeme_karari.html 
151 http://www.haber34.com/sultanbeyli-cemevi-ibadethane-olarak-tanindi-3920-haberi.html 
152 http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/448350.asp 
153http://www.todayszaman.com/tzweb/yazarDetay.do;jsessionid=288858336CAD12FFCF6B7D4CB385C4E4?haberno=150581 
154 http://www.milliyet.com.tr/default.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=979417; http://www.porttakal.com/haber-abdullah-gul-hacibektas-ta-yuhalandi-
82012.html 
155http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Yasam/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=1031932&Kategori=yasam&b=Bakan%20Gunaydan%20Aleviler%20ici
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experiences Such as Sivas and Maraş Events in the past. As a representative of the 
state I would like to apologize.‖156 
For the first time, a representative of the Turkish State apologized to the Alevi 
community. Günay‘s apology was one of the most significant steps of the AKP‘s 
―Alevi engagement policy.‖ 
 January 7 2009, Second Alevi iftar (fast breaking) was held at Feshane 
Convention Center in İstanbul. The host of the iftar was AKP İstanbul deputie 
Reha Çauroğlu and his wife Meltem Çamuroğlu. Prime Minister Erdoğan, his 
wife Emine Erdoğan, 5 cabinet ministers, Director of Religious Affairs Ali 
Bardakoğlu, Fener Greek Patriarch Barhelomeos and high level bureaucrats 
including the mayor and the police chief of İstanbul participated in the iftar. 
President of the CEM Foundation İzzettin Doğan and President of the Ehl-i Beyt 
Foundation Fermani Altun also participated in the iftar157.  
The Prime Minister condemned various discriminatory practices and emphasized 
the unity and integrity of the Turkish people in his speech. Within his important 
speech, Erdoğan emphasized that ―Sivas and Başbağlar are our shared pains.‖  
State TV TRT 1 broadcasted the prime time news from Karacahmet Cemevi on 
the 10
th
 of Muharram. It was an important gesture because the PM Erdoğan was 
accused of demolishing Karacaahmet. TRT 2 also broadcasted programs on 
Karbala, Alevi culture, beliefs and rituals on the month of Moharram. 
The second gesture was from the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Bardakoğlu 
recommended fasting and some other prayers in Muharram and explained the 
catastrophic event to both Alevi and Sunni audiences.
158
 Bardakoğlu gave a 
sensitive speech about the catastrophic event of the Karbala Massacre and framed 
the events as a shared pain. Bardakoğlu‘s speech was embracing and inclusive of 
Alevi collective narratives.  
 February 24 2009, Antalya administrative court decreed a decision in favor of a 
family, who appealed to the court with the request of exemption for their daughter 
S.D. from religious courses (Hurriyet, Milliyet, Sabah).159 The decision was 
another legal step against the compulsory religious classes.  
 June 3-4 2009, Ministry of State initiated the 7 step Alevi workshops series. 
Seven step workshops series that was moderated by Professor Necdet Subaşı tries 
to incorporate a multiplicity of related actors and stakeholders to the engagement 
process. The final outcome of the workshop series will be a summary and 
recommendations for the resolution of the problems of Alevi citizens. The 
____________ 
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presence of the Minister of State Faruk Çelik in the workshops is also another 
important feature of workshop series. No definitive resolution model is expected 
as the outcome of workshop series yet the findings and observations will be 
presented to the political decision making bodies. The project also tries to assure 
official acknowledgment of all the related parties as the partners of the solution 
process. The outline of the 7 step workshops will incorporate the following actors: 
1) Representatives of Alevi associations and foundations 
2) Academics 
3) Journalists and intellectuals 
4) Sydicates, business associations, civil society organizations and human rights 
organizations 
5) Diyanet and theology professors 
6) Politicians  
7)  Presentation of the findings to the government 
For the government the purpose of the workshop series was to understand the 
dynamics of the problem, to comprehend the contending view points on the issue 
and to have an opportunity to work together with the all related actors of the Alevi 
issue.  
 June 9 2009, MHP (National Action Party) publicized its 5 point Alevi policy 
plan. 
The leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahçeli also announced the suggestions of his 
party‘s new Alevi policy160. During the ideological struggle of the 1970s, the MHP was 
the arch enemy of the Alevi, who were predominantly active in left and extreme left poles 
of Turkish politics. There is traditionally a deep-rooted animosity against the MHP 
among the Alevi activists, which why MHPs efforts on Alevi issue are important for 
social and political reconciliation in Turkey. Bahçeli‘s package included the following 
themes: 
1. Allocation of budget to cemevis. 
2. Representation of Alevis within the Diyanet 
3. Opening of government funded Alevi research centers and institutes 
4. Broadcasting of informative productions about Alevi culture on Alevi special 
days on official state TV TRT  
5. Representation and teaching of Alevi culture and beliefs in religion classes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
160 http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=1104777&Kategori=siyaset&b=MHPden%20Alevi%20acilimi
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